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Abstract 
This study presented a framework to explain corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSD) 
in terms of determinants and consequences. The study is dealing with quantity and quality 
of CSD in both annual and stand alone reports. The framework is based on legitimacy theory 
as appropriate theoretical background for CSD, and the main idea in this theoretical 
framework is that CSD is a function of social pressure on companies concerning their social 
responsibility.  
The framework has started with explain the level of social pressure at the country level to 
explain the differences of the level of CSD among countries. It is argued that the interaction 
between economic level, culture and the level of corporate governance determine the level 
of social pressure in a given country. The level of CSD at the company level is determined 
according to two dimensions; the degree of social pressure that face each company and 
how each company responses to this pressure. It is argued that, on one hand, the 
interaction between corporate characteristics and media coverage of the company 
determine the degree of social pressure that face a company and on the other hand 
corporate governance mechanisms determine how each company responses to pressure. 
The last point in framework explains that the direct consequence for CSD is improving 
corporate social reputation. 
The empirical results support, to large extent, the framework. At a country level, both 
cultural values and economic level determine the level of social responsibility disclosure in 
the country. Concerning determinants of CSD at a company level, it appears that quantity of 
CSD, and to lesser extent quality of CSD, can be determined according to the following 
variables: corporate size, type of activity, media pressure, board size, the presence of 
C 
 
corporate responsibility committee as a board committee, and ownership diffusion. With 
regard to the consequences of CSD, the empirical evidence indicates that CSD significantly 
influences corporate social reputation, while it has no impact on corporate market value.         
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1. THE RISE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE  
The impact of companies on society is a growing global concern; the expectations of 
consumers, employees, investors, and local communities on the role of businesses in 
society are increasing. Guidelines, principles, and codes are being developed for 
corporate conduct. Governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
demanding increased transparency and accountability about both a company’s daily 
operations and the impact of these operations on society. Professional organisations carry 
out social audits, governments legislate for mandatory social reports, rating agencies rank 
corporations, and companies themselves publish an increasing number of reports on their 
social performance. This attention to the impact of companies on society has led to the 
emergence of an important concept in business literature over the last three decades, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Most definitions of corporate social responsibility describe it as constituting actions 
whereby companies integrate societal concerns into their business policies and 
operations; these societal concerns include environmental, economic, and social 
concerns. For companies to survive and grow, they have to undertake various socially 
desirable actions, and it is important that society recognises the compatibility of the 
behaviour of companies with its own ethical values. If companies fail to operate 
according to the boundaries set by the social norms, they face a threat to their survival. 
The CSR concept is closely related to the concept of sustainable development which 
depends on three key components: environmental protection; economic growth; and 
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social equity. As a consequence, close attention is paid to the concept of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSD). 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure provides information to the public regarding 
corporate activities that relate to the society, such as about reducing environmental 
impact, improving waste management, compliance with environmental regulations, and 
efforts to protect employees. By the 1980s, a large volume of literature had developed on 
environmental accounting building on diverse views from social accounting. In the 
1990s, literature relating to the disclosure of social and environmental information in the 
form of what is commonly known as social and ethical accounting and auditing and 
reporting (SEAAR) developed. The emergence and increasing interest in social and 
environmental accounting and disclosure reflects the increasing demand for transparency 
driven by a number of factors, including: 
· Societal interest in social and environmental issues has become increasingly 
mainstream. 
· The development of the CSR field generally and of CSR standards in particular. 
· Increasing demand for new and better information to meet the information needs of 
different stakeholders. 
· Advances in communication technology. 
· Investor interest in CSR performance as a business issue. 
· Declines in the levels of trust afforded to some institutions. 
Social and environmental accounting research is moving from the margins of the 
agenda of the accounting and management research community towards a central concern 
of national and international importance. This is reflected in the growing number of 
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studies in academic journals and books, and the growing number of papers presented at 
major national and international conferences such as the Centre for Social and 
Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR) conferences in the UK and Australia, the 
Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting (APIRA) conferences associated 
with Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal (AAAJ), the European 
Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting (IPA) conferences and the Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting (CPA) conferences associated with the Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting Journal (Parker, 2005: 844). 
 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
CSD is a voluntary activity and it is important to understand the following questions: 
· Which companies disclose information about social and environmental activities?  
· Which companies disclose more information than others? 
· What are the benefits of CSD for companies?  
Studies, which have examined the factors influencing the level of CSD, concentrate on 
the corporate characteristics as determinants of the level of CSD. These studies suffer 
from an important limitation in not presenting a clear theoretical background for choosing 
the determining factors examined. There are a number other limitations related to these 
studies: (1) a concentration on environmental disclosure which considers only one 
category of CSD; (2) a concentration on analysis disclosure in annual reports, while 
ignoring stand-alone reports, thereby providing an incomplete picture of CSD; and (3) 
paying scant attention to analysing the quality of CSD, which limits the understanding of 
the issue. The current study, in part, attempts to overcome these limitations, as it provides 
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a theoretical framework of determinants of the level (quantity and quality) of CSD in 
both annual and stand-alone reports. Within the theoretical framework, the study 
examines factors that did not receive adequate attention previously in the literature, such 
as the degree of multinational activities and corporate governance.  
Furthermore, the literature to date has not given sufficient attention to the consequences 
of CSD. A number of studies have examined the impact of CSD on the corporate 
reputation and financial position of companies. However, these studies also suffer from 
the lack of a clear theoretical background. This study provides a theoretical framework 
for assessing the consequences of CSD. Within this theoretical framework, the study adds 
to the literature by examining the impact of CSD on corporate market value measured by 
Tobin’s q.  
This study provides a framework for the determinants and consequences of CSD based 
using legitimacy theory. The study by Salama (2003) examines both the determinants and 
consequences of environmental disclosure. This study suffers from a number of 
limitations, namely: (1) the provision of separate models for the determinants and 
consequences of disclosure without a theoretical framework to link the two aspects; (2) a 
concentration on environmental disclosure in annual reports; (3) the provision of a 
determinants’ model based only on corporate characteristics as determinants of 
environmental disclosure, and derived from literature primarily from the mid-1980s; and 
(4) an examination of the impact of environmental disclosure on corporate reputation, 
while ignoring the analysis of economic consequences. The current study attempts to 
overcome these limitations by providing a clear theoretical framework for understanding 
the determinants and consequences of CSD.  
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3. MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY AND CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE  
Rizk (2002) argues that social accountability issues date back more than 30 years and a 
fundamental problem in the field of CSR research is that there is no standard, universal 
definition to provide a framework or model for the systematic collection, organisation 
and analysis of corporate data. The need to create a framework that can explain CSD in 
terms of both determinants and consequences remains an important concern. To explain 
why particular disclosures are made, or in describing how companies should make 
particular disclosures, reference is made to a particular theoretical perspective. In the area 
of social and environmental disclosure practices, recent research has tended to rely upon 
the approaches of legitimacy theory, and to a lesser extent, stakeholder theory, both of 
which have their roots in political economy theory. In line with previous literature, the 
suggested framework is based on legitimacy theory as the theoretical background. 
Previous literature related to CSD has concentrated on developed countries, in 
particular the USA and the UK. International surveys and comparative studies indicate a 
significant gap between developed and developing countries in CSD practices, as CSD is 
considered a western phenomenon. As the purpose of this study is to present a framework 
to explain the CSD phenomenon, UK companies are chosen as the basis for the empirical 
study. UK companies provide best practices in the area of CSD, and UK business 
environments are considered suitable for the study of CSD and its related concepts, such 
as corporate social responsibility and sustainable development.  
This study adds to CSD-related literature in various ways. The study develops a 
theoretical framework that explains CSD in terms of determinants and consequences in 
an integrated framework. Despite this framework being based on previous literature, it 
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presents a different approach to legitimacy theory, by presenting a new dimension on 
how companies respond to social pressure. The framework, from the perspective of 
determinants, suggests that CSD is a function of not only social pressure, but also of how 
companies respond to this pressure. The framework, from the perspective of 
consequences, suggests that CSD has a consequence at a social level, without a financial 
consequence.  
Within this framework, the study casts light on the relationship between CSD and 
variables that did not receive adequate attention in previous studies, such as the degree of 
multinational activities, corporate governance practices and corporate market value. The 
study also presents two new variables to CSD literature: the presence of a corporate 
responsibility committee as a board committee; and Tobin’s q. In addition, the study 
presents new measures for a number of variables: corporate size will be measured as the 
number of employees on the basis that employees are considered important stakeholders 
and are more related to the concept of CSD; types of activities measured as a binary 
variable as manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies on the basis that this 
division is more appropriate to CSD as a whole; and media pressure is measured, in line 
with previous literature, as the number of news-related items pertaining to a company, 
including on-line news. The study also presents a new method for measuring the quality 
of CSD in annual reports and presents an indicator for measuring the quality of disclosure 
in stand-alone reports.  
Briefly, the study adds to literature in the following ways: 
· Analysing a theoretical framework for determinants and consequences of CSD. 
· Dealing with quantity and quality of CSD in both annual and stand-alone reports. 
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· Shedding light on the relationship between CSD and variables such as multinationality, 
corporate governance and corporate market value. 
· Using various statistical methods.   
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main limitation of prior studies is the lack of a clear framework that can explain 
CSD in terms of determinants and consequences. Therefore, the main research question 
is: 
· What variables could represent a framework of determinants and consequences of 
CSD? 
In analysing the main question, the study also answers a number of sub-questions. 
First, questions concerning CSD: 
· Is there a relationship between quantity and quality of CSD? 
· Is there a relationship between either quantity or quality of CSD in annual reports and 
stand-alone CSR reports? 
Second, questions concerning determinants: 
· Do determinants have the same influence on quantity and quality of CSDs? 
· What are the variables that have the strongest effect on CSD? 
Third, questions concerning consequences: 
· Are consequences the same for quantity and quality of CSDs? 
· Does legitimacy theory, as a dominant theory in CSD literature, provide adequate 
explanations for the consequences of CSD? 
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5. METHODOLOGY   
The purpose of this research is to present a framework that explains the phenomenon of 
CSD in terms of both determinants and consequences. In line with the objective, the 
study uses quantitative research, and is conducted mainly by adopting a deductive 
approach. This selection is based in accordance with the nature of the research topic. The 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods is based on the topic being 
studied. While the quantitative approach is objective and relies primarily on statistics and 
data, the qualitative approach is subjective and utilises language and descriptions (Jean 
Lee, 1992: 88).  
In the deductive approach, the researcher formulates a particular theoretical framework 
and then tests it (Ali & Birley, 1999: 103). The deductive approach depends on specific 
steps as follows: (1) develop a theoretical framework; (2) variables identified for relevant 
constructs; (3) results analysis in terms of previous theoretical framework; and (4) 
outcome testing theoretical framework, according to whether hypotheses are accepted or 
rejected (Ali & Birley, 1999: 106). The deductive approach begins with statements that 
are assumed to be true and moves from a general rule to a specific solution (Belkaoui, 
2004: 111). In line with the deductive approach, this research starts with the general 
statement that legitimacy theory is the most appropriate theory to explain CSD, and the 
main perspective underlying this theory is that CSD is a function of social pressure on 
companies in relation to CSR practices. Based on this general statement, the theoretical 
framework that explains CSD in terms of both determinants and consequences is 
developed. This theoretical framework is then presented in three empirical models which 
are statistically examined. These empirical models are closely related to the general 
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statement, as each model provides an answer for a specific question concerning the 
concept of social pressure, as follows:  
· What is creating social pressure in a given country? In answer to this question, a 
suggested model presents an explanation for the determinants of CSD at the country 
level. A general argument underlying this model is that socio-economic factors in a 
country determine the awareness of the importance of CSR. 
· Are all companies in a given country facing the same degree of social pressure and do 
all companies respond to social pressure in the same way? In answer to this question, a 
suggested model presents an explanation for the determinants of CSD at the company 
level.  
· What are the benefits of CSD for companies? In answer to this question, a suggested 
model presents an explanation for consequences of CSD. The general argument 
underlying this model is that, in accordance with legitimacy theory, CSD adds to the 
corporate social reputation but without any direct economic benefits.  
Each model contains a number of variables and it is tested by various statistical 
methods using a software package. The variables included in each model are derived 
from the general argument related to the specific model, while the statistical methods are 
determined by the nature of the data concerning the variables. Therefore, this study, 
according to the deductive approach, moves from a general argument, legitimacy theory, 
to a specific argument, the framework of determinants and consequences of CSD. 
The focal point of this study is CSD which is measured through two types of 
documents: annual reports and corporate responsibility reports. The measurement of 
CSD, in particular in annual reports, is controversial. Content analysis technique is used 
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to measure both the quantity and quality of CSD in annual reports. Indicators are used to 
measure both the quantity and quality of disclosure in corporate responsibility reports. 
 
6. STRUCTURE OF THESIS   
The study is structured as follows. First, the main phenomenon of study, CSD, is 
explained and previous studies are analysed to in order to determine their limitations. 
Second, the theoretical framework is developed and derived into empirical models. Then, 
the results of statistical analysis are presented and interpreted in the context of theoretical 
framework.  
In line with the objective of study, it is divided into two main parts: the first develops 
the theoretical framework, while the second empirically examines the framework. The 
first part consists of four chapters. Chapter two is designed to provide a general view of 
the phenomenon of CSD, derived from previous studies. Chapter three focuses on the 
literature in relation to determinants and consequences of CSD, in order to raise the 
limitations of the previous studies. Chapter four presents an explanation of the theoretical 
framework. As how to measure CSD, in particular in annual reports, is controversial, 
chapter five explains the measurement process of CSD. Part two present the empirical 
results. Chapter six presents a deep analysis of the descriptive statistics of the results of 
CSD measurement. Chapters seven, eight and nine present the empirical results for each 
of the three empirical models derived from the theoretical framework. Chapter ten 
provides a summary of the findings of this research as well as a discussion of the 
limitations of the research and recommendations for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The interest in corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSD) has increased with time. 
Today, as a range of stakeholder groups now demand information about social and 
environmental issues companies need to justify their activities to a wider public by increasing 
their communications on arrange of issues and not just confining themselves to 
communicating about the economic dimensions of their operations (Daub, 2007: 75). CSD is 
a key tool for communicating with stakeholders regarding a company’s social responsibility 
activities. It forms a central charter for public relations in communicating and creating mutual 
understanding, managing potential conflicts and achieving legitimacy (Golob & Bartlett, 
2007: 1). 
CSD, in most cases, is one of the forms of corporate voluntary disclosure1 which has 
become of wide interest to researchers over the last three decades. There are a number of 
issues relating to CSD that have been addressed in accounting literature, which this chapter 
will elucidate. The objectives of this chapter are to:  
· clarify the nature of CSD, its definition, historical background and related concepts;  
· identify the disclosure media of CSD; 
· identify the methods of measurement of quality of CSD; and 
· identify the status of CSD in the UK.   
This chapter provides a detailed answer to two simple questions: What is CSD? What are the 
aspects of this type of disclosure? This chapter was motivated by two concerns: (1) it is 
                                                
1 Corporate voluntary disclosure can be defined as “disclosure in excess of requirements, representing free 
choices on the part of company managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to 
the decisions needs of users of their annual reports” (Chau & Gray, 2002: 247). 
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important to provide a general explanation for the phenomenon that is considered a focal 
point of this study. (2) It discusses aspects of CSD which will be important in the rest of the 
study, such as CSD media and CSD quality.  
The chapter is based on a review of a number of studies related to CSD. The chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 2 presents explanations of the nature of CSD, identifies 
motivations for CSD, its historical background, define some concepts that are closely related 
to it and define the information underlying the concept of CSD in order to explain the concept 
of CSD. Sections 3 and 4 present explanations of disclosure media and disclosure quality 
respectively. The final section explains the status of CSD in the UK.   
 
2. THE NATURE OF CSD  
CSD can be defined as the provision of financial and non-financial information relating to a 
company’s interaction with its physical and social environment as stated in corporate annual 
reports or corporate social reports (Hackston & Milne, 1996: 78). Social and environmental 
disclosure can typically be thought of as providing information relating to company’s 
activities, aspirations and public image with regard to environmental, community, employee 
and consumer issues (Gray, et al, 2001: 329). Haron et al (2004) indicate that social 
disclosure can provide either positive information which presents the company as operating 
in harmony with the environment, such as stating that the company is conducting training 
programmes for employees or that waste management policies are being undertaken, or 
negative information which presents the company as operating to the detriment of 
environment, such as the inability to control or reduce pollution or failure to solve a social 
problem.  
CSD is a voluntary disclosure in most cases. Gray & Milne (2002) argue that the voluntary 
approach tries to highlight two aspects:  
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· The natural environment and social justice are safe in the hands of business, and this arises 
because 
· Such ideas are a mere extension of good business practices (Gray & Milne, 2002: 2). 
Fukukawa, et al (2007) argue that voluntary disclosure of social and environmental 
information is criticised as biased attempts to manipulate public perceptions, and efforts to 
increase mandatory disclosures have been ongoing in several countries such as the UK and 
the USA.  
Aaronson & Reeves (2002) argue that there is public pressure to develop corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) policies arising from the failure of voluntary disclosure. This public 
pressure acts as a driver for governments, as well as other institutions, to provide different 
accreditation mechanisms, guidelines and standards for CSR practices and reporting. 
However, these efforts do not attempt to make CSD mandatory, but seek to find the middle 
way to ground by which to hold companies accountable for their actions. Van der Lann 
(2004) indicates an emerging form of CSD, the solicited disclosure, in which companies are 
increasingly asked to account in various forms about their interactions with and impacts on 
society. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), regulatory agencies, ethical or socially 
responsible fund managers, ratings agencies and other interested parties are requesting social 
information from companies. The difference between voluntary and solicited disclosure is the 
motive to provide the information. The motive for voluntary CSD comes from the 
management of companies, either in response to a threat to legitimacy or a need to account, 
while the motive for solicited CSD is a direct request from the identified stakeholders (Van 
der Lann, 2004: 9-10).  
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CSD is considered to be a western phenomenon; as a result the research has concentrated 
primarily on studies in developed countries.2 There are some obstacles facing CSD in 
developing countries where the institutions, standards and appeals system, which support 
CSD in western countries, are relatively weak (Kemp, 2001). Chambers et al (2003) suggest a 
number of arguments which can explain the low levels of CSR in developing countries: 
· CSR is a function of economic wealth. 
· Civil society in developed countries stimulates CSR by generating greater societal 
demands and expectations of business responsibility. 
· Western governance is more developed than in developing countries and thus encourages 
greater CSR. 
Hope (2003) suggests a measure of enforcement based on five country-level factors: audit 
spending; insider trading laws; judicial efficiency; rule of law; and shareholder protection. 
Aerts et al (2004) applied this measure in order to explain the international differences in the 
demand for environmental disclosure across a sample of countries. The research found that 
USA has the strongest enforcement level, followed by Canada, the Netherlands, France, 
Belgium and Germany. In high enforcement countries, the mandatory disclosure was found to 
be highly regulated, resulting in higher levels of disclosure. Thus, North American 
companies, which operate in a more regulated context compared to continental European 
companies, disclose more environmental information related to expenditure and risk, 
abatement and remediation. Furthermore, Cormier & Gordon (2001) provide evidence that 
publicly owned companies disclose more social and environmental information than do the 
privately owned companies. 
Solomon (2000) conducted a survey to identify aspects of environmental reporting and 
comparing these with financial reporting. The results suggest that the implicit conceptual 
                                                
2 The literature generally is dominated by USA studies but there is also extensive literature on the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand. Evidence is also available from Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, Germany, Sweden, Mexico, Japan and 
India.(Gray et al,1995: 69). 
                                                         
                                                                                                                             -17- 
 
framework for environmental reporting mirrors the explicit financial reporting conceptual 
framework in the UK in the following ways: 
· The users of financial reporting are also the users of environmental reporting; the 
difference being in the greater emphasis attached to some users (employees, legislators, 
and regulators) and less emphasis attached to others (shareholders). 
· All qualitative characteristics relevant in financial reporting are also relevant in 
environmental reporting. 
· Verification is necessary for environmental reporting as for financial reporting 
· Companies bear the cost of environmental reporting as with financial reporting. 
· The most appropriate presentation of environmental reporting is within annual reports as 
the financial reporting. 
However, there are a number of differences between environmental and financial reporting; 
· The elements of environmental reporting are totally different from those of financial 
reporting. 
· There is no consensus on who should perform verification for environmental reporting. 
2.1. CSD Information 
There is no clear definition of what constitutes CSD information. Most studies define social 
and environmental information on the basis of an early survey of Ernst and Ernst (1978) that 
divides CSD items of information into the following categories:  
· Environment (pollution control, prevention or repair of environmental damage, 
conservation of natural resources, and other environmental disclosures);  
· Energy (conservation, energy efficiency of products, and other energy-related disclosures); 
· Fair business practices (employment of minorities, advancement of minorities, 
employment of women, advancement of women, employment of other special interest 
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groups, support for minority businesses, socially responsible practices abroad, and other 
statements on fair business practices); 
· Human resources (employee health and safety, employee training, and other human 
resource disclosures); 
· Community involvement (community activities, health and related activities, education and 
arts, and other community activity disclosures);  
· Products (safety, reducing pollution from product use, and other product-related 
disclosures); and 
· Other social responsibilities disclosed (other disclosures, and additional information). 
To investigate the demand for CSD by users, Rockness & Williams (1988) surveyed 
directors of ethical mutual funds and found a strong demand for many types of social 
information. Deegan & Rankin (1997) surveyed various classes of annual report users and 
found that a number of groups within society consider environmental issues to be material to 
their decision-making processes. More recently, Stratos (2004) presented an analysis of the 
demand of corporate responsibility information by capital market segments and indicated that 
a number of trends are emerging: 
· The demands are evolving rapidly. 
· Most segments of capital market pay at least a degree of attention to the specific 
environmental and, in fewer cases, social issues faced by companies. 
· Social or environmental issues are important only in terms of risk to the company’s 
financial health. 
· Leading capital markets players analyse at least qualitatively, and in some cases 
quantitatively the environmental management and performance information of companies. 
The absence of a definition and determination of CSD information has motivated a number 
of attempts to develop a clear framework for this information. In this context, Owen (2003) 
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argues that developing a global framework of CSR reporting is a desirable objective. One 
such initiative is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) developed in co-operation with the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The mission of GRI is to develop and 
disseminate globally applicable sustainability reporting guidelines to enable organisations to 
voluntarily report on their activities in the social, environmental and economic dimensions. A 
similar initiative has also been introduced by (ISEA) (Owen, 2003). The standard is called 
Accountability AA1000 Assurance Standard and is similar to GRI. According to Hopkins 
(2003) there is evidence that GRI is more rapidly gaining ground and AA1000 has linked up 
with GRI. Several other international standards and guidelines have been introduced, of 
which three distinct but complementary categories reinforce CSR reporting: 
· Codes of conduct (e.g. OECD guidelines, ILO declaration) which define standards of 
corporate behaviour; 
· Management standards (e.g. SA8000, ISO14000) which offer framework for implementing 
socially responsible practices; and 
· Screenings and rankings (e.g. Dow Jones sustainability index, FTSE4Good) which 
provides basis for responsible investing and comparing companies (Hopkins, 2003). 
2.2. Motivations of CSD 
As CSD is a voluntary disclosure a number of studies have investigated the reasons that 
companies disclose social and environmental information. Deegan (2002) indicates that a 
number of drivers have been suggested from the research, including: 
· There may be business advantages in appearing to do the right thing, which may be the key 
motivation rather than the acceptance of any social responsibilities by business. 
· To attract investment funds internationally, as ethical investment funds are increasingly 
becoming part of the capital market. 
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· To comply with borrowing requirements, as increasingly lending institutions require 
borrowers to periodically provide various items of information about their social and 
environmental policies and performance.  
· As a result of certain threats to the company’s legitimacy.  
· To manage particular stakeholder groups.  
· To comply with societal expectations; a reflective view that compliance with the social 
license to operate or social contract is dependent on providing certain accounts of social 
and environmental performance. 
· To comply with particular codes of conduct. 
· The desire to comply with legal requirements; however, these are not a major driver 
because there is a shortage of legislation in relation to social and environmental disclosures 
in most countries. 
· To forestall efforts to introduce more disclosure regulations; evidence has shown that one 
of the reasons that the Australian minerals industry introduced its code of environmental 
conduct was a fear that government might take the matter further and instigate the 
development of regulation. 
2.3. Historical Background 
Rob Gray* presents a historical review of social and environmental accounting and 
reporting (SEAR), the key points of which are: 
·  The 1970s saw fairly widespread interest in CSR and the first substantive experiment with 
social accounting and auditing. 
· In the late 1970s the legal requirements in France (the Bilan Social) influenced corporate 
disclosure in UK with the potential addition of CSR to company law in the UK; however, 
                                                
* Gray, R., “Social and Environmental Accounting and Reporting: from Ridicule to Revolution? From Hope to 
Hubris?- A Personal Review of the Field”, CSEAR, Selected Discussion and Working Papers.   
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at this stage social accounting was not a part of accounting in general, and it was not 
coherent either theoretically or practically. 
· In the late of 1980s social accounting and auditing was the province of the dispossessed 
and dissatisfied in relation to social and environmental concerns. 
· By the 1990s the majority espoused green concerns with the result that the environmental 
agenda steadily evolved with mentions in accounting standards and areas of accounting 
education. 
· By the mid-1990s social accounting re-emerged in the non-profit sector and then in the 
corporate sector. 
· By the early 21st century social and environmental accounting has become almost 
mainstream. 
2.4. Related Concepts 
It can be argued that CSD has developed mainly as a consequence of the attention that has 
been paid to three other concepts in the business world, CSR, sustainable development (SD) 
and socially responsible investment (SRI). CSR and SD are terms used to describe social and 
environmental contributions and consequences of business activity. In order to provide a 
fuller understanding of CSD, this section provides detailed explanations of each of these 
concepts.    
2.4.1. Corporate social responsibility 
The growing incidence and sophistication of CSD has matched an increased interest in CSR 
on the part of consumers, socially responsible investors, employees, creditors, legislators and 
regulators (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006: 1169). Due to recent corporate scandals and the 
increasingly international interest in important issues concerning the roles and responsibilities 
of companies, pressures on companies to behave ethically have intensified and, as a result, 
companies face pressure to develop policies, standards, and behaviours that demonstrate their 
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sensitivity to stakeholder concerns (Brammer, et al, 2007: 229). In response to the changing 
market, CSR is becoming a vital part of staying competitive, partly because it helps to retain 
talented staff and to satisfy customers’ expectations (Gardiner, et al, 2003). Academics 
consider the notion of CSR has been in existence since the 1950s, proliferating in the 1970s, 
and gaining increasing attention in the 1990s and the new millennium (Golob & Bartlett, 
2007: 1). 
According to Young et al (2003) “corporate social responsibility (CSR) was traditionally 
defined as business action which is not required by law, directed to alleviating or averting 
some social ill, and adjacent to the organisation’s main for-profit activity” (Young et al, 
2003: 1). CSR from the managerial perspective can lead to a better balancing of corporate 
objectives and societal risks; from the regulatory perspective, it offers the prospect of 
reflexive types of regulation; and from the financial perspective, it holds out the possibility of 
new types of deliberation, based around shareholder engagement with companies (Deakin & 
Hobbs, 2007: 75). McWilliams & Siegel (2001) state that the provision of CSR will depend 
on research and development (R&D) spending, advertising intensity, the extent of product 
differentiation, the percentage of government sales, consumer income, the tightness of the 
labour market, and the stage of industry life cycle. Wood (1991) presents an integrated 
definition of CSR as the configuration of the principles of social responsibility, processes of 
social responsiveness, and policies, programmes, and observable outcomes as they relate to 
the firm’s societal relationships. Briefly, a firm committed to CSR has principles and 
processes in order to minimise its negative impacts and maximise its positive impacts on 
societal at all or on selected groups (Wood, 1991: 693). The European Commission defines 
CSR as a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with stakeholders on a voluntary basis (Brammer, 
et al, 2006: 1). According to Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), CSR is defined as 
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achieving commercial success in ways that honour ethical values and respect people, 
communities, and the natural environment (Tsoutsoura, 2004: 3). Also, according to the 
European Commission’s green paper, CSR is essentially a concept whereby companies 
decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and cleaner environment (Vuontisjarvi, 
2006: 332).  
To identify CSR at a practical level, the type of company responsibility, which extends the 
traditional responsibility of companies in maximising profit, should be clearly defined. In this 
context, Smith & Ward (2007) indicate that CSR needs to be understood and practised at two 
levels: operational; and conceptual. At the conceptual level, CSR will remain useful because 
it provides space for a higher-level activity in which the boundaries of business obligations to 
society can be examined, argued and refined. At the operational level, CSR is increasingly 
breaking up into a distinct series of sub-agendas: business and human rights; business and 
corruption; and business and tax avoidance (Smith & Ward, 2007: 18). 
Carroll (1979, 1991) indicates the different levels of responsibility which companies 
respond to as the following:  
· Economic level, companies produces products and services that society wants and sells 
them at a profit. 
· Legal level, companies obeys all the laws and rules applied by the state. 
· Ethical level, companies view it as their responsibility to satisfy society’s expectations of 
business to go beyond basic legal requirements and what is just and fair, and their practice 
is reflective of this. 
· Discretionary level, companies goes beyond stakeholder views of what is just and fair, and 
is an exemplary corporate citizen. 
The growing awareness of CSR has added to the criticisms of the use of profit as an all-
inclusive measure of corporate performance. In response, a number of major accounting 
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institutions (AICPA, NAA, and ICAEW) began to consider corporate social accounting in the 
mid-1970s (Hackston & Milne, 1996: 77). Furthermore, the growing attention given to CSR 
has seen the development of a CSR industry, with a wide range of economic activities, 
including: 
· Socially responsible investment; 
· Social rating by external agencies (KLD in the USA, EIRIS in the UK, ARESE/VIGEO in 
France, and SAM in Switzerland; 
· Teaching on CSR; 
· Consulting on CSR strategies or sustainable development; 
· Communication of the CSR policy and public relations activities linked to CSR related 
issues; and 
· Audit and certification of the social responsible statements and reports or stakeholder 
reports produced by companies (Gond, 2006: 9). 
In more detail, the UNCTAD report (2003) defines the factors which govern corporations’ 
relations with society as: main international initiatives for CSR; codes of conduct; 
international and national law; corporate governance; public pressure; reputational risk; and 
investor pressure. 
It can be argued that CSR simply refers to the fact that companies take into account social 
issues when they plan and implement their activities. These social issues include: ethical 
behaviour; paying attention to employees; the environment; and the community as a whole. It 
is clear that CSR is closely related to CSD, which can be considered an interpretation of CSR 
activities.  
2.4.2. Sustainable development 
The concept of SD is used to motivate various political, legal and economic initiatives 
which seek to resolve the social, environmental and economic concerns faced by individuals, 
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organisations and governments. The most widely accepted definition for SD is found in the 
Brundtland report as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. According to Elkington (1999) this 
notion has added economic development to social and environmental accounting and 
reporting. In 2003, the consulting company Sytain Consult undertook a survey in Germany 
entitled ‘Expectations of RWE: AG’s sustainability strategy from an external perspective’. 
The survey respondents were from NGOs. The top issues for sustainable policies were ranked 
as follow: reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; public health and safety; efficiency in 
production; transport and consumption; transparency for customers; substitution for energy 
sources; and corporate governance and corporate citizenship (Aerts, et al, 2004: 12). 
Bebbington (2001) states that SD has been considered within accounting literature in the 
context of SEAR because accounting for SD shares some of the concerns of SEAR 
(Bebbington, 2001: 143). However, Bebbington argues there are two main differences 
between SEAR and SD:  
· The extent to which the present economic arrangements are challenged by each area 
differs. 
· The position from which accounting for SD can be theorised may be different from that of 
SEAR. 
The company’s adoption of sustainability is more than a public relations exercise. 
Sustainability takes place only when there is an active manager within a company (Szekely & 
Knirsch, 2005: 629). However, the factors that determine the sustainable performance of the 
company can be internal (mainly managerial and organisational) or external (stakeholders’ 
demands). In addition, at least three critical success factors are required to achieve 
sustainable performance: leadership and vision; flexibility to change; and openness for 
engagement (Szekely & Knirsch, 2005: 629-631). Sustainable company leaders capture other 
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qualitative, non-financial criterion as references for their performance, such as quality of 
management, corporate governance structure, reputation, human capital management, 
stakeholders’ relations, and environmental protection. 
Despite the blurred boundaries between corporate sustainability and CSR, two differences 
can be ascertained between the two concepts. First, while corporate sustainability considers 
the ultimate goal, CSR is an intermediate stage in which companies try to balance the 
competing forces that affect the bottom line: profit; people; and planet. Second, while CRS is 
communication oriented to people and organisations, corporate sustainability is concerned 
with the agency principle (e.g. value creation, environmental management, human capital 
management, etc.) (Lo & Sheu, 2007: 347). 
2.4.3. Socially responsible investment 
SRI is related to the growing interest in CSR. SRI involves a fund implementing ethical 
screens to ensure that it does not invest in firms that have poor records of CSR. There are a 
large number of ethical mutual funds in the USA, Canada, and Europe, which are growing in 
numbers by up to 70% per year. According to the USA social investment forum, over 10% of 
all equity investment is currently managed under the guidelines for SRI (Brammer, et al, 
2006: 97). Ethically screened funds in the UK are valued between UK£50bn and UK£100bn, 
while socially-screened funds are estimated to be worth US$2trn (Knoepfel, 2001). The 
growing interest in SRI has been motivated by regulatory changes, such as an amendment to 
the pension fund law, introduced in July 2000, which required pension fund trustees to 
disclose the impact of their operations on attitudes towards and the practice of SRI in UK 
pension funds. Another influencing factor has been the review of UK company law which 
called for greater accountability for social and environmental impacts (Solomon & Solomon. 
2006: 566).  
Gond (2006) provides three examples of institutional arrangements supporting SRI practices:  
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· The development of specific metrics and corporate social performance (CSP) measurement 
practices helping investors to select socially responsible companies 
· The creation of ethical or socially responsible indexes such as the Domini Social Index in 
USA and the FTSE4GOOD in Europe. 
· The development of rewards and/or incentive systems inside companies aligning classic 
company objectives with objectives related to CSR (Gond, 2006: 19). 
Friedman & Miles (2001) examine the potential influence of the SRI sector on CSR practices. 
They argue that the SRI sector is characterised by a number of intermediaries and pioneer 
funds that actively lobby for changes in corporate behaviour, especially for increased levels 
of accountability and disclosure on environmental, social and ethical issues. However, their 
demands have not been met previously because companies have regarded them as a radical 
minority.  
Despite the rapid growth of SRI,3 it is still a small percentage of total funds invested. The 
Social Investment Forum’s 2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends identified 
that around 11% of assets under professional management in the USA are now involved in 
SRI4.       
In summary, it can be argued that CSR is considered to be an intermediate stage which can 
lead to SD, while SRI influences both CSR and SD. These three concepts lead to, and 
influence, CSD. The following figure summarizes the impact of these concepts on CSD, 
 
 
 
                                                
3 SRI assets rose more than 324% from US$639bn in 1995 (the year of the first Report on Socially Responsible 
Investing Trends in the United States) to US$2.71trn in 2007. During the same period, the broader universe of 
assets under professional management increased less than 260%t from US$7trn to US$25.1trn. 
4 Social investment forum, 2007 report on socially responsible investing trend in the United States 
                                                         
                                                                                                                             -28- 
 
Figure 2.1: CSD and its related concepts 
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3. CSD MEDIA 
A variety of media can be used to disclose social and environmental information, including: 
annual reports; advertisements or articles published detailing companies’ activities; booklets 
or leaflets to address the social and environmental activities of the company; CD reports; 
community reports; environmental reports; labelling of products to promote environmental 
and other concerns; press releases; supplements to the annual report or produced at interim 
dates; video tapes; and websites (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006: 273). 
This is supported by Campbell et al (2003) who indicate that companies may use media 
other than its annual report to disclose social and environmental information. For example, 
advertising was used extensively by tobacco companies in the UK until recently, and it is still 
used as a medium of corporate communications by other companies. Also, the internet is a 
powerful means for providing social information, as the website of a company has the 
potential to reach a much wider than its annual reports. ACCA (2001) indicates that there are 
three major methods to present the social, environmental and sustainability information 
through the web site:  
CSR 
SD 
SRI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Companies    CSD 
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· Piggy back, replication of the paper based report in electronic form. 
· Stand-alone approach, complete reporting solely through the web site. 
· Integrated approach, reports plus additional features and information (ACCA, 2001: 13). 
To examine the importance of the various possible media for users, Danastas & Gadenne 
(2006a) surveyed NGOs as users for CSD and they provide a ranking in importance of 
disclosure media as the following. 
Table 2.1: the importance of CSD media  
Ranking By % of users By degree of average use 
1 Environmental reports(42,4) Environmental reports 
2 Website report(33,9) Annual reports 
3 Annual reports Website report 
4 Supplementary materials(30,5) Media releases 
5 Media releases(25,4) Supplementary materials 
6 Advertising(20,3) advertising 
Source: (Danastas & Gadenne, 2006 a) 
The results show the great importance of corporate responsibility reports for users. 
Actually, the growing trend towards CSD is matched by the release of an increasing number 
of separate CSR reports. Jenkins & Yakovleva (2006) argue that the petro-chemical industry 
was the first sector to issue stand-alone reports starting in the 1980s, while the mining sector 
started producing environmental reports gradually from the 1990s. According to KPMG’s 
triennial surveys (initiated in 1993) CSR reporting has been steadily rising and has increased 
substantially in recent years. In 2008, 79% of the G250 (global 250) companies and 45% of 
N100 (national 100) companies in 16 countries issued separate CSR reports, compared with 
52% and 33% respectively in 2005, 45% and 28% in 2002, and 35% and 24% in 1999, see 
figure 2.2, (KPMG, 2002, 2005, 2008).   
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Figure 2.2: CSR reports between G250, and N100 (KPMG) 
  
 
4. DISCLOSURE QUALITY 
The quality of CSD is not straightforwardly linked to the quantity of disclosure, of more 
relevance is if it refers to reports of specific actions, quantifies environmental impact, sets 
formal targets, and is subject to external audit (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006: 1169-1170). The 
quality of environmental disclosure varies widely across companies since the disclosure 
content is not strictly regulated (Aerts et al, 2004: 6). In determining disclosure quality, 
management considers the institutional context of the company, which means giving attention 
to the following matters: 
· What other companies, either in the same industry or in the same country, do in that respect 
(imitation). 
· What the company has done in the past (routine). 
· Relevant regulations and laws governing disclosure (institutions) (Cormier, et al, 2005: 5). 
Beattie et al (2004) indicate that there are two principle ways to measure quality of 
disclosure: use subjective analyst disclosure quality ranking; and use researcher-constructed 
disclosure indices, in which the amount of disclosure is used as a proxy for disclosure quality 
(Beattie, et al, 2004: 207). Hammond & Miles (2004) suggest the following attributes in 
relation to social disclosure quality: quantitative disclosure; third party verification; 
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establishment of appropriate targets and reporting progress against targets; warts and all 
reporting; the adoption of reporting guidelines and standards; the ability to accurately assess 
performance from disclosure; clear statement of vision from chief executive; good coverage 
of significant issues; wide access; reporting of normalised data; and awards/accolades 
(Hammond & Miles, 2004: 69-71). 
The measurement of disclosure quality is considered a difficult task. This is because there is 
an unresolved theoretical debate around the concept of quality itself, and consequently, it is 
difficult to determine a clear and accepted disclosure quality measurement. In addition, the 
measurement of disclosure quality appears to suffer from subjectivity.  
Previous studies have concentrated on using a ranking system to measure CSD quality. In 
this context, Robertson & Nicholson (1996) suggest the three-levels scoring system based on 
a qualitative hierarchy of disclosure: 
· First level, which is general rhetoric. These are statements of CSR across a range of annual 
reports from different companies read as though they were written by the same person, and 
are considered to be decorated items and are somewhat vague and so general as to be 
meaningless as they are not backed by specific objectives and actions. 
· Second level which is the specific endeavours. This relates to CSR initiatives (policies and 
activities) that are specifically tied to the company and its operating environment. 
· Third level, which is the implementation and monitoring of social responsibility 
programmes providing details of annual social and environmental audit or review 
processes. 
This hierarchical model has been used to measure the quality of CSD by researchers such as 
Toms, (2002), Salama (2003) and Hasseldine et al, (2005).  
Similarly, Cormier et al (2005) measure environmental disclosure quality by rating based 
on a score of one to three allocated to specific disclosures: one for items discussed in general, 
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two when an item is described specifically, and three for an item described explicitly in 
monetary or quantitative terms (thus allowing for an assessment of its relative importance). 
Raar (2002) uses a weighting system which evaluates the quality of disclosure for the 
individual industry and on a group basis. In his study; he develops a weighting and ranking 
system to evaluate the quantity and quality of information. For example, the category of 
policies contained: the nominal value ‘if there is any information relating to policies?’; an 
ordinal variable ‘how much?’; and a continuous variable ‘how was it measured?’. The 
ranking system is then used to evaluate the quality of disclosure consisting from seven points5 
as following table: 
Table 2.2: disclosure quality ranking (Raar, 2002) 
Quality ranking 
 
Definition of quality 
1=monetary Disclosure in monetary/currency terms 
2=non-monetary Quantified in numeric terms of weight, volume, size, etc. but not   
financial/currency 
3=qualitative only Descriptive prose only 
4=Qualitative and monetary Descriptive prose and currency 
5=qualitative and non-monetary Descriptive prose and numeric terms 
6=monetary and non-monetary A combination of currency and numeric terms 
7=qualitative, monetary and non-
monetary 
Descriptive prose, financial, and numeric terms 
 
The lowest score in this ranking is 1: this information is based on monetary information 
alone and would be insufficient for stakeholders to make informed decisions relating to 
environmental issues. The highest score is 7: this information provides a combination of 
discussion on environmental objectives, and results in qualitative, non-monetary and 
monetary terms and is considered to be more meaningful to help stakeholders’ decisions by 
linking disclosure, environmental performance and economic performance. 
                                                
5 It is similar to ranking system used by Gamble et al (1995) to assess the quality of annual report disclosure 
which consists of seven points: 1= journal entry; 2 = footnote; 3-5 = violation cited; 4 – 6 = short qualitative 
disclosure; and 7 = extended qualitative disclosure. 
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Walden & Schwartz (1997) use a four elements index to assess the quality of environmental 
disclosure: 
· Effect, significant or not significant; 
· Quantification, monetary or not monetary; 
· Specificity, specific as to actions, persons, events, or places, or not specific; and 
· Time frame, past, present, or future. 
In addition, Van Staden & Hooks, (2007) developed a 5-point scale to assess the quality of 
environmental disclosure, this quality scale as the following, 
Scale Description 
0 No disclosure 
1 Minimum coverage, little detail-general items, a anecdotal or briefly mentioned 
2 Descriptive: the impact of the company or its policies was clearly evident 
3 Quantitative: the environmental impact was clearly defined in monetary terms or actual physical 
quantities 
4 Truly extraordinary: benchmarking against best practice 
 
5. CSD IN THE UK  
The status of CSD in UK is closely associated with the status of CSR. The UK is 
considered to be one of the leading practitioners in the area of CSR and contributes to CSR 
thinking and practice. Matten & Moon (2004) compare CSR in Europe with the USA and 
propose a conceptual framework of explicit versus implicit CSR. They define explicit CSR, 
as in the USA, where companies volunteer to address important social and economic issues 
through their CSR policies, while in Europe including the UK the responsibility for these 
issues is undertaken as a part of a company’s legal responsibilities and thus CSR is implicit 
(Matten & Moon, 2004). Williams & Aguilera (2008) indicate the difference between the UK 
and the USA as the emphasis given in the two countries’ capital markets to companies’ social 
and environmental roles. Legal factors include more compulsory disclosure of social and 
environmental information by publicly listed companies in the UK than in the USA. 
Institutional factors include: 
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· Differences in the composition of institutional investors in the two markets with a higher 
percentage of institutional investors in UK than in USA. 
· Soft low encouragement in the UK by the highly-influential Cadbury Commission of 
Institutional Investor Engagement with portfolio companies. 
· Encouragement of attention to CSR issues by the institutional shareholders committee 
which represent 80% of institutional investment in the UK. 
In line with this increasing attention to CSR, similar attention has been paid to CSD. Haron et 
al (2004) argues that there is a general rise in the UK in the proportion of disclosures of social 
and environmental information; this was linked to the increase in the mandatory disclosure 
and to the stability of voluntary disclosures. At the end of the 1970s, CSD could be 
highlighted on one page of employee-related disclosure which includes disclosures on 
charitable donations. Although employee-related disclosure is still the majority of social 
disclosure in the UK, disclosure now covers a wider range of issue pertaining to employees. 
In addition, community and environmental disclosure has grown significantly. Between 1979 
and 1991, the level of CSD was raised by 4 times because of changes in regulations which 
made disclosure of a number of issues mandatory.  
Howland & Foo (2003) compare environmental reporting between the UK and the USA. 
Their findings show that: 
· More companies in UK produce environmental disclosures than in the USA. 
· Concerning the location in the annual report of the disclosure of environmental 
information, in the UK the most prevalent means of disclosure is a separate section, while 
most American companies disclosed the information in the management discussion and 
analysis section. 
· There is a different emphasis on environmental items; 89% of UK companies disclosed 
information on environmental awards but only 33% of American companies did so, while 
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72% of USA companies disclosed environmental regulation information but only 37% of 
UK companies did so. 
Cooper & Owen (2007) state that recent developments in the UK provide the opportunity to 
re-visit claims about CSD: 
· First, there has been a dramatic quickening of the pace in terms of companies producing 
stand-alone social and environmental reports. 
· Second, the prospect of mandatory reporting was raised by the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s publication of draft regulation on the operating and financial review. 
The importance of the CSR concept in the UK has been supported by drivers which also 
influence the status of CSD. These drivers include: the role of UK government; the launch of 
a number of CSR initiatives; and the presence of regulations related to the concept of CSR. 
5.1. The Role of Government 
The UK government has developed a CSR strategy which was announced in the CSR report 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2002). UK government developed three pillars to 
promote CSR practices amongst the business sector: 
· Companies should recognise that their activities have a wider impact on the society; 
· Therefore, the companies should take account of the economic, social, environmental and 
human rights impact of activities; and 
· The companies should seek to achieve benefits by working in partnership with other 
groups. 
Bichta (2003) argues that the UK government considers that CSR should have economic 
foundations, therefore companies should preserve the interests of shareholders and explore 
new means of improving economic performance that exceed legal requirements. The concept 
of CSR has attracted the interest of government through: 
· In spring 2000, the UK government appointed the world’s first minister for CSR. 
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· The government launched its CSR academy to promote and integrate CSR values into 
general management training and education. 
· The UK parliament has two all-party groups on corporate citizenship; one group on CSR 
and one group on SRI. 
· The UK government supports domestic businesses taking account of their social and 
environmental impacts wherever they operate—locally, regionally and internationally. To 
support businesses, a number of funded programmes designed to help companies increase 
their resource efficiency including (www.csr.gov.uk);  
· Envirowise programme (waste and water). www.envirowise.gov.uk 
· Action energy/carbon trust (energy). www.actionenergy.co.uk  
· Transport energy (transport). www.transportenergy.org.uk  
· The UK government gave a number of commitments at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in September 2002. As part of the commitment on 
sustainable production and consumption, the government has pledged to ensure that the 
UK£13bn worth of goods and service it buys every year are sustainable.  
5.2. CSR Initiatives 
The attention to CSR has resulted in the emergence of a number of initiatives and 
regulatory changes that promote CSR. Rizk (2003) argues that the UK accounting system can 
be viewed as a haphazard response to environmental changes rather than a systematic process 
of change, which has enabled the development of the breadth and width of CSR initiatives. 
Many CSR initiatives have been appeared, including: 
· The SIGMA project which published guidelines for organisations looking to contribute to 
sustainable development. 
· Acon trust guidelines on environmental standards to support small- and medium-sized 
companies.    
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· The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to improve transparency in the 
payments made by companies operating in the sector to ensure the revenues received by 
poorer countries will support growth and stability in those countries.  
· The PharmaFutures project that assists pension fund managers in the pharmaceutical sector 
in examining the sustainability of the existing business models. 
· The Green Technology Initiative which appears to be a UK version of the Green Grid, the 
consortium of IT companies and professionals. This initiative includes IT equipment 
outside the data centre and aims to reduce the carbon footprint. 
· The green building code which was launched by the UK property sector to tackle the 
harmful effects of commercial property on the environment.  
Rizk, 2003, presented CSR initiatives in UK in the following table; 
Table 2.3: CSR Initiatives in Force in the United Kingdom 
 Initiative Overview of Regulation 
OECD Convention on combating the 
bribery of foreign public officials in 
international business transactions 
The Convention came into force in 1999 and aims to prohibit the 
bribing of foreign public officials in order to obtain or retain business 
or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business 
(Article 1:1) The UK ratified the Convention on 14 December 1998 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act  
In 2002 the UK law codified the existing common law and, in fact, 
extended it beyond the OECD Convention requirements. UK 
companies and nationals (including directors) can now be prosecuted 
in the UK for corruption offences wherever they take place in the 
world and whether they involve public officials or the private sector 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act  Amendments were made to the Act, which came into force in July 
2002, to prevent payments made outside the UK which constitute a 
criminal offence if made within the UK as being treated as tax 
deductible 
United Kingdom Listing Authority's 
("UKLA") Combined Code: Principles 
of Good Governance and Code of 
Best Practice 
In the early 1990s there were initial calls for increased transparency 
and greater corporate governance. This resulted in a number of 
business-led initiatives that addressed the largely financial related 
aspects of governance, which culminated in the UKLA's Combined 
Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice (the 
"Combined Code"). The 1999 Turnbull Report further expanded the 
Code and provided guidance for directors on the internal control 
requirements of the Combined Code. The Turnbull Guidance on 
internal control involves Boards identifying and reviewing the risks 
faced by their business; introducing monitoring and control processes 
and reporting annually to shareholders on compliance. 
Forge II Guidelines on CSR 
Management and Reporting for the 
Financial Services 
The Forge Guidelines, launched November 2002, are voluntary 
guidelines developed by leading financial services institutions 
together with the Association of British Insurers and the British 
Bankers Association. Built on earlier sector environmental 
management and reporting guidelines, they provide best practice 
guidance on developing and implementing a CSR management and 
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reporting framework. 
The Association of British Insurers 
Guidelines 
These guidelines, which were issued in October 2001, contain 
recommendations on how to improve disclosure by inviting 
companies to state their approach to CSR and encourage companies 
to adopt the best practice when responding to external social, ethical 
and environmental risks. 
Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations 20025 
The Regulations, which came into force on 1 August 2002, provide 
that in future, the annual report will be required to include details of: 
directors’ remuneration; individual directors’ remuneration packages; 
the company's remuneration policies; and information regarding the 
role of the Board and the remuneration committee. 
The London Principles These guidelines were developed from a project commissioned by the 
Corporation of London to examine the role of the UK financial 
services sector in promoting sustainable development. The 
corporation signed a memorandum of understanding to promote the 
guidelines on 30 August 2002. The guidelines cover the areas of 
economic prosperity, environmental protection and social 
development. 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 On 30 July 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was signed into force 
in the US, the most comprehensive series of amendments to the US 
federal securities laws since the 1960s. Many of the Act's 
requirements are being implemented through the rulemaking 
procedures of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
"SEC"). The Act attempts to reinforce the enforcement powers of the 
SEC through stiffer penalties. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to 
companies (US and non-US) with securities registered under or 
otherwise required to file reports with the SEC pursuant to the US 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. The Act does not apply 
to those companies who have certain reporting exemptions.  The 
provisions to note are those requiring that CEOs and CFOs certify 
company financial statements; that CEOs and CFOs forfeit their 
performance bonuses and profit on stock sales in certain 
circumstances; the prohibition of loans to officers and directors; 
enhanced responsibilities for audit committees; auditor 
independence; the restriction on trading by company directors and 
executives; additional company financial disclosures; the regulation of 
insider transactions; and "whistleblower protection" for employees 
who provide evidence of accounting problems or other fraud related 
situations involving their employer. 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 
The guidelines were first adopted by participating Governments in 
1976 and amended in 2000. They seek to express standards of 
behaviour expected by OECD Governments of multinational 
enterprises based in, or operating in, their territory. The OECD 
guidelines were amended in 2000.  Under the Guidelines, adhering 
countries are required to establish a National Contact Point ("NCP") to 
handle enquiries concerning all matters covered by the Guidelines. 
The UK NCP is an interdepartmental body based in the International 
Investment Policy Unit of DTI 
The Global Compact To date 82 companies have committed to the nine principles of the 
UN's Global Compact. At the World Economic Forum in Davis on 31 
January 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged world 
business leaders to "embrace and enact" the Global Compact, both in 
corporate practices and by supporting appropriate public policies. 
 
Global Reporting Initiative The initiative was formally inaugurated in April 2002. GRI is an 
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international, multi-stakeholder effort to create a common 
framework for voluntary reporting on an organisation's activities. In 
November 2002, GRI entered into a new cooperative framework with 
the UN's Global Compact such that companies endorsing the Global 
Compact are encouraged to use GRI reporting to fulfil their 
requirements. 
Ethical Trading Initiative The ETI is a partnership of companies, non-governmental 
organisations, and trade unions working to identify and to promote 
ethical trade. 
Business in the Community's 
Corporate Social Responsibility Index 
On 23 September 2002, questionnaires for the first Corporate 
Responsibility Index and the 7th Business in the Environment Index 
were issued. FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and equivalent internationally listed 
groups were invited to participate in the survey. Individual company 
results remain confidential to the company, while top-line results are 
published annually in two summary reports. The Index is intended to 
measure a company's performance on how it integrates corporate 
responsibility within its core business practices and on its 
management performance across the key areas of environment, 
workplace, community and marketplace. 
EU Rapporteur Richard Howitt MEP is the European Parliament's Rapporteur on the 
European Commission's Green Paper on Promoting a European 
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility 2001. 
Minister for Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
This new post was created in March 2001, coinciding with the launch 
of "Society and Business" which provides a business case for CSR and 
associated information. The Minister for corporate social 
responsibility is currently Stephen Timms MP. 
New Corporate Volunteering 
Initiative 
 
This was announced in the Pre Budget Report in November 2002 as a 
joint Treasury and Home Office financial scheme to help young British 
volunteers from lower income backgrounds take a year out after 
school to undertake community service. 
International Labour Organisation 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy 
This invites employers and workers organisations and multinational 
enterprises to observe principles in the fields of employment, 
training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations, on a 
voluntary basis. 
Fundamental ILO Conventions These are identified as being fundamental to the rights of human 
beings at work irrespective of the levels of development of individual 
Member States. Primary responsibility for implementation lies with 
the Member States of the ILO but this could, in turn, impact business. 
The UK has ratified all the fundamental conventions.  
ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, 1998 
This declaration requires all Member States that have not ratified the 
fundamental ILO Conventions nevertheless to promote the following 
principles: 
· Realisation of a freedom of association and recognition of the right 
to collective bargaining; 
· Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
· Effective abolition of child labour; and 
· Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
Working Time (Amendment) 
Regulations 2001 
The Regulations amended the Working Time Regulations, removing 
the 13-week qualifying period for holiday pay and substituting it with 
the right to take one-twelfth of the annual leave for each month 
worked, rounded to the nearest half day. 
Race Relations Act (Statutory 
Duties)Order 2001 
The Order, which came into force on 3 December 2001, places all 
public bodies under a statutory duty to promote racial equality. 
Maternity and Parental Leave 
(Amendment) Regulations 2001 
These amendments to the existing regulations came into force on 10 
January 2002. All parents with children, under the age of five as at 15 
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December 1999 are eligible to take parental leave. Parents of disabled 
children are entitled to take up to 18 weeks' leave. 
Employment Act 2002 The Act, which came became law on 8 July 2002, makes provision for 
statutory rights to paternity and adoption leave and pay and paves 
the way for amendments to the law relating to statutory maternity 
leave and pay, as well as introducing a right to request flexible 
working arrangements. 
ISO 14001 This is an international standard, which specifies the requirements for 
an environmental management system ("EMS"). ISO 14001 is a 
management tool, which organisations of any size and type can use to 
help them control the impact on the environment of their activities, 
products and services in a structured and systematic way. 
Making a Corporate Commitment 
(MACC 2) 
 
MACC 2, a Government initiative, invites companies and public sector 
organisations to commit to setting quantified targets for improving 
resource efficiency and environmental performance and reporting on 
these targets. It covers greenhouse gas emissions, waste and water. 
MACC 2 is voluntary. 
Environmental Reporting Guidelines 
 
The Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs have 
produced a number of guidelines to assist companies on reporting, 
including General Guidelines on Environmental Reporting and 
guidelines specific to Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Waste and Water 
Use.24 They each provide details as to what a company should be 
aiming to include in its annual report should the company wish to 
report voluntarily. 
Health and Safety at Work Act  
(1974) 
This Act imposes duties on employers to ensure the health and safety 
of their employees and to ensure that the health and safety of other 
persons is not adversely affected by the employer's undertaking. 
Directors' Health and Safety 
Responsibilities 
In July 2001, the Health and Safety Commission published new 
guidance on the health and safety responsibilities for company 
directors and the board members of public sector and voluntary 
organisations. Although not law, compliance with the guidance will 
normally be enough to demonstrate legal compliance. 
Corporate Manslaughter (common 
law offence) 
Manslaughter charges are increasingly being brought in "death at 
work" cases against both companies and individuals. 
Pensions Act 1995 and the 
Occupational Pension Schemes 
Amendment Regulations (1999) 
In July 2000, the Pensions Act 1995 was amended, significantly 
affecting the world of investment. Pension fund trustees must now 
state the extent to which they take social, environmental, and ethical 
considerations when they invest money. 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index The Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes were set up to meet the 
financial market's demands for indexes to benchmark the 
performance of investments in sustainability companies and funds. 
The indexes are provided by Dow Jones in Association with SAM 
Sustainable Asset Management and STOXX Limited 
FTSE4Good There are eight indices in the FTSE4Good series (all available in real-
time): four benchmark indices (FTSE4Good UK, FTSE4Good Europe, 
FTSE4Good Global Index, FTSE4Good US Index) and four tradable 
indices (FTSE4Good UK 50, FTSE4Good Europe 50, FTSE4Good USA 
100, FTSE4Good Global 100). The FTSE4Good bases entry on its 
Selection criteria cover three areas: working towards environmental 
sustainability; developing positive relationships with stakeholders; 
upholding and supporting universal human rights. 
Source: Rizk, 2003:               
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KPMG (2005) presents the main standards and guidelines on corporate management and 
reporting in the UK:  
· The Department for Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) published general 
guidelines for environmental reporting on greenhouse gas emission, on waste and on water. 
· The Public Environmental Reporting Initiative (PERI) provides a tool for companies to 
produce a balanced perspective on their environmental policies, practices and performance. 
Furthermore, development of good corporate governance practices in the UK has been an 
important factor in increase attention on CSR, as the presence of a well-formed corporate 
governance programme should take care of most CSR issues. Corporate governance has 
become an important issue in many countries but the response has varied from legislative 
action such as the Sarbannes-Oxley Act in the USA, to the adoption of best practices such as 
in the UK (Barako, et al, 2006: 108).  
The drivers that have increased attention to corporate governance in the UK include; 
· The collapse of important businesses such as Polly Peck, BCCI, and Barings. 
· Changing patterns of share ownership which has resulted in higher levels of ownership by 
institutional investors. 
· Institutional investors are increasingly seeking to diversify their portfolios. 
· Technological advances in communications and markets generally. 
· Business increasingly seeking external funds. 
· Within a country, good corporate governance helps to engender confidence in the stock 
market and hence in the economic environment as a whole (Mallin, et al, 2005: 533). 
5.3. CSR Regulations  
In addition to CSR initiatives, CSR in the UK is related to regulatory aspects. There are 
laws covering issues such as the minimum wage and health and safety; however, there are no 
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regulations covering overall disclosure of environmental or community impacts. The 
regulations that cover aspects related to CSR are: 
· The Employment Act 2002 which provides more choice and support to balance childcare 
and work in ways that benefit everyone; employers, employees and children. 
· Environmental legislation introduced new regulatory regimes such as Pollution Prevention 
and Control (PPC). 
A company law review was established in 1998 to undertake a fundamental review of British 
company law. This long-tem review, which was launched by UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), opened up the debate about if the law should protect the interests of 
shareholders or all stakeholders (Williamson & Lynch-Wood, 2008: 124). The approach of 
company responsibility through the review is that “the company must retain overall 
responsibility to shareholders but this should be understood in a rather inclusive way” 
(Bichta, 2003: 43). The final report of review recommends that companies should be required 
to prepare and publish an Operating and Financial Review (OFR) as part of their annual 
report. The primary purpose of OFR is to improve transparency in the interest of better 
corporate governance. Williamson & Lynch-Wood, (2008) presented “the most important 
provisions relating to social and environmental information” in the following table; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
                                                                                                                             -43- 
 
Table 2.4: OFR 
Who What Auditing 
Quoted 
companies must 
produce an OFR 
To the extent necessary to comply with the 
general requirements of the OFR, the review must 
include: 
· Information about environmental matters 
(including the impact of the company on the 
environment); 
· Information about the company’s employees; 
· Information about social and community 
issues; 
· Information about the policies of the company 
in each of these areas; 
· Information about the extent to which those 
policies have been successfully implemented; 
· Analysis using financial and, where appropriate, 
other key performance indicators, including 
information relating to environmental matters 
and employee matters 
If the review does not contain this information 
and analysis it must state which kinds of 
information and analysis it does not contain. 
The auditors must state in their 
report: 
· Whether in their opinion the 
information given is consistent 
with those accounts 
· Whether any matters have come 
to their attention which are 
inconsistent with the information 
given in the review 
Source: Williamson & Lynch-Wood, 2008: 131. 
The Companies Act 2006 requires publicly-listed companies to report on the following 
issues where they are necessary to understand the company’s business: 
· Environmental matters (including the impact of company’s activities on the environment); 
· The company’s employees; 
· Social and community issues; and 
· Risks down company supply chain. 
Also, the law extends directors’ duties to consider the impact of their business operations on 
the community and the environment.  
KPMG (2005) presents a summary of mandatory requirements in the UK:   
· The Operating and Financial Review (OFR) requires all UK-listed companies to provide a 
narrative within their annual reports on the company’s strategies, performance, future plans 
and key risks which may include ethical, social and environmental aspects. 
· The combined code requires companies to report on governance and internal controls, 
which cover, among other things, material non-financial issues. 
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6. SUMMARY   
The following points summarise the aspects of CSD under discussion: 
· CSD concerns the information, voluntarily (to a large extent), provided by companies 
regarding their activities associated with their responsibilities towards the environment and 
society as a whole. 
· CSD is considered to be a reflection of a number of recent developments throughout the 
business environment: CSR; SD; and SRI. 
· Various mediums are used to disclose CSR information, including annual reports, and, 
increasingly, the use of separate corporate responsibility reports. 
· The literature points to developed countries becoming more interested in CSD in 
comparison with other countries. 
· A number of researchers are interested in measuring the quality of CSD in annual reports. 
The predominant method employed in measuring this quality is by using a ranking system, 
which, as a general rule, is based on differentiating between general information and 
information that reports specific activities. 
The considerable interest among researchers in CSD includes a number of studies that 
analyse the determinants and consequences of CSD. This aspect will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
1. INTRODUCTION    
The previous chapter related to general literature on CSD, therefore this chapter is on 
literature related to determinants and consequences of CSD. The academic literature is 
particularly concerned with three questions; which, why and what. The first question is: 
Which companies seem more interested in providing information on their social 
responsibilities?  To answer this question, part of the literature provides an empirical 
analysis of the factors (determinants) affecting CSD. The second question is: Why are 
companies interested in social and environmental disclosure? Some studies indicate 
interest in explaining the motivations of companies to disclose social and environmental 
information. The third question is: What are the benefits (consequences) of this disclosure 
to the company? In this context, part of the literature has focused its attention on studying 
the consequences of social and environmental disclosure.  
This chapter is based on a review of previous studies related to determinants and 
consequences of CSD. The objectives of this chapter are: 
· To analyse previous studies related to determinants and consequences of CSD, and to 
define the  limitations of these studies, 
· To cast light on some variables that did not receive adequate attention in previous 
studies. 
The importance of this chapter is that it represents a basis on which to recognise a gap in 
previous literature and develop research questions. Limitations of previous studies also 
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provide a basis for defining some concerns that should be taken into account in the 
development of this study. The chapter proceeds as follows: the second and third sections 
provide a presentation of studies that focus on determinants, and consequences of CSD 
respectively. 
 
2. DETERMINANTS OF CSD 
Analysis of disclosure determinants is a major consideration in accounting literature. 
Researchers attempt to answer two major questions. First, what attitudes do companies 
adopt toward accounting disclosure, either general or specific? This question leads to 
analysis of the disclosure level. Second, why do some companies disclose more, or less, 
information than others? This question leads to analysis of disclosure determinants.  
Because CSD is a voluntary activity, it is important to understand which companies 
disclose information about social and environmental activities, or which companies 
disclose such information, more so than others. Adams, (2002) indicated that an 
understanding of the factors which influence disclosure is necessary for improving 
accountability and specifically: 
· The extensiveness of reporting,  
· The quality and quantity of reporting by individual companies,  
· The completeness or comprehensiveness of reporting (by understanding the reasons 
for non-disclosure), and  
· The disclosure of critical analysis of the (potential) role of legislation in achieving 
improvements in the abovementioned areas. 
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Determinants of CSD are different from determinants of corporate financial reporting, 
in which CSD addresses the social accountability of companies and focuses on a broader 
audience (stakeholders), than corporate financial reporting, with its primary focus on the 
information needs of investors and creditors (Smith, et al, 2005:125). Various variables 
have been examined in several studies as determinants of CSD; Adams, (2002) 
categorized the determinants of CSD into three categories as in the following table;          
Table 3.1: categories of CSD determinants (Adams, 2002) 
CATEGORY VARIABLES 
Corporate 
characteristics 
Size-industry membership-corporate age-profit 
General contextual 
factors 
The country of origin of company-social and political context-economic context-
cultural context-period of time-specific events-media pressure-stakeholder power. 
Internal context Company chair-presence of CSD committee. 
 
Lee & Hutchison, (2005) categorized the forces affecting the decision to disclose 
environmental information, according to the results of prior studies, into; laws and 
regulations, firm/industry characteristics, rational cost-benefit analysis, cultural forces 
and attitudes, and legitimacy, public pressure, and publicity. Sylvie, et al (2003) reviewed 
literature and indicated that the evidence from studies suggests that voluntary 
environmental disclosure increases with; 
· Corporate size and membership in environment-sensitive industries such as oil and 
gas, chemicals, forest and paper products or utilities 
· The extent to which a company is widely-owned 
· A company’s exposure to environmental-related legal proceedings or fines related to 
the environment 
· A company’s media exposure of its environmental activities 
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· The probability of being involved in accidents in the future 
· Environmental lobby groups’ concerns about company’s environmental performance. 
Previous literature has paid much attention to examining the factors that could explain the 
differences in CSD among companies, while little attention has been paid to examining 
the differences in CSD among different countries. To explain the differences of CSD 
among different companies, previous studies mainly analysed the impact of corporate 
characteristics on CSD and some studies have focused on studying the impact of media 
pressure.  On the other hand, some studies have provided a particular model to explain 
the level of CSD, based on stakeholder perspectives. Therefore, the literature of 
determinants will be organised into general studies (the majority of studies interested in 
examining some variables as determinants of CSD), special model studies (the studies 
that present a particular model to explain CSD), and determinants at a country level. 
2.1 General Studies 
General studies are studies that examine some variables as potential determinants of 
CSD. These studies have been primarily concerned with the impact of corporate 
characteristics and to a lesser extent, the impact of media pressure, while less attention 
has been paid to the impact of the degree of multinational activities and corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
2.1.1 Corporate characteristics 
Ahmed & Courtis, (1999) indicated that accounting literature has been interested in the 
association between corporate characteristics and corporate annual report disclosure since 
1961. So, studies that related to CSD particularly interested in examining the impact of 
corporate characteristics on it. 
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Cowen, et al, (1987) examined the influence of corporate characteristics on the 
categories of CSD in annual reports. They used Ernst & Whinney, (1978) survey to 
categorize CSD into; environment, energy, fair business practices, human resources, 
community involvement, and products. The corporate characteristics variables in this 
study are; size, industry, profitability, and presence of social responsibility committee 
(which introduced as a corporate characteristics for the first time).  The results, based on 
a sample of 134 US companies, showed that company size has a significant impact on 
disclosure elements; environmental, energy, fair business practice, community 
involvement, but no influence over human resources or product disclosures. Industry type 
influenced some types of disclosure-energy and community involvement-, but most 
disclosure types –fair business practice, human resources, products, other-do not 
significantly affected by industry type. Human resources information appears to be 
related to the presence of social responsibility committee.  
This study followed the common accounting literature in examining the impact of 
corporate characteristics on disclosure and it did not presented a theoretical background 
for determinants. The study is focused on social disclosure in annual reports due to the 
probability that corporate responsibility reports were not a common practice at the time of 
study.  
Patten, (1991) examined the influence of size, industry and profitability. The results, 
based on sample of 128 companies, indicated that both size and industry are significant 
explanatory variables, while profitability was not significantly related. 
Hackston & Milne, (1996) using a sample of the largest of 50 companies listed on 
theNew Zealand stock exchange at the end of 1992, examined three variables as 
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determinants of CSD; Company size, Corporate profitability and Industry type. The 
results indicated that both size and industry are significantly associated with amount of 
disclosure, while profitability is not. In addition, the size-disclosure relationship is much 
stronger for the high –profile companies industry companies than for the low profile 
industry companies. 
Trotman & Bradely, (1981) examined the effects of four variables; size (measured by 
total assets), systematic risk, social pressures (measured from Bradley 1978 survey), and 
management’s decision horizon (measured from Bradley 1978 survey). The results 
indicated that there are positive association between size, social pressure, and emphasis a 
company places on the long term from one hand and the CSD from another hand, while 
there is no significant association between the systematic risk of company and the amount 
of CSD.  
Garcia-Ayuso & Larrinaga, (2003) examined factors influencing environmental 
disclosure based on a sample of Spanish companies. The factors that examined are; size, 
risk, profitability, environmental sensitivity, and media exposure. The empirical results 
based on a sample of 112 companies show that concerning amount of disclosure, both 
media coverage and environmental sensitivity have some explanatory power. Concerning 
the decision to disclose environmental information in annual reports, it is associated with 
size, risk, sensitivity analysis, and media coverage. 
Hossain, et al, (2006) examine the relationship between social and environmental 
disclosure and several corporate attributes in a developing country, Bangladesh. The 
variables used to explain CSD; size, profitability, industry, subsidiaries of multinational 
company, and audit firm. The results indicated that the variables which were found to be 
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positively significant in determining disclosure levels are industry and the net profit 
margin. 
Ahmad, et al, (2003) examined factors influencing environmental disclosure in annual 
reports for Malaysian listed companies. They are focusing on some corporate 
characteristics; corporate size, financial leverage, profitability, industry membership, 
auditor type, and effective tax rate. Based on a sample of 299 companies, the empirical 
results revealed that environmental disclosure is significantly associated with both auditor 
type and financial leverage.  
Ho & Taylor, (2007) examined the influence of corporate characteristics (size, 
profitability, industry membership, leverage, and liquidity) and country on triple bottom-
line reporting (TBL) in annual report, stand-alone report, and special website reports, in 
both US and Japan. The empirical results, based on sample of 50 of the largest US and 
Japanese companies, show a positive and significant association between both corporate 
size and country and TBL disclosure, negative association between corporate 
profitability, liquidity, and industry membership and TBL reporting, while there is no 
significant association between leverage and TBL reporting. Despite this study extending 
the analysis of CSD to other disclosure media over annual reports, it does not present a 
clear framework for the variables that were examined. In addition to small sample size, 
the study examined between determinants at the company level and at the country level. 
Monteiro & Aibar-Guzman, (2009) examined determinants of environmental disclosure 
in the annual reports for large Portuguese companies. The factors that they examined are; 
firm size, industry membership, profitability, quotation on the stock market, foreign 
ownership, and environmental certification. The empirical results, based on a sample of 
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109 companies, show that firm size and the fact that a company is listed on the stock 
market are positively associated with environmental disclosure. In addition to 
concentration on environmental disclosure in annual reports, this study did not provide a 
theoretical background for selected determinants. 
Jinfeng & Huifeng, (2009) examined the factors influencing level of environmental 
protection information disclosure in annual reports. They examined some corporate 
characteristics; corporate size, profitability, industrial nature, financial leverage, and type 
of accounting firm. The empirical results, based on a sample of 248 Chinese companies, 
show that corporate size, industry nature, and type of accounting firm are significantly 
associated with environmental disclosure in annual reports. Garcia-Sanchez, (2008) 
showed that both corporate size and industry membership are associated with CSD, while 
there is no association between profitability and CSD, based on a sample of 35 
companies.         
There are also some studies which interested in influence of corporate characteristics, 
with other variables, on CSD. Brammer & Pavelin, (2004) based on sample of 134 of the 
largest UK companies, examined the relation between disclosure and corporate 
characteristics (size and industry) and they found that disclosure strategy is influenced by 
industry type and it is positively related to corporate size. Also, Gao, et al, (2005) 
examined the influence of corporate size and industry on CSD in Hong Kong companies, 
and they found that size and industry influence the level of CSD.  
Branco & Rodrigues, (2008) examined the factors influencing CSD in both annual 
reports and web sites for Portuguese listed companies. They argued that, based on both 
legitimacy theory and a resource-based perspective, CSD used by companies as a 
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legitimacy tool to improve corporate image. They examined the following factors; degree 
of international activity, company size, industry, consumer proximity (a company’s 
proximity to final consumer), environmental sensitivity, and media pressure. The 
empirical results, based on a sample of 49 companies, show that only company size and 
media pressure are significantly associated with CSD, while other variables are not 
associated. Although this study used a clear theoretical framework, it did not provide a 
clear link between factors selected as determinants of CSD and this theoretical 
framework. Also, this study added to literature by examining CSD in both annual reports 
and internet disclosure, but it suffered from a small sample size.  
Previous studies focused on corporate characteristics as determinants of CSD, and the 
variables that have been used to represent company characteristics are corporate size, 
profitability and industry type. The following points can be noted:  
(a) Corporate size is a prevalent variable that has been examined as a determinant of CSD 
in previous studies. There are various indicators used in previous studies to measure 
company size (sales, total assets, Market capitalization, Fortune rank, Turnover and 
interest received and receivable for banks), but there is no theoretical reason for using 
a particular measure of size (Hackston & Milne, 1996:87). The empirical results seem 
to provide evidence of a significant impact of corporate size on CSD.  
(b) Profitability is also a common variable which represents the financial condition of the 
company. The empirical results appear to provide inconclusive evidence about the 
impact of profitability on CSD. There are some methods used to measure corporate 
profitability such as ROA, ROE, five year average ROE, and one year lagged ROA.  
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(c) Regarding industry type, there is almost total agreement among studies on the use of a 
binary code (high profile and low profile) as a measure of industry type. Roberts, 
(1992) defines high-profile industries as those industries with high consumer visibility, 
a high level of political risk, or are characterised by concentrated, intense competition. 
Commonly perceived high-profile industries are petroleum, chemical, mining and 
extractive, forest, paper, automobile and airline. Low-profile industries are food, 
health and personal products, hotel, and appliance and household products (Robert, 
1992: 605). The empirical results provide evidence that industry type is positively 
associated with CSD.  
Gray, et al, (2001) presented an analysis to the relationship between CSD and corporate 
characteristics as the following: 
· the relationship between CSD and size has produced somewhat consistent results, as 
the majority of studies conclude that there is a relation, but Singh & Ahuja, (1983) 
find no relation, and Cowen, et al, (1987) find the relation only holds for certain areas 
of disclosure. 
· the relationship between CSD and industry membership has produced less than 
consistent results, Hackston & Milne,(1996) find strong relation, Ness & Mirza, 
(1991) find that this relation holds specifically for the oil industry, while, some other 
studies find that specific areas of disclosure are related to industry, 
· the relationship between CSD and profit has produced inconsistent results, some 
studies find no relation, while some other studies find no relation or an inverse 
relation, and on the other hand some studies find a positive relation (Gray, et al, a, 
2001:330-331). 
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And from the results of their empirical study, Gray, et al, (2001) believe that in the UK, 
CSD is related to corporate characteristics. The detailed functional models of the 
relationships between different measures of CSD and the corporate characteristics vary 
with both variables chosen and the time period selected. So, we are unable to claim that 
there is any unique and/or stable relationship between any measure of disclosure and any 
corporate characteristics. And they stated that “whilst we can confidently claim that 
corporate characteristics are highly indicative of a predisposition to disclose, researchers 
need to make their claims about the relationship between disclosure and characteristics 
with more care”. 
2.1.2 Degree of multinational activities  
In contrast to wide attention that has been paid for corporate characteristics; size, 
industry membership, and profitability, the degree of multinational activities as one of 
corporate characteristics did not received adequate attention. Toms, et al, (2007) and 
Toms, (2008) stated that although a large literature on the determinants of CSD has 
evolved; there is a little evidence on the relation between international activity and CSD. 
They argued that the level of CSD in multinational corporations depend on the political 
and environmental risk in the countries in which they operate rather than the number of 
foreign countries in which they operate. So, they examined the impact of number of 
foreign countries, political risk in foreign countries, and environmental risk in foreign 
countries on CSD in the sample of multinational companies from environmentally 
sensitive industries. The empirical results show that both political and environmental 
risks in countries in which the companies operate are associated with CSD, while the 
number of countries is not associated. The limitations of these studies are the 
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concentration on some environmentally sensitive industries (oil, gas, and chemicals) 
when examining social disclosure, the small sample, and the confusion between 
determinants at the country level and on the company level.  
Branco & Rodrigues, (2008) examined the impact of multinationality, with some other 
corporate characteristics variables, measured by the ratio of foreign sales, on CSD by 
Portuguese listed companies through both annual reports and web sites. Empirical results 
show non-significant association between multinationality and CSD in two media. Stanny 
& Ely, (2008) examined factors influencing environmental disclosure about effects of 
climate change, and from the factors that they examined the ratio of foreign sales. The 
empirical results revealed that foreign sales are significantly associated with disclosure. 
It appears that previous studies have used two indicators to measure multinationality: 
ratio of foreign sales, and number of foreign countries, and they provide inconsistent 
results concerning the relationship between multinationality and CSD.  
2.1.3 Media pressure 
Recent disclosure literature emphasises the importance of media exposure in 
determining corporate disclosure, so some studies have focused on examining the impact 
of media pressure on CSD. Brown & Deegan, (1998) examined by industry the 
relationship between print media attention to environmental issues and the extent of 
corporate annual report environmental disclosure. They used two theories; legitimacy 
theory and media agenda setting theory, based on the notion that the media can be 
particularly effective in driving the community’s concern about the environmental 
performance of particular organisation (from media agenda setting theory). Where such 
concern is raised, organizations will respond by increasing the extent of disclosure of 
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environmental information within the annual report (from legitimacy theory). Nine 
industries were reviewed, Annual report environmental disclosure and print media data 
are collected for five individual years between the periods 1981 to 1994. The results 
indicated that for all industries, the extent of corporate disclosure and the newspapers 
articles in 1993/1994(the latest data year) was greater than it was in 1981/1982 (the 
earliest data year).in six of the nine industries examined, there was a significant 
correlation between the level of media attention and the quantity of corporate 
environmental disclosure. 
Adler & Milne, (1997) examined the influence of media pressure, with size and 
industry, on CSD in New Zealand corporations. Media pressure was measured by 
perusing the National Business Review, the Herald and INNZ (Index New Zealand). All 
news stories on any of the 122 companies were collected and each news was categorized 
according to CSD theme (environment, energy, community, product/customers, 
employee, and general). The results indicated that for large companies there is a 
relationship between media pressure and CSD, while there is no relation for small 
companies. They suggest that because the large companies receive most attention from 
media. Also, for the high-profile companies, strong and significant correlations were 
found between CSD and media pressure. For low-profile companies, significant 
correlations were only observed between media pressure and disclosure about employees. 
Patten, (2002 a) argued that the availability of firm-specific release information, even 
though  not widely publicized in the national print media, led to substantially increased 
public policy pressure for companies with worse environmental performance. The 
companies would attempt to offset negative impacts of the pollution information by 
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increasing environmental disclosure. While the change in disclosure appear to be affected 
by media pressure for some of the sample companies, the TRI (toxic release inventory) 
impact remained significant when this media pressure was controlled for. Therefore, the 
study suggested that substantial media pressure is not necessary to induce public policy 
pressure related changes in environmental disclosure  
Deegan, et al, (2002) in their longitudinal study, concentrated on social and 
environmental disclosure of BHP Company from 1983 to 1997. They examined the 
relation between disclosure and community concerns for particular social and 
environmental issue as measured by the extent of media attention. They used content 
analysis to measure media attention by the number of relevant articles in the print media 
mentioning BHP for the period from 1983 to 1997. The empirical results support the 
proposes that management would release positive information in response to 
unfavourable media attention. Cormier & Magnan, (2003) examined the influence of 
media pressure (within their cost-benefit framework) on environmental reporting for 
French companies using the number of environmental news stories reported in 
ABI/inform for a particular firm in a given year as a measure for media pressure. And 
they found a relation between media pressure and environmental reporting strategy. 
Deegan, et al, (2000) examined the change in annual report disclosure by Australian 
companies following five different environmental disasters; 
· The 1984 union carbide chemical leak in Bhopal, India 
· The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill off Alaska 
· The 1991 Kirki oil spill off the west coast of Australia 
· The 1994 Moura mine explosion in Queensland, Australia 
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· The 1995 oil spill off the north coast of Tasmania resulting from the Iron Baron 
running aground. 
They indicated that four of five disasters received media coverage while one, the Kirki oil 
spill off the west coast of Australia, did not. The results revealed that there is higher 
disclosure in the periods after disaster relative to the periods before the disasters for each 
the events except for the kirki oil spill. They suggested that the lack of reaction to the 
kirki oil spill may be due to the lack of media attention. 
Some other studies examined the impact of media pressure with other variables. 
Brammer & Pavelin, (2004) examined the media pressure using data derived from the 
Factiva database, and they found a positive relation. Brammer & Pavelin, (2006) 
examined the influence of media pressure (with some other variables) on both the 
decision to make voluntary environmental disclosure and the quality of this disclosure. 
They used data from Factiva database and they found no significant relation between 
media pressure and both decision to make disclosure and quality of disclosure. In 
addition, Li, et al, (1997) indicated that companies with higher environmental media 
pressure, defined as the proportion of news articles about the company that were 
environmentally-related, were more likely to make more disclosure about the incidents 
than companies with lower media pressure. Bewley & Li, (2000) found that the number 
of environmental related news articles published about a company was positively related 
to the level of environmental disclosure. 
It would seem that previous studies consistently used the number of news items in printed 
media as an indicator of media pressure, and this provided inconsistent results concerning 
the relationship between media pressure and CSD.  
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2.1.4 Corporate governance 
Halme & Huse, (1997) examined the relation between environmental disclosure and 
corporate governance variables (ownership concentration and board size), industry, and 
country variables in four European countries (Finland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden). The 
empirical results, based on a sample of 140 companies in four countries,  show that no 
association between both ownership concentration and the number of board members 
with environmental disclosure, while industry appear to be the most important factor in 
explaining environmental disclosure. 
Haniffa & Cooke, (2005) examined the impact of culture and corporate governance 
mechanisms on social reporting in Malaysian companies. The culture value that is 
examined is the ethnic background of directors and shareholders. The governance 
mechanisms that are examined are proportion of non-executive directors on the board, 
multiple directorships for chairman, and proportion of foreign shareholders. The results 
based on a sample of 139 non-financial companies show CSD is significantly associated 
with culture, multiple directorship, and foreign ownership. Non-executive directors are 
negatively associated with CSD. 
Ghazali, (2007) indicated that no studies have been done on the association between 
corporate ownership structure and CSD, so his study examined the influence of 
ownership structure on CSD. The factors that examined are: ownership concentration; 
director ownership; government ownership; company size; profitability, and industry. 
The empirical findings, based on sample of 86 Malaysian companies, indicated that two 
ownership variables, director ownership and government ownership, are significantly 
influence of CSD in annual report, while, third ownership variable, ownership 
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concentration, is not statistically significant in explaining the level of CSD. Profitability 
is not a significant factor in explaining CSD, while industry was also significant factor 
influencing CSD. 
In addition, some studies examined certain variables of corporate governance with other 
variables. Naser, et al, (2006) examined factors influencing CSD in developing country. 
The variables that examined are corporate growth, market capitalisation, profitability, 
leverage, and ownership variables (governmental ownership, institutional ownership, and 
major shareholders). The results based on a sample of 21 Qatari companies show positive 
association between extent of CSD and corporate size, leverage, and corporate growth. 
Ownership variables are not associated with CSD. Brammer & Pavelin, (2006) examined 
the influence of corporate ownership and board composition (with some other variables) 
on environmental disclosure. They distinguish between the decision to make a voluntary 
environmental disclosure and decisions concerning the quality of such disclosure.  
Brammer & Pavelin, (2008) examined the impact of same factors on the quality of 
environmental disclosure. Prado- Lorenzo, et al, (2009 a) examined the impact of a 
number of independent directors on CSD in Spanish companies, and their results 
indicated no relation between two variables. 
2.1.5 Other studies 
Cormier & Magnan, (1999) using a cost-benefit framework6, examined the 
determinants of corporate environmental reporting by Canadian companies (33 
companies) subject to water pollution compliance regulations during the 1986-1993 
periods. The variables suggested as determinants of environmental disclosure are; 
                                               
6 According to this approach, corporate environmental disclosure can be viewed as an outcome of management’s 
assessment of the costs and benefits to be derived from additional disclosure (Li,et al,1997:460). 
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· Information costs which are proxied by five variables: Volatility or perceived firm 
risk, Reliance on capital markets, Trading volume, Control by a single shareholder, 
individual or family, and Subsidiary of another company. 
· Financial condition which are proxied by three variables; Accounting-based 
performance, Stock market performance, and Leverage. 
· Environmental performance which proxied by excess pollution, fines and penalties, 
orders to conform, and legal actions. 
The result indicated that among information cost variables, there is evidence that a 
company’s risk, reliance on capital markets, and trading volume are positively related to 
the extent of its environmental disclosure, while concentrated ownership (closely-held) is 
associated with less environmental disclosure. There is evidence that a company in good 
financial condition chooses to disclose more than company in poor financial condition 
where financial condition is proxied as an accounting-based rate of return on assets or 
leverage. There is evidence that company’s environmental performance, especially excess 
pollution, positively influences its environmental disclosure. 
In 2003, Cormier & Magnan, (2003) extended their work by assessing how French 
companies proprietary costs and media pressure affects its disclosure. They argued that 
environmental reporting strategy is determined by: 
· Benefits from a reduction in information asymmetry. 
· Costs resulting from disclosure of proprietary information (proprietary costs). 
· Environmental media visibility. 
Their empirical work (based on a sample comprising 246 firm year observations) 
examined the influence of variables; information costs, proprietary costs and media 
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visibility. Their results indicated that economically derived variables such as information 
costs and proprietary costs are significant determinants of corporate environmental 
reporting. Also, it is appear that environmental reporting related to corporate media 
visibility.  
Cormier, et al, (2005) suggest a multi-tiered theoretical framework consider the 
company’s decision to provide environmental information as reflecting its responsiveness 
to different levels of influence: 
· Financial stakeholder’ information needs 
· Society’s environmental concerns which translate into public pressures 
· Institutional constraints and processes which could be either company – or country- 
specific. 
In their empirical study (based on 337 firm-year observations of Germany companies) 
they examine the influence of the following variables; information costs; financial 
condition; and media pressure.The results show that information costs are potentially 
important determinants of environmental disclosure strategy. Also, environmental 
disclosure quality is related to media pressure, while there is no relation between 
financial condition and environmental disclosure. In addition, the results are consistent 
with institutional theory which there is evidence that imitation and routine determine 
environmental disclosure. 
Brammer & Pavelin, (2006) examines the influence of some variables on environmental 
disclosure. They distinguishes between the decision to make a voluntary environmental 
disclosure and decision concerning the quality of such disclosure, and examined how 
each type of decision is determined by company and industry characteristics. The 
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variables which were examined are; the nature of business activities (industry type), the 
corporate environmental performance, corporate size, media pressure, company 
ownership, company resources (profitability and leverage), and board composition. The 
results (based on a data could be obtained from 447 companies) were divided to: 
1. The decision of disclosure;  
The results showed statistically significant systematic variation across sectors in the 
propensity to make environmental disclosures. Size have a highly significant positive 
effect, highly leveraged companies are significantly less likely to make disclosure, no 
significant relationship between current profitability and disclosure. There is significant 
and negative relationship between the size of the largest shareholding in company and 
disclosure, no significant relation between disclosure and the variables of environmental 
performance, media pressure, and number of non-executive directors. 
2. The quality of disclosure;  
Both industry type and size has a positive relationship. Both leverage and size of the 
largest shareholdings have a significant negative effect, no significant role for media 
pressure, profitability, and the number of non-executive directors. 
This study has some advantages compared with other studies; using a large sample, 
examining various variables, and taking into account the quality of disclosure. At the 
same time, this study has some limitations; it has concentrated on environmental 
disclosure in annual reports, and it did not measure the quantity of disclosure. In addition, 
it does not present the theoretical background for variables used, and in particular 
governance variables.  
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Brammer & Pavelin, (2008) examined factors influencing the quality of environmental 
disclosure. To measure quality of environmental disclosure, the study used the PIRC 
environmental reporting 2000 survey. The PIRC analyzes the content of corporate annual 
reports and other statements of environmental policy or performance, and uses five 
indicators of quality of corporate environmental disclosure; disclosure of an 
environmental policy, the description of environmental initiatives, reporting on 
environmental improvements, setting of environmental targets, and the presence of an 
environmental audit. The factors that they are examined as determinants of quality of 
environmental disclosure are; type of activities, environmental performance, corporate 
size, media pressure, corporate ownership, profitability and leverage, and number of non-
executive directors on the board. The empirical results, based on a sample of 447 
companies, show that both corporate size and type of activities is significantly associated 
with the quality of corporate environmental disclosure. Despite this study being 
characterized by the large size of the sample, and evaluation of environmental disclosure 
in annual reports and other statements, it is limited by its concentration on the quality of 
environmental disclosure and it does not present a theoretical background for selected 
determinants.  
Michelon, (2007) examined the relationship between corporate reputation and CSD. He 
argued that corporate reputation can be considered either determinant or result of CSD. 
He used the participation in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) as indicator for 
corporate reputation, which corporate reputation measured as a dummy variable equal 1 if 
the company belonged to the DJSI and 0 otherwise. The results stated that companies 
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with a strong reputation provide a significantly higher amount of CSD to their 
stakeholders. 
Yusoff & Lehman, (2005) examines the differences in the factors influencing 
environmental disclosure decision between Malaysian and Australian companies. The 
factors which are examined are; the environmental sensitivity of an industry, the 
corporation financial performance, and environmental certification (ISO 14000) which 
means whether companies accredited ISO 14001 or non-accredited ISO 14001. The study 
explores whether ISO 14000 certification is a better signal for accounting system to 
encounter environmental matters or not. The results, based on the sample include 
corporate annual reports of the top 50 Malaysian and Australian public listed companies, 
show that ; inconsistent with previous studies, environmental sensitivity does not relate to 
environmental disclosure for both Malaysian and Australian companies, while financial 
performance seem to be not related for Malaysian companies but related for Australian 
companies, the environmental certification (ISO 14000) is a significant determinant of 
environmental disclosure for both Malaysian and Australian companies. 
Liu, & Anbumozhi, (2008) examined the factors affecting the disclosure level of 
corporate environmental information in Chinese listed companies on the bases of 
stakeholder theory. The empirical results based on sample of 175 companies showed that 
government power (the environmental sensitivity of industry) is positively related with 
the level of environmental disclosure, while shareholder power (percent of floating stock 
possessed by the top 10 shareholders) and creditor power (debt/asset) are not associated 
with the level of disclosure. 
                                                          
                                                                                                            -68-  
Parsa & Kouhy, (2008) noted that the literature was extremely focused on the 
disclosure of social information by large companies, so they examined the determinants 
of the disclosure of social information by small-and medium-sized companies in UK. 
Based on a sample of 100 UK companies, they used a correlation test to examine the 
relation between CSD and some variables. The empirical results show that the corporate 
age is not associated with CSD, while industrial background, corporate size, and gearing, 
are associated with it. These results imply that small-and medium-sized companies are 
similar to large companies in the impact of both corporate size and industry membership 
on CSD. 
Reverte, (2009) examined the determinants of CSD by Spanish listed companies.  The 
study examined the impact of some variables that related to legitimacy theory on CSD. 
Based on a sample of 46 companies, the empirical results indicated that corporate size, 
industry membership, and media pressure are significantly associated with CSD, while 
both profitability and leverage are not associated with it. The study implied that 
legitimacy theory is the most relevant theory to explain the CSD practices of Spanish 
companies. 
Prado- Lorenzo, et al, (2009 a) test a stakeholder theory approach to analyzing CSD, 
and examined shareholder power and ownership dispersion on CSD. The variables which 
have been examined are; the presence of financial institution in the corporate ownership 
structure, the presence of a physical person that represents a dominant shareholder and a 
number of independent directors. The empirical results, based on a sample of 99 Spanish 
companies, reveal only a limited association between the presence of a physical person 
that represents a dominant shareholder and CSD. 
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Clarkson, et al, (2008) examined the association between level of environmental 
disclosure (in corporate responsibility reports) and environmental performance from point 
of view two competing theories concerning predictions about the level of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. The economic disclosure theory predicts positive association 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure based on a notion that 
companies with good environmental performance will be willing to convey their type, 
while companies with bad environmental performance will choose to be silent on their 
environmental performance. Socio-political theories (legitimacy and stakeholders) predict 
a negative association between environmental performance and environmental disclosure. 
The empirical results, based on a sample of 191companies, show a positive association 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure.  
Choi, (1999) examined factors influencing environmental disclosure in semi-annual 
reports for Korean companies. The factors that they examined are; corporate size, 
corporate financial performance, stakeholders power (owners, creditors, government, and 
auditors), and corporate age. They conducted two-stage analysis; examined discloser and 
non-discloser companies, and then they examined the level of environmental disclosure 
for discloser companies. The empirical results, based on a sample of 64 companies, show 
that concerning disclosure decision, both corporate size and auditor’ influence are 
significantly associate with the decision. Concerning the level of disclosure for discloser 
companies, financial leverage and corporate age are significantly associated with the 
level of disclosure. 
Stanny & Ely, (2008) examined factors influencing environmental disclosure about 
effects of climate change. Institutional investors are asking companies to disclose 
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information about climate change through the Carbon Disclosure Project. They argued 
that companies that receive more scrutiny will increase their disclosure. The factors that 
they examined are; corporate size, previous disclosure, industry, foreign sales, asset age, 
capital expenditure, Tobin’s Q, leverage, profitability, and institutional ownership. The 
empirical results, based on a sample of S&P 500 companies, revealed that corporate size, 
previous disclosure, and foreign sales are significantly associated with disclosure. While 
there is no significant association between disclosure and institutional ownership, Tobin’s 
Q, profitability, leverage, industry, and asset age. 
Interesting in the same issue, climate change, Prado-Lorenzo, (2009 b) examined 
factors that influence the disclosure of information on issues related to greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate change in different countries (USA, Australia, Canada, and the 
European Union). The factors that examined are corporate size, leverage, industry, return 
on equity, return on assets, market to book value, whether company has its headquarters 
in a country which approved the Kyoto protocol, and whether company belongs to Dow 
Jones sustainability index. The results show that corporate size, market to book ratio, and 
Kyoto protocol are significantly associated with disclosure. Return on equity is 
negatively associated with disclosure, while leverage, return on assets and sustainability 
index is not associated with disclosure.   
Haddock, (2005) examined the impact of location on value chain on environmental 
reporting in the UK food sector. He found that companies that are proximate to final 
consumer, particularly those with a brand name, had more disclosure than business-to-
business companies. Then, Haddock & Fraser, (2008) extended this study by examining 
the impact of location on value chain on environmental reporting for FTSE 250 
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companies. They found that companies that are close to market, or are brand-name 
companies have more disclosure than business-to-business companies.    
In addition to previous studies, Tagesson, et al, (2009) examined the factors influencing 
social and environmental disclosures on corporate websites in Swedish companies. The 
results show that disclosure is associated with corporate size (number of employees), 
industry, profitability, and ownership identity. Wanderley, et al, (2008) examined the 
impact of both country of origin and industry sector on CSR information on corporate 
websites in emerging countries. They analysed the websites of 127 companies in 8 
countries (Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand and South Africa), 
and found evidence that both country and industry sector have a significant influence 
over CSD in websites, and country of origin has stronger influence than industry sector.  
Cho, et al, (2006) examined the relation between corporations’ spending on political 
activities and environmental disclosure. Based on a sample of 119 US environmentally 
sensitive companies, the correlation results showed that there is a significant association 
between political expenditures and environmental disclosure. Rizk, et al, (2008) indicated 
that environmental disclosure is associated with industry membership while it is not 
associated with type of ownership (private and government owned companies) in 
developing country Egypt. Domench & Dallo, (2001)7 examined certain factors that 
influence environmental disclosure in annual reports. Based on a sample of 56 Spanish 
companies, the results show that company size and industry membership are associated 
with environmental disclosure, while there is no significant association between financial 
development and environmental disclosure. 
                                               
7 This paper in Spanish with English abstract  
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Hossain & Reaz, (2007) examined determinants of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports for Indian banking companies. Social disclosure represented one category of 
voluntary disclosure categories. The empirical results, based on a sample of 38 banking 
companies, show that corporate size and assets in-place are significantly associated with 
disclosure, while corporate age, multiple exchange listing, business complexity, and 
board composition (percentage of non-executive directors) are not associate with 
disclosure. Mitchell & Hill, (2009) suggested that implementation of internal 
environmental policy facilitate increased corporate social and environmental reporting in 
South African companies. Karim, et al, (2006) revealed a negative association between 
both foreign concentration and earnings volatility and environmental disclosure in the 
footnotes of annual reports and 10-K report. 
Mio, (2009) addresses another issue; he examined factors influencing the quality of 
sustainability, environmental and social reports of Italian companies. He presents an 
analysis for the link between the quality of reports and the following variables: level of 
clarification of the sustainability strategy; level of complexity; territoriality (extension of 
the market); degree of maturity and experience in sustainability communication; rate of 
growth (turnover and number of employees); degree of privatization and organizational 
structure and arrangements of the issues of social responsibility. 
The approach to measure quality of reports is based on comparing the degree of 
application of principles expressed by the GRI-G3 guidelines. The assessment of 
application is based on a scale of 0-5 (0 for non-applied principles, 5 for fully respected 
principles). The analysis show that variables influencing the quality of reports are the 
complexity, the territorial, and number of employees, and to limited extent the level of 
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privatization. There are no correlation between the quality of reports and turnover and 
organizational structure.  
Away from the dominant methodology used in literature (using correlation or 
regression analysis), Adams, (2002) indicated to the lack of explanation for internal 
contextual factors and their impact on reporting, so, these factors were examined by using 
interviews with three UK companies and four German companies. All companies were in 
the chemical and/or pharmaceutical business. The findings showed that there are 
significant internal contextual variables which are likely to impact on the extensiveness, 
quality, quantity and completeness of reporting. These variables include aspects of the 
reporting process and attitudes to reporting, its impacts, legislation and audit. The study 
indicated that the process of reporting and decision making appears to depend on country 
of origin, corporate size and corporate culture. Aspects of process which appear to be 
influenced by these variables are the degree of formality versus informality, departments 
involved and the extent of engagement of stakeholders. The findings pointed that 
accountants are neither involved in data collection nor considered appropriate people to 
be involved. The attitudes of interviewees are also likely to have an influence on the 
extent nature of reporting. 
Using the same methodology, interviews, Ljungdahl, (2004) conducted 20 interviews 
with representatives of 8 Swedish companies mainly in the forest products sector. The 
aim of the interviews was to identify which influenced CSR reporting. The interviews’ 
results show the factors identified during interviews can be divided to factors which are 
primarily of an external nature (public opinion, customer demands, stakeholder interest, 
peer pressure) and factors which are of an internal nature (management support, 
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environmental department, environmental management system, corporate culture, 
reporting experience, competitive advantage) as the following; 
· Public opinion and customer demands; all interviewees agree that the product market 
demands and public opinion consider pressures on companies to act in an socially 
acceptable manner more than legal requirements. 
· Stakeholder interest and peer pressure; several interviewees indicated that, directly or 
indirectly, the reporting activities of competitors as a factor affected their company’s 
disclosure. 
· Management support and centralised environmental department; consider internal 
factors that have influence on the disclosure. 
· Prior reporting experience, corporate culture and competitive advantage; the positive 
reporting experience consider important motive for developing CSR reporting.       
2.2 Special Models 
 
In addition to previous studies, there are some studies which suggested a proposed 
framework (based on stakeholder perspective) that can explain which company disclose 
more corporate social responsibility information. 
To explain the disclosure decision, Ullmann, (1985) argued that strategic posture 
articulates with two other factors (financial performance, and stakeholder power) and he 
suggest a contingency framework to explain disclosure strategy depending on these three 
variables as the following table;  
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Table 3.2: Ullman’ model for disclosure strategy  
Situation Stakeholder 
power 
Strategic 
posture 
Financial 
performance 
Disclosure strategy 
1 High Active Good Mandatory and voluntary: high 
2 High Active Poor Mandatory-high voluntary-low 
3 High Passive Good Mandatory-indeterminate voluntary-
low 
4 High Passive Poor Mandatory-indeterminate voluntary-
low 
5 Low Active Good Mandatory-high voluntary-low 
6 Low Active Poor Mandatory and voluntary: low 
7 Low Passive Good Mandatory and voluntary: low 
8 Low Passive Poor Mandatory and voluntary: low 
Source: (Ullman, 1985:553) 
Robert, (1992) tested empirically the ability of stakeholder theory to explain CSD and 
his results support the Ullman’s framework. Elijido-Ten, (2004) used Ullman’s model to 
examine the determinants of environmental disclosures in developing country Malaysia. 
He examined stakeholder power (shareholder power, creditor power, and government 
power), strategic posture (the presence of environmental committee and ISO 
certification); and economic performance (return on assets and change in firm value). The 
findings show that environmental disclosure is associated with strategic posture and the 
government’s power to sanction companies. Economic performance is not associated 
with environmental disclosure. And recently, Magness (2006) examined this framework 
and suggests another one to Discretionary disclosure depending on two variables 
(strategic posture and financial performance) as the following; 
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Table 3.3: Magness’ model for disclosure strategy  
Strategic posture Financial performance Discretionary disclosure expected to be 
High Good High 
High Poor Low 
Low Good Low 
Low Poor low 
Source: (Magness, 2006:555) 
 
In the same context, stakeholder perspective, Aerts, et al, (2004) suggested that based 
on an analysis of a typical company’s relationships, stakeholders can be divided into 
three groups: business stakeholder; social stakeholders and financial stakeholders. They 
examined the influence of business stakeholders’ implicit claims (time horizon and 
industry concentration ratio), social stakeholders’ implicit claims (media exposure and 
capital intensity), and financial stakeholders’ implicit claims (forecast dispersion, 
concentrated ownership, return on assets, and leverage) on environmental disclosure in 
north American countries, USA and Canada, and continental European countries, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Netherlands. The results show that business stakeholders 
concerns can explain to a significant extent the corporate environmental disclosure in 
North America. Also, media exposure through either positive or negative news stories 
published in newspapers or magazines is positively related to environmental disclosure. 
On the other hand, Belkaoui & Kaprik, (1989) suggested a positive model of the 
corporate decision to disclose social information in terms of both social performance and 
economic performance.  
2.3 Determinants on The Country Level 
The majority of prior studies have concentrated on analysis data from one country, and 
there are some studies which presented a comparative analysis between some countries 
(see the following table). 
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Table 3.4: some of CSD comparatives studies 
Study countries comments 
Roberts,1991, Germany, Netherlands, France, 
Sweden and Switzerland.  
Concentrated on environmental disclosure, and 
indicated that while the majority of the companies 
disclose at least some environmental information, 
the level of disclosure is generally low.   
Gamble,et al,1996 Australia-belgium-canada-
denmark-finland-france-
germany-india-italy-japan-
luxemburg-New Zealand –
Netherlands –Norway –China - 
South Africa –Sweden - 
Switzerland- UK - USA 
The British American accounting model produced 
the highest percentage of companies employing the 
different environmental disclosure forms 
Fekrat,et al,1996 Austria-belgium-canada-chile-
denmark-finland-france-
germany-italy-japan-
netherlands-new Zealand- 
Norway – Spain –Sweden -
Switzerland-UK-USA 
No apparent relation between disclosure and 
environmental performance 
 
 
Adams,et al,1998 France – Germany –
Netherlands – Sweden –
Switzerland -UK 
Whilst legitimacy theory can be employed to explain 
differences related to size and industry, the 
differences between countries are much more 
complex 
Williams & Pei, 
1999 
Australia- Singapore –
Malaysia - Hong Kong 
Companies in all countries appear to provide more 
disclosure on web sites than annual reports 
Williams,1999 Australia-Singapore- Hong 
Kong – Philippines – Thailand 
– Indonesia -Malaysia 
The socio-political and economic system of a nation 
interact to shape the perceptions of companies in 
the need to release CSD that meet social 
expectations as well as government regulation 
Adams & 
Kuasirikun, 2000 
 
UK-Germany 
 
 
The factors which have caused differences between 
two countries are industry initiatives, extent of 
regulation, and other social and political pressure 
Buhr & Freedman, 
2001 
 
 
Canada-USA 
 
 
 
Concentrated on environmental disclosure and 
show that over the time period the disclosure 
produced by Canadian companies increased more 
than the US disclosure which was initially greater. 
Newson & Deegan,  
2002 
Australia-Singapore-south 
Korea 
There is weak association between global 
expectations and social disclosure policies of large 
multinational companies 
Holland&Foo,2003 UK-USA  
Smith, et al,2005 Denmark-Norway-USA  
Aerts, et al,2008 Belgium, France ,Germany, 
Netherlands, Canada, and USA 
The results show that north American companies 
provide more environmental disclosure related to 
expenditures and risk, abatement, and remediation 
than continental Europe companies. 
Chambers, et al, 
2003. 
India, south Korea, Thailand, 
Singapore, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Indonesia 
They indicated that CSD in Asia lag behind those in 
the west 
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Some studies have examined the determinants that explain the differences between 
countries in the level of CSD applications. Williams, (1999) used political economy 
theory to explain the determinants of CSD on the countries level. He suggest that culture 
dimensions (uncertainty avoidance and masculinity), political and civil system, legal 
system, level of economic development, and equity market are the variables which 
represent the determinants of CSD on the country level. The results of empirical tests 
(based on the sample of listed companies in seven countries) show that two cultural 
dimensions and political and civil system are significant determinants of quantity of CSD 
provided by listed companies in these countries, While, the legal system and equity 
market do not appear to be important factors in explaining CSD. 
Chambers, et al, (2003) investigated corporate social responsibility disclosure on the 
internet through analysis of websites of the top 50 companies in seven Asian countries. 
They attempted to explain the different levels of disclosure among seven countries by 
analysing the impact of economic level, social development, system of governance, and 
globalisation on the level of disclosure. They examined the economic level by two 
variables; economic performance (GDP per capita), economic structure (the balance of 
economic sectors), and they indicated that there is no relationship between economic 
level and disclosure. They measured social development by two proxies; life expectancy 
and adult literacy, and found that there is no statistically significant relationship with 
disclosure. They expected that high standards of governance would be positively 
correlated with disclosure, and they measured governance by using published data on 
perceptions of corruption, bribery and opacity at the national level, they find no clear 
relationship with disclosure. The study investigated the impact of globalisation through 
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three variables; level of direct foreign investment, international export patterns, and the 
domestic/international status of companies. In general, they report a positive association 
between globalisation and disclosure.  
Van Der Laan Smith, et al, (2005) argued that stakeholder orientation in a country will 
influence the extent and quality of CSD in annual reports. They argued that corporate 
governance systems, ownership structure, and cultural factors in a country influence the 
manner in which the role of company and its stakeholders is defined in a society. The 
results based on a sample of 32 Norwegian/Danish companies and 26 US companies 
support their argument. 
Buhr & Freedman, (2001) explains that the factors such as history, geography, the 
political system, the legal system, and the business climate affect the different disclosure 
responses in Canada and USA. Adams & Kuasirikun, (2000) explored some of the factors 
which might be thought have caused the diversity in reporting between German and UK 
including; industry initiatives, extent of regulation demanding ethical responsibility, and 
other social and political pressures. 
2.4 Limitations of Prior Studies  
The current study is considered a general study, as it examines a framework of some 
variables that could explain the level of CSD. Haron, et al, 2004, argued that it should be 
noted that past research on CSD lacks a consistent approach in terms of (a) research 
method, (b) sample selection, or (c) the period of study. The studies related to 
determinants of CSD suffer from some limitations that contribute to the inconclusiveness 
of existing studies; 
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· The samples in earlier studies have tended to be small and restricted in diversity in both 
size and industry. 
· They lack theory and have inappropriate definitions of key terms. 
· They use binary variables extensively to indicate whether an industry has a high or low 
profile, regarding social or environmental issues (Ullman, 1985; Patten, 2002b:765; 
Brammer & Pavelin, 2006:1170).  
The current study attempts to overcome these general limitations through using a large 
sample, which includes various economic sectors, in order to achieve industry diversity in 
the sample. This study also depends on presenting a theoretical framework for 
determinants.  
In addition to other general limitations, previous studies appear to suffer from some 
further limitations, the first of which is ignoring stand-alone corporate responsibility 
reports.  Although annual reports are considered as the most important disclosure 
documents, because they are produced regularly, are required by legislation and produced 
by all major companies, the growing trend toward CSD has been matched by increasing 
interest in releasing separate CSR reports10. Despite a growing trend toward producing 
stand-alone reports, the previous studies did not pay attention to these reports. It is 
important that attention be given to these reports to explain the level of social disclosure 
for the company as a whole, over and above the level of social disclosure in annual 
reports. Roberts (1991) stated that the exclusive focus on annual reports may provide an 
incomplete picture (to some extent) of corporate disclosure practices (Roberts, 1991:61).  
                                               
10 According to KPMG’s triennial surveys (initiated in 1993) CSR reports have been steadily rising since 1993 and have increased 
substantially in the past three years. In 2005, 52% of G250 (global 250 companies) and 33% of N100 (national 100 companies in 16 
countries) companies issued separate CR reports, compared with 45% and 28% respectively in 2002 and 35% and 24% respectively in 
1999, (KPMG, 2002, 2005). 
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Zeghal & Ahmed (1990) also indicated that annual reports are not the only medium that 
companies can use to disclose their socially responsible behaviour. Unerman (2000) 
stated that “studies which only examine annual reports risk underestimating the volume 
of CSR companies engage in” (Unerman, 2000:674). On the other hand, the presence of 
stand-alone reports could affect social disclosure in annual reports, and ignoring stand-
alone reports may lead to misleading results. It is possible that companies that produce 
corporate responsibility reports could decrease the quantity of social and environmental 
information in their annual reports based on the presence of this information in their 
stand-alone reports. By contrast, these companies could increase this information in their 
annual reports, based on the fact that the information already exists in responsibility 
reports and consequently there is no additional cost in disclosing this information in 
annual reports. In this context, Danastas & Gadenne, (2006) stated that “the production of 
separate environmental reports by large corporations and the utilisation of company 
websites to disclose environmental information consequently diminishes the amount of 
corporate social disclosure included in the company’s annual report”(Danastas & 
Gadenne, 2006:87).  Briefly, concentration on CSD in annual reports provides an 
incomplete picture of CSD and could provide misleading results.  
Another limitation of previous studies is that the majority of these studies have 
concentrated on measuring the quantity of CSD; few studies have taken into account the 
quality of CSD. The quality of CSD does not necessarily or directly link to the amount of 
disclosure (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006: 1169-1170). Van Staden & Hooks, (2007) argued 
that evaluating the quality and extent of environmental disclosure in different media will 
give a comprehensive picture of companies’ attempts to discuss environmental activities 
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(Van Staden & Hooks, 2007: 198). There has been recognition that reliance on mere 
numbers of disclosures may be misleading (Cowen, et al, 1987: 121). Counting the 
number of sentences or words does not provide an understanding of the type and 
importance of information being disclosed (Smith, et al, 2005: 140). There is a view that 
environmental disclosure quality affects a company’s immediate stakeholders and 
society, more than the disclosure quantity (Cormier, et al, 2005:5). It can be argued that 
disclosure quality reflects whether the company provides information about actual 
activities or just provides a quantity of general information. Ignoring quality of disclosure 
could provide misleading results, as it does not differentiate between companies that 
provide real information and those that provide only general information. Thus, ignoring 
disclosure quality leads to misunderstanding regarding the level of CSD and adds to an 
incomplete picture of CSD. Although the measuring of disclosure quality is difficult, and 
may lack objectivity, it is important to evaluate CSD taking into account both quantity 
and quality of disclosure.  
Most studies have concentrated on analysing environmental disclosure. These studies 
seem to be motivated by growing global concerns concerning environmental issues and 
increasing attention from the public with regard to the impact on the environment of 
companies’ activities. In this aspect, some studies indicated that environmental 
information is not the prevalent social disclosure category in annual reports; Hackston & 
Milne (1996), indicated that human resources and community information are the most 
important categories in New Zealand companies. Rizk et al. (2008) indicated that 
employee-related information is the most important information in Egyptian companies.  
Futhermore, Sobhani et al. (2009) indicated that human resources information is the most 
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important information in Bangladesh. Therefore, concentration on environmental 
disclosure fails in its reflection of corporate social responsibility strategies. Concentration 
on environmental disclosure has also led to concentration on particular economic sectors, 
which in most cases seem to be environmentally sensitive sectors. These environmentally 
sensitive sectors are attributed to the industry sector and consequently other economic 
sectors are ignored. This idea is based on the notion that some economic sectors, in 
particular financial and services sectors have no impact on the environment. This 
concentration on some economic sectors could lead to misleading results. For example, 
previous literature indicates positive relationships between corporate size and CSD, but 
this relationship could be disputed if all economic sectors are not taken into account.  
Despite widespread academic and business interest in CSD, the theoretical framework 
of the underlying determinants of CSD is still elusive (Cormier, et al., 2005: 6), and each 
study has concentrated on examining some variables as determinants of CSD. Previous 
literature on determinants of CSD has been primarily concerned with the impact of 
corporate characteristics, following mainstream disclosure literature, and some studies 
have examined the impact of media pressure on CSD. By contrast, little attention has 
been paid to the impact of other variables, such as corporate governance and degree of 
multinational activities, on CSD. Regarding this concern, Haniffa & Cooke, (2005) 
argued that since disclosure is an accounting activity involving both human and non-
human resources, studies in this area would benefit if both cultural and corporate 
governance factors are considered (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005: 392). Consideration of 
corporate governance is important because it is top management that oversees disclosure 
in annual reports (Gibbins, et al, 1990). 
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It can therefore be argued that previous studies related to determinants of CSD display 
two basic limitations. One limitation is related to CSD itself, as these studies, in most 
cases, have provided an incomplete picture of CSD through concentration on quantity of 
environmental disclosure in annual reports. The second limitation is related to 
determinants, as there is no theoretical background to explain the selected variables. In 
addition to these two basic limitations, the concentration on some economic sectors in 
analysis could provide misleading results. Briefly, the limitations of previous studies are: 
1. Concentration on annual reports and ignoring stand-alone reports. 
2. Concentration on quantity of disclosure and ignoring its quality. 
3. Concentration on environmental disclosure. 
4. Lack of theoretical background to explain determinants. 
Several questions come to mind as a result of these limitations. Which factors can 
represent a framework for CSD determinants (at the companies’ level)? Are these factors 
influencing both the quantity and quality of CSD?  Which factors have the greatest 
impact on the level of CSD? 
 
3. CONSEQUENCES OF CSD 
Despite the importance of clarifying the significance of CSD and analysing the benefits 
that would have been achieved by companies, the consequences of social disclosure have 
attracted less attention than the determinants of this disclosure. The consequences of CSD 
can be represented as feedback from society on CSD, and could be seen as an answer to 
the question: Does this disclosure achieve its objectives? Dierkes & Antal, (1985) suggest 
a stepwise process for evaluating the usefulness and use of CSD, they suggest 
investigating; 
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· How important is the concept of CSR to users? 
· How much CSD satisfies users’ information needs when making decisions? 
· Is CSD considered useable? Is the information perceived to be reliable and is it 
presented in such a way that it can be used? 
· Does CSD actually change decision-making behaviour?  
Prior studies have concentrated on two dimensions as consequences of CSD; the impact 
of CSD on corporate social reputation and the impact of CSD on financial performance 
(the market reaction to CSD).  
3.1 Corporate Social Reputation  
One of the most important explanations for CSR disclosure is it could be a part of 
corporate reputation (to avoid or alleviate social pressure). Fomburn, (1996) defines 
reputation as strategic asset that produce tangible benefits such as: Premium prices for 
products; Lower costs for capital and labour'; Improved loyalty from employee; Greater 
latitude in decision making and Cushion of goodwill when crises hit ( Fomburn, 
1996:57). Fomburn & Van Riel, (1997) suggested that reputation is: 
a. Derivative, second-order characteristics which emerge from particular organisational 
fields, and is 
b. External reflections of internal sense making activities conducted within firms, which 
c. Develop from prior activities and prior assessments by diverse evaluators, and as such 
d. Comprise multiple images/assessments of companies. 
Although, legitimacy and reputation are occasionally used interchangeably in social 
accounting studies (Deegan, 2002:296), Deephouse & Carter, (2005) suggested that 
legitimacy and reputation differ in two aspects: 
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· The nature of assessment; while legitimacy relies on meeting and adhering to the 
expectations of social system's norms, rules and meanings, reputation relates to a 
comparison of companies to determine their relative standing. 
· The dimension of evaluation; reputation may be related to virtually any organisational 
attribute such as attractive landscaping around facilities, but such features are not 
usually linked to legitimacy (Deephouse & Carter, 2005:331). 
The common way to describe corporate reputation is using reputation ranking studies 
and various reputation indexes. Stakeholders use environmental ratings to make decisions 
about investments, consumer purchases, and political activism such as lobbying and 
boycotting. For example, KLD dropped Coca-Cola Co. from its broad market social 
index in July 2006 because of concerns over the company’s labour and environmental 
policies in the developing world. This action prompted TIAA-CREF, the biggest US 
retirement fund, to sell over 50 million shares of Coca-Cola Co. stock. Critics of the 
company also seized on KLD action as support for their longstanding complaints against 
Coca-Cola Co. (Chatterji, 2007:5). 
Some studies have examined the impact of CSD on corporate reputation; Toms, (2002) 
analysed the relationship between the environmental disclosure (with diverse institutional 
share ownership, systematic risk, size and profitability) and corporate environmental 
reputation. He proposed theoretical framework based on resource-based view of the firm 
supplemented by quality signalling theory. The environmental reputation determined by 
using the corporate reputation rankings for the community and environmental 
responsibility aspect of management today’s survey of Britain’s most admired companies 
in 1996 and 1997. The empirical results suggest that environmental disclosure in annual 
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reports contributes significantly to the creation of environmental reputation. So it is 
concluded that there is strong support for the relationship between disclosure strategy and 
environmental reputation. Hasseldine, et al, (2005) extend the work of Toms, 2002, using 
the theoretical framework integrating the resource based view of the firm with quality-
signalling theory, they examine the effects of quantity and quality of environmental 
disclosure on the corporate environmental reputation. They added research and 
development expenditure as a variable influence environmental reputation. The results 
show that environmental disclosure has a strong effect on the creation of environmental 
reputation. The results show that quality of disclosure has stronger effect on 
environmental reputation than quantity of disclosure, so it is concluded that content 
analysis based on the mere volume of disclosures may be insufficient for the purpose of 
identifying the relationship between disclosure and reputation.  
Deegan & Rankin, (1996) found that increased disclosure by companies in years in 
which they were prosecuted by the Australian environmental protection agency. Aerts & 
Cormier, (2009) argued that companies use environmental disclosure (in annual reports 
and press releases) to manage their environmental legitimacy. They examined the impact 
of environmental disclosure in both annual reports and press releases on environmental 
legitimacy measured by Janis-Fadner coefficient rely on content analysis of press media 
coverage for corporate environmental issues. The study differentiated between two types 
of environmental press releases, proactive and reactive. The empirical results based on a 
sample of 158 US and Canadian companies, revealed that environmental legitimacy is 
positively affected by environmental disclosure in annual reports and by reactive 
environmental press releases. 
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3.2 Economic Consequences11 
Ullman, (1985) distinguished between social disclosure and social performance and 
argued that there are three relationships to study; the relation between social disclosure 
and social performance, the relation between social disclosure and economic 
performance, and the relation between social performance and economic performance. 
He argued that social disclosure may not be correlated with social performance and social 
disclosure cannot be substituted for performance without prior empirical verification. 
Therefore, the academic literature has been interested to study the relation between the 
three variables; corporate social performance (CSP), corporate social disclosure (CSD), 
and corporate financial performance (CFP). In order to better understand of the economic 
consequences of CSD, first the relation between CSP and CFP will be analysing, and then 
analysis the studies that related to economic consequences of CSD. 
3.2.1 Social and financial performance 
Although, traditionally, it has been assumed that investors will act in accordance with 
their economic interests when choosing from among alternatives investments, there are 
two new factors have been introduced into investment decision-making due to rising 
public concerns over the social and environmental consequences of corporate activities; 
new and increasingly stringent sanctions against certain types of corporate activities, an 
                                               
11 Healy & Palepu, 2001, reviews the studies which examined the economic consequences of voluntary 
disclosure. they argue that there are potentially three types of capital market affects for companies that make 
extensive voluntary disclosure: 
1. Improved stock quality; voluntary disclosure reduce information asymmetries among informed and 
uniformed investors, therefore, with high levels of voluntary disclosure, investors can be relatively confident 
that any stock transactions occur at a fair price, increasing liquidity in the company’s stock. 
2. Reduced cost of capital; when disclosure is imperfect, investors bear risks in forecasting the future payoffs 
from their investment. If this risk is non—diversifiable, investors will demand an incremental return for 
information risk. Therefore, with high levels of disclosure, and hence low information   risk, are likely to 
have a lower cost of capital. 
3. Increased information intermediation; if management’s private information is not fully revealed through 
required disclosure, voluntary disclosure lowers the cost of information acquisition for analysts and hence 
increases their supply. 
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increase in the number of investors who believe they should avoid investing in certain 
classes of corporations (Spicer, 1978: 95-96). Therefore, attention has been paid to 
corporate social performance. Wood, (1991) described CSP as being comprised of three 
major components; first, the level of CSR which is based on legitimacy within society, 
public responsibility within the organisation, and managerial direction by each individual 
within the organisation. Second, the processes of corporate social responsiveness and 
these include environmental assessment, stakeholder management and issues 
management. Third, the outcomes of corporate behaviour which includes social impacts, 
social programs and social policies. 
There are two viewpoints about the relation between CSR and CFP;  
· First one by Friedman, 1970, (agree with simple economic model of a profit 
maximizing firm) who stated that corporate resources spent on social responsibility-
related activities come out of shareholders pocket. According to his claim, CSR cannot 
be contributing to company value. So, we can expect a negative relation between CSR 
and CFP. 
· Second one believes that it is a myth that activities in social responsibility are in 
fundamental conflict with the interests of shareholders. There are some 
mechanisms(deriving from stakeholder theory) that explain why managing the 
stakeholders interests can increase a company’s profit such as; 
¶ Managing environmental concerns can lower the costs of complying with 
existing and future environmental regulations, although it can increase the 
operating costs in short run. 
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¶ Managing employee relation; can lower worker turnover and absenteeism, 
and enhance productivity by improving commitment and efforts. Increased 
diversity in the workforce means that a company is not constrained by race or 
gender in selecting the best person for jobs which enabling company to recruit 
better talent. 
¶ Managing good interorganisational relationships with the suppliers can be 
the source of competitive advantage. 
¶ Maintaining a good relationship with community may have a positive 
effect of attracting desirable residents, besides it can decrease the possibility of a 
negative media event such as picketing. 
¶ Customers can take actions to reward or punish a company’s action in an 
attempt to change or reinforce such actions, thereby creating a positive link 
between CSP and CFP (Moon, 2007: 5-6). 
The relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial 
performance (CFP) has attracted the attention of many researchers. Pava & Krausz, 
(1996) conducted an analysis based on 21 empirical studies from 1972 to 1992, and they 
found that 12 studies pointed to a positive association, 8 studies found no association and 
one study found a negative association. Griffin & Mahon, (1997) divided previous studies 
by decade and they found following results (table 3.5); 
Table 3.5: studies on relationship between CSP and CFP divided historically (Griffin & 
Mahon, 1997) 
Decade Positive No effect/ 
inconclusive 
Negative 
1970s 12 4 I 
1980s 14 5 16 
1990s 7 0 3 
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Orlitzky, et.al, (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 52 studies (which evaluated the 
relationship between CSP and CFP) and they found: 
· CSP appears to be more highly correlated with accounting-based measures of CFP 
than with market-based indicators, 
· CSP reputation indices are more highly correlated with CFP than are other indicators 
of CSP. 
Margolis, et al, (2006) provided an analysis to the 99 research studies which have 
sought to determine whether or not positive social performance leads to positive 
Financial Performance and they indicated that the studies look at CSP as either dependent 
(is a product of corporate financial performance), or independent (CSP contributes to 
CFP) variable. From the 80 studies evaluated whether CSP contributes to CFP; 53% point 
to positive relationship, 24% found no relationship, 4% find a negative relationship, and 
19% yield a mixed results. From 19 studies evaluated whether CSP is an outcome of 
CFP; 68%point to positive relationship, 16% yield no relationship, and 16% providing 
mixed results. Dam, (2006) presented an overview of the results of the studies on the 
relationship between CSR and CFP classified by financial performance measures, he 
analysed the impact of socially responsible behaviour on three widely used financial 
indicators; the market-to-book ratio, return on assets and stock market returns. The 
findings in the following table, 
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Table 3.6: studies on relationship between CSP and CFP divided according to financial 
performance indicators (Dam, 2006) 
Financial performance 
indicators 
 
No, of 
studies 
Positive 
relation 
Negative 
relation 
Mixed 
relation 
No 
relation 
Market-to book 5 5 0 0 0 
Return on assets 36 27 0 0 9 
Stock market returns 27 7 9 3 8 
Total 68 39 9 3 17 
 
These findings show that for market-to book we can expect a positive relation with social 
responsibility, for return on assets also a positive relation, and for stock market returns 
the relation is ambiguous. 
McWilliams & Siegel, (2000) suggests that the reason for inconsistency of results 
related to the relation between social and financial performance is the flaw in existing 
econometric studies. These studies do not control for investment in R&D which has been 
shown to be an important determinant of firm performance and they stated that when the 
model is properly specified we find that CSR has a neutral impact on financial 
performance. Husted & Allen, (2007) argued that the positive relationship between CSR 
and financial performance will be found when companies design CSR projects in ways 
that seek to achieve competitive advantage for companies (Husted & Allen, 2007: 346). 
Berman, et al, (1999) used the stakeholder relationships and a firm strategy as impacts 
on CFP, and they suggest three models as following; 
· The direct effect model which stakeholders relationships and corporate strategy have 
direct and separate impact on CFP 
· The moderation model which corporate strategy have a direct impact on CFP but 
moderated by the impact of stakeholders relationships 
                                                          
                                                                                                            -93-  
· The intrinsic stakeholder commitment model which the company has an intrinsic 
commitment to its various stakeholders which puts their interests at the heart of 
strategic decision making 
The empirical work which was carried out to test these three models showed support for 
first and second models and not support for third model. They found that two 
stakeholders’ relationships –employees and customers- have direct impact on CFP, while 
all five stakeholder relationships- employees, customers, community, natural 
environment and diversity of workforce- moderated the corporate strategy-performance 
relation. 
3.2.2 Economic consequences of CSD 
It is clear that general awareness and concern in society for matters such as 
environmental degradation, habitat destruction, global climate change, human rights, and 
stakeholder involvement, continue to increase. It certainly seems likely that the number 
of potential areas in which social or environmental activity can have relatively direct 
financial consequences must increase. These consequences can be of a cost-saving nature, 
cost or liability avoidance, revenue-generating, or even simple signals of best-in-class 
management practices (Murray, et al, 2006: 231).  
A number of studies have paid attention to study the market reaction to CSD. Parsa & 
Kouhy, (2001) examined the relation between CSD and different aspects of performance. 
The different aspects of performance and their measures are; 
performance aspects accounting ratios 
Profitability Trading profit margin 
Managerial efficiency Stock ratio (days) 
Debtors (days) 
Creditors (days) 
Gearing ratios Reference and loan capital/equity and reserves 
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Liquidity ratio Working capital ratio 
The empirical results show that profitability and gearing were found to be positively 
associated with CSD, concerning of managerial efficiency only stock ratio was associated 
with CSD, while no association between liquidity and CSD. 
To examine whether social disclosure has information content, Ingram, (1978) 
examined the impact of corporate social disclosure on security returns using two related 
tests; one analyzed returns from a broad spectrum of the market, and another investigate 
the return performance of specific market segments. The results indicated that in first test, 
the social disclosure has no information content, while the second test suggest that the 
information content of social disclosure varies between companies. These results suggest 
that the information content of corporate social disclosure is conditional upon the market 
segment with which the company is identified.  Anderson & Frankle, (1980) examine 
whether social disclosure has information content and if the market values this disclosure 
positively. They compared the returns to portfolios composed of securities of socially 
disclosing companies with the returns to portfolios of equivalent risk composed of 
securities of non-disclosing companies. The mean returns of the portfolios are compared 
over two six-month periods (pre- and post fiscal year), if social performance information 
have no information content. Then the mean returns for the disclosing and non-disclosing 
portfolios should be equal. The results indicated that social disclosure has information 
content and that the market values this disclosure positively.  
To explore the decision usefulness of narrative disclosure on corporate environmental 
performance, Chan & Milne, (1999) examined the investors’ reaction to two states of 
corporate environmental performance; one the company discloses about its bad 
environmental performance(bad news), and another the company discloses it is a leader 
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in environmental management(good news). The results indicated that the investors react 
strongly and negatively to the poor environmental performance, while there is no 
significant reaction to the good environmental performance. Shane & Spicer, (1983) 
indicated that empirical studies provide on limited support for the proposition that 
investors using social performance information in making investment decision, so they 
examined the relation between security price movements and externally produced social 
information through examining the association between security price movements and the 
release of 8 major studies conducted by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) of 
corporate environmental performance in four important USA industries (  pulp and paper, 
electric power, iron and steel, and petroleum). The results indicated that, on average, 
there are relatively large negative abnormal returns on the two days immediately prior to 
newspaper indicated to the release of CEP studies. In addition, the companies revealed to 
have low-pollution control rankings were found to have significantly more negative 
returns than companies with high rankings on the day of publishing reports. These results 
report some significant association between security price movements and the release of 
externally produced social information, and point to that investors using information 
released by CEP to discriminate between companies with different pollution control 
performance. Freedman & Stagliano (1991) examined investor reaction to the Supreme 
Court’s affirmation that work-place cotton-dust emissions had to be reduced. The results 
show that stock prices of companies in cotton-textile industry were negatively affected by 
Supreme Court decision. The share price of companies which provided no disclosure or 
only narrative disclosure declined relative to companies which provided quantitative 
disclosure about the decision impact.  
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Epstein & Freedman, (1994) examined whether or not individual investors demand 
social information. Using a survey of 300 individual investors, the results indicated that 
non-institutional shareholders are interested in having their corporations report on some 
information concerning social activities. It appears that there is a strong demand for 
information about product safety and quality and about company’s environmental 
activities. 
Belkaoui, (1972) and Longstreth & Rosenbloom, (1973) (as cited in Ingram, 
1978,).were two the first studies to examine the relevance of the social information for 
investors. The first study surveyed groups of bank officers, practicing accountants, and 
students, and the results indicated that the disclosure of pollution costs had an impact on 
investment decision. The second study surveyed institutional investors and found that 
approximately 57% of the respondents stated that they did consider social factors in 
addition to economic factors (Ingram, 1978: 271). 
Solomon & Solomon (2006) used interviews with UK institutional investors to examine 
the benefits of social, ethical and environmental disclosure (SEE) for institutional 
investment. The results indicated that investors did not consider public SEE was adequate 
for their investment decisions. Therefore, private SEE disclosure channels were 
developed, and private SEE disclosure process was becoming dialogic in nature, as both 
companies and institutional investors are require information from each other.  
To examine the influence of environmental information on share prices, Stevens, (1984) 
suggested that investors are motivated by factors other than risk and return, and he 
believed that if such investors (ethical investors) were numerous their behaviour might 
affect share prices. And to investigate whether share prices are systematically affected by 
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environmental disasters, Blacconiere & Patten, (1994) found that companies with more 
disclosure prior to the Bhopal disaster in 1984 faced a less negative market reaction to 
disaster than other companies in the chemical industry who disclosed very little on 
environmental matters. Gozali, et al, (2002) examined the relationship between the 
environmental information disclosed in the annual report and the company’s share price, 
using data of Australian companies from 1998 to 2000; they found that companies with 
positive environmental disclosure perform significantly better in the market than 
companies that disclose negative environmental information. Balcconiere & Northcut, 
(1997) examine the relation between stock price reaction to the superfund amendments 
and reauthorization act(SARA) of 1986 and the extent of environmental information in 
financial reports(10-K reports),they argued that companies with extensive environmental 
disclosure would be affected less negatively by the expected increased regulatory costs 
resulting from SARA. The results indicated that chemical companies with extensive 
environmental disclosure in their 10-K reports had a less negative reaction to SARA.  
Recently, Murray, et al, (2006) explored the capital markets concern about social and 
environmental disclosure. They argued that financial markets are variously seen as 
offering the biggest single impediment or the greatest possible opportunity for 
international capitalism to re-invent itself in a new form that is compatible with the 
exigencies of sustainability. In the absence of an apparent will to closely regulate 
financial markets, it must fall to incentive, and persuasion to encourage markets to act in 
a manner less incompatible with the social and environmental aims of sustainability. a 
potentially major factor in achieving this ambitious re-direction must inevitably be 
information and ,in particular, information about corporation social and environmental 
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activities. This is a role currently fulfilled, albeit inadequately, by CSD mainly through 
corporate annual report. They stated that with significant growth in ethical investment 
funds, it is apparent that investors become less obsessed by financial return. 
Consequently, social and environmental disclosures may well offer an important source 
of direct input to these ethical investors’ decisions. The results indicated that over a 
period of time, total social and environmental disclosure is significantly related to market 
returns even after adjusting for the size effect. Parsa & Deng (2007) examined the market 
reaction to the announcement of social and environmental information of new entrants to 
the London Stock Exchange over the period from 1999 to 2003. They searched for social 
announcements in two channels; investor relations websites of the companies, and the 
financial times online power search engine. They measured market reaction as the 
abnormal return on individual companies’ share prices over three days when social 
information was released. The results show that of 249 non-financial companies that 
joined London Stock Exchange, there were 65 social information releases by 40 
companies. The results provide evidence that there is an overall positive reaction to most 
social information announcements, and the profit could have been made if shares had 
been bought on the day social information were announced and were sold three days 
later. Despite this result being based on limited data, it supports the argument of 
legitimacy theory that companies use CSD to improve their public reputation. 
Milne & Chan, (1999) study the usefulness of CSD for investment decision –making. 
They argued that traditional user group (investors) find social information useful for their 
investment decision making and companies are fulfilling these decision needs. The 
empirical results show that the decision impact is small with no more than a 15% switch 
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in investment funds being detected. Abbott & Monsen, (1979) examined the relation 
between social disclosure and the total returns for investors for 1964-1974, and the results 
indicated that there appears to be no effect of social disclosure.  
Balabanis, et al, (1998) investigated the relationship between CSR (performance and 
disclosure) and economic performance (including financial performance measured by 
return on equity and gross profit to sales ratio, and market performance measured by 
systematic risk and excess market valuation) based on sample of large 56 UK companies. 
They found that CSD associated with concurrent financial performance. In particular, 
gross profit to sales ratio was found to influence disclosure positively. A combination of 
high CSP and good CSD was found have positive effects on overall company’s 
profitability. A combination of low CSP and good CSD or high CSP and poor CSD was 
found to be not-economically rewarding strategies. Concerning market reaction, they 
found negative market reaction in the subsequent period to companies with high CSD. 
Richardson & Welker, (2001) examined the relation between social and financial 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital based on a sample of Canadian companies. They 
argued that social disclosure could play a role similar to financial disclosure and reduce 
the cost of equity capital by reducing transactions costs and/or reducing estimation error. 
also ,social disclosure could influence the cost of equity capital directly through investors 
preference effects if investors are willing to accept a lower expected returns on 
investment that fulfil social objectives. The basic hypothesis is that there is a negative 
relation between social disclosure, as financial disclosure, and cost of equity capital. The 
results indicated, in contrast to the hypothesis, that there is a statistically significant 
positive relation between the level of social disclosure and cost of equity capital.  
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Lorraine, et al, (2004) indicated that studies which concentrated on environmental 
information in annual reports suffer from the problem that it is very difficult to attribute 
any share price changes at the time of the information disclosure to the environmental 
news since other information is also issued to the market (Lorraine,et al,2004:7). So they 
focused on externally produced environmental performance(it looks at publicity about 
fines for environmental pollution as well as commendations about good environmental 
achievements) to see whether such information influences share prices, the results 
indicated that there is a stock market response to such news specially for details on fines 
(Lorraine,et al,2004). 
Cormier & Magnan (2007) examined the impact of voluntary environmental reporting 
(in both annual reports and environmental reports) on the stock market valuation of a 
company’ earnings from two perspectives; the North American financial reporting 
context (Canada), and continental European financial reporting context (France and 
Germany). The results indicated that environmental disclosure has moderating impact on 
the stock market valuation of German company earnings, and does not influence on stock 
market valuation of Canadian and French company earnings. They presented three 
potential reasons for the absence of an impact of environmental disclosure on market 
valuation of company earnings; investors use other sources to be aware about 
environmental performance, investors may not care about environmental disclosure and 
what is being disclosed is too thin to draw any conclusion.  
Plumlee, et al, (2008) investigated the association between the quality of company’s 
voluntary environmental disclosure (as a part of annual report or 10-K or stand-alone 
report) and the components of firm value (cost of capital and expected future cash flow). 
                                                          
                                                                                                            -101-  
They documented a negative relation between both cost of capital and expected future 
cash flows and quality of voluntary environmental disclosure. They found that quality of 
disclosure within stand-alone report have a less impact than other media. Also, they 
found that the impact is less for companies that working in environmentally sensitive 
industries. Dhaliwal, et al (2009) examined whether producing stand-alone corporate 
responsibility reports and social performance indicators are associated with reduction in 
cost of equity capital. They performed various types of analyses to answer some 
questions; (1) whether companies’ desire to reduce cost of capital motivates them to 
produce CSR reports. The findings indicate that companies with higher cost of equity are 
more likely to produce CSR reports reflecting positive answer to the question. (2) 
Whether the producing of CSR reports leads to lower cost of equity capital. The empirical 
results indicated that publishing of CSR reports is not associated with lower cost of 
equity, while social performance indicators are significantly associated with lower cost of 
equity. This result reflects that investors evaluate corporate social performance. (3) What 
is the mechanism that causes CSR reports to be associated with lower cost of equity 
capital? The results indicate that reporting companies with superior social performance 
attract institutional investors and have lower forecasts errors and dispersion. (4) Whether 
reporting companies exploit the benefit of a reduction in the cost of equity capital by 
issuing equity capital after CSR reporting. The results indicate that reporting companies 
are more likely to conduct seasoned equity offerings reflecting a positive answer to the 
question. The results of this study suggest that investor are more likely to be interested in 
social performance, and at the same time, it appears that investors are more interested in 
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social performance indicators than CSR reporting. Also, these results refer to economic 
benefits of CSD is significantly associated with good social performance indicators.   
In addition to previous studies, Patten & Trompeter, (2003) presented another 
viewpoint of the consequences, which they examined the relation between environmental 
disclosure and the extent of earnings management in response to regulatory threat. They 
argued that several investigations document that companies appear to manipulate 
discretionary accruals to report lower income in periods of heightened political scrutiny. 
The empirical results, based on a sample of 40 US chemical companies, show that 
companies with higher level of environmental disclosure tended to take less negative 
discretionary accruals which support the argument that companies use environmental 
disclosure as an effective tool for reducing exposure to potential regulatory costs. 
3.3 Limitations of Prior Studies 
Previous studies on the benefits of CSD suffer from some limitations. While these 
studies are interested in examining the relationship between CSD and other variables 
which represent indicators to financial performance and corporate reputation, they are not 
interested in clarifying the concept of the consequences of CSD. No study has attempted 
to discuss the concept of the consequences of CSD as a complete framework. The studies 
that are interested in the analysis of market reaction to CSD, suffer from similar 
limitations concerning CSD, as these studies have concentrated on quantity of disclosure 
in annual reports. These limitations of CSD could indicate that the studies provide an 
incomplete picture of CSD and consequently they could provide misleading results.  The 
studies that examined the relationship between corporate disclosure and corporate 
reputation have been primarily focused on environmental disclosure and environmental 
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reputation, so these studies have provided an incomplete picture for the relationship 
between CSD and corporate reputation. While there are many studies that examine the 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance, 
there are few studies which were concerned with the relationship between CSD and 
corporate financial performance and, in particular, corporate market value, which is 
considered the final result for company management. According to a rational and 
cost/benefit approach to voluntary disclosure, the companies voluntarily disclose only the 
information that they perceive will increase the value of their companies (Verrecchia, 
1983; Craswell & Taylor, 1992).  
In brief, previous literature, on one hand, suffers from limitations concerning CSD, 
related to ignoring the quality of CSD and ignoring stand-alone reports. On the other 
hand, previous literature yielded inconclusive results about the economic consequences of 
CSD, in addition to its interest in the reputational impact of environmental disclosure 
only, and as a general rule there is no clear theoretical explanation for the consequences 
of CSD. Thus, the next section presents a theoretical background for suggested 
consequences of CSD. 
 
4. SUMMARY    
This chapter has focused on the analyses of previous studies related to both determinants 
and consequences of CSD. Regarding determinants of CSD, the literature did not provide 
an integrated framework which could provide a complete picture of CSD quantity and 
quality in both annual and stand-alone reports, based on a clear theoretical background 
for these determinants. With regard to the consequences of CSD, previous literature 
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yielded inconclusive results concerning the economic consequences of CSD, as well as its 
interest in the reputational impact of environmental disclosure only, and in a general there 
is no clear theoretical explanation for the consequences of CSD. The next chapter 
therefore, presents a theoretical framework for suggested determinants and consequences 
of CSD.  
 
 
   
 
Chapter 4 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical Framework 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting Theory Development can be defined as “a piecemeal process of trial and 
error in response to changing social and economic forces” (Underdown & Taylor, 1985: 
2). There have been many approaches in the development of accounting theory, such as 
the deductive, inductive, ethical, sociological and economic approaches, and the more 
modern, positive and normative accounting theories (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004: 110). The 
two main, classical methods of theory construction are the deductive and inductive 
approaches. The deductive approach formulated a theory, and then developed the 
principles and techniques used in implementing this theory. The theory was then verified 
by looking at reality. The inductive approach looked at accounting in practice, and 
formed a general theory to suit this practice by analysing recurring relationships. In terms 
of the modern approaches, positive theory of accounting looks at how things are currently 
practised, while normative theory develops a theory on what the principles ought to be. 
These theories follow the traditional guidance of the inductive and deductive approaches 
respectively. The following table presents some differences between deductive and 
inductive approaches; 
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Table 4.1: Some differences between deductive and inductive approaches  
Stage Deductive 
 
Inductive 
1 Develop theoretical framework Area of inquiry identified but no theoretical 
framework 
 
2 Variables identified for relevant constructs Respondents identify constructs and explain 
the relationship between them 
 
3 Instrument development Broad themes for discussion identified 
 
4 Outcome: theory tested according to whether 
hypotheses are accepted or rejected 
Outcome: theory developed  
Source: (Ali & Birley, 1999: 106) 
In terms of this study, the deductive approach is considered to be an appropriate 
approach in line with the nature and objective of the research. The deductive approach 
begins with statements that are assumed to be true and then moves from general rules to 
specific solutions (Belkaoui, 2004: 111). In the deductive approach there is a well-
established role for existing theory because it informs the development of hypotheses, the 
choice of variables and the measures (Ali & Birley, 1999: 103). The stages of deductive 
approach are: (1) think of theory that is appropriate to the topic; (2) narrow this theory to 
specific hypotheses; (3) collect observations; and (4) test hypotheses. In line with these 
stages, the theoretical framework of this research has adopted legitimacy theory as an 
appropriate theory. From the perspectives underlying this theory, specific models have 
been developed to explain the determinants and consequences of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSD) through a number of hypotheses.  
CSD in most cases is a voluntary activity that varies between companies and countries. 
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on explaining this variation. Although 
there is widespread academic interest in CSD, no comprehensive theoretical framework 
has yet been developed which can interpret CSD in terms of the determinants and 
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consequences. Thus, Gray et al. (1995a) point to empirical studies relying on different 
theoretical and methodological constructs within various national contexts. 
In order to build a consistent and coherent theoretical framework that explains 
voluntary CSD, the basic idea that informs the motivation behind CSD should be 
clarified. The main motivation behind companies voluntarily disclosing social and 
environmental information is pressure from the community. This social pressure results 
from the awareness of the importance of social and environmental matters, as well as 
economic concerns. Different companies have responded in different ways to this 
pressure, according to various factors that determine (the determinants) the level of social 
responsibility information (quantity and quality) provided by each company. The main 
benefit of meeting the requirements CSD is to mitigate the social pressure; however, in 
addition, companies can expect financial benefits from any disclosure.  
The use of an appropriate theoretical framework that clarifies CSD should help explain: 
how the community is becoming more aware of the importance of non-economic issues; 
how companies deal with this new focus; and how companies can benefit from their 
disclosure. The theoretical framework should include two levels: the country level; and 
the corporate level. The country level includes the factors that determine the level of 
community awareness concerning the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and therefore the level of pressure on companies. The corporate level includes the factors 
that determine a company’s response to social pressure and therefore the level of 
disclosure. It should also identify the benefits of this disclosure for the companies. The 
two types of factors are related, so that the factors at a country level influence those at a 
company level. Dong et al. (2007) argue that the variables at the company level may be 
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the compound products of company systems and national systems. Firm theories suggest 
that the features of the macro-environment may be reflected in company-specific 
characteristics. For example, in large companies in each country, the level of leverage 
ratio may be noticeably influenced by the financing system of the country. As another 
example, a company’s multi-national activities are closely related to the macro-economic 
policy of the home country (Dong et al., 2007: 11). 
Thus, theoretical framework for the research incorporates the two levels of analysis. 
The country level seeks to clarify the differences in the volume of social disclosure 
among different countries, in order to understand how these differences affect the degree 
of community-awareness and consequently social pressure on the companies. Political 
economic theory provides a useful basis with which to understand this level of analysis. 
At the companies’ level there are two relevant dimensions to be assessed. First, it is 
necessary to clarify the differences in the level of social disclosure among the various 
companies and, second, to interpret the consequences of this disclosure. In this context, it 
is necessary to understand why the social pressure results in differences in the levels of 
CSD among companies. Legitimacy theory provides a useful method of analysis for 
understanding how companies legitimise their activities for their stakeholders, and/or 
society as a whole when facing social pressures. As a result of this legitimisation process, 
companies expect to benefit from the process.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section two provides the analysis for the 
theoretical framework, while sections three and four discuss the country level and the 
company level respectively. 
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2. INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
The starting point for explaining the concept of CSD is to understand how it is viewed 
by a community views. According to political economy theory at a country level there are 
a number of social factors involved in the formation of society’s awareness of the 
importance of social and environmental issues, namely: the country’s level of economic 
attainment; and the cultural dimensions of its society. These factors are combined as 
follows: a high level of economic attainment indicates that basic economic needs are 
satisfied, which consequently provides an opportunity for members of the community to 
give greater attention to non-economic issues. The cultural values in any society play a 
key role in what issues are considered important. These two variables interact to create a 
societal awareness that is reflected in the emergence of groups (stakeholders, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), professional organisations, and socially responsible 
investment (SRI)) that focus on the social and environmental responsibilities of 
companies. The activities of these groups combine to create a social pressure on 
companies regarding the impact of their activities on the environment and on society as a 
whole. In responding to this pressure, companies attempt to provide information about 
how socially responsible their activities are. Furthermore, the level of corporate 
governance in a country can be an important factor in the interpretation of the level of the 
responses of companies to this social pressure. 
According to legitimacy theory, companies respond to social pressures in order to 
legitimise their activities in order to continue operating in the market. CSD is considered 
to be part of the legitimisation strategies. Two questions can be raised in this regard: Do 
all companies face the same degree of social pressure? Do all companies respond to this 
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pressure in the same degree? The answers to these questions are determined by certain 
factors (corporate characteristics, media pressure and degree of multi-national activities, 
corporate ownership structures and corporate governance) which vary among companies. 
These factors determine the level of CSD (quantity and quality) by individual companies. 
Consequently, in theory if companies succeed in legitimising their activities (by 
providing a high level of quantity and quality of CSD) they should be rewarded by the 
different sectors of society. The integrated theoretical framework is represented 
diagrammatically in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: the integrated theoretical framework  
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3. THE COUNTRY LEVEL 
Previous research indicates that the level of CSD varies between different countries. 
Therefore, there is a need to explain these differences. Smith et al. (2005) argue that while 
international differences in corporate financial reporting have been extensively studied, the 
reasons for international differences in CSD are not well understood (Smith et al. 2005: 125). 
The starting point for understanding the variations in CSD is to explain how each country 
devotes more (or less) attention to this type of disclosure. In this regard, the bourgeois 
political economic theory, a derivative of the modern liberalism perspective, is being 
increasingly utilised in voluntary environmental and social disclosure. According to Williams 
(1999), differences in the quantity of voluntary environmental and social disclosure may be 
due to variations in country level characteristics that shape the socio-political and economic 
systems of the respective countries. Gray et al. (1996) classify political economy theory in 
two forms, classical and bourgeois. Classical political economic theory is related to the 
existence of class interests, power and conflict within society. Bourgeois political economic 
theory ignores the existence of particularly powerful groups in society, instead focusing on 
group interactions within society. The usefulness of political economy theories is that they 
consider the political, social and institutional framework within which economic activity 
takes place (Gray et al., 1995a: 52). In addition, political economy theories assess corporate 
disclosure as a reaction to the existing demands of corporate stakeholders, and consider 
accounting reports as social, political and economic documents (Guthrie & Parker, 1990: 
166). 
Dong et al. (2007) state that cross-country studies document the fact that country-level 
factors, including economic development status, cultural values and legal systems have a 
substantial influence on corporate disclosure (Dong et al., 2007: 5-6). Archambault & 
Archambault (2003) state that, “Accounting exists along with other systems, such as political 
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systems and economic systems. Systems within a country share a cultural environment. 
Culture influences what goes on within each system, as well as how the systems interact with 
one another” (Archambault & Archambault, 2003: 175). 
Based on the notion of societal variables that describe factors to which all companies within 
a particular country are subjected, and which vary between nations, the following model is 
suggested to explain the differences between CSD at the country level.  
Figure 4.2: Theoretical framework at the country level 
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This model depends on four main aspects: (1) the factors that create social attention on non-
economic issues; (2) the pressure groups which interpret this attention to put actual pressure 
on companies; (3) the concept of social pressure which is considered the main motivation for 
CSD; and (4) the level of corporate governance which is considered an important factor in 
determining how companies react to public expectations. 
The assumptions underpinning the model are that at the country level a high level of 
economic development leads to the satisfaction of a large part of the economic needs of 
individuals. This satisfaction provides an opportunity for society members to move beyond 
considering only economic issues, to the importance of non-economic issues such as CSR. At 
the corporate level, a high economic level of attainment means that there is a substantial 
probability that the companies have the financial capacity to establish a sophisticated 
information system allowing them to disclose social and environmental information. In 
addition, the prevalent cultural values of a society are assumed to determine the extent to 
which individuals possess sufficient awareness that they can impact on the activities of the 
company in relation to the environment and the community as a whole. These activities may 
acquire the same level of importance as the economic impact of those activities. In addition, 
the individuals have the ability to influence companies. 
The interaction between these factors (economic level of attainment and culture) leads to 
increasing societal awareness of the concept of CSR. Consequently, it is possible for pressure 
groups to emerge, such as: 
¶ Growing stakeholder power; 
¶ A growing role for NGOs and civil society; 
¶ Increasing awareness by professional organisations of the importance of social and 
environmental matters; and 
¶ An increasing number of investors interested in SRI. 
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These groups create pressure on companies, which in turn they try to reduce. The level of 
corporate governance of the country appears to play an important role in determining the 
degree of responsiveness shown by the companies, with changes occurring in the community; 
among them an increasing interest in CSR. The main sections of the model can be explained 
as follows: 
3.1 Factors Determine Social Pressure 
Different countries devote different levels of attention to non-economic issues. It can be 
argued that a starting point for paying attention to social and environmental matters is a high 
economic level. Then, cultural dimensions in a community could lead to an increase or a 
decrease in this level of attention.   
3.1.1 Economic level  
The impact of economic level on CSD can be theorised based on two pillars; the positive 
impact of economic level on social life and the positive impact on corporate disclosure 
practices. Concerning first pillar, economic development impacts on a society, in that a high 
level of economic development creates more needs and increasing expectations. Diener & 
Diener (1995) found that economic level (the wealth of a nation) is associated with quality of 
human life and the basic fiscal needs were met early in economic development. Arthaud-Day 
& Near (2005) found that absolute income is stronger predictor of happiness. Robila, (2006) 
provide evidence that indicated the relation between economic and social concerns is strong. 
Schyns, (2002) indicated that, independent of individual income, the economic prosperity of 
a country contributed to a person’s life satisfaction level. Gordon, (1990) stated that as the 
level of economic development increases, demands for better living conditions, education, 
work safety and training would also become greater. Moaddel, (1994) argued that greater 
economic development will be accompanied by a growth in the number and strength of 
pressure and monitoring groups, such as labour unions and consumer bodies that seek to 
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ensure an equitable distribution of benefits derived from enhanced economic wealth. 
Therefore, as economies develop, the expectations concerning the role of companies are 
changing and more attention will be paid to the social role of companies in community.   
With regard to second pillar, conceptual studies of accounting and socio-political and 
economic systems have identified economic factors as important determinants of the 
development of accounting and reporting practices (Williams, 1999). Riahi-Belkaoui, (2002) 
argued that the economic environment is important to the development of accounting in 
general and reporting and disclosure in particular. Choi, et al, (2002) argued that the 
development of disclosure system closely parallels the development of an accounting system, 
and accounting system is closely influenced by the level of economic development. Dong, et 
al, (2007) argued that countries at different stages of economic development are expected to 
have different accounting practices. The more developed economy, the more demand for 
disclosure, and a high level of disclosure transparency contributes to creating and maintaining 
the confidence in capital markets which in turn encourages a better flow of foreign 
investment into a country (Qu & Leung, 2006). The social function of accounting to measure 
and communicate data become more important as economic develops (HassabElnaby, et al, 
2003). Chambers, et al, (2003) assumed that a higher level of wealth would reflect greater 
resources that could be re-invested in the society through CSR. Indeed, in countries where the 
level of economic growth is relatively high, the social function of accountancy as an 
instrument of measurement and communication is of considerable importance. Business and 
economic activities will reach a size and complexity that require a sophisticated high-quality 
accounting system and standards (Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2006).  
Theoretically, there should be a positive impact on the level of disclosures and reporting 
practices in a given nation as the level of economic development increases (Doupink & 
Salter, 1995). On the other hand, the economic level has impact on public needs and 
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expectations. Therefore, it can be argued that high economic development leads to satisfying 
economics needs and consequently paying more attention to non-economic matters. But 
depending only on economic growth as a justification for engagement in social and 
environmental disclosure, without integrated with cultural factors, is not sufficient.  
3.1.2 Culture  
The impact of culture on CSD can be theorised based on the notion that culture is a very 
important determinant of public perceptions toward different concerns. Culture influences 
perceptions of the quality of life and the level of life satisfaction (Near & Rechner, 1993; 
Oishi, et al, 2009). On the other hand, the social values of the publics within which 
companies exist influence how a company operates and reports (Deegan & Rankin, 1996). 
Culture is predominant attitudes and behaviours that characterise the function of a group, and 
consider an important determinant of public perceptions toward various concerns. So, culture 
values in a given country play an important role in determining public perceptions toward 
CSR. “examining societal values or culture would be helpful in identifying countries that   
would have different perceptions of a company’s stakeholders and their influences on a 
corporation’s CSD practices” (Smith, et al, 2005: 132). According to Adams, (2003), there is 
a relationship between culture context and reporting, and according to Taskumis, (2007) there 
is possibility that accountants' disclosure decisions are more heavily influenced by cultural 
values than the recognition decision. Also Hofstede, (2001) suggests that the more judgment 
an activity requires, the more it is ruled by values and thus influenced by cultural differences. 
CSD is a voluntary activity, so it requires to judgment, therefore, it is widely to be influenced 
by cultural factors. 
The early studies on the influence of culture on financial accounting and reporting could be 
traced back to mid-1970s, the literature on culture is fragmented until 1980 when Hofstede, 
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(1980) identified four dimensions of societal culture, and the Hofstede’s cultural framework 
has been used in several accounting and reporting studies (Qu & Leung, 2006).   
Culture dimension can depend on Hofstede’s four values12 which can use to differentiate 
between cultures. These cultural values are; Strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, 
Individualism versus collectivism, Masculinity versus femininity and Large versus small 
power distance 
Gray, (1988) theorized connections between Hofstede's cultural values and accounting 
values. By doing so, he provides the most comprehensive description of the ways that 
accounting systems can differ as a result of a cultural variation. Gray's model describes 
accounting values in four dimensions: Professionalism versus statutory control, Uniformity 
versus flexibility, Conservatism versus optimism and Secrecy versus transparency13 
Gray proposed the following hypothesis that explains the relationship between secrecy and 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions; 
"The higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and the 
lower it ranks in terms of individualism and masculinity then the more likely it is to rank 
highly in terms of secrecy." 
The relationship between Gray's accounting dimensions and Hofstede's cultural dimensions 
can be summarized in the following table; 
 
 
 
                                                
12 The theory of cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede,1980 has been widely studied in the fields of 
sociology ,organisational theory, and more recently in accounting literature. an analysis of social citation index 
reveals that over the period 1981-1992 ,the theory has been cited in 583 studies in many different 
fields(Sudarwan&Fogarty,1996) 
 
13 Secrecy is a preference for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of business information to those 
who are closely involved with its management and financing. As such, it can be contrasted to a more 
transparent, open and publicly accountable preference. 
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Table 4.2: cultural values and accounting dimensions 
Cultural values 
(Hofstede) 
Accounting values(Gray) 
Professionalism 
 
uniformity conservatism secrecy 
Power distance - + ? + 
Uncertainty avoidance - + + + 
individualism + - - - 
masculinity ? ? - - 
{+ indicates direct relationship, - indicates an inverse relationship,? Indicates indeterminate relationship} 
Source; (Baydoun & Willett, 1995: 71) 
The relationship between accounting values and accounting practices as following: 
Table 4.3: accounting values and accounting practices (Baydoun & Willett, 1995) 
Accounting values Accounting practices 
professionalism authority 
uniformity application 
conservatism measurement 
secrecy disclosure 
 
Jaggi & Low, (2000) explain Gray's hypothesis as follows:  
· The cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, which indicates the degree to which the 
members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, is associated 
with lower disclosure of financial information. 
· the cultural dimension of power distance ,which relates to acceptance of institutional and 
organizational authority by individuals, suggests that high power distance societies are 
secretive and do not encourage information sharing, which means there is a negative 
association between power distance and financial disclosure. 
· The culture dimension of individualism encourages competitive environments, which 
suggests that these societies would be less secretive, thus there would an expectation of a 
positive association between individualism and financial disclosure. 
· The culture dimension of masculinity refers to societal preference for assertiveness, high 
achievement, and financial success, which means that business institution, would be much 
stronger in these societies, and individuals will value the achievement of goals. Thus, there 
will be a positive association between masculinity and financial disclosures. 
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So, there are negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and power distance with 
disclosure. While, there are positive relationships between individualism and masculinity 
with disclosure. However, Gray considers the link between masculinity and disclosure to be 
less important. 
It can be argued that because cultural values are important factors in determining society’s 
perceptions, they play a critical role in determining the degree to which the society will be 
aware of the importance of social and environmental matters.  
The interaction between high economic level and some cultural values leads to increasing 
interest in CSR. This increasing attention has been reflected in the emergence of some parts 
of the community directing a large part of their attention to the social responsibility of 
companies. These parts can play the role of pressure groups in the country. 
3.2 Pressure Groups 
Increasing attention paid to non-economic issues leads to the emergence in some parts of 
society which focus their attention on social responsibility of companies. These parts put 
pressure on companies concerning the impact of their activities on community, and are called 
pressure groups. In this concern, Tilt, (1994) argued that “a general presumption has emerged 
that community pressure groups are a major source of influence on companies’ social 
disclosure practices” (Tilt, 1994: 47). In Anglo-Saxon society, the demand for legitimacy 
may come from some groups such as consumers (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005: 394). The most 
important parts of the community that may pay attention to the social and environmental 
matters are; 
A. Stakeholders 
Stakeholders are groups of people, who have an interest in a business organization; they 
can be seen as being either external to the organization, or internal. The transformation 
from concentration only on corporate shareholders to concentration on a wide variety of 
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corporate stakeholders represents one of the most important drivers behind corporate 
social responsibility. We can differentiate between stakeholders according to their interest 
in corporate activities and the power which they have to influence corporate activities. The 
companies need to manage their stakeholders based on these two factors as the following14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Non-governmental organizations  
NGOs are organizations independent from governments, consisting of a voluntary 
association of people that do not seek to challenge governments as political parties, and 
they are non-profit, non-violent, and non-criminal (Segerlund, 2005: 31). NGOs can be 
considered civil society actors, as they are often concerned to shape formal and informal 
rules that govern aspects of social life. They try to directly and indirectly impact on 
corporate activities (Adams & Whelan, 2009: 132). The level of NGOs activism 
dramatically increased involving direct campaigns, hard-line advocacy campaigns, and 
market campaigns (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009: 562). It has been widely recognized that 
social and environmental NGOs have influence on companies, and many NGOs remain 
                                                
14 This is derived from mind tools: Essential skills for your excellent career! 
http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newPPM_07.htm.  
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skeptical about corporate motives for social disclosure and the type of information 
disclosed (Danastas & Gadenne, 2006: 54). Guay, et al, (2004) document the growing 
influence of NGOs in the realm of socially responsible investing (SRI), they find that 
NGOs have opportunities to influence corporate conduct via direct, indirect, and 
interactive influences on the investment community, and that the overall influence of 
NGOs as major actors in socially responsible investment is growing.  
C. Professional organizations 
There are some professional organizations that draw the attention to corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, and issued some initiatives or guidelines in this context. Sylvie, 
(2003) indicated that accounting organizations getting involved in environmental 
disclosure through several initiatives that mandate, or encourage, companies to disclose 
environmental information likely to be of interest to stakeholders [Price Waterhouse, 
1991; 1992; 1994; Federation des experts comptables europeens, 1993,1999; United 
Nations, 1992; Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountant (CICA), 1992; 1993; 1994; 
American Institute of Public Certified Accountants (AICPA), 1996; European 
Commission, 2001; Financial Accounting Standards Board (SFAS No. 143 and 144), 
2002]. For instance, the AICPA has issued a Statement of Position1 to serve as a guide for 
environmental debt reporting. In addition, over the last few years, The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board's Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) has made several 
propositions concerning the accounting of environmental costs. In Canada; the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) added guidelines to their standard dealing with 
provisions in financial statements for future expenditures for removal of fixed assets and 
site remediation. There are also some organizations that issued guidelines for corporate 
social responsibility or corporate social disclosure such as;  
• OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises  
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• ILO Conventions on Workplace Practice  
• UN Global Compact A code of conduct for large companies launched by the UN 
Secretary General in 2000.  
• Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)  
• ISO standards  
• Accountability 1000S (AA1000S) Standard issued by the UK Institute of Social and 
Ethical Accountability. 
• Social Accountability 8000 (SA8000) Developed by Social Accountability International.  
• Global Sullivan Principles. 
D. Socially responsible investment  
Socially responsible investment indicates that investors are combined financial objectives 
with their social values. It has grown which one of every eight dollars in the hands of 
professional money managers in US is allocated to such investment opportunities (Hill, et 
al, 2007: 167).  The common definition of SRI is “an investment process that considers the 
social and environmental consequences of investment, both positive and negative, within 
the context of rigorous financial analysis. It is a process of identifying and investing in 
companies that meet certain standards of corporate social responsibility CSR” (Williams, 
2005,). According to the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy 
(NRTEE) nearly 50% of Europe’s financial institutions now offer responsible investment 
products, in Canada, responsible investment funds have grown, and total responsible 
investment assets managed in Canada in 2003 were $51.4 billion. The total value of SRI 
assets in the UK increased from £23 billion in 1997 to £225 billion in 2001 (UK social 
investment forum). According to socially investment forum, SRI assets rose more than 258 
percent from $639 billion in 1995 to $2.29 trillion in 2005, while the broader universe of 
assets under professional management increased less than 249 percent from $7 trillion to 
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$24.4 trillion over the same period. Sparkes & Cowton, (2004) argued that SRI not only 
has grown but it has also matured in some ways such as, we now have SRI stock market 
indices and there are several different approaches to the practice of SRI. Williams, (2005) 
argued that SRI investors appear to care more about social criteria rather than financial and 
shareholder interests and are more likely to punish companies for poor social performance 
as consumers as well as in their investment choices.       
Mattingly & Greening, 2002, (As cited in Tilt, 2001) argued that lobby groups can 
influence the company via a variety of means including collaboration, mediation, coercion, 
and subversion. Depending on the relationship they have with the company or the salience of 
the stakeholder to the company. Collaboration and coercion are used when stakeholders has 
high salience, mediation is used when stakeholders has low salience, and subversion is used 
when both company and stakeholders have low salience.  
O;Dwyer, et al, 2003,(as cited in Tilt, 2001) found that there is a demand for social 
disclosure information by lobby groups motivated by a desire for accountability. Deegan & 
Blomquist, 2006, found that the major environmental organizations in Australia, the world 
wide fund for nature WWF were able to influence environmental reporting practices in some 
way. Fiedler & Deegan, (2002) found that the collaboration between non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and business were motivated by stakeholder pressure. Tilt, (1994) 
found that lobby groups use social and environmental information produced by companies 
and attempt to influence their actions. And after 10 years, Tilt, (2001)  repeated survey and 
found that lobby groups have some interest in directly trying to influence company’ 
reporting, but their primary focus is on changing companies’ activities. In contrast, Tilt, 
(1997) found that the companies themselves do not perceive lobby groups as having a major 
influence on their behaviour. The companies consider legislation as the most influential 
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followed by public opinion, stakeholders, consumers, and insurance companies, and finally 
lobby groups and the media. 
It appears that these groups can create what will be known as social pressure which 
companies must to address. 
3.3 Social Pressure 
The literature indicated that companies use CSD as a respond to public policy pressure 
regarding social responsibility. The social accounting can be considered as a reflection of 
social conflict between capital and other social interests such as environmentalists, workers, 
consumers, minorities (Tinker, et al, 1991: 46-47). The increasing of societal pressures on 
irresponsible companies, sometimes accompanied by negative media coverage or consumer 
boycotts, resulted in that private sector has adapted its relationships with society (Pater & 
Lierop, 2006: 339). Walden & Schwartz, (1997) indicated that public policy pressures in the 
1960s and 1970s led to a substantial increase in corporate social reporting, and although this 
pressure seemingly decreased during 1980s, there appear to be renewed interest (Walden & 
Schwartz, 1997,:126). Increased public policy pressure can arise from the dissatisfaction of 
the public itself, new or proposed political action, and/or increased regulatory oversight 
(Walden & Schwartz, 1997:127). Boulding,1978,(as cited in Walden & Schwartz, 1997) 
argued that public policy pressure consist of three nonmarket environments; the cultural 
environment consist of values and attitudes of the general population, the political 
environment constantly creates new laws and new sanctions, and the legal environment 
which include laws, regulation and possible sanction. These environments all interact, for 
example, cultural changes can have a profound effect on political action and subsequently on 
the legal structure. Thus, public pressure can rise due to concerns of the general population, 
political bodies, or regulatory agencies (Boulding, 1978, as cited in Cho & Patten, 2007: 
640). 
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From a legitimacy theory perspective the companies use disclosure as a means of 
responding to, and participating in, public policy pressure. Aerts & Cormier, (2006) argued 
that, in consistent with legitimacy theory, companies use corporate communication media, for 
example annual report disclosure and press releases, to manage perceived environmental 
legitimacy by signalling to relevant publics that their behaviour is appropriate and desirable, 
at the same time, react to public pressure by increasing the level and quality of their 
environmental disclosure (Aerts & Cormier, 2006: 3). CSD aims to influence people’s 
perceptions about the company, in this respect, CSD is a public relations vehicle aimed at 
influencing people’s perceptions (Hooghiemstra, 2000: 57). Cho, et al, (2006) argued that 
CSD can be considered as both reactive device and proactive policy. Several studies argued 
that environmental disclosure is one of methods which corporation use to address exposure to 
public policy and there is evidence that this disclosure appears to be used by companies as a 
response to negative environmental performance. On the other hand disclosure can be used as 
a proactive policy tool and some studies argue that disclosure can be used to anticipate, 
avoid, and manage social pressure (Cho, et al, 2006: 141). 
It appears that from a community view of point, both economic level and cultural values 
determine the degree of social pressure in a given country. The question arises from the 
companies’ points of view: What would determine the level of companies’ responses to 
social pressure in a given country?  
3.4 The Level of Corporate Governance 
How companies respond to social pressure is considered an important factor in determining 
the level of social disclosure in a country, and the level of corporate governance in the 
country is a determining factor in how the companies respond to social pressure. Corporate 
governance can be defined as the system by which companies are directed and controlled 
(Mallin, et al, 2005). It can be argued that the level of corporate governance in the country 
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reflects the commitment of companies to good governance factors which reflects the extent to 
which companies act in the interests of various stakeholders. Consequently, corporate 
governance is considered as an important factor that determines the extent to which 
companies will react to social pressure. The Ethical Resource Centre (2003) considers ethics 
as a core concept in corporate governance and the struggle against corruption. Without high 
standards of corporate governance, businesses may under-perform, while strong governance’ 
companies on a habitual system based on ethical values will perform strongly (Cassidy, 
2003). Chambers, et al, (2003) argued that Western governance is more developed and thus 
encourages greater CSR than in developing countries. 
Mallin et al. (2005) indicated that no two corporate governance systems are alike; rules and 
practices in each country have developed in a specific legal and political environment.  The 
level of corporate governance in the country is largely influenced by economic, social, and 
cultural factors in the country. Turnbull, (1997) argued that the cultural context is important 
in understanding Corporate Governance practices. O’Sullivan, (2003) argued that the 
evolution of systems of corporate governance is related to two types of arguments; first one 
economic and second one is political. Li & Harrison (2007) argued that a country’s socio-
cultural characteristics have important influences on governance structure (Li & Harrison, 
2007: 608). Doidge, et al (2007) argued that economic development has more influence on a 
country’s corporate governance practices than do corporate characteristics.  Cornelius (2005) 
argued that the country factors can play a key role in setting the corporate governance 
framework. Legal, political, historical and cultural factors interact and help determine 
attitudes towards the role of the companies in the economy (Cornelius, 2004: 13).  
Smith, et al, (2005) indicated that there are two corporate worldviews influence country’s 
corporate governance structure; contractarianism and communitarianism. Corporate 
governance structures in contractarian countries (US and other Anglo-American countries) 
                                                                                 
                                                                                                             -129- 
          
primarily revolve around managing shareholder relations and promoting shareholder value, 
so there is a strong shareholder orientation in the corporate governance system in these 
countries. Communitarian perspective has social responsibility toward all stakeholders, so 
there is a stakeholder orientation in the corporate governance system in communitarian 
countries (Smith, et al, 2005: 129-130). But, Williams & Aguilera, (2008) indicated that there 
is doubt on a unified Anglo-American system of corporate governance which legal 
developments and institutional contexts concerning CSR in UK show similarities with 
Europe and contrasts with US (Williams & Aguilera, 2008: 9). While the country factors 
influence the framework of corporate governance, there is no guarantee that all companies in 
a given framework will demonstrate the same corporate governance standards (Cornelius, 
2005: 15). 
The level of CSD in a given country will therefore be determined according to two 
dimensions: the degree of social pressure and the degree of companies’ responses to this 
pressure. Consequently, the differences between countries at the level of CSD can be 
explained according to the differences among countries in these two dimensions. These 
dimensions can be translated into specific factors, in which it is argued that a country’s socio-
economic factors and the level of corporate governance in the country will interact to 
determine the level of social disclosure in a given country. According to the previous 
explanation, the status of CSD in a specific country depends on three factors and these factors 
influence the CSD status according to the following model: 
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Figure 4.3: Model of CSD in a specific country 
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                                                                       Power distance                     low 
                                                                       Individualism                         high 
                                                                       Masculinity                            high 
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Therefore, this section discusses the legitimacy theory, the determinants of CSD and the 
consequences of CSD. 
4.1. Legitimacy Theory 
Liu et al (2006) argue that a wide body of literature uses legitimacy theory to explain 
incentives for corporate voluntary disclosure (Liu et al, 2006: 8). According to legitimacy 
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influence stakeholders’ and eventually society’s perceptions about the company 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000: 57). Legitimacy theory suggests that companies use CSD as a means of 
addressing exposure to public policy. According to Patten (2002a), the differences in the 
extent of CSD are a systematic function of differences in public policy pressure facing 
individual companies. In the majority of cases, individuals are not aware that a particular 
course of action is the best way to achieve a certain objective, or that one objective is better 
than another. In the face of such uncertainty, a social system develops as rules, norms, values, 
and models come to be accepted by social actors as legitimate (acceptable, desirable, 
appropriate). When faced with uncertain decisions, social actors refer back to these rules, 
norms, values, and models in order to proceed. (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 416). Companies 
need to be in accordance with society’s rules to gain acceptance (legitimacy) from other areas 
of society. According to Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) legitimacy is not directly observable 
and has to be conceived as a social assessment or appraisal of acceptance, appropriateness 
and/or desirability. 
The concept of legitimacy is a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Aerts & 
Cormier, 2006). Legitimation refers to the characteristic of being legitimised by being placed 
within a framework through which something that is viewed as right and proper (Tyler, 2006: 
376). Legitimacy is considered to be an intangible asset that determines the ability of a 
corporation to accumulate capital and personnel, which may influence its survival. 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) argue that there are strategic actions which can lead to 
legitimacy, and in turn legitimacy generates other resources and makes possible survival and 
growth (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 415). In addition, legitimacy has an important role in 
securing support for the corporation’s activities. It shapes a reservoir of support. The 
companies which are viewed as legitimate are more highly insulated from unsystematic 
variations in their stock prices (Aerts & Cormier, 2006: 5).  
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Patten (1991, 1992) argues that social legitimacy is distinct from economic legitimacy but 
is not monitored in the marketplace but rather through public policy process. Scott (1995, 
cited in Aerts & Cormier, 2006) distinguishes between regulative, normative and cognitive 
legitimacy. According to Aerts and Cormier (2006) legitimacy that is treated in corporate 
environmental reporting literature is mainly of a normative legitimacy, which incorporates a 
significant regulatory component. Laws, regulations and formal rules constitute objective 
reference points and provide formalised and objective assessment parameters. The closer the 
company’s behaviour aligns with the relevant norms and values, the higher its normative 
legitimacy (Aerts & Cormier, 2006:5).  
Tilling (2004) argues that there are two major classes of legitimacy theory: institutional 
legitimacy which refers to the type of organisational structure (capitalism or government) that 
has gained acceptance from society as a whole; and organisational legitimacy (strategic 
legitimacy) which refers to companies seeking legitimation by approval or avoidance of 
sanction from groups in society. Organisational legitimacy theory suggests that a company 
may occupy one of four phases in relation to its legitimacy: establishing legitimacy; 
maintaining legitimacy; extending legitimacy; and defending legitimacy. Tilling (2004) 
suggests that to develop legitimacy theory, the possibility that company may not successfully 
be able to defend its legitimacy and therefore start to lose legitimacy should be added to the 
model. This loss phase is most likely to be preceded by sustained media, NGO scrutiny, and 
government regulation and monitoring. During the loss phase, the company is most likely to 
increase its social and environmental disclosure in order to meet the specific threat. Suchman 
(1995) argues that legitimacy theory from an institutional viewpoint refers to companies, 
managers, performance measures and audience needs which are components within a larger 
institutionalised cultural framework that produce demands on each other.    
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Legitimacy theory is closely related to stakeholder theory. The demand for enhanced 
disclosure has been fuelled by the increasing popularity of the stakeholder theory that has 
resulted in an increased recognition that the interactions of a company are not limited to 
shareholders (Boesso & Kumar, 2007: 270). 
Legitimacy theory comprises two basic ideas: companies need to legitimise their activities; 
and this legitimacy process provides some benefits for companies. The first element is 
consistent with the argument that CSD is linked to the presence of social pressure. In this 
context, it can be argued that the need for legitimacy is not equal for all companies due to the 
differences in both the degree of social pressure facing companies and the level of the 
response to this pressure. There are a number of factors which determine the degree of social 
pressure facing companies and the responses to this pressure. These factors are the potential 
determinants of CSD. The second element refers to the fact that the companies can expect to 
gain benefits from achieving legitimacy through CSD. Thus, it can be argued that the 
legitimacy theory provides a framework to explain both determinants and consequences of 
CSD.  
4.2. Suggested Framework of CSD Determinants 
According to legitimacy theory the determinants of CSD are those factors which are related 
to social pressure. In this regard, two important questions come to mind: Are all companies 
facing the same degree of social pressure? Are all companies responding to this pressure to 
the same degree? In this context, it can be argued that both degree of social pressure and 
degree of companies’ responsiveness differ across companies. Two types of factors determine 
these variations (see Figure 4.4). 
The first type is factors that can determine the degree of social pressure facing companies. 
These factors include corporate characteristics (size, industry and degree of multi-nationality) 
and media pressure. It can be argued that large industrial companies which incorporate a 
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substantial degree of multi-national activities, and which face widespread media pressure 
garner greater attention from the broader society and consequently face the highest degree of 
social pressure. Therefore, according to legitimacy theory, these companies will need to 
legitimise their activities more strongly. Thus, a positive relationship between these factors 
and CSD is expected. 
The second type of factor is the degree of company response to social pressure. These 
factors include corporate ownership and corporate governance. It can be argued that well-
governed companies and those with a more dispersed ownership tend to respond positively to 
social pressure and provide greater levels of disclosure. 
Figure 4.4: Suggested model of CSD determinants 
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4.2.1.1 corporate size   
Corporate size has the greater attention in literature as a determinant of disclosure, where an 
expected positive association between corporate size and corporate disclosure is always 
argued. Riahi-Belkaoui, (2001) argued that the reasons for positive association between 
corporate size and corporate disclosure include; 
· The disclosure cost hypothesis which means decreasing costs associated with larger 
companies lead to more affordable disclosure, 
· The transaction hypothesis which means that the incentives for private information 
acquisition are greater for larger companies leads to increasing disclosure with company 
size, 
· The legal hypothesis which means that the value of damages in securities litigations are a 
function of company size which lead to increasing disclosure with larger companies. 
Ho & Taylor, (2007) summarized the reasons for an association between disclosure and 
corporate size according to prior literature as the following:  
· Disclosure costs may generally be lower for larger companies because economics of scale 
and the news media are more likely to report stories about larger companies and analysts 
are more likely to attend their meetings. 
· Larger companies are more likely to have higher agency costs because higher information 
asymmetry between managers and share-holders, therefore larger companies are likely to 
disclose more information. 
· Larger companies are generally more exposed to political attacks, demands for the 
exercise of social responsibility, greater regulation, and threat of nationalization. 
· Smaller companies are more likely than larger companies to feel that increasing 
disclosure would be detrimental to their competitive position. 
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Concerning CSD and consistent with legitimacy theory, firm size is considered a 
determinant of CSD with larger companies being;   
1. More visible target  
2. Facing potentially higher political costs 
3. Having more investors and other stakeholder looking out for information (Cormier, et al, 
2005:8). 
Cormier & Gordon, (2001) argued that legitimacy theory literature indicates that more 
attention will be paid to more visible or rely on political or social support companies, and it is 
hypothesized that larger companies have greater visibility and are more politically sensitive 
than smaller companies (Cormier & Gordon, 2001: 589). Also, Daub, (2007) stated that 
“experience to-date shows that a much larger share of the responsibility for global problems 
such as the pollution of the environment or social inequality is placed on the shoulders of 
large companies compared to small-to-medium-sized companies and, on balance, they are put 
under more pressure by their stakeholders” (Daub, 2007: 79). Husted & Allen, (2007) argued 
that the large companies have more need to design social strategy. Therefore, it can be argued 
that larger companies have greater attention from society and consequently will be object for 
more social pressure. 
4.2.1.2 industry effect  
Levels of disclosure in annual reports are not likely to be identical throughout all economic 
sectors (Comfferman & Cooke, 2002: 11). Ho & Taylor, (2007) argued that companies in the 
same industry tend to adopt similar disclosure practices to be in line with the peculiarities of 
their industry such as political vulnerability or degree of diversification. If a company does 
not follow industry-wide disclosure practices, then it may be interpreted by the market that 
the company is hiding bad news.( Ho & Taylor, 2007: 132). Prior literature presented some 
explanations for the association between voluntary disclosure and type of industry; the 
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existence of dominant companies that influence other companies to follow their practice, the 
presence of regulated industry, industry sensitivity and meeting the needs of international 
capital markets (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006).  
Industries have different degrees of legitimacy based on a variety of actions and 
consequences derived from collective action of industry members. Industry level legitimacy 
is deterring according to the degree to which the operations and business processes of 
companies in a given industry and their products and services offered are accepted as 
appropriate and useful by broader publics. For example the oil industry’s reputation has been 
damaged by highly visible oil spills, the chemical industry has been attacked in the past by 
environmental groups which may have reduced its legitimacy, and many well-established 
industries have a high level of legitimacy such as banking and medicine (Aerts & Cormier, 
2006:10). Industry legitimacy affects the credibility of corporate environmental 
communication efforts. The credibility of corporate environmental communication efforts 
would be validated through a positive association between environmental performance and 
environmental communication content. (Aerts & Cormier, 2006:10). Husted & Allen, (2007) 
argued that the industry environment has a large effect on corporate adaptation for social 
strategy. They also indicated that one of the key indicators of managerial engagement in 
social strategy is how managers perceive the terrain of the competitive industry environment. 
Boutin-Dufresne & Sacaris (2004) argued that companies in a particular industry may be 
socially responsible simply by the nature of their activities. So, it can be argued that industry 
membership affects the public expectations concerning the impact of their activities on the 
community and consequently the need for legitimacy.  
4.2.1.3 multi-nationality  
Zarzeski, (1996) argued that companies in the international marketplace provide higher 
levels of disclosure practices than their domestic counterparts. Depoers, (2000) argued that 
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the operating in a number of geographical areas including other countries increase the amount 
of information controlled by a company. Moreover companies are induced to comply with the 
usual disclosure practices in countries in which they operate.  Riahi-Belkaoui, (2001) argued 
that, basically, there are two reasons why we might expect a positive association between 
disclosure and multinationality; 
· The capital-need hypothesis which means that much of the impetus for voluntary 
disclosure by multinational companies surrounds the need to raise capital at the lowest 
possible cost. The pressure for information associated with global competition for capital 
manifests itself in the supplementary voluntary disclosures that multinational companies 
have been found to make. 
· The multiple listing hypotheses which means that multinational companies are generally 
listed in more than one stock exchange. The companies with multiple listing are more 
likely to have greater number of shareholders who can make more monitoring costs, from 
the methods to reduce shareholders’ monitoring costs and alleviate the moral hazards 
problem is through disclosure in corporate annual reports. 
In context of CSD, Newson & Deegan, (2002) argued that, based on legitimacy theory, 
companies will respond to the expectations of relevant publics, and for multinational 
corporations, relevant publics is not restricted to home country but rather is more global 
orientation. 
In the multinational environment companies are faced with potentially divergent home-
country, host-country and international pressures that affect their self-regulation strategies 
(Muller, 2006:189). The international operations of company have substantial impact on the 
formulation and implementation of business ethical principles such as codes of conduct 
(Tulder & Kolk, 2001: 267). 
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In this context, it can be argued that geographical extension means that companies face 
more public needs and expectations. Consequently, the multinational companies are more 
likely to face greater social pressure.  
4.2.2 Media pressure 
The media is able to change people’s perceptions of some issues. O’Donovan, (1997) show 
that senior executives of three large Australian companies believe that the media is able to 
shape society’s perceptions and that CSD are used to correct misperceptions presented by the 
media. There are some studies shows that the media is able to influence people’s perceptions 
concerning corporate reputation (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). 
Therefore, Hooghiemstra, (2000) argued that management will use the annual report to 
alleviate the negative media coverage. 
From the view of point of  legitimacy theory, it is indicated that differences in social 
disclosure are a systematic function of differences in public policy pressures, and these 
pressures can arise from cultural, political, or legal environments (Walden &  
Schwartz,1997:127), while media pressure arguments could be seen as having an influence 
on the cultural environment (Patten, 2002 a:158). Also, Brown & Deegan, (1998) extend 
legitimacy theory by examining the role of media coverage in increasing public policy 
pressure which companies face; they provided evidence that higher level of print media 
coverage of environmental issues increase public policy pressure by driving public concerns, 
which in turn leads to greater environmental disclosure. 
Therefore, it can be argued that more attention from the media on companies affect public 
perceptions and expectations concerning the impact of companies’ activities in community 
and consequently the need for legitimacy. 
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4.2.3 Corporate governance  
The term corporate governance emerged in the 1970s as a frame work to explain 
contemporary corporate scandals, with the word increasing in usage and became an 
institutionalized field of activity for corporations (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005: 163). Roe, (2002) 
argued that a corporate governance system depends not only on laws and regulations, but also 
on the structure and operations of other institutions such as legal firms, the accounting 
profession, investment banks, and enforcement mechanisms. Issues of governance include 
corporate accountability, to whom and for what the company is responsible, and by whom 
and what standards it is to be governed (Worthy & Neuschel, 1983). Corporate governance 
contains the controls and procedures that exist to ensure that management acts in the interest 
of shareholders, to reduce the probability that management acts in its self-interest and takes 
actions that deviate from maximizing the value of the company, also, corporate governance 
mechanisms affect the information disclosed by the company to its shareholders 
(Kanagaretnam, et al, 2007: 498). The importance of effective governance has been recently 
addressed by a wave of well-publicized corporate scandals including Enron, Tyco, 
Worldcomm, and Global Crossing. In response, companies have taken steps to strengthen 
their governance not only by making boards more independent but also by explicitly charging 
directors to enhance corporate transparency through the adoption of higher disclosure 
standards (Hauswald & Marquez, 2006: 2).  
It is argued that good corporate governance practices are accompanied with good disclosure 
practices, Patel & Dallas, (2002) argued that good corporate governance must include; a 
vigilant board of directors, adequately and timely disclosure of financial information, 
meaningful disclosure about the board and its management processes, and a transparent 
ownership structure identifying any conflicts of interests between mangers, directors, 
shareholders, and other related parties. Ho & Wong, (2001) indicated that to improve 
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transparency and accountability, both the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) and Hong 
Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) set up a corporate governance working group 
(CGWG) which recommended a number of practices including; separation of CEO and board 
chairman, a requirement of at least two non-executive directors, limitation of family members 
on the board to no more than 50%, and a requirement for two board committees (an audit 
committee and a remuneration committee) to be composed mainly of non-executive directors 
(Ho & Wong, 2001: 142).  Forker, (1992) argued that adoption of internal control devices 
such as audit committees and non-executives directors, and separation of the roles of 
Chairman and Chief Executive, improve monitoring quality and reduce benefits from 
withholding information, and as a consequence the quality of disclosure is improved (Forker, 
1992: 112). Chen, et al, (2006) argued that poor disclosure practice within a company is 
accompanied by poor corporate governance and improving transparency and disclosure 
practice will lead to better corporate governance.  
In the context of CSD, it is argued that research into corporate governance has traditionally 
adopted an agency theory perspective, as it is mainly associated with the problem that 
companies need to show accountability to main stakeholders group, the shareholders. This 
shareholder-oriented perspective has been reflected in governance policy documents and 
codes of conduct (Brennan & Solomon, 2008: 886). More recently, the considerations of 
corporate governance have started to broaden, as there has been a change of emphasis away 
from the traditional shareholder-oriented approach towards a more stakeholder-oriented 
approach (Brennan & Solomon, 2008: 890). This broader approach has started to reflect in 
governance practices as the following (Brennan & Solomon, 2008: 890); (1) the Tyson 
Report (2003) in the UK, sought to broaden the board diversity by encouraging non-executive 
directors to be drawn from diverse backgrounds. (2) Two reports produced in South Africa 
(the King report 1994, 2002) draw attention to the need for companies to act responsibly 
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toward their diverse stakeholders. (3) International initiatives by OECD (OECD 1999, 2004) 
are making stakeholders concerns one of the primary principles of corporate governance best 
practices. 
Mallin, et al, (2005) argued that corporate governance is concerned with both the internal 
aspects of the company, such as control and board structures, and external aspects such as the 
relationships with shareholders and stakeholders (Mallin, et al, 2005: 532). Ho & Wong, 
(2001) argued that corporate governance is thought as delineating rights and responsibilities 
of each group of company’s stakeholders. Transparency is one major indicator of the standard 
of corporate governance in an economy (Ho & Wong, 2001: 142). In addition, it appears that 
the corporate governance system is related with ethical concerns; the Ethical Resource Centre 
2003 considers ethics as a core concept in corporate governance and the struggle against 
corruption. Without high standards of corporate governance, businesses may under-perform, 
while strongly governed companies on a habitual system based on ethical values will perform 
strongly (Cassidy, 2003). Mallin, (2002) indicated to that ethical investment has now been 
increasingly perceived as a mainstream element of good corporate governance. 
Karamanou & Vafeas, (2005) stated that “—well governed firms are more mindful of their 
obligation not to mislead shareholders” (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005: 455). It can be argued 
that good corporate governance can play an important role in transferring community 
concerns to companies’ attention, and consequently it is considered an important factor which 
can determine how companies react to society’s needs and expectations. 
Of governance practices, the structure of board of directors appear to be important 
mechanism that could influence corporate activities, the Board of Directors is considered an 
important determinant of corporate governance (Bahgat & Bolton, 2008: 258). Halme & 
Huse, (1997) argued that the role of the board may be linked to the companies’ environmental 
attention; the environmental groups and corporate activists ask the board of directors to make 
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their companies behave in a socially acceptable manner as a board could operate as a sort of 
“superego” of their companies (Halme & Huse, 1997: 142). The board of directors may lead 
to greater monitoring and consequently to the high level of CSD, and the degree to which the 
board will affect CSD may also depend on the characteristics of this corporate governance 
mechanism. Thus, the characteristics of the board (board composition) can be seen as an 
indicator of corporate governance. 
The structure of boards varies between countries and region of the world. But, the 
objectives of the board are the same, enhance stakeholder investment. The quality of board 
should have greater attention especially with the problems which have encountered 
companies all over the world. Corporate Governance codes require increasing non-executive 
members on the board and separation between CEO and chairman to improve the monitoring 
role of the board. Anderson & Reeb, (2004) argued that studies on board of directors 
effectiveness often focus on board composition classifying directors as either insiders 
(company’ employee) or outsider (non-employees).outside directors are often divided into; 
“those with existing or potential business ties to the firm (affiliates) and those members 
(independents) whose only tie to the firm is their directorship” (Anderson & Reeb, 2004: 2). 
Karamanou & Vafeas, (2005) argued that as a response to recent financial disclosure 
scandals, US-congress and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and major stock 
exchanges focused on corporate boards as primary method for enhancing the quality of 
financial disclosure (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005: 454). Kanagaretnam, et al, (2007) argued 
that the substantial part of literature indicates that boards that do a more effective job of 
monitoring management enhance the quality and the frequency of information released by 
management, and this suggests that information asymmetry on average is lower for 
companies whose boards are more effective (Kanagaretnam, et al, 2007: 498).  Effective 
board monitoring of management should not only increase the frequency of disclosures but 
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also enhance their quality (Kanagaretnam, et al, 2007: 499). Ajinkya, et al, (2005) and 
Karamanou & Vafeas, (2005) documented that companies with more effective boards issue 
more frequent earnings forecasts and these forecasts are more accurate.                              
Chen, (2006) argued that it is necessary to understand the common determinants of board 
structure which contribute to the correlation between independent directors and disclosure. 
These determinants are; 
· External financing needs, which the studies referred to the existence of a relation between 
external financing needs and good corporate governance, and therefore independent board 
structure, also there is relation between external financing needs and level of voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, it is likely that the correlation between board independence and 
disclosure could be due to the external financing needs. 
· Overseas markets, which studies referred to existence relation between disclosure score 
and interaction with overseas markets, also, it is likely that the international exchanges and 
flow of information will lead to more board independence. Therefore, the interaction with 
overseas markets could determine both board independences and disclosure.  
John & Senbet, (1998) argued that the effectiveness of a board in monitoring management 
is determined by its composition, independence and size. Board composition and board 
independence are related as board independence increases as the proportion of independent 
outside directors increases. Fama, (1980) argued that the higher the proportion of outside 
directors (directors not involved in the direct operation of the company), the greater 
monitoring ability over management. So, of the variables related to board of directors, three 
variables will be of interest; board size, proportion of non-executive directors, and presence 
of corporate responsibility committee as a board committee. The presence of non-executive 
directors has the most attention of researchers. Chen & Jaggi, (2000) argued that the inclusion 
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of non-executive directors on corporate boards started to receive increasing attention in the 
1980s, which two main arguments are developed; 
· Non-executive directors will provide advice to board on strategic decisions, which may 
improve the company’s financial and economic performance. 
· Non-executive directors improve monitoring of management decisions and activities by 
board. 
Barako, et al, (2006) argued that non-executive directors consider a governance mechanism 
that enhances the board’s capacity to ameliorate agency conflict between owners and 
managers which may occur in the decision to voluntarily disclose information in annual 
report. (Barako, et al, 2006: 111). Chen, (2006) indicated that in US, non-executive directors 
are shown to play more important role in monitoring managers than do inside board directors 
(Chen, 2006: 290). In addition to monitoring the quality of financial information, non-
executive directors can play important role in determining and monitoring corporate 
voluntary disclosure (Ajinkya, et al, 2005: 344). Also, outside directors who are less aligned 
to management may be more inclined to encourage companies to disclose more information 
to outside investors, so, it is expected that the more outside directors on the board will be 
resulted in more voluntary disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003: 327). Charitau, et al, (2007) 
suggests that the companies with more independent boards will be less likely to become 
delisted because independent directors are more likely to protect shareholder interests from 
managerial opportunism and increasing corporate performance (Charitau, et al, 2007: 252). 
Cheng & Courtenay, (2006) argued that concerning outside or non-executive directors, it is 
necessary to distinguish between those who are affiliated with management through family or 
business relations (grey directors) and those who are truly independent (no relation with 
management ( Cheng & Courtenay, 2006: 264). Empirically, independent directors are found 
to impact a range of board decisions such as firing of non-performing CEO, resistance to 
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greenmail payments, and the negotiations of tender offers. (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006: 265). 
Anderson & Reeb, (2004) argued that independent directors can defend the minority 
shareholders by protecting their rights against large-shareholders opportunism; independent 
directors play an important role in balancing the interests of competing shareholders and they 
act as an influential governance mechanism in protecting outside shareholders from large 
shareholders expropriation (Anderson & Reeb, 2004: 2). 
In the context of CSD, companies with higher levels of outside directors’ representation 
tend to have higher CSP (Harrison & Freeman, 1999:480). Zahra & Stanton, (1988) argued 
that non-executive directors are likely to respond to concerns about honour and obligation 
and are more interested in satisfying the social responsibilities of the company. Outside 
directors may enhance the reputation and credibility of a company and help to establish and 
maintain its legitimacy (Johnson & Greening, 1999: 568). The role of non-executive directors 
in improving the monitoring of corporate boards suggests that the corporate board will 
become more responsive to investors, and inclusion of non-executive directors will improve 
the company’s compliance with the disclosure requirements which in turn will improve the 
comprehensiveness and quality of disclosure (Chen & Jaggi, 2000: 286). Rose, (2007) argued 
that the new regulations requiring more independent directors are a major step in improving 
corporate ethics and social responsibility (Rose, 2007: 321). Therefore, it appears that 
presence of non-executive directors is linking between companies and outside environment. 
4.2.4 Corporate ownership 
Corporate ownership differs across the world. In some countries, companies are diffusely 
owned with managers firmly in control; in other countries companies have more concentrated 
ownership (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999). Developed countries such as the UK and USA are 
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characterized by dispersed ownership15 in which institutional investors such as pension funds 
and mutual funds predominate (Chau & Gray, 2002: 249; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003: 448). In 
developing countries, ownership is heavily concentrated (La Porta, et al, 1998). 
 “The structure of ownership determines the level of monitoring and thereby the level of 
disclosure” (Eng & Mak, 2003: 326). Makhija & Patton, (2004) examined the impact of 
ownership structure on the extent of voluntary financial disclosure, they found that the extent 
of disclosure is positively related to investment fund ownership at low levels of fund 
ownership but is negatively related to investment fund ownership at high levels of ownership.       
Smith, et al, (2005) argue that ownership structure may influence the relationship between 
companies and stakeholders, and influence the level of quantity and quality of CSD (Smith, et 
al, 2005: 131).  
In the context of CSD, the ownership structure may give rise to legitimacy gap (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005: 401). In companies with a dispersed ownership structure, opportunistic 
management behaviour and conflicts between agents and principles are more likely to occur 
(Tagesson, et al, 2009: 355). On the other hand, concentration of ownership makes 
accountability a minor issue and consequently companies have little incentive to voluntarily 
disclose information (Naser, et al, 2006: 17).  It can be argued that ownership structure could 
have impact through two dimensions. Corporate governance addresses the agency problem 
and ownership diffusion increase this problem (Chen, 2001: 54), and consequently there is 
need for good governance practices which affect companies’ respond to social pressure. On 
the other hand, ownership structure can be important source of incentives for managers 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), and also can influence managerial behaviour (Grossman & Hart, 
                                                
15 Aguilera & Jackson (2003) suggested an explanation for dispersing ownership in the US based on a developed 
financial system and intercorporate networks with restricted strategic interfirm cooperation. In contrast, 
concentrated ownership (such as in Germany and Italy), is explained by a combination of factors: property rights 
favouring blockholders and the availability of bank-based finance. Also, La Porta et al. (1999) suggest an 
explanation for differences in ownership structure across the world based on the legal protection of minority 
shareholders. 
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1988). In this context, it can be argued that, in general, the more diffused ownership 
companies are more likely to need to deal with society’s perception toward them in order to 
maintain good relations with various owners. 
4.3. The Consequences of CSD 
According to legitimacy theory, companies use CSD as a legitimacy tool. Tilling (2001) 
refers to the notion that more legitimate companies are the most likely to attract the resources 
necessary for survival. Therefore, researchers need to move away from trying to directly 
assess legitimacy and instead focus on measuring it in terms of the resources that relevant 
stakeholders provide. Actually, companies voluntarily provide social and environmental 
information to satisfy community needs, by identifying the degree of commitment of these 
companies to their social responsibilities. In this way, CSD is directed toward all sectors of 
society and, therefore, the consequences of this disclosure depend on its importance to each 
sector and the ability of this sector to influence companies (Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.5: expected consequences of CSD 
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Figure 4.5 shows that companies provide disclosure for different sectors (stakeholders, 
NGOs, professional organisations, governments and investors) of society. It is argued that the 
consequences of CSD depend on the extent to which CSD appears to be important to each 
sector. In this context, it appears that stakeholders, NGOs and professional organisations are 
more interested in CSD than other parties, and these parties will react positively to higher 
levels of CSD by improving the companies’ social reputation. While the importance of CSD 
for investors remains a disputed issue, (in addition to the low proportion of socially 
responsible investors in the financial market), this reflects the limited influence of this sector 
on companies and consequently indicates a limited financial impact for CSD. Governments 
also deliver CSD as a means to evaluate the status of companies’ commitment to the concept 
of CSR.  Governments can therefore determine the need to enact regulations that control the 
impact of companies’ activities on the environment and the community as a whole. It can be 
expected then that higher CSD could alleviate government intervention in companies’ 
activities, but it is difficult to examine this objective empirically. Therefore, the expected 
benefits of CSD, as a part of legitimacy strategy, are improving social reputation and 
improving the financial position. 
4.3.1. Corporate social reputation 
According to legitimacy theory, corporate reputation is improved as a result of the 
legitimation process. As Nguyen & Leblanc (2001) argue “corporate image and corporate 
reputation are considered as the global outcomes of the process of legitimation” (Nguyen & 
Leblanc, 2001: 227). Reputation is a multi-dimensional concept that includes both financial 
and social aspects because companies’ strategic actions and their outcomes are continually 
evaluated not only by the financial markets but also by all the stakeholders of the company 
(Espinosa & Trombetta, 2004: 2). Hemphill (2006) argues that corporate social reputation, 
reflecting CSR, requires an effective non-market strategy. Reputation can be conceptualised 
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with reference to both strategic management literature and a sociological perspective. From 
the first perspective, reputation can be considered as the company’s attributes that reflect the 
extent to which stakeholders see the company as a good corporate citizen. From the second 
perspective, reputation is a subjective collective assessment of the trustworthiness and 
reliability of companies (Michelon, 2007: 7).  
The expected relationship between CSD and corporate reputation can be theorised in the 
context of two ideas. First, corporate communication strategy plays an important role in 
constructing corporate reputation and therefore CSD is considered to be a part of the 
corporate communication strategy. Second, CSR activities positively add to corporate 
reputation, and therefore CSD is considered to be an interpretation of the CSR concept.  
In the context of the first perspective, corporate reputation is considered to be a socially 
constructed concept which reflects the stakeholders’ perceptions of how well company 
responses meet the demands and expectations of different stakeholders (Nguyen & Leblanc, 
2001: 228). Corporate image involves popular perceptions of the company, which result from 
information transmitted via a company’s communications. Lewis (2001) state that reputation 
is a product, at any particular moment, of a mix of behaviour, communication, and 
expectation. Gray & Balmer (1998) present an operational model for managing corporate 
reputation and image and suggest that companies gain their reputation or image through their 
communications (see following Figure). Espinosa & Trombetta (2004) argued that the 
communication strategy of a company is a crucial in determining its image, and quality of 
annual report disclosures is a natural element of a company communication strategy. Lewis 
(2003) argued that if companies are to engage the public in the 21st century, their 
communication must give social responsibility a bigger and more central role, where ethics 
and values will play more prominent role in consumer choices. 
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Concerning the second perspective, corporate reputation is affected by, among others, the 
quality of management, the company’s financial soundness and its demonstration of social 
matters (Hooghiemstra, 2000: 58). Lewis (2003) argues that there are around six major facets 
of reputation which determine overall reputation: leadership; quality of products/services; 
financial performance; treatment of staff; environmental responsibility; and social 
responsibility. Quevedo-Puente et al (2007) argue that corporate social performance (CSP) 
and corporate reputation are two closely related concepts that include the relationship 
between the company and its stakeholders. These concepts are linked by company 
legitimation which is the process that translates past performance into future expectations. 
Legitimation transforms CSP, an objective flow variable, into corporate reputation, a 
perceptual stock variable. Hemphill (2006) argues that companies should design a socially 
responsible strategy to maintain or rebuild corporate reputation. This should operate on two 
levels of engagement: 
¶ Interactive engagement which builds relationships with stakeholders; and  
¶ Reactive engagement which is undertaken when evidence of improper business practices 
are investigated by federal authorities. 
Therefore, the relationship between CSD and corporate reputation can be theoretically 
justified. Hooghiemstra (2000: 58) argues that narratives may contribute to the building of 
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by engaging in CSD. Michelon (2007) argues that once a company has a strong reputation, 
CSD can be used to preserve the reputation (Michelon, 2007: 7). 
4.3.2. Market value 
A second consequence of CSD is the anticipated positive impact on corporate economic 
performance. Balabanis et al (1998) argue that both CSD and CSP are related to past, 
concurrent, and future financial performance.  They suggest that CSD and CSP are inter-
related, and also related to concurrent financial performance. Past financial performance is 
considered to be one of the determinants of CSD, while future financial performance is 
considered to be a result of CSD. Bird et al. (2007) argue that there are various ways in which 
expenditures on CSR activities may translate into increases in value of the company: 
¶ Activities, such as energy efficiency, result in cost savings which can lead to increased 
profitability and supposedly an increase in the company’s market valuation. 
¶ Activities, such as improved product quality, can lead to reputational benefits which 
increase both profitability and market valuation in the long-term. 
¶ Activities, such as voluntarily controlling pollution emissions, can alleviate future action 
by government and other regulatory bodies which could impose significant costs on the 
company (Bird, et al., 2007: 191). 
In general, the impact of CSD on economic performance is reflected in a positive impact on 
the corporate market value. Theoretically, increased level of disclosure (in quantity and/or 
quality) reduces the information asymmetry between company and its shareholders or among 
potential buyers and sellers of its shares. This, in turn should reduce the discount at which 
company’ shares are sold and hence lower the costs of issuing capital (Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000: 92). Plumlee et al (2008) argue that disclosure quality has direct and indirect effects on 
future cash flow. The indirect impact is through the impact on cost of capital, thereby 
changing the company’s hurdle rate as it applies to future projects. Thus the potential positive 
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net present value of a project to a company changes according to its disclosure quality. The 
direct impact is because high quality disclosure may have an information value that provides 
more complete understanding of company behaviour (Plumlee, et al., 2008: 10). Teoh & 
Hwang (1991) indicate that investors may assess firm value based on whether or not news 
was disclosed on a particular date, and whether it was good or bad (Teoh & Hwang, 1991: 
286). Rahman (2002) argues that corporate voluntary disclosure is one of the determinants of 
market value in line with internal and external corporate governance factors. In the context of 
CSD, Blacconiere & Patten (1994) argue that environmental disclosure is expected to 
moderate the negative market reaction to environmental accidents.  
The demands for corporate responsibility information by the capital market come from 
seven main sources: 
¶ SRI or responsible investment funds are responsible for much of the increased salience of 
corporate responsibility information. 
¶ The increasing number of financial indices that incorporate environmental and social 
criteria, such as the Dow Jones sustainability indexes, the FTSE4Good and the Canadian-
based Jantzi Social Index (JSI). 
¶ Shareholders have been filing resolutions in escalating numbers, as well as increasingly 
supporting resolutions that demand disclosure of social and/or environmental performance 
information. 
¶ Financial institutions are using their combined influence (i.e. the enormous sums of funds) 
to create pressure for improved performance and enhanced disclosure on specific issues. 
¶ Oversight bodies and regulators in both Europe and North America have initiated measures 
to enhance the impact of existing disclosure requirements. 
¶ New regulatory obligations related to disclosure are being introduced by a growing number 
of jurisdictions. 
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¶ A wide variety of awareness-raising initiatives have been developed from the UNP FI to 
various civil society initiatives to the ongoing NRTEE initiative (Stratos, 2004: 5-7). 
It has been argued that the consequences of CSD depend on its importance to each sector of 
society. Thus, the economic consequences of CSD depend on its importance to financial 
markets (investors). In this context, it can be argued that the theoretical link between CSD 
and economic performance depends on two related ideas: (1) the increasing interest in the 
concept of CSR is accompanied by an increasing attention paid to social information, (2) the 
expected increase in the proportion of SRI in capital markets.  
In relation to the first idea, the increasing interest in the concept of CSR has led to a number 
of studies to examine the potentially positive relationship between corporate social 
performance CSP and corporate financial performance. These studies, in most cases, indicate 
a positive association between the two reflecting the fact that investors take into account CSP 
information when they make investment decisions. Solomon & Solomon (2006) argue that 
there is growth in the integration of social and environmental issues in institutional 
investments in the UK (Solomon & Solomon, 2006: 565). However, Wahba (2008) argues 
that despite the growing expectation that social performance positively influences financial 
performance, to date these theories are inconclusive and empirical evidence is mixed (Wahba, 
2008: 90). Shane & Spicer (1983) highlight that empirical studies have investigated the 
general question of whether or not investors have found social information useful for 
investment decisions by surveying institutional investors’ demands for social information, 
and examining the stock market reaction to voluntary corporate social disclosure. They find it 
is not clear whether investors actually use corporate social information in making investment 
decisions (Shane & Spicer, 1983: 522). The organisation, Business in the Environment, (BiE, 
(1994) cited in Deegan & Rankin, 1997), examined the attitudes of British investment 
analysts on issues pertaining to the environment, and found that environmental issues have a 
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very low ranking in the analysts’ priorities when they make their investment analyses. 
Henningsson (2008) finds that fund management groups do not feel any pressure to 
compromise social and environmental issues with their focus on corporate financial 
performance. Furthermore, other studies that examine the importance of social responsibility 
information for investors produced mixed results. Therefore, the hypothesis that social 
responsibility information is important for investment decisions is still disputed.  
Within the argument that investors are interested in social and environmental information, 
another concern that arises is that investors may prefer external sources to obtain information 
on the social performance of companies. Solomon & Solomon (2006) argue that the weight 
of literature over the last 30 years seems to indicate that social, environmental and ethical 
information is considered decision-useful, but is inadequately disclosed (Solomon & 
Solomon, 2006: 567). Murray et al. (2006) argue that financial markets are offered a 
significant opportunity for international capitalism to reinvent itself in a form that is 
compatible with the exigencies of sustainability through new information, and in particular, 
information about social responsibility activities. Social and environmental disclosure 
through annual reports fulfils this role, but this disclosure is inadequate because it fails to 
offer a complete picture of a company’s social responsibility activities (Murray et al., 2006: 
229). The empirical results of a study by Dhaliwal et al. (2009) indicate that investors are 
actually interested in social performance, although at the same time, they are more interested 
in social performance indicators than CSR reporting. Therefore, it appears that if we accept 
the argument that investors are interested in social responsibility information, it is unclear to 
what extent CSD plays a role in this development. 
With regard to the second idea (the expected increase in the proportion of SRI in capital 
markets), Hill et al. (2007) argue that SRI “demonstrated the long-term positive consequences 
of CSR on the market value of firms” (Hill et al., 2007: 172). The growing proportion of SRI 
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is a strong factor in the expected positive impact of social disclosure on economic 
performance. Rockness & Williams (1988) and Harte et al. (1991) detect a strong demand for 
social disclosure from ethical investors. Ullmann (1985) argues that ethical investors could 
pay a premium for shares of socially responsible companies. SRI has become a powerful 
engine for change leading to higher CSR standards (Valor et al, 2009: 1). Murray et al. 
(2006) argue that the growth in ethical investment funds reverses the traditional hypothesis 
that investors are exclusively interested in a financial appraisal of their investments. This 
growth indicates that social and environmental information may well offer an important 
source of direct input to ethical investors’ decisions (Murray et al, 2006: 232). However, the 
influence of SRI is limited because as Valore et al. (2009: 2) indicate that despite SRI being 
on the rise, particularly in terms of the number of funds offered, retail SRI accounts form a 
small proportion of total retail funds. Therefore, the idea that SRI represents an important 
function in capital markets and can influence corporate financial positions is still disputed.  
In summary, it is argued that according to legitimacy theory, companies use CSD as a tool 
to legitimise their activities in the face of social pressure. Therefore, the primary consequence 
of CSD is to improve corporate social reputation; however, there is no clear theoretical link 
between CSD and financial performance. 
 
5. SUMMARY   
This chapter presents a theoretical framework that explains CSD. It suggests that, according 
to political economy theory, the interaction between socio-economic factors (the economic 
level of attainment, the political system, culture and level of corporate governance) in each 
country provides an explanation as to the level of CSD in that country. 
At the company level, the framework, using legitimacy theory, explains that the level of 
CSD in each company is a result of interaction between two types of factors: factors that 
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determine the level of social pressure on the company (corporate characteristics, media 
pressure and degree of multi-national activities), and factors that determine the company’s 
response to social pressure (corporate ownership and corporate governance). In addition, this 
disclosure provides advantages for companies by improving their social reputation. The next 
chapter clarifies the method used to measure CSD.   
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Chapter 5 
Methodology  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter presented a theoretical framework that identifies the determinants and 
consequences of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSD). To examine this framework, 
three empirical models are used. The first is a model to examine the determinants of social 
disclosure at the country level, the second is a model to examine the determinants of social 
disclosure at the company level, and the third is a model to examine the consequences of CSD. 
Each model includes several variables which are measured through several databases.16 The 
focal point of this framework is CSD. The measurement of CSD, in particular in annual 
reports, is controversial according to previous studies. As a result, this chapter focuses on 
clarifying ways of measuring CSD.  
Previous studies suffer from limitations which this study attempts to avoid by analysing, not 
only the quantity but also the quality of CSD as a whole (i.e. not only environmental 
disclosure), in both annual and stand-alone reports (i.e. not only annual reports). The following 
variables are used to measure CSD: 
¶ Quantity of disclosure in both annual and, if available, stand-alone reports (whatever the 
name of the report be it corporate social responsibility report, corporate responsibility report, 
corporate sustainability report, environmental report, social and environmental report, 
corporate citizenship, etc.)  
¶ Quality of disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports.  
The objectives of this chapter are to: 
                                               
16 The explanation for these variables and the method of measurement will be discussed in the chapter pertinent to 
each model. 
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¶ Explain the measurement of CSD, in particular in annual reports; and 
¶ Present a pilot study that examines the validity of the measures.  
The next two sections explain the measurement of quantity and quality of social disclosure 
respectively. Section 4 defines the sample and section 5 presents a pilot study which is 
conducted to ensure the relevance of measurement procedures to the selected sample. Last two 
sections explain positionality and research ethics.  
 
2. THE QUANTITY OF CSD 
This section is related to measuring the quantity of CSD in both annual and stand-alone 
reports. The accurate measurement of disclosure is a key factor in ensuring the accuracy of the 
results of these studies. A large part of this chapter will therefore focus on the measurement of 
social disclosure in annual reports. 
2.1 The Quantity of CSD in Annual Report 
The research method commonly used in assessing the quantity of CSD is content analysis. 
Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data according to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980: 21). The main 
characteristic in content analysis is that data are coded and measured in a reliable and 
systematic manner (Krippendorff, 1980). The content analysis technique requires determining 
the documents used in analysis (annual reports), define CSD and its categories, the unit of 
analysis, and the reliability of the content analysis technique. 
2.1.1 Annual reports 
Annual reports are formal public documents produced by companies in response to the 
mandatory corporate reporting requirements existing in most western economies (Santon & 
Santon, 2002:478). Daub, (2007) stated that the annual report is sometimes referred to as a 
company business card which reflects that it provide readers with a comprehensive picture of 
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the publishing organization (Daub, 2007: 75). The annual reports are commonly divided into 
two sections; one for statutory required financial statements, and other for non-statutory 
matters. It is observed that content changes have been partly mandatory, partly voluntary. In 
the UK, the mandatory content increased rapidly between 1970 and 1990 as a result of 
changing demands from several regulatory bodies. Also, voluntary disclosure increased as the 
corporate report moved towards being a public relations document (Santon & Santon, 
2002:479). Tsang, (2001) argued that compared with one or two decades ago, today, annual 
reports are more professional with colourful graphs and diagrams, fancy designs and exotic 
paper. There is growing realization that annual reports have a disclosure function which can 
serve crucial public relations function. White & Hanson, (2002) present a justification for 
extensive use of annual report by researchers “for no other medium offers the same blend of 
consistency, accessibility wide applicability. No other medium yields the same access to 
corporate communication with lay audiences” (White & Hanson, 2002:455). 
The majority of literature uses the annual report as the principle focus of disclosure. The 
literature presents some justifications for this as the following: 
· Annual reports provide a high degree of credibility to information disclosed within them 
(Tilt, 1994). 
· The annual report is a statutory document and produced regularly, and it represents what is 
probably the most important document which companies use in construction of its own 
social imagery (Hines, 1988). 
· Annual reports are the most accessible source of information for listed companies, in hard 
copies and electronically (Yusoff & Lehman, 2005). 
· The financial image of a company is critical in terms of how companies are seen and 
judged, the social and environmental factors frequently will produce conflict with financial 
ambitions of the company and its owners, so the presentation of the financial information 
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and social and environmental information within the same report becomes an important 
element in demonstrating how the company reconciles these matters (Gray, et al, 1995 b: 
82). 
2.1.2 Define CSD and its categories 
The measurement of CSD in annual reports requires a clear definition for CSD and its 
categories. The literature identifies four major themes for corporate social responsibility; 
natural environment, employees, community, and customers (Gray, et al, 1995 b: 81). But 
Gray, et al, (1995 b) identified four problems:  
· There will be some elements which seem instinctively to be social responsibility but fall 
outside these categories, so it may be other category succeed in capturing such elements. 
· These categories fail in any separation of voluntary versus regulated/mandated disclosure. 
· For comparability objective, it is advisable to follow the Ernst and Ernst subcategories, but 
many of Ernst and Ernst categories would stay at or near zero for UK. 
· Changes over time will make previously marginal categories too narrow and cumbersome 
(Gray, et al, 1995 b: 81). 
Based on some studies (Gray, et al, 1995 b; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Hall, 2002; Newson & 
Deegan, 2002; Williams, 1999; Williams &Pei, 1999; Deegan, et al, 2002) the CSD 
categories17 can be determined as the following: 
1- Environment 
 
1-1 Environmental pollution 
1. Pollution control  
2. compliance with pollution laws and regulations 
3. Prevention or repair environmental damage  
4. Conservation of natural resources,  
5. Using recycled materials 
6. Efficiently using materials resources in the manufacturing process 
                                               
17 This index is adopted from Hackston & Milne, 1996, which it is the most comprehensive index in literature and 
it is applied in New Zealand which is a developed country, and is used to explain the determinants of CSD. Also, 
index of Gray, et al, 1995 b, was used because it is similar to the previous and applied in UK, but it was used to 
construct social disclosure database. 
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7. Supporting anti-litter campaigns 
8. Receiving award  
9. Preventing waste 
1-2 Aesthetics 
10. Designing facilities harmonious with the environment 
11. Contributions to beautify the environment 
12. Restoring historical buildings/structures 
1-3 Other 
13. Undertaking environmental studies  
14. Wildlife conservation 
 
2- Energy 
 
15. Conservation of energy  
16. Utilizing waste materials for energy production 
17. Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
18. Research aimed at improving energy efficiency of products 
19. Receiving awards  
20. Voicing the company’s concern about the energy shortage  
21. energy policies 
 
3- Employee 
 
3-1 Employee health and safety 
22. Reducing hazards in the work environment 
23. Accident statistics 
24. Complying with health and safety standards and regulations 
25. Receiving a safety award  
26. Establishing a safety department/committee/policy 
27. Conducting research to improve work safety 
28. Provide low cost health care for employees 
3-2 Employment of minorities or women 
29. Recruiting or employing racial minorities and/or women 
30. Establishing goals for minority representation in the workforce 
31. Programme for the advancement or minorities in the workplace 
32. Employment of other special interest groups,  
33. Disclosures about internal advancement statistics 
3-3 Employee training 
34. Training employees through in-house programmes  
35. Financial assistance  
36. Establishment of trainee centres 
3-4 Employee assistance/benefits 
37. Providing assistance or guidance to employees  
38. Providing staff accommodation/ 
39. Providing recreational activities/facilities  
3-5 Employee remuneration 
40. Providing amount and/or percentage figures for salaries, wages, and                                                                           
pay taxes superannuation 
41. Remuneration policies  
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3-6 Employee profiles 
42. Number of employees  
43. Providing the disposition of staff-  
44. Providing statistics on the number of staff ,  
45. Providing per employee statistics,  
46. Providing information on the qualifications of employees recruited 
3-7 Employee share purchase schemes 
47. a share purchase scheme or pension programme 
48. Providing any other profit sharing schemes 
3-8 Employee morale 
49. improve job satisfaction and employee motivation 
50. stability of the workers’ jobs  
51. awards for effective communication with employees 
52. communication with employees  
3-9 Industrial relations 
53. company’s relationship with trade unions  
54. industrial action  
3-10 Other 
55. Improving working conditions-  
56. re-organization of the company 
57. statistics on employee turnover 
 
4- Products 
 
4-1 Product development 
58. developments in company’s products,  
59. development expenditure  
60. Information on any research projects set up by the company to improve 
its product in any way 
4-2 Product safety 
61. products safety standards 
62. safety research  
63. improve procedures of processing and preparation of products 
4-3 Product quality 
64. quality of the company’s products  
65. Verifiable information  
 
5- Community development 
66. Donations  
67. Summer or part-time employment of students 
68. Sponsoring public health projects 
69. Aiding medical research 
70. Sponsoring educational conferences,  
71. Funding scholarship programmes or activities 
72. Supporting national pride/government sponsored campaigns 
73. Other special community related activities,  
 
6- Customers 
 
7- Value added statement  
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8- Others 
74. Corporate objectives/policies;  
75. Other;  
 
The above definition of CSD categories is just an initial definition that will be tested to 
determine its relevance for companies in the sample. This definition will be tested in the pilot 
study in last section of this chapter.  
2.1.3 Unit of analysis 
The methods used in content analysis' studies to quantify disclosure are number of characters, 
words, sentences, pages, and proportion of volume of CSD to total disclosure. The literature 
does not provide a theoretical justification for choice of any one of these measures (Williams, 
1999).  
The measurement of quantity of disclosure in terms of words was justified by maintaining 
that volume of disclosure can thereby be recorded in greater detail (Deegan & Gordon, 1996). 
Zeghal & Ahmed, (1990) indicated that words are the smallest unit of measurement and can be 
expected to provide the maximum strength to the study in assessing disclosure quantity. The 
criticism of using words as a basis for measurement are, it is an ambiguous measure, and using 
numbers of words leaves the researchers pondering which individual word is a CSD and which 
is not, therefore, the possibility remains that disagreement between different coders could be 
quite serious (Hackston & Milne, 1996:84). Milne & Adler, (1999) argued that individual word 
has no meaning to provide a sound basis for coding CSD without a sentence or sentences for 
context. 
The measurement in terms of sentences was justified in that; (1) sentences can be counted 
with more accuracy than words, (2) sentences are used to convey meaning whereas discerning 
the meaning of individual words in isolation is problematic, (3) sentences overcome the 
problem of allocation of portions of pages and remove the need to account for the number of 
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words, (4) in addition, sentences are a more natural unit of written English to count than words 
(Hackston & Milne, 1996:84-85). Walden & Schwartz, (1997) argued that a sentence consider 
a conventional unit of speech and writing, while portion of pages is not. Using sentences as a 
unit of measurement seems to ignore that the differences in use of grammar may result in 
conveying the same message by using a similar number of words and similar amount of space 
but using a different number of sentences (Unerman, 2000:675). Also, Milne & Adler, (1999) 
argued that measurement in terms of sentences give similar results to measurement of volume 
in terms of proportion of the page.  
The criticism of using pages to measurement is that print sizes, column sizes, and pages sizes 
may differ from annual report to another (Ng, 1985). Milne & Adler, (1999) suggested that 
using areas of pages as a basis for measure CSD adds unnecessary reliability. Therefore, 
Gray,et al,1995b;Unerman,2000, measured CSD using portion of pages use a grid with 25 rows 
of equal height and four columns of equal width was laid across each CSR disclosure, with 
volume being counted as the number of cells on the grid taken up by disclosure and making 
allowance for any blank parts of a page. Also, Newson & Deegan, (2002) measure the CSD to 
the nearest hundredth of a page using a transparent plastic A4 sheet divided into a grid of 100 
rectangles, each side is divided into 10 after allowing for a standard margin of approximately 
25 mm. The transparent sheet is placed over sections of highlighted text, pictures,, or captions 
and the number of hundredths assessed . No allowance was made for typeface or margins 
between blocks of text; such technique provides similar results to measurement by individual 
sentences. 
A strong criticism against measuring CSD in terms of number of characters, words or 
sentences is that this will be result ignoring any non-narrative disclosure such as photographs 
or charts which consider effective methods of communication (Unerman, 2000:675). It is 
argued that photographs are sometimes more powerful tool than narrative disclosure for 
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stakeholder who does not have either time or inclination to read every word in the annual 
report (Unerman, 2000:675). 
For the purpose of this study, CSD quantity in annual report will be measured by an 
alternative three units: number of sentences, number of pages, and percentage of pages. The 
objectives of using different three units are: (1) using the number of sentences as an 
appropriate indicator to quantity of CSD in annual reports in order to analyse the quantity of 
CSD in annual reports only; (2) using the number of pages in annual reports in order to 
measure total quantity of CSD as a total number of pages in both annual and stand-alone 
reports; (3) examining the results that derived from three different units to indicate if they 
provide similar results or not. 
2.1.4 Reliability of content analysis 
The main characteristic of content analysis is that data should be tested to prove that they are 
objective, systematic, and reliable (Krippendorff, 1980). Reliability in content analysis 
involves two separate but related issues; (Milne & Adler, 1999) 
· Verify that coded data is in fact reliable. The common ways in achieving this objective is 
demonstrating the use of multiple coders and reporting either the discrepancies between the 
coders are few, or the discrepancies have been re-analyzed and the differences resolved. 
Alternatively, researchers can demonstrate that a single coder has undergone a sufficient 
period of training. 
· The reliability associated with the coding instruments themselves. By establishing the 
reliability of particular tool/method across a wide range of data sets and coders, content 
analysts can reduce the need for the costly use of multiple coders (Milne & Adler, 1999). 
Newson & Deegan, (2002) using two types of reliability test for coding CSD; first, assess the 
proportion of coding errors between coders (inter-coder reliability or reproducibility). Second, 
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assess the performance of coder against a predetermined standard (ex post coding decisions) to 
determine coder accuracy. 
Krippendorff, (1980) indicated to three types of content analysis' reliability; 
· Stability, sometimes called intra-coder reliability, refer to the ability of a judge to code data 
the same way over time. If annual reports analysed by a coder and then analysed again after 
three weeks, and the coding was the same each time then the stability of content analysis 
would be perfect. 
· Reproducibility, sometimes called inter-coder reliability, refer to that the same coding 
achieved when various coder are involved. The inter-coder reliability use to measure 
reproducibility and involves assessing the proportion of coding errors between various 
coders. 
· Accuracy, refer to assessing coding performance against a predetermined standards set by a 
panel of experts or known from previous experiments and studies. 
For the purpose of this study, the validity of disclosure measurement will be evaluated at two 
stages: first, the inter-coder reliability will be determined through a pilot study. In a pilot study 
a sample of annual reports of companies (for 2005) will be evaluated by two coders (researcher 
and independent coder). Then inter-coder reliability will be measured through some statistical 
methods. Also, the differences between two coders will be discussed, and then the annual 
reports of 2006 will be evaluated by two coders. At the second stage, the validity of the 
measurement will be measured after obtaining the results. 
2.2 The Quantity of CSD in Stand-Alone Reports 
Roberts, (1991) stated that the exclusive focus on annual reports may provide an incomplete 
picture (to some extent) of corporate disclosure practices (Roberts, 1991:61). Also, Zeghal & 
Ahmed, (1990) indicated that annual reports are not the only medium can companies use to 
disclose their socially responsible behaviour. Unerman, (2000) stated that ''Studies which only 
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examine annual reports risk underestimating the volume of CSR companies engage in'' 
(Unerman, 2000:674). So, there are some studies which used documents other than annual 
reports; Guthrie & Parker, (1989) used, with annual report, half yearly produced report of PHB 
company, Zeghal & Ahmed, (1990) used, with annual report, corporate advertisements and 
brochures, Harte & Owen, (1991) used, with annual report, environmental report, Simmons & 
Neu, (1996) used ,with annual report, press reports regarding environmental fines, while, Ince, 
(1997) do not use annual report in his study which examined the content of environmental 
policy statement, Ho & Taylor, (2007) examined triple bottom-line reporting (TBL) in annual 
report, stand-alone report, and special website reports, Branco & Rodrigues, (2008) examined 
CSD in both annual reports and web sites.  
With a variety of means which can used to disclose CSR information, Unerman, (2000) 
indicated that any study must limit the range of documents included for two main reasons: 
· Large companies might publish a large number of documents each year; it risks a researcher 
being overwhelmed by the number of documents. 
· Many of documents might not have been placed in a corporate archive, so it is difficult to 
ensure completeness of data. 
Therefore, it appears that, on the one hand, depending on annual reports only may provide an 
incomplete picture, and on the other hand, examining all documents is illogical, the quantity of 
CSD will be measured through two documents: annual report and a stand-alone report.  
 
3. QUALITY OF CSD 
Measuring the volume of information only is not adequate for understanding the phenomenon 
of CSD. So, to better understand the phenomenon, the quality of CSD will be taken into 
account. Although the measurement of disclosure quality is difficult and methods often lack 
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objectivity, the measurement of disclosure quantity must be paralleled by measuring the quality 
so that we understand more clearly the level of corporate social disclosure. 
3.1 The Quality of Disclosure in Annual Reports  
The measurement of disclosure quality is a disputed topic in academic literature. The 
common method used in literature to measure the quality of CSD is rank disclosure 
information, according to its type or according to predetermined factors. The literature used 
various ranking systems to measure the quality of CSD in annual reports. These ranking 
systems presented different point scales for assessing the quality of social disclosure in annual 
reports. The point scale relied on using several points: Robertson & Nicholson (1996) and 
Cormier et al. (2005) suggested a 3-point scale system, Gamble et al. (1995) and Raar (2002) 
used a 7-point scale and Van Staden & Hooks (2007) developed a 5-point scale to assess the 
quality of environmental disclosure. Generally, these different ranking systems depend on the 
distinction between general disclosure and disclosure that reports specific activities. It can be 
argued that using a ranking system that consists of many points could reduce reliability in the 
measurement, as an increasing number of points leads to a greater opportunity for the existence 
of a subjective judgement of measurement. It would seem therefore, that developing a ranking 
system that depends on the lowest possible number of points, could achieve reliable results.  
The search for a more reliable ranking system raises an important question: What is the 
meaning of disclosure quality? The concept of quality is a controversial issue in academic 
literature and in contemporary philosophy. The business definition of quality is that the quality 
of product or service indicates the perception of the degree to which the product or service 
meets users’ expectations. ISO 9000 defines quality as “degree to which a set of inherent 
characteristics fulfils requirements”. In this context, it can be argued that disclosure quality 
reflects whether this disclosure meets users’ needs. The question that then arises is: What are 
the users’ needs? In this regard, it can be argued that obtaining specific information represents 
 
                                                                                          
 
 
                                                                                                                  - 171 - 
the users’ main requirements from disclosure. Consequently, CSD quality can be determined 
according to whether this disclosure provides clear, specific information or not.  The question 
now is: Which type of disclosure reflects specific information? Al-Tuwajiri et al. (2004) 
proposed qualitative disclosure measures which denoted weights for different disclosure items, 
based on the perceived importance of each item to various user categories: weight 3 to 
quantitative disclosure, weight 2 to non-quantitative disclosure that reports specific activities, 
and weight 1 to common qualitative disclosure. Cormier et al. (2005) used the rating based on 
the scores of one to three: three for items described in quantitative terms, two when an item is 
described specifically and one for an item discussed in general terms. Quantified disclosures 
are more likely to represent actual activities, and represent the important and distinguishing 
differences between competitors (Toms, 2002: 270). Quantitative disclosure is one of the 
attributes used in social disclosure quality (Hammond & Miles, 2004: 69-71). Brammer & 
Pavelin (2006) argued that disclosure quality refers to whether the disclosure reports specific 
actions, quantifies environmental impacts, sets formal targets and is subject to external audit 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006:1169-1170). Toms, 2002, designed a pilot questionnaire survey 
sent to fund managers and analysts. The results showed that the low rating given to “non-
quantified information” and the high rating for “externally monitored environmental report”. 
The rating from high rating to low rating was as follows: 
1. Externally monitored environmental report 
2. Quantified environmental performance in annual report 
3. Specified policies 
4. Publication of an environmental policy 
5. Volume of information available in reports 
6. Non-quantified information. 
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Therefore, a measurement based on a 2-point scale system can be suggested to assess the 
quality of social disclosure in annual reports as follows: 
1, if disclosure is quantitative disclosure, graphs or narrative disclosure which reports the 
policies and activities of a company concerning its social responsibility. 
0, otherwise  
The following table provide some examples for the quality rating score 
Table 5.1: Examples for the quality rating score 
Rating 
scale 
example 
0 “The Group’s research and development activities are focused on developing new products and new 
processes, as well as maintaining and improving the quality of existing products.”18 
 
“The group is committed to the fair and equitable treatment of all its employees irrespective of 
gender, race, age, disability or sexual orientation. Policies have been implemented across the group 
to ensure that this commitment is acted on in practice”19 
 
“As all our businesses have an objective of continuous improvement, our environmental initiatives 
focus on minimizing waste generation, preventing pollution and reducing energy consumption”20 
 
“During the year accessibility to, and visibility of our customer relations team was increased to ensure 
that the group is equipped with the best possible service to respond to customers’ needs”21 
 
“Going forward, we have developed a new community involvement policy, encouraging our 
employees to form long-term relationships with local charities and focus both volunteering and 
fundraising on benefitting the local community. We believe that these efforts will now have a 
significant impact and will build on the benefits we are already providing through the group’s 
contracts with local authorities”22 
 
“it is therefore very pleasing to note that, for the sixth consecutive year, we are able to report an 
overall improvement in our SHE performance. In addition, good progress has been made towards 
achieving our long term targets for sustainable development”23 
 
“The group continues to recognize that a well run business balances the expectations of all key 
stakeholders: our customers, shareholders, employees and the communities in which we live and 
work. This is reflected in our commitment to responsible corporate behavior and the principles of 
global compact”24 
1 “At the Johnson Matthey Technology Centre we are already designing exhaust after treatment 
systems for 2010 and beyond, when conventional three-way gasoline and diesel catalysts will no 
longer meet the demands of new engine technologies. The experience that we have gained over 30 
                                               
18 British American tobacco. Annual report, 2005 
19 WS Atkins plc, annual report, 2005 
20 The weir group plc, annual report, 2006 
21 Brit insurance holdings plc, annual report, 2006 
22 Mouchel parkman, annual report, 2006 
23 Yule Catto & Co plc, annual report, 2006 
24 Abbot group plc, annual report, 2005 
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years means that we have an extensive knowledge base on which to build our designs. By inputting 
performance measurements into mathematical models, we are even able to predict how potential 
catalysts would perform on vehicles that do not yet exist. Among the technologies we are 
developing”25 
“in 2003 the group undertook an initiative to minimize the environmental impact of its single largest 
volume-packaging component, namely our plastic delivery sacks. After 14 months of trials the 
company re-engineered the base material to reduce the gauge of the material without loss of pack 
strength. The result of this project was to reduce the plastic tonnage entering the waste stream by 62 
tonnes annually (a reduction of 10.3%). A comprehensive environmental risk assessment, undertaken 
at the same time, measured improvements achieved in the control of environmental impacts in the 
areas of packaging, paper, print, energy consumption and waste.”26 
 
“We are pleased to launch our group chief executive’ annual CR awards in 2006. Awards were 
presented in each of our five critical CR areas in April 2007 and included a financial contribution to 
the winning contract or individual plus a financial contribution to a charity of the winner’s choice”27 
 
“”At our scheme in Formby our team came to the aid of a local charitable trust which ocuupis a 
building next door to the site. The local site team arranged with the trust to redecorate the exterior 
of the building with graffiti proof paint”28 
 
“no charitable or political donations were made during the year”29 
“Building on the 2004 launch of our VT young graduate scheme, the group has designed a 
comprehensive graduate development programme”30 
 
“Barclays committed £35.3m in support of the community in the UK (2004: £29.5m) and £3.8m was 
committed in international support (2004: £2.5m). UK commitment includes £16.7m of charitable 
donations (2004: £11.2m).”31 
 
“Since 2003 our total employee costs, which consist of salaries, plus all other costs associated with 
employment such as bonuses, pension, healthcare etc, have consistently reduced as a percentage of 
sales from 39.6% in 2003 to 31.7% for the second half of 2006. Our medium term target is to improve 
that ratio to 30%”32 
The quality score will be measured by evaluate each sentence in social disclosure according to 
previous rating, then calculate the average score (total score / number of sentences). 
3.2 The Quality of CSD in Stand-Alone Reports 
There is a lack of interest in studying quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports. Actually, 
using content analysis to measure quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports is considered a 
very difficult and lengthy task due to a large number of pages in each report. Therefore, we can 
use an indicator to the quality of a stand-alone report based on some characteristics of these 
                                               
25 Johnson matthey. Annual report, 2005 
26 N Brown grouo, report and accounts 2006 
27 Alfred McAlpine plc, annual report, 2006 
28 McCarthy & Stone plc, annual report, 2005 
29 The Scottish Investment Trust plc, annual report, 2006 
30 VT Group plc, annual report, 2006 
31 Barclays. Annual report, 2005 
32 The Morgan Crucible company plc, annual report, 2006 
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reports. The relevant question is what are the characteristics that reflect the quality of these 
reports? In this concern, it can be argued that using reporting guidelines and reviewing reports 
by an independent auditor are considered as important characteristics of good quality reports. 
Frankental, (2001) argued that corporate responsibility reports are public relations, and can 
have real substance if they are benchmarked and audited. So, the researcher uses as an 
indicator to the quality of stand-alone reports based on two points: first, whether this report is 
prepared based on some reporting guidelines such as GRI or AAA, and second, whether this 
report is audited by an independent auditor. The absence of reporting guidelines could create a 
confusion which might make it difficult for readers to identify what to look for in corporate 
responsibility reports, and without auditing CSR reports, the companies could make 
exaggerated claims that may be unverifiable. This will limit the usefulness of corporate 
responsibility reports (Idowu & Towler, 2004: 434). Reporting guidelines provide accepted 
framework of disclosure information that can be of interest for users. Reporting guidelines are 
considered useful because they provide a direct guidance on what and how to report. The GRI 
provide a holistic framework that addresses broad performance as to how a company is 
reporting to stakeholders. Also, using reporting guidelines provides a method to increased 
comparability. Mio, (2009) presented approach to measure quality of sustainability, 
environmental and social reports based on comparing the degree of application of principles 
expressed by the GRI-G3 guidelines.  
Concerning assurance, the AA1000 defines assurance as “an evaluation method that uses a 
specified set of principles and standards to assess the quality of a reporting organisation’s 
subject matter, such as reports, an the organisation’s related systems, processes and 
competencies that underpin its performance. Assurance includes the communication of the 
results of this evaluation to provide credibility to the subject matter for its users.” 
(www.accountability.org.uk). Credible data can be viewed as a central part of corporate 
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responsibility, and more stakeholders are demanding CSR reports that truly represent what the 
companies have achieved and what they will achieve in the future, so the third-party assurance 
of CSR reports is presented at the beginning of the 1990s (Park & Brorson, 2005: 1096). 
Independent assurance must be shown to add more value and the growing demands for more 
robust disclosure will require a significant innovation in assurance standards (Accountability, 
csrnetwork, 2004: 9). Aw, et al, 2009, examine whether the assurance of voluntary 
environmental disclosure in sustainability reports, annual reports, and corporate websites 
improves the quality of this disclosure. The results show that the quality of voluntary 
environmental disclosure is indeed higher for reporting companies with environmental 
assurance than those without, and the quality is no different whether assurance is from 
accountants or consultant assurors. The benefits of assurance according to the European 
Federation of accountants are; credibility adds to the quality of information, favourable 
publicity, and demonstrates compliance. Solomon (2000) conducted a survey to identify some 
aspects of environmental reporting and compare them with financial reporting, and one of the 
results suggests that verification is necessary for environmental reporting as for financial 
reporting. Hammond & Miles (2004) suggested some attributes to social disclosure quality, and 
from these attributes, third party verification, and the adoption of reporting guidelines and 
standards (Hammond & Miles, 2004: 69-71).  
Therefore, the quality of stand-alone report will be measured according to the following 
rating:  
· 1 if the stand-alone report is audited, and 0 otherwise. 
· 1 if the stand-alone report is prepared according to some guidelines and 0 otherwise. 
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4. THE SAMPLE AND STATISTICAL METHODS  
The objective of study is to examine a framework for establishing the determinants and 
consequences of CSD. In order, to obtain a deeper understanding of CSD, the framework is 
examined through an empirical study at two levels (country and company level) and through 
four empirical models using statistical methods. The sample is identified, in conformity with 
each level and each model. At a country level, the empirical model is designed to examine the 
determinants of the level of CSD in different countries. According to the objective of this 
model, the sample is designed to include a large number of countries and to achieve diversity 
which means that countries in the sample should be different at different stages of economic 
attainment and have different culture dimensions. The determining factor in the selection of the 
countries in the sample is the availability of data, in particular data related to culture values 
because there is no clear definition for culture values and there is a problem in cross-cultural 
research in determining convenient measures of cultural dimensions. Hofstede’s cultural values 
are used to measure cultural variables, which enable a sample of 58 countries. The data are 
collected for more than one year in order to provide greater confidence in the results. The 
determining factor for choosing the years is to choose the most recent years available at the 
outset of this study. Another factor that should be taken into account in the selection of these 
years is the availability of data regarding the level of corporate governance in each country. 
The Global Competitiveness Report presents an index for corporate governance in each country 
in 2004. Furthermore, the consistency between the years of country level data and company 
level data is taken into account. Therefore, the data are collected for three years: 2004; 2005; 
and 2006. 
At a company level, three empirical models are presented: (1) a model to examine the 
determinants of CSD; (2) a model to examine the impact of CSD on corporate social 
reputation; and (3) a model to examine the impact of CSD on corporate market value. To 
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achieve the objectives of these models, it is necessary to select a country that provides good 
practices of CSR and a high level of CSD. The UK was selected because of the following: 
¶ The UK is increasingly seen as one of the leading contributors internationally on CSR 
thinking and practice; 
¶ UK companies provide best practices of CSD. 
For first and second model, the sample contains both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies for 
the years 2005 and 2006. Due to problems in obtaining annual reports from a number of 
companies, the final number of companies is 317 in 2005 and 327 in 2006. FTSE companies 
have been selected in the light of: 
¶ Sampling large size companies is common practice in previous studies; and  
¶ Large size companies hypothetically provide the best practices of CSD, which are 
considered to be more consistent with the objective of models.  
For Model 3, the sample is confined only to FTSE 100 companies with FTSE 250 companies 
excluded. There is clear difference in market capitalisation between two indexes (FTSE 100 
companies and FTSE 250 companies) where FTSE 100 companies represent about 81% of the 
market capitalisation of the entire London stock exchange while the FTSE 250 index represents 
about 13% of the FTSE 100 index. Therefore, using both to examine the impact of CSD on 
market value would create an inconsistent sample and could provide misleading results. In 
addition, significant levels of financial data which are required to measure Tobin’s q are 
missing for FTSE 250 companies in the DataStream database.  
At the company level, the data are also collected for more than one year to provide greater 
confidence in the results. The determining factor for choosing the years is to select the most 
recent years at the outset of the study. Another factor taken into account is the time required to 
measure CSD in annual reports.     
The Table 5.2 summarise the samples used in this study. 
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Table 5.2. The Sample 
Model Sample Explanation 
Determinants of 
CSD at the 
country level 
58 countries The important factor in determining the sample is cultural values data, 
so the sample is determined according to the available cultural data. 
The sample therefore consists of 58 selected countries, based on the 
countries mentioned in Hofstede’s survey. Data covers 2004, 2005 and 
2006.  
Determinants of 
CSD at the 
company level 
FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 
companies in 
2005 and 2006. 
To examine a suggested model for determinants of CSD, UK companies 
were chosen, as they provide a high level of CSD and consequently 
more confidence in the results can be expected. In the UK, the FTSE all-
share index represents 98% of the UK’s market capitalisation, with a 
combined value of approximately UK£1.28trn. The FTSE all-share index 
is considered to be the best performance measure of the overall London 
equity market. The FTSE all-share index also accounts for 8.11% of the 
world’s equity market capitalisation (www.ftse.co.uk,). The FTSE all-
share is the aggregation of the FTSE 100 index, FTSE 250 index and the 
FTSE small-cap index. The sample contains both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
companies over a period of two years, 2005 and 2006. The FTSE 100 
index lists the largest 100 companies, and represents about 81% of the 
market capitalisation of the entire London stock exchange. The FTSE 
250 index represents about 13% of the FTSE 100 index. Due to problems 
in obtaining annual reports from a number of companies, the final 
number of companies is 317 in 2005 and 327 in 2006. FTSE companies 
provide clear corporate characteristics and more probability of applying 
good governance practices. They also tend to be the subject of high 
levels of media coverage. All economic sectors were included in the 
sample, as the study is related to CSD, not only environmental 
disclosure, and to overcome the limitations of the majority of previous 
studies which are restricted to a number of economic sectors. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the results from such a sample are 
more general.  
The impact of CSD 
on corporate 
reputation  
The impact of CSD 
on corporate 
market value  
FTSE 100 
companies  
The significant difference in market capitalisation between FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 companies creates inconsistent sample. Missing data for 
FTSE 250 in DataStream.  
 
Different empirical models include different types of data and statistical method will be 
determined according to type of data in each model. Following table summarize statistical 
methods used in empirical models.  
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Table 5.3: Statistical methods  
Model Type of data Regression Correlation  
Determinants at the country level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Count data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poisson 
regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both parametric and non-
parametric correlations 
Determinants of quality of CSD in 
annual reports 
Determinants of quantity of CSD in 
stand-alone reports 
Determinants of quality of CSD in 
stand-alone reports 
Determinants of total quantity of CSD  
The impact of CSD on corporate social 
reputation 
Determinants of total quality  of CSD   
 
Continuous 
data  
 
 
OLS regression 
 
 
Parametric and non-parametric 
correlation  
Determinants of quantity of CSD in 
annual reports 
The impact of CSD on corporate 
market value 
In addition, non-parametric tests (the Mann-Whitney U test and The Kruskal Wallis test) are 
used to measure correlation between CSD at a company level and some other variables: type of 
activities; number of foreign countries; number of directors on the board; the presence of 
corporate responsibility committee and media pressure.  
 
5. PILOT STUDY 
The pilot study was conducted to achieve two objectives: 
· Examine the reliability of disclosure index to ensure its ability to represent various aspects of 
social disclosure in the selected sample; and 
· Examine the reliability of the disclosure measurement. 
To achieve these objectives, a number of companies were randomly selected, but taking into 
account the need to be representative of all sectors in the sample. 56 companies (16% of the 
sample) were selected (Appendix 1). The annual reports for these companies (in both 2005 and 
2006) were distributed to the researcher and another independent person. 
 
 
5.1. Reliability of Disclosure Index 
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By applying a previous disclosure index to the selected companies, the researcher noted the 
following: 
· The employee category is the largest part of CSD. 
· There are two categories—energy and value-added—that can be changed from main 
categories to sub-categories. The energy category was added to the environment category, 
and the value-added category was added to the ‘other’ category.  
· Two further main categories should be added: ethical information; and general health and 
safety information. A review of the annual reports indicated that most companies provide 
information concerning its commitment to ethics, or indicate the presence of a code of 
conduct within the company. Although the volume of such information is small, it cannot be 
integrated with any other category. The review of the annual reports also highlighted that 
most companies provide information on general health and safety policies that are applied to 
all parties dealing with the company, such as employees, customers and suppliers. This 
category of disclosure is difficult to integrate into any other section, but as it deals with 
general information, it can be integrated into ‘other information’, which becomes ‘health, 
safety and other information’. The ‘other’ category includes: 
· Reports about the presence of a CSR committee, its members and activities; 
· Information about awards received by the company concerning its social responsibility; 
· The presence of the company in one or more social indices; and 
· General disclosure which cannot be attributed to other categories. 
In total, the study uses seven categories of CSD: environment; community; employees; 
product; customer; ethics; health, safety and other. 
Therefore, the disclosure index was restructured as the following; 
1-Environment 
· Pollution control  
 
                                                                                          
 
 
                                                                                                                  - 181 - 
· Compliance with pollution laws and regulations 
· Prevention or repair environmental damage  
· Conservation of natural resources,  
· Using recycled materials 
· Efficiently using materials resources in the manufacturing process 
· Supporting anti-litter campaigns 
· Receiving award  
· Preventing waste 
· Designing facilities harmonious with the environment 
· Contributions to beautify the environment 
· Restoring historical buildings/structures 
· Undertaking environmental studies  
· Wildlife conservation 
· Conservation of energy  
· Utilizing waste materials for energy production 
· Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
· Research aimed at improving energy efficiency of products 
· Receiving awards  
 
2-Community development 
· Donations  
· Summer or part-time employment of students 
· Sponsoring public health projects 
· Aiding medical research 
· Sponsoring educational conferences,  
· Funding scholarship programmes or activities 
· Supporting national pride/government sponsored campaigns 
· Other special community related activities,  
 
 3-Employee 
· Employee health and safety 
· Employment of minorities or women 
· Employee training 
· Employee assistance/benefits 
· Employee remuneration 
· Employee profiles 
· Employee share purchase schemes 
· Employee morale 
· Industrial relations 
·  Other 
4-Products 
· Product development(research and development) 
· Product safety 
· Product quality 
5-Customers 
· Customer satisfaction 
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6-Ethical  
· Code of conduct  
7-Health, Safety, and Others  
· General health and safety information that cannot be attributed to specific 
category 
· (Corporate objectives/policies; general disclosure of corporate objectives 
/policies relating to the social responsibility of the company to the various segments of 
society  
· Report about the presence of corporate social responsibility committee and its 
members and activities, 
· Other; disclosing /reporting to groups in society other than shareholders and 
employees. e.g. Consumers, any other information that relates to the social 
responsibility of the company). 
· Information about awards received by the company concerning its social 
responsibility, or the presence of the company in one, or more, social indexes 
5.2. Reliability of Disclosure Measurement 
The basic characteristic of content analysis is that data should be tested to prove that they are 
objective, systematic and reliable (Krippendorff, 1980). As Hayes & Krippendorff (2007) state, 
“Conclusions from such data can be trusted only after demonstrating their reliability” (Hayes & 
Krippendorff, 2007: 77). They further argue that among the types of reliability (stability, 
reproducibility, and accuracy), reproducibility is the strongest and most feasible type to test. 
The reliability of measurement is measured using the inter-coder test in which the disclosure is 
assessed by the researcher and another person, and the results then compared. 
Lombard et al. (2002) suggest guidelines for the calculation of inter-coder reliability, 
including: 
· Use one or more appropriate indices. There are different measures or indices of inter-coder 
reliability, and there is no theoretical basis for choosing between them. Hayes & 
Krippendorff (2007) suggest that a good measure of reliability should have the following 
properties: 
· It should assess the agreement between two or more coders; 
· It should be grounded in the distribution of the categories or scale points actually used by 
the coders; 
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· It should constitute a numerical scale between at least two points with sensible reliability 
interpretations; 
· It should be appropriate to the level of measurement of the data; and 
· Its sampling behaviour should be known or at least computable. 
Using these criteria, they evaluate the adequacy of a number of measures of reliability 
commonly used by researchers (percent agreement, Bennett et al’s Ѕ, Scott’s Pi, Cohen’s 
Kappa, Fleiss’s K, Cronbach’s alpha and Krippendorff’s alpha). They propose 
Krippendorff’s alpha as the standard reliability measure. For the purposes of this study, 
several measures are used: per cent agreement, Scott’s Pi, Cohen’s Kappa and 
Krippendorff’s alpha. Hughes and Garrett (1990) argue that for several decades the 
consensus has been that percentage agreement is an unacceptable estimation approach (e.g., 
Krippendorff, 1980; Scott, 1955). One of the most important deficiencies of percentage 
agreement is that it does not correct for chance agreement among coders. Scott’s Pi (1955), 
Krippendorff’s alpha (1980) and Cohen’s Kappa (1960) are intra-class correlations that share 
the following conceptual definition:  
observed agreement - expected agreement / 1 - expected agreement 
· Determine an appropriate minimum acceptable level of reliability. Higher criteria should be 
used for liberal indices (such as per cent agreement), and lower criteria can be used with 
more conservative indices (Cohen’s Kappa, Scott’s Pi, and Krippendorff’s alpha). Seppanen 
(2009) provides the interpretation of the significance of Krippendorff’s alpha as: 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4. The interpretation of the significance of Krippendorff’s alpha 
K Interpretation 
0                                      Poor agreement 
0.0 - 0.2 Fair agreement 
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0.21 - 0.40 Slight agreement 
0.41 - 0.60 Moderate agreement 
0.61 - 0.80 Substantial agreement 
0.81 – 1.00 Almost perfect agreement 
Source: Seppanen (2009: 113) 
· Do not use: 
· Only per cent agreement to calculate reliability, 
· Cronbach’s alpha, Pearson’s r, or other correlation-based indices that standardise coder-
values and only measure co-variation, 
· Chi-square to calculate reliability, and  
· Overall reliability across variables, rather than reliability levels for each variable, as a 
standard for evaluating the reliability of the instrument. 
5.2.1. The reliability of measurement of the quantity of disclosure 
The annual reports were reviewed by both a researcher and another person. Then the inter-
coder reliability was measured using a number of reliability measures.  The differences in the 
results were discussed to identify the reasons for these differences. The reliability measures 
used were per cent agreement, Scott’s Pi, Cohen’s Kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha. At the 
time of the pilot study, the software to measure Krippendorff’s alpha had not been distributed 
widely, so the first three measures were calculated first, using Simstat software.33 In 2007, 
Hayes & Krippendorff (2007) presented a freely-available macro written for SPSS to calculate 
Krippendorff’s alpha, and in 2008, the on-line utility ReCal was developed to calculate several 
measures of reliability, among them Krippendorff’s alpha. This on-line utility was used to 
measure Krippendorff’s alpha34. 
The annual reports for 2005 were reviewed by two coders to measure the quantity of social 
disclosure by calculating the number of sentences used. Each coder provided the number of 
                                               
33 Appendix 2 provides a sample of Simstat outputs. 
34 To give assurance about the results of ReCal, per cent agreement, Scott’s Pi, and Cohen’s Kappa using this 
online utility and Simstat software, were compared. Appendix 3 provides a sample of ReCal results. 
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sentences for each category of CSD: environment (ENVs), community (COMs), employees 
(EMPs), product (PROs), customer (CUSs), ethical (ETHs), and health, safety and other 
(OTHs). Then the results were organised in the following data set-up for use with Simstat 
software and ReCal utility. 
Unit Var1coder1 Var1coder2 Var2coder1 Var2coder2 
Company 1     
Company 2     
Company 3     
Company 4     
In this data set-up, each row represents the results for each company and each column 
represents the coder judgements for a particular variable. The reliability is measured at the 
level of each category of CSD. Table 5.5 presents the results of reliability measures. 
Table 5.5. Reliability of Quantity Measurement, 2005 
 Percent agreement Cohen's Kappa Scott's pi Krippendorff’s alpha 
ENVs 80.4% 0.795 0.794 0.796 
COMs 89.3% 0.888 0.888 0.889 
EMPs 89.3% 0.890 0.889 0.890 
PROs 73.2% 0.632 0.624 0.627 
CUSs 75.0% 0.682 0.677 0.680 
ETHs 89.3% 0.860 0.860 0.861 
OTHs 76.8% 0.760 0.759 0.761 
CSDs 41.1% 0.403 0.400 0.405 
Table 5.5 indicates a high degree of agreement between the two coders, which can attributed to 
the clarity in presentation of information on CSR through annual reports, especially as a large 
number of companies have a special section for this information in their annual reports. This 
degree of agreement could also reflect a high degree of clarity in the disclosure index. 
Table 5.5 indicates that product and customer information show the lowest degree of 
agreement. The results were discussed between the two coders and the discussion indicated that 
the main reason for the differences is that both product and customer information is considered 
general information, in which a large proportion of companies provide a wide range of 
information about their products and their customers through annual reports.35 As a result of 
                                               
35 For example, a number of companies, in particular chemical companies, provided a large amount of information 
on product description. In addition, the information about both product and customers was often presented during 
the discussion of other topics such as the relationship with suppliers and the company’s financial position.  
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the findings, it is necessary to confine the definition of information on products to product 
quality, and information on customers to customer satisfaction. 
The category of ‘other’ information also shows a low degree of agreement between the two 
coders. The discussion showed that the main reason is that this category contains information 
on health and safety. The confusion about information on health and safety occurred because 
this information was often presented in a general form. As a result, it was found that there is a 
need to differentiate between general health and safety information, and the health and safety 
information that is related to employees. 
In addition, the discussion showed that care has to be taken when the sentences are counted. 
After the discussion of results between the two coders, they reviewed the annual reports for 
2006 to measure the number of sentences of social disclosure. The reliability measures are 
presented in Table 5.6, which shows a high degree of agreement between the two coders and 
consequently a high degree of reliability in the content analysis procedures. 
Table 5.6. Reliability of Quantity Measurement, 2006 
 Percent agreement Cohen's Kappa Scott's pi Krippendorff’s alpha 
ENVs 91.1% 0.906 0.906 0.907 
COMs 91.1% 0.907 0.906 0.907 
EMPs 92.9% 0.926 0.926 0.927 
PROs 96.4% 0.946 0.946 0.946 
CUSs 92.9% 0.888 0.888 0.889 
ETHs 94.6% 0.920 0.920 0.921 
OTHs 87.5% 0.870 0.870 0.871 
CSDs 60.7% 0.601 0.599 0.603 
 
5.2.2. The reliability of quality measurement 
The same procedures that were used to measure the reliability of quantity measurement were 
used to measure the reliability of quality measurement. After the agreement on the quantity of 
CSD for each company, the annual reports in both 2005 and 2006 were reviewed by the two 
coders to measure the quality of disclosure. Each coder provided a quality measurement for 
each category of CSD. Then the results were organised in the data set-up. 
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Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide the results regarding reliability measures. The results, in general, 
provided evidence for a high degree of agreement between the two coders and consequently a 
high degree of reliability in quality measurement procedures. The discussion between the two 
coders indicated two aspects: 
· Reducing the number of points in the ranking system for disclosure quality, leads to reducing 
the differences between coders. 
· The differences between coders is mainly due to the evaluation of narrative disclosure that 
presents specific information, in particular the information on company objectives 
concerning CSR, in which there is a need to differentiate between general and specific 
objectives.  
Table 5.7. Reliability of Quality Measurement, 2005 
 Percent agreement Cohen's Kappa Scott's pi Krippendorff’s alpha 
ENVQ 87.5% 0.867 0.867 0.868 
COMQ 92.9% 0.926 0.926 0.926 
EMPQ 89.3% 0.891 0.89 0.891 
PROQ 92.9% 0.859 0.859 0.86 
CUSQ 92.9% 0.872 0.872 0.873 
ETHQ 100.0% 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OTHQ 78.6% 0.772 0.771 0.773 
CSDQ 83.9% 0.836 0.836 0.837 
 
Table 5.8. Reliability of Quality Measurement, 2006 
 Percent agreement Cohen's Kappa Scott's pi Krippendorff’s alpha 
ENVQ 94.6% 0.943 0.943 0.943 
COMQ 92.9% 0.926 0.926 0.926 
EMPQ 96.4% 0.963 0.963 0.964 
PROQ 92.9% 0.859 0.859 0.860 
CUSQ 92.9% 0.872 0.872 0.873 
ETHQ 100.0% 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OTHQ 78.6% 0.772 0.771 0.773 
CSDQ 83.9% 0.836 0.836 0.837 
 
6. POSITIONALITY  
Positionality indicates how the researcher’s personality can affect the research process and 
results. As Moser (2008) point outs, “The reality is that researchers will not all produce the 
same findings because we all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, a 
particular experience, a particular culture, without being contained by that position” (2008: 
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384). Personality involves a number of key components that generally agreed upon namely, 
stable characteristics, and a certain degree of consistency in how people respond across various 
situations (Moser, 2008: 387). The following paragraphs clarify how my personality affected 
this research.  
After I have graduated from Benha University in my home country Egypt, I obtained the post 
of assistant teacher at the Faculty of Commerce. I gained a Master’s Degree in Accounting and 
I successfully qualified for a PhD in Accounting. To pass this examination, I had to read 
widely in accounting literature. Then I got scholarship from Egyptian government to undertake 
a PhD in Accounting at a university in the UK. The selection of the subject of thesis was 
determined largely by the requirements of the scholarship, which required that the study was 
linked to accounting disclosure. I selected the subject of thesis in the light of reading of the 
latest topics in accounting literature at the time. Also, this subject is commensurate to a large 
extent with my social and cultural background as I belong to a developing country where the 
companies are not particularly interested in their social responsibilities. Although there is a 
large volume of studies related to CSD, I believe that there is a need to develop a model that 
helps understand the phenomenon of CSD and also understand why this type of disclosure is 
not common in countries like Egypt.   
The structure of thesis was influenced to a degree by my personal circumstances; when I 
came to the UK for the first time I faced with significant problems regarding my English 
language skills. To overcome these I read a huge volume of studies. Also, I am largely 
influenced by my native language (Arabic) and type of research which I use in Egypt. 
Therefore, the thesis includes a large literature review. Although the methodology was 
influenced by the review of previous studies, my personality and preferences intervened to a 
large extent in the selection of methodology. I prefer the practical rather than the theoretical 
side of research. I am also more comfortable with figures than with text. In addition, I strongly 
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believe that theories play a limited role in social science as a general and in particular 
accounting studies. On the basis of the foregoing, the thesis includes a large practical part.  
 
7. RESEARCH ETHICS  
Research ethics is important as it promote the objectives of research like knowledge, truth 
and the avoidance of errors. The scientific community should be aware of fraud and 
malpractice in research. For business research, the consequences of poor research ethics are not 
as significant, as say, for medical research, but nevertheless, it can undermine the integrity of 
the teaching profession (Dotterweich & Garrison, 1998: 433). A number of organisations 
provide guidance on the subject, such as: an EU Code of Ethics for Socio-economic Research 
funded by the European Commission’s Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme; 
ethical guidelines issued by Social Research Association and; Ethical Guidelines for Good 
Research Practice issued by Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the 
Commonwealth. These various guidelines include a number of criteria which define good 
ethical practices in research. Despite the diversity of such guidance, they include largely 
similar criteria. All researchers are committed to the following practices which are derived 
from the EU Code of Ethics for Socio-economic Research:  
· The aim of the study is to benefit society; 
· Researchers should endeavour to balance professional integrity with respect for national and 
international law; 
· Researchers should endeavour to ensure that an appropriate research method is selected on 
the basis of informed professional expertise; 
· Researchers should endeavour to ensure factual accuracy and avoid falsification, fabrication, 
suppression or misinterpretation of data; 
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· Researchers should endeavour to ensure that reporting and dissemination are carried out in a 
responsible manner; 
· Researchers should endeavour to ensure that methodology and findings are open for 
discussion and peer review; 
· Researchers should endeavour to ensure that any debts to previous research as a source of 
knowledge, data, concepts and methodology are fully acknowledged in all outputs; and 
· Researchers should endeavour to ensure that all data are treated with appropriate 
confidentiality and anonymity.   
Dotterweich & Garrison (1998) argue that the ethical issues in business research are: (1) 
falsifying data; (2) violating the confidentiality of a client; (3) ignoring contrary data; (4) using 
inconsistent statistical treatment; (5) selective reporting of data; (6) using the same data for 
several papers; (7) plagiarism; (8) co-authored research; (9) failing to give credit to co-author; 
(10) adding names of persons not contributing to research; and (11) multiple journals. In 
preparing the current research, the researcher was committed to avoiding the following bad 
research ethics: 
· Falsifying data (fabrication during data collection); the researcher was exceedingly careful 
during the data collection process;  
· Ignoring contrary data; 
· Using inconsistent statistical treatment; as a result the researcher used various statistical 
methods according to the nature of data; 
· Selective reporting of data; and 
· Plagiarism.   
8. SUMMARY   
This chapter provides an explanation for the method of measuring CSD in both annual and 
stand-alone reports. 
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· CSD quantity in annual reports is measured by: number of sentences; number of pages; and 
percentage of pages. 
· CSD quantity in stand-alone reports is measured as the total number of report pages. 
· The quality of CSD in annual reports is measured using a 2-point scale system to assess the 
quality of social disclosure in annual reports as follows: 
· 1, for quantity disclosure, graphs or narrative disclosure which reports the policies and 
activities of a company concerning its social responsibility, or 
· 0, otherwise. 
· The quality of stand-alone reports is measured according to the following rating:  
· 1, if the stand-alone report is audited, and 0, otherwise. 
· 1, if the stand-alone report is prepared according to set guidelines and 0, otherwise. 
This chapter also provides evidence regarding content analysis reliability, using a variety of 
reliability measures that are commonly used in previous research. 
The next part of the study (the empirical part) presents an empirical examination of the 
suggested theoretical models in order to explain the determinants and consequences of CSD. 
This will commence in the next chapter by providing a comprehensive analysis for the results 
of the measurement of CSD in the sample companies.  
 
 
 
  
   
 
Chapter 6 
ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
DISCLSOURE  
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Chapter 6 
Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides descriptive statistics of CSD. The importance of this chapter is to 
provide support for the argument that UK companies provide best practices of CSD and they 
are appropriate for examining a suggested framework. The chapter is based on statistical 
analysis of the results of disclosure measurement. The objectives of this chapter are:  
· To analyse CSD (quantity and quality) in annual reports and corporate responsibility 
reports, 
· Analyse the levels of different categories of CSD in annual reports, 
· Comparative analysis of CSD in different economic sectors, 
· Analysis of the correlation between different variables of CSD.   
 This chapter addresses a key question regarding the level of CSD in UK companies 
generally, and in each economic sector. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a 
general view of CSD in the sample, sections 3 and 4 provide analysis of CSD in annual 
reports and different economic sectors respectively, and the last section presents a correlation 
analysis among different CSD variables.    
 
2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CSD 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for CSD over a period of two years, 2005 and 2006. 
With regard to CSD in annual reports, the results show that minimum disclosure in annual 
reports is 0, indicating that some companies do not provide any social disclosure in their 
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annual reports. It appears that only a few companies do not provide CSD, 7 (0.022%) 
companies in 2005 and 9 (0.027%) companies in 2006, reflecting that more than 99.9% of 
UK companies provide some form of CSD. The high proportion of companies that do provide 
some CSD reflect, as expected, the growing interest of UK companies in CSD and consistent 
with what has been stated in an early study of Guthrie & Parker (1990) that 98% of UK 
companies provide CSD against 85% and 56% of U.S. and Australian companies also 
provide CSD. Studies in developing countries indicate lower percentages. Andrew, et al 
(1989) found that of 119 publicly-listed companies in Malaysia and Singapore, 26% of 
companies provide CSD. Lynn, (1992) found that only 17 (6.4%) of 264 companies in Hong 
Kong provide any CSD data in their 1989 annual reports. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of CSD  
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Part 1: 2005       
CSDarp .00 16.62 4.1546 3.00691 1.349 2.450 
CSDars .00 500.00 102.24 76.47278 1.480 3.304 
CSDarpp .00 .22 .0432 .03018 1.787 5.665 
CSDarq .00 1.00 .4280 .15928 .324 1.246 
CSDsa .00 230.00 16.3531 28.97254 3.212 15.175 
CSDsaq .00 2.00 .3245 .65769 1.798 1.714 
CSDt .00 231.94 19.7855 29.01493 3.137 14.503 
CSDty .00 2.75 .7441 .69467 1.725 1.777 
 
Frequency 0 1 2    
SA 195(61.5%) 
 
122(38.5%)     
CSDsaq 56(46%) 34(28%) 32(26%) 
 
   
Part 2:2006       
CSDarp .00 28.67 4.7765 3.61122 1.934 7.446 
CSDars .00 691.00 116.89 89.13449 2.144 9.165 
CSDarpp .00 .21 .0433 .02859 1.641 5.856 
CSDarq .00 1.00 .4258 .16421 -.099 .523 
CSDsa .00 247.00 16.1410 27.02171 3.167 18.188 
CSDsaq .00 2.00 .3365 .67013 1.743 1.488 
CSDt .00 251.93 20.1771 27.40322 3.018 16.692 
CSDty .00 2.71 .7529 .71428 1.649 1.492 
       
Frequency        0        1      2    
SA 199(60.9%) 
 
128(39.1%)     
CSDsaq 58(46%) 35(27%) 35(27%)    
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The quantity of CSD in annual reports was measured using three indicators: number of 
pages, number of sentences and proportion of pages. Regarding the number of pages of 
disclosure in annual reports (CSDarp), it was between 0 and 16.62 pages in 2005, and 
increased to between 0 and 28.67 pages in 2006. The average number of pages was 4.15 in 
2005, and this increased slightly to 4.78 pages in 2006. This average number of pages was 
higher than that found in some other countries (the figure of 0.7 pages found by Cowen, et 
al., (1987) and 0.39 pages found by Patten (1991), in US companies, and 0.75 in Hackston & 
Milne (1996) in New Zealand companies), and reflects the increasing interest in corporate 
responsibility information in annual reports. The number of sentences of disclosure in annual 
reports (CSDars) was between 0 and 500 sentences in 2005 and between 0 and 691 sentences 
in 2006, with the average of 102.24 sentences in 2005, increasing slightly to 116.89 sentences 
in 2006. These average numbers of sentences, compared with the study of Hackston & Milne 
(1996), which indicated the average number of sentences as 23.4 in New Zealand companies, 
confirms the increased interest in CSR information. These results also reflect that social 
disclosure in annual reports increased slightly between 2005 and 2006, and this is proven by 
the fact that the average percentage of social disclosure pages in annual report pages 
(CSDarpp) is approximately constant over the two-year period, (.0432 in 2005 and .0433 in 2006).  
To examine whether the results of the quantity of CSD in annual reports (CSDars) follows 
normal distribution for data, the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data is performed. The 
results of the Shapiro-Wilk W test show that CSDars does not follow normal distribution in 
both 2005 and 2006. The following figure presents the distribution of data concerning 
CSDars in 2005 and 2006, and shows that the majority of companies provide less than 200 
sentences of CSD over the two-year period. The frequencies analysis shows that in 2005, 
89% of companies provide less than 200 sentences of CSD, (59.3% of companies provide 
less than 100 sentences and 29.7% provide between 100 and 200 sentences). In 2006, 87.6% 
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of companies provide less than 200 sentences, (47.4% of companies provide less than 100 
sentences and 40.2% provide between 100 and 200 sentences).     
Figure 6.1: graphical distribution of quantity of CSD in annual reports 
    
           A; 2005
   
B: 2006 
With regard to the quality of social disclosure in annual reports (CSDarq), the score for 
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years being 0.4280 in 2005, and 0.4258 in 2006. The average score of CSDarq reflects that 
the majority of social responsibility disclosure in annual reports comprises only a general 
statement and does not report specific activities of CSR (i.e. rhetorical disclosure). This result 
indicates a low level of CSD quality in annual reports in UK companies, which suggests that 
increasing interest in CSD is reflected only in the increasing quantity of disclosure, without 
paying the same attention to the quality of this disclosure. The low score of disclosure quality 
is consistent with the viewpoint that because rhetorical disclosure is cheap, the companies 
tend to provide it in large volumes (Toms, 2002: 270). 
To examine whether the results of the quality of CSD in annual reports (CSDarq) follows 
normal distribution for data, the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data is performed. The 
results of the Shapiro-Wilk W test show that CSDarq does not follow normal distribution data 
in both 2005 and 2006. The following figure presents the distribution of data concerning 
CSDarq in 2005 and 2006, and shows that the quality score for the majority of companies is 
between 0.2 and 0.6 over the two years. The frequencies analysis shows that in 2005, 6.8% of 
companies provide a quality score of less than 0.2 and 80.3% of companies provide a quality 
score between 0.2 and 0.6 (35.5% provide quality scores between 0.2 and 0.4 and 44.8% 
provide quality scores between 0.4 and 0.6), while 12.9% of companies provide quality 
scores of more than 0.6. In 2006, 7.8% of companies provide a quality score of less than 0.2 
and 77.9% of companies provide a quality score between 0.2 and 0.6 (34.6% provide quality 
scores between 0.2 and 0.4 and 43.3% provide quality scores between 0.4 and 0.6), while 
14.3% of companies provide quality scores of more than 0.6. 
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Figure 6.2: graphical distribution of quality of CSD in annual reports 
 
A: 2005 
 
B: 2006 
 
With regard to corporate responsibility reports, the results show that a higher percentage of 
companies did not produce stand-alone corporate responsibility reports. In 2005, 195 
companies (61.5%) and 199 companies (60.9%) in 2006 did not produce stand-alone 
corporate responsibility reports, while 122 (38.5%) in 2005 and 128 (39.1%) in 2006 
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produced such reports. This finding is lower than has been found in the study of Hooland & 
Foo (2003), which indicated that 53% of UK companies produced stand-alone reports 
compared with 39% in the US. It is also lower than the global average of the publishing of 
stand-alone reports. In 2005, 52% of G250 (global 250 companies) and 33% of N100 
(national 100 companies in 16 countries) companies produced separate corporate 
responsibility reports, compared with 45% and 28% respectively in 2002, and 35% and 24% 
respectively in 1999, (KPMG, 2002, 2005). The quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports 
is measured by the number of report pages. The number of pages of corporate responsibility 
reports (CSDsa) is between 0 and 230 pages in 2005, and it appears to increase slightly to 
between 0 and 247 pages in 2006. The average number of report pages is approximately 
constant over two years, at 16.35 in 2005 and 16.14 in 2006. This slight increase in quantity 
of disclosure in stand-alone reports is consistent with a slight increase in the quantity of 
disclosure in annual reports, reflecting that disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports 
could be related.  
To examine whether the results of the quantity of CSD in stand-alone reports (CSDsa) 
follows the normal distribution for data, the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data is 
performed. The results of the Shapiro-Wilk W test show that CSDsa does not follow normal 
distribution in both 2005 and 2006. The following figure presents the distribution of data 
concerning CSDsa in 2005 and 2006 and shows that the majority of companies do not 
produce such reports, and of the companies that do produce such reports, the majority provide 
reports of less than 100 pages, over the two-year period:  
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Figure 6.3: graphical distribution of quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports 
 
A: 2005 
 
B: 2006 
Regarding the quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports (CSDsaq), the minimum quality 
score is 0 and the maximum is 1. The average of quality scores is 0.32 in 2005, increasing 
slightly to 0.34 in 2006. This finding reflects the low quality of social disclosure in stand-
alone reports. To examine this finding, the frequencies analysis shows that, of the companies 
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that release stand-alone reports (122 and 128), there are 56 (46%) companies in 2005 and 58 
(46%) in 2006 that do not use both CSR reporting guidelines (such as GRI and AAA) in 
preparing their corporate responsibility reports, and an independent auditor to review their 
reports (quality score is 0). However, 34 companies (28%) in 2005 and 35 companies (27%) 
in 2006 use either reporting guidelines, or an independent auditor (quality score is 1), and 32 
companies (26%) in 2005 and 35 companies (27%) in 2006, use both reporting guidelines and 
an independent auditor (quality score is 2). These results indicate that the majority of 
companies could use a third-party assurance of corporate responsibility reports, considered 
consistent with the results of the KPMG survey, which indicated that more than half of the 
top 100 UK companies published corporate responsibility reports with formal assurance 
statements in 2002 and 2005. This finding is higher than has been found as the global average 
of using third-party assurance, as 29% and 30% of the top 250 of global fortune companies 
published third-party assured reports in 2002 and 2005 respectively (KPMG, 2002 and 2005), 
and amongst the top 100 companies in 22 countries, 27% and 33% provided reports that 
included a formal assurance statement in 2002 and 2005 respectively (KPMG, 2002 and 
2005). In addition, the 2004 survey on the accountability of the world’s 100 highest-revenue 
companies showed that 15 companies (15%) provided reports with third-party assurance. 
These findings suggest that UK companies are more interested in using third-party assurance 
as a means of adding credibility to their responsibility reports. On the other hand, the findings 
may indicate that stakeholders in UK companies are more interested in assured responsibility 
reports, and providing an assurance service for responsibility reports is a growing practice 
among UK accounting firms. 
To examine whether the results of the quality of CSD in stand-alone reports (CSDsaq) follow 
normal distribution for data, the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data is performed. The 
results of the Shapiro-Wilk W test show that CSDsaq does not follow normal distribution in 
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both 2005 and 2006. The following figure presents the distribution of data concerning 
CSDsaq in 2005 and 2006, and shows that the quality score for the majority of companies is 
0, over the two-year period:  
Figure 6.4: graphical distribution of quality score of stand-alone reports 
 
A: 2005 
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3. ANALYSIS OF CSD IN ANNUAL REPORTS  
To obtain more detailed information on categories of social disclosure in annual reports, 
table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics for the categories of social disclosure in annual 
reports. It is expected that environmental information could be regarded as privileged 
information, due to global concerns regarding environmental issues. Owen, (2003) posited 
that the growing practice of environmental reporting among companies throughout western 
Europe is not surprising, due to the wide variety of influences that have been brought to bear 
on the process, from a myriad of sources.  
Table 6.2: Categories of CSD in annual reports  
 No. of pages No. Of sentences Disclosure quality 
 Min. Max. 
 
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. mean 
Part 1:2005          
ENV. .00 5.25 .7605 .00 120.00 18.2744 .00 1.00 .4958 
COM. .00 6.84 .6748 .00 200.00 15.9874 .00 1.00 .7244 
EMP. .00 8.95 1.3170 .00 183.00 34.5521 .00 1.00 .4171 
PRO .00 5.54 .1455 .00 125.00 3.8991 0 1 .47 
CUS .00 4.00 .2003 .00 79.00 4.6278 0 1 .39 
ETH .00 2.34 .1385 .00 79.00 3.7035 .00 1.00 .1055 
OTH .00 6.00 .9215 .00 107.00 
 
21.1924 .00 .91 .1955 
Part 2:2006          
ENV. .00 8.37 .9588 .00 362.00 23.1957 .00 1.00 .4838 
COM. .00 10.40 .7021 .00 340.00 17.3303 .00 1.00 .6989 
EMP. .00 11.37 1.5484 .00 211.00 38.8685 .00 .86 .4076 
PRO .00 5.04 .1566 .00 143.00 4.5627 0 1 .45 
CUS .00 5.64 .2561 .00 103.00 6.1315 0 1 .44 
ETH .00 1.36 .1251 .00 44.00 3.4985 .00 1.00 .1587 
OTH .00 8.59 1.0594 .00 122.00 23.2997 .00 1.00 .2092 
          
 
The results in both 2005 and 2006 are consistent and show that, contrary to expectation, 
employee-related information was found to be more readily available, and the most important 
social information in the annual reports (with an average of 34.55 sentences in 2005, 
increasing slightly to 38.87 sentences in 2006). The second category is health, safety and 
other information (with an average of 21.19 sentences in 2005, increasing to 23.3 sentences 
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in 2006). The third category is environmental information (with an average of 18.27 
sentences in 2005, increasing to 23.19 sentences in 2006). Community information is the 
fourth category (with 15.99 sentences in 2005, increasing to 17.33 in 2006). It can also be 
noted that there is a lower percentage of CUS, PRO, and ETH categories compared with the 
other categories. These results are consistent, to a large extent, with what has been found in 
other countries. Hackston & Milne (1996) indicated that human resources and community 
information are the most important categories in New Zealand companies, and Rizk et al. 
(2008) indicated that employee-related information is the most important information in 
Egyptian companies. Lynn, (1992) found that employees information was the most important 
category in Hong Kong. Guthrie and Parker (1990) found that CSD in the U.S., UK and 
Australia was spread across six themes: 40% human resources, 31% community involvement, 
13% environment, 7% energy and products and 2% other. Sobhani et al. (2009) indicated that 
human resource information is the most important information in Bangladesh companies. 
Haron (2004) postulated that, in general, between 1979 and 1991 CSD was increased by as 
much as 4 times, because of the changes in disclosure regulations, which made disclosure of 
some themes mandatory. The importance of disclosure themes has changed. Employee-
related disclosure dropped from approximately 90% to about 78% and community and 
environmental reporting rose from approximately 10% to 32%. It is also noted that the 
increase in health and safety disclosure is associated with the general rise in environmental 
concerns, and the increase in major, widely-publicised accidents. A very low level of energy 
and customer information was found, regardless of the need for the economical and efficient 
use of energy (Haron, et al, 2004: 6).  
The average number of pages for each type of disclosure provides the same results as the 
average number of sentences. Cowen et al. (1987) indicated that fair business practice and 
environmental information have a higher mean number of pages, than other types of 
                                                                                                                                              - 205 - 
disclosure, but by comparison with current results, it appears that companies have changed 
their interests.  
With regard to the quality of each category, it is expected that both ethical and other 
information will have the lowest quality score, due to both categories most often representing 
a general statement only. Consistent results in both 2005 and 2006 show that community 
information has the highest quality score, indicating that the majority of community 
information addresses the company’s activities in the community. The quality scores for 
environment, employee, product and customer information are similar, but generally, it is a 
low quality score (less than 0.5), and indicates that most information for these categories is 
only provided in general statements. The lowest quality scores are for both ethical and other 
information, which is consistent with expectations.  
The results concerning incidence of disclosure (the number of companies interested in each 
disclosure category) are consistent, to a large extent, with previous results. The following 
table present the number of companies that provide information about each category of CSD; 
Table 6.3: The incidence of CSD categories  
 NO. OF COMPANIES 
CSD categories 2005 2006 
Environment 263 (83%) 277 (85%) 
Community 297 (94%) 302 (92%) 
Employee 295 (93%) 298 (91%) 
 Product 118 (37%) 121 (37%) 
Customer 116 (37%) 134 (41%) 
Ethical 126 (40%) 136 (42%) 
Health, safety and other 291 (92%) 300 (92%) 
These results indicate that a higher number of companies are more interested in community 
information, than other categories. It also provides additional evidence that companies are 
more concerned about community, employees, environment, health, safety and other 
information, while they are less concerned about product, customer and ethical information. 
These results are not consistent with the findings of Hackston & Milne (1996), who indicated 
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that a higher number of New Zealand companies make disclosures on human resources and 
products. In the study of Sobhani et al. (2009) in Bangladesh, 100% of companies are found 
to disclose at least one item of disclosure on human resources, while some other categories 
are as follows: community issues (47%), consumer issues (23%) and environmental issues 
(19%). Imam, (2000) found that of 40 companies in Bangladesh, all companies provided 
employee information, 25 % of the sample companies provided community, and 22.5 %, 
environmental disclosure. Only 10 per cent of companies provided consumer-related 
disclosure. The incidence rates of CSD categories in Malaysian companies show that the 
employee category is the most important category, as 42% of companies in 1996 and 43% of 
companies in 2002, disclosed one or more items concerning employees. The incidence for 
other categories shows:  environment category 11% and 17% in 1996 and 2002 respectively, 
community category 9% and 21% in 1996 and 2002 respectively and product category 16% 
and 17% in 1996 and 2002 respectively (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Saleh, 2009, found that 
human resources disclosure has the highest disclosure level and environmental disclosure was 
less disclosed in Malaysian companies. Abu-Baker & Naser, (2000) found that the majority 
of Jordanian companies have disclosed social responsibility information concerned with 
human resources. Therefore, it appears that employee information is the most important 
category from the perspective of quantity of disclosure, which is consistent with various 
studies in other countries, while it is not the most important category from the perspective of 
a number of companies that disclose information (figure 6.5). This is not consistent with 
various studies in other countries. The proportion of companies that make some form of 
environmental disclosure is 83% in 2005, increasing to 85% in 2006, and this percentage is 
higher than has been found in some earlier studies in the UK, e.g. the figure of 75% found by 
Gray et al. (1995a) and 57% found by Brammer & Pawelin (2006), reflecting the increasing 
interest of UK companies in environmental issues.  
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Figure 6.5: Disclosing companies for each category 
 
3.1 Disclosure Location in Annual Reports 
Gray, et al., (1995b) indicated that the disclosure location has been of little value in previous 
literature, but Yusoff & Lehman, (2005) argued that the study of disclosure location may 
contribute positively to the literature. To analyse the selection of locations in annual reports,  
disclosing social responsibility information, the annual reports are divided into seven 
sections: chairman statement (CS), chief executive statement (CEO), business strategy, 
directors’ report (DR), corporate governance report (CG) and a specific section for corporate 
responsibility disclosure (SS). Figure 6.6 presents the disclosure locations in annual reports. 
The findings reflect that the most important location for social responsibility information is 
the director’s report, as 283 companies (89%) show social information in the director’s report 
in 2005 and this percentage decreased in 2006 to 282 companies (87%). This finding is 
consistent with what has been found in Guthrie & Parker (1990) that the director's report is 
the most popular location for CSD in the UK. The second most important location for social 
information is the business strategy section.  
With regard to the presence of a specific section for corporate responsibility information in 
annual reports, 217 companies (68.5%) in 2005 and 221 (67.6%) in 2006 provide a specific 
section for corporate responsibility disclosure in their annual reports, while 100 companies 
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(31.5%) in 2005 and 106 (32.4%) in 2006 do not provide this section. Comparing this result 
with Harte & Owen (1991), who analysed the annual reports of 30 companies and found that 
10 reported on environmental matters in a separate section of their annual reports, indicates 
increasing attention to providing this separate section, in UK companies. This result is 
consistent, to some extent, with the results of Holland & Foo (2003), which indicated that the 
separate section is the most noticeable means of disclosure in UK companies (58% of UK 
companies have done so, compared with only 28% of US companies), and with the study of 
Yusoff & Lehman, (2005) which indicated that director’s report and separate section tended 
to be the favoured locations for Australian companies and a review of operations and separate 
section for Malaysian companies. The proportion of companies that provided a separate 
section for social information in annual reports, reflects the increasing interest in providing a 
separate section for social responsibility information in annual reports, particularly when 
compared with Niskala & Pretes, (1995), who show that 14.7% of their sample of Finnish 
companies provided separate sections for environmental disclosure in annual reports in 1987, 
and this percentage increased to 28% in 1992, and Abbott & Monsen (1979), who presented 
the location of social disclosure in annual reports of Fortune 500 in 1973 and 1974, and 
indicated that in 1973, 24.6% of companies provided a separate section for social disclosure 
in their annual reports and this percentage increased to 29.2% in 1974.  
Despite the chairman in most cases being a non-executive director, and it is expected that he 
will be more interested in corporate responsibility issues, the figures show that the chairman’s 
statement is less interested in social information, as 222 companies (70%) do not present any 
social information in their chairman’s statements in 2005, and in 2006, 218 companies (67%), 
also do not present social information in chairman’s statements. In addition, both chief 
executive’s statements and corporate governance reports are less interested in corporate 
responsibility information. 
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Figure 6.6: Disclosure location in annual reports 
 
 
4. CSD in DIFFERENT SECTORS  
To analyse CSD according to different sectors, the sample companies are divided into four 
categories: 
· Industry (manufacturing) sector – this sector comprises the following industries: aerospace 
& defence, automobiles & parts, beverages, chemicals, construction & building material, 
diversified industrials, electricity, electronic & electrical equipment, engineering & 
machinery, food producers & processors, forestry & paper, mining, oil & gas, personal 
care & household products, pharmaceuticals, real estate, steel & other metals, tobacco and 
water. 
· Financial sector – this sector comprises the following activities: banks, insurance, 
investment companies, life assurance and speciality & other finance. 
· Services sector – this sector comprises the following activities: business support services, 
computer software services, gas distribution, health, information technology, leisure, 
entertainment & hotels, media & photography, packaging, restaurants, pubs & breweries, 
support services, telecommunication services, transport and travel & leisure. 
· General retailers sector – this sector comprises the following activities: food & drug 
retailers and general retailers. 
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Table 6.4 provides the average score of disclosure variables according to different sectors. 
Generally, it is expected that, based on previous literature, the industrial companies could 
produce a higher quantity of social disclosure. Contrary to this expectation, Chambers et al. 
(2003) expected the services sector to be more associated with CSR than the agricultural and 
industrial sector, because services companies tend to be more conscious of their customer 
image. 
Table 6.4: Analysis of CSD in different sectors  
Sector financial General retailers Industry Services 
Year 
 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
No. Of 
companies 
65 68 21 22 136 143 95 94 
CSDarp 3.08 3.43 3.61 4.62 4.89 5.66 3.95 4.45 
CSDars 74.15 82.03 83.38 113.09 121.62 137.66 97.87 111.39 
CSDarpp 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
CSDarq 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.5 0.43 0.41 
CSDsa 10.21 14.83 21.86 20.32 17.71 17.11 17.25 14.47 
CSDsaq 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.36 0.47 0.44 0.19 0.21 
CSDt 12.66 17.17 25.47 24.93 22.09 22.41 20.11 17.84 
CSDty 0.73 0.63 0.67 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.61 0.6 
SA 
0 45(69.2%) 46(67.6%) 13(61.9%) 12(54.5%) 76(55.9%) 76(53.1%) 61(64.2%) 65(69.1%) 
1 20(30.8%) 22(32.4%) 8(38.1%) 10(45.5%) 60(44.1%) 67(46.9%) 34(35.8%) 29(30.9%) 
CSDsaq 
0 9(45%)36 9(40.9%) 4(50%) 4(40%) 20(33.3%) 27(40.3%) 23(67.6%) 18(62.1%) 
1 7(35%) 8(36.4%) 3(38%) 4(40%) 19(31.7%) 19(28.4%) 5(14.7%) 4(13.8%) 
2 4(20%) 5(22.7%) 1(12%) 2(20%) 21(35%) 21(31.3%) 6(17.6%) 7(24.1%) 
  
With regard to the quantity of social disclosure in annual reports, the industrial companies 
provide a higher quantity, and financial companies, a lower quantity. The consistent results in 
both 2005 and 2006 show that industrial companies produce an average quantity of disclosure 
of 121.62 sentences in 2005, increasing to 137.66 sentences in 2006; services companies have 
an average quantity of 97.87 sentences in 2005 increasing to 111.39 sentences in 2006; the 
third sector is general retailers with an average of 83.38 sentences in 2005, increasing to 
                                                        
36 These percentages are calculated according to the total number of companies that produce responsibility 
reports in each sector. 
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113.09 sentences in 2006 and the last sector, financial companies with an average of 74.15 
sentences in 2005, increasing to 82.03 in 2006 (see Figure 6.7, a and b). Consistent with these 
results, there are seven financial companies which do not provide any social disclosure in 
their annual reports while all industrial, general retailers and services companies provide 
some social information in their annual reports. It appears that due to the nature of their 
activities, industrial companies could face more public questions about the impact of their 
activities on the environment and community as a whole, so they provide more social 
disclosure in annual reports. 
Contradictory to the results of quantity of disclosure, the financial companies provide the 
best quality of information, with the average quality score of 0.49 in 2005, increasing to 0.5 
in 2006. This result indicates that despite financial companies providing less quantity of 
disclosure than other sectors, they are more interested in providing specific information than 
other sectors. The second sector is industry companies with the average score 0.42 in 2005, 
increasing to 0.5 in 2006. There is a similar quality score in both general retailers and 
services companies in 2005 (0.43), while in 2006, the average score in services companies 
(0.46) is more than the average in general retailers companies (0.41) (see Figure 6.7, a, and 
b). It appears that quality score is similar, to a large extent, among different economic sectors, 
and generally indicates a low quality score in the different economic sectors. 
Regarding stand-alone reports (SA), the industrial sector shows a large percentage of 
companies that produce corporate responsibility reports, as 44.1% of companies in this 
sector, in 2005, produced such reports, and this percentage increased to 46.9% in 2006. The 
second sector is the general retailers sector, as 38.1% of companies in this sector produce 
corporate responsibility reports and this percentage increased to 45.5% in 2006. This is 
followed by the services sector and the last sector, the financial sector. Despite these 
percentages, the average number of report pages (CSDsa) show that the general retailers 
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produced the highest quantity of corporate responsibility reports, with an average of 21.86 
pages in 2005, which decreased to 20.32 pages in 2006. The second sector in the quantity of 
corporate responsibility reports is the industrial sector, followed by the services sector, and 
the last sector is the financial sector (see Figure 6.7, a, and b), which reflects the lack of 
interest in CSD in this sector. These results also show that despite the increasing percentage 
of companies interested in producing responsibility reports between 2005 and 2006, the 
average number of pages of these reports tended to decrease over the two year-period. 
With regard to the quality of corporate responsibility reports (CSDsaq), the average quality 
score shows that industrial companies have the highest quality score (0.47 in 2005 decreasing 
to 0.44 in 2006). This result indicates that industrial companies are more interested in using 
corporate responsibility reporting guidelines and third-party assurance when they prepare 
their corporate responsibility reports. In more detail: of 60 industrial companies in 2005 that 
produce responsibility reports, 19 (31.7%) companies used either reporting guidelines or 
third-party assurance, 21 (35%) companies used both reporting guidelines and third-party 
assurance, while 20 (33.3%) companies used neither reporting guidelines nor third-party 
assurance, and these percentages in 2006 are 28.4%, 31.3% and 40.3% respectively. These 
percentages refer to the fact that the majority of manufacturing companies that produce 
responsibility reports are making use of, at least, either reporting guidelines or third-party 
assurance. The services sector has the lowest average score of quality, 0.19 in 2005 
increasing to 0.21 in 2006 (see Figure 6.7, c and d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: The level of CSD in different economic sectors 
 
Figure a: the quantity of social disclosure in different sectors, 2005    Figure b: the quantity of social disc losure in different sectors, 2006 
 
 
Figure c: the quality of social disclosure in different sectors, 2005      Figure d: the quality of social disclosure in different sectors, 2006 
 
4.1 CSD Categories in Different Economic Sectors 
For further analysis of CSD in different sectors, the quantity and quality of CSD categories in 
annual reports can be analysed. Table 6.5 provides an analysis of the incidence of disclosure 
(the number of companies interested in each disclosure category, in different economic 
sectors). Tagesson, et al, (2009) present some expectations concerning CSD, in different 
economic sectors, as the following: Manufacturing companies negatively influence the 
environment and consequently disclose more environmental information than companies in 
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other sectors. Finance and services companies disclose little information on social and 
environmental issues, while mining companies, oil companies and chemical companies 
maintain a leading position regarding such reporting. Mining, oil and chemical companies 
emphasise information regarding environmental, and health and safety issues, while the 
finance and services companies seem to report more on social issues and philanthropic deeds 
(Tagesson, et al, 2009: 354). Sweeney & Coughlan, 2008, suggest that, based on reviewing 
available literature, the companies should focus on certain stakeholders more than others, and 
they classified stakeholders for primary and secondary focus as the following (Sweeney & 
Coughlan, 2008: 118):  
Industry Primary Secondary  
Financial service Customers, employees Community 
Pharmaceutical-medical Community Employees 
Pharmaceutical-health Customers  Environment 
Telecommunications Customers  Employees 
Automobile  Environment  Customers 
Oil & gas Environment  Customers 
Retail  Customers, employees Community  
It can be expected that industrial companies are more interested in environmental 
information, general retailers companies are more interested in customer information and 
financial and services companies are more interested in both customers and employee 
information.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              - 215 - 
Table 6.5: Incidence of disclosure categories in different sectors 
     Financial General retailers       Industry     services 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
 65 68 21 22 136 143 95 94 
Env. 44 (67.7%) 45 (66.2%) 15 (71.4%) 19 (86.3%) 123 (90.4%) 131 (91.6%) 81 (85.2%) 85 (90.4%) 
Com. 54 (83%) 55 (80.8%) 20 (95.2%) 22 (100%) 131 (96.3%) 137 (95.8%) 92 (96.8%) 91 (96.8%) 
Emp. 48 (73.8%) 48 (70.6%) 21 (100%) 22 (100%) 133 (97.7%) 138 (96.5%) 93 (97.8%) 93 (98.9%) 
Pro. 4   (6%) 5   (7%) 2    (9%) 7    (31.8%) 76 (55.8%) 78 (54.5%) 36 (37.8%) 34 (36.1%) 
Cus. 24 (36.9%) 26 (38.2%) 10 (47.6%) 12 (54.5%) 44 (32.3%) 56 (39.1%) 38 (40%) 43 (45.7%) 
Eth. 21 (32.3%) 18 (26.4%) 10 (47.6%) 9 (40.9%) 50 (36.7%) 63 (44%) 45 (47.3%) 49 (52.1%) 
Oth. 65 (100%) 57 (83.8%) 20 (95.2%) 21 (95.4%) 131 (96.3%) 137 (95.8%) 87 (91.5%) 88 (93.6%) 
 
The figures in table 6.5 show that community, employees and other information are the most 
important categories for the different sectors. For the financial sector, it appears that financial 
companies are more interested in other information category, as 100% and 83.8% of financial 
companies provide at least one sentence on this information, in 2005 and 2006 respectively. 
At the same time, these companies are less interested in the product information category.  
Financial companies also show noticeable attention to community information, indicating 
that community activities are the most important social responsibility activities for financial 
companies. These results are not consistent with Hamid, 2004, who found that financial 
services companies focus on customers and employees as primary stakeholders. For the 
general retailers sector, it appears that these companies are more interested in employee 
information, and less interested in product information.  This result indicates that employees 
are the most important stakeholders for retailer companies. The results show that 47.6% and 
54.5% of general retailers companies provide at least one sentence of information concerning 
customers. This result reflects, contrary to expectation, that customers are not considered as 
important stakeholders for retailer companies.  With regard to the industry sector, it appears 
that employee information is the most important information category for industrial 
companies, indicating that employees are considered the most important stakeholders for 
these companies.  This result is consistent with the results of Andrew, et al (1989) which 
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found that the most important category in Malaysian and Singaporean industry companies 
was human resources information. Andrew, et al (1989) explained the interest in employee 
information on the basis that to improve working conditions and living standards of workers 
is an important concern for the governments of these countries. The results show that 
environmental information is not the most important category for industrial companies, and is 
not consistent with the result of Tagesson, et al, (2009) which indicated that Swedish 
companies within the raw-material industry disclose more environmental information. For the 
services sector, employee information is the most important category for these companies, 
which is consistent with Saches, et al, 2006, who found that the Communication Company in 
Switzerland has devoted much attention to employees.  
These results can be viewed from the perspective of disclosure categories. Concerning 
environmental information, the industrial sector is more interested in this category, while the 
financial sector is less interested in this category. Community and employee information are 
similar among different sectors and financial companies are less interested in both categories. 
Regarding product information, the industry sector is more interested in this category and 
financial companies are less interested in it. With regard to other categories, the results show 
the same attention to these categories among the different sectors.  
Table 6.6 provides an analysis of disclosure categories in annual reports, which present the 
averages of both number of sentences and quality score for each category. Regarding the 
quantity of each category, the figures in Table 6.6 show that industrial companies have the 
largest quantity of all categories, except the customer information category, in which 
industrial companies provide the lowest quantity of disclosure, while the other sectors 
provide similar quantities of disclosure information. In all sectors, employee information is 
considered the most important category. Regarding the quality score, the financial sector 
provides the best information quality for all disclosure categories. 
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Table 6.6: CSD categories in different sectors 
Sector  Financial  General retailers       Industry          Services 
Year  2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006  2005 2006 
No. Of 
companies 
65 68 21 22 136 143 95 94 
ENV.(no. Of 
sentences) 
7.23 9.75 10.57 16.05 25.32 32.35 17.44 20.67 
COM.(no. Of 
sentences) 
16.37 15.97 14.57 17.64 16.62 19.06 15.14 15.62 
EMP.(no. Of 
sentences) 
28.05 31.07 27.14 36.23 38.39 41.92 35.15 40.48 
PRO.(no. Of 
sentences) 
0.38 0.75 0.57 3.36 
 
6.45 7.48 3.39 3.17 
CUS.(no. Of 
sentences) 
6.31 6.91 4.81 8.73 3.44 4.62 5.14 7.27 
ETH.(no. Of 
sentences) 
2.2 1.82 4 2.45 4.63 4.27 3.35 3.79 
OTH.(no. Of 
sentences) 
13.61 15.75 21.71 28.64 26.77 27.97 18.27 20.40 
ENV.(quality) 0.51 0.58 0.43 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.52 0.53 
COM.(quality) 0.75 0.75 0.64 0.75 0.68 0.69 0.7 0.68 
EMP.(quality) 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.43 
PRO.(quality) 0.92 0.69 0.25 0.51 0.61 0.6 0.51 0.52 
CUS.(quality) 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.58 0.45 0.52 
ETH.(quality) 0.21 0.38 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.1 0.12 
OTH.(quality) 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.22 
 
5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT DISCLSOURE VARIABLES  
CSD was measured by the use of a selection of variables that represent both quantity and 
quality of disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports. To better understand CSD, a 
correlation test was performed among the different disclosure variables identify the 
relationships between disclosure variables. 
Firstly, is there a relationship between the quantity and quality of social disclosure? The 
correlation results show that there was weak correlation between the quantity of disclosure in 
annual reports CSDars and the quality of this disclosure CSDarq (β 0.298 and Sig 0.000) in 2005, 
and this correlation increased in 2006 (β 0.455 and Sig 0.000), but it was still  weak. This weak 
correlation between the quantity and quality of disclosure in annual reports reflected that the 
extension of social disclosure in annual reports did not match, in most cases, with the quality 
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of this disclosure. With reference to corporate responsibility reports, the correlation results 
show that there is a medium correlation between the quantity and quality of these reports (β 
0.571 and Sig.000) in 2005, and a similar result in 2006 (β 0.607 and Sig.000). These results show 
that, to some extent, the companies that produce big corporate responsibility reports are more 
interested in using both reporting guidelines and third-party assurance. In addition, there is a 
medium correlation between total quantity and total quality of social disclosure (β 0.592 and 
0.636 and Sig .000 and .000 in 2005 and 2006 respectively), reflecting that, in general, the relationship 
between quantity and quality of CSD is not strong. 
Secondly, is there a correlation between producing stand-alone reports and the quantity of 
social disclosure in annual reports? It is expected that producing stand-alone reports could 
impact on the quantity of social disclosure in annual reports in one of two dimensions. The 
first one is increasing disclosure in annual reports due to the presence of information, and 
consequently there is no additional cost for increasing disclosure. The second one is 
decreasing disclosure in annual reports due to the presence of separate reports and 
consequently the users can depend on these reports. The correlation results show that in both 
2005 and 2006 there is a weak correlation between SA and CSDars (β 0.234 and 0.260 and Sig 
.000 and .000 in 2005 and 2006 respectively). There is also no correlation between the presence of a 
separate section for corporate responsibility information in annual reports, and producing 
stand-alone reports (β 0.049 and 0.074 and Sig 0.388 and 0.185 in 2005 and 2006 respectively), reflecting 
that the companies trend of producing corporate responsibility reports is not influenced, to a 
large extent, by the disclosure in their annual reports. It also appears that despite companies 
producing corporate responsibility reports, there is also a tendency to disclose social 
responsibility information in their annual reports, which indicates that annual reports remain 
an important means of disclosing social responsibility information.  
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6. CONCLUSION  
This chapter presented a detailed analysis of CSD practices in UK companies, and addressed 
a basic question regarding the level of CSD in UK companies. According to empirical 
figures, it can be argued that UK companies, in particular industrial companies, reveal great 
interest in CSD. In addition, some points can be concluded from this chapter as follows:  
· In general, there is a slight increase in CSD between 2005 and 2006 indicating a small rate 
of growth of CSD, over this period. 
· The majority of companies provide social responsibility disclosure in their annual reports, 
while most of them do not provide a stand-alone report, indicating that annual reports are 
still the main means of CSD. 
· The quality of social disclosure in annual reports is generally low and the majority of this 
disclosure comprises only a general statement. 
· Approximately half of the companies use neither reporting guidelines, nor an independent 
auditor when preparing stand-alone reports. 
· Contrary to growing interest in environmental issues, employee information is considered 
the most important information in annual report disclosure. 
· The director’s report is the most important location for corporate social responsibility 
information in annual reports. 
· Industrial companies provide the highest quantity of social disclosure in annual reports, 
while financial companies provide the best quality of social information in annual reports. 
· The industry sector has the largest proportion of companies interested in releasing 
corporate responsibility reports, but the general retailers sector has the largest average 
number of pages for these reports. 
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· The industry sector is more interested in using reporting guidelines and third-party 
assurance.  
This chapter shows a high level of CSD in the UK, as a developed country, compared with 
other countries, in particular developing countries. The key question is how to explain the 
differences in the level of CSD among different countries. This question is the focal point of 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Determinants at the country level 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
It is argued that the starting point for understanding the phenomenon of CSD is to 
understand how social pressure is created in a given country. A suggested theoretical 
framework has two levels of analysis: firstly, analysis of CSD at the country level, and 
secondly, at the company level. The two levels of analysis are related, as both depend on the 
concept of social pressure as the main idea that can explain CSD. The purpose of this chapter 
is to explain the level of CSD in a given country and what causes the differences in this level 
different countries. The chapter addresses the basic question: What determines the level of 
social responsibility disclosure at the country level? This chapter is based on the use of 
statistical methods (correlation and regression) to examine the theoretical model of 
determinants of CSD at a country level. The importance of this chapter is that it represents a 
starting point for an integrated framework.  
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
According to the theoretical framework, the suggested model of determinants of social 
responsibility disclosure in a given country, based on political-economy theory, consists of 
societal variables (economic and cultural) that interact with each other in the development of 
community awareness of the importance of CSR. Both economic and cultural factors 
determine the extent of the pressure that members of society are able to exert on companies, 
concerning their social responsibilities. On the other hand, the level of corporate governance 
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in the country could determine the level of companies’ commitment to CSR. The following 
figure presents a suggested model that will be examined in this chapter: 
Figure 7.1: Theoretical framework at the country level 
 
According to the previous model, the following general hypothesis can be advanced: 
General hypothesis: The level of social disclosure in a given country can be determined 
according to the economic level, the level of corporate governance and the cultural values 
of the country. 
Within this general hypothesis, further hypotheses will be examined: 
The level of 
voluntary social 
disclosure in the 
country 
Culture Economic 
level 
Society' 
perceptions 
High 
Increasing attention for non-economic matters (environmental and social) 
matters) 
The level of 
corporate 
governance 
 
Social 
pressure 
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2.1 Economic Level  
It is argued that the economic level is the most important factor in determining the level of 
CSD in a given country, as the economic level can influence both the society’s attention to 
the concept of CSR, and the ability of companies to increase their disclosure. Evidence from 
economic literature indicates that there are influential cross-country differences in economic 
efficiency (Bushman & Smith, 2001: 297).  A high economic level provides opportunities for 
members of society to draw attention to non-economic matters (social and environmental). 
Companies in economically developed countries are probably more candid, therefore 
business performance can be evaluated by society (Gray, 1985, as cited in Zarzeski, 1996: 
20).  
The level of accounting disclosure seems to be associated with the level of development of 
the economy (Lee, 1987). The transparency of accounting disclosure increases in more 
developed economies (Kang & Pang, 2005: 5).  Studies provide mixed results concerning the 
impact of economic development on accounting. Cooke and Wallace (1990), Doupnik and 
Salter (1995), and Salter (1998) provide evidence on the influence of the economic 
environment on accounting development. Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) and Williams (1999), 
however, provide evidence that does not support the influence of the economic development 
on the development of accounting practices.  
The positive association between the economic level and the level of social responsibility 
disclosure in a given country can be argued based on the following: 
· Satisfaction of the primary needs (economic needs) of individuals so that they can draw 
attention to non-economic (social and environmental) issues and consequently exert 
pressure on companies concerning these issues, and 
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· Companies are more likely to have information systems that can provide more disclosure 
regarding social and environmental issues. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: countries with high economic level are more likely to have greater social 
responsibility disclosure, than those with low economic level.   
2.2 Cultural Values 
Cultural values are important because the traditions of a nation are instilled in its people, 
and can help explain why certain conditions prevail (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002: 317). All 
companies exist within a cultural context, and the influences of culture are pervasive and 
underlie nations’ institutional arrangements. Therefore, national culture influences 
management assumptions, organisational structures and activities (Smith, et al, 2005: 132). 
Zarzeski (1996) posited that “culture underlies the business activities of a nation”. 
Radebaugh, (1975) stated that culture influences a country’s development of accounting 
objectives and policies. Adams (2002) attested that from the determinants of CSD, one can 
derive the cultural context of a country. Lee & Hutchison (2005) also mentioned cultural 
forces as determinants of environmental disclosure. Arnold, et al (2007) found evidence 
indicates that Hofstede’s cultural values of individualism and masculinity are associated with 
country differences in implementation of code of conduct in European context. 
It can be argued that cultural values in a society will determine the extent to which 
individuals possess sufficient awareness of the fact that: 
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· The impact of the activities of the company on the environment, and the community as a 
whole, may be at the same level of importance as the economic impact of those activities, 
and  
· They have the ability to influence companies. 
Therefore, the cultural values in a society will determine the level of pressure that the 
community is able to exert on companies, concerning their social responsibility. 
Consequently, cultural values can be considered a determinant of the level of social 
responsibility disclosure at the country level. 
To determine a clear and concise measure that can explain a specific country’s culture is a 
difficult task. The study by Hofstede (1980) developed measures for four cultural dimensions, 
through surveys from over 160 000 IBM employees, across 64 countries. The study by Gray 
(1988) suggested several hypotheses that relate Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, 
(individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity and power 
distance) to accounting systems. Some studies have used Gray’s theory (1988) to explain the 
relationship between cultural values and accounting systems (Perera, 1989; Gray & Vint, 
1995; Zarzeski, 1996; and Hope, 2003b). Williams, (1999) extends the theoretical framework 
developed by Gray to include social and environmental disclosures. Based on Gray’s theory 
(1988), the following hypothesis, concerning the impact of cultural values on the level of 
social responsibility disclosure in a given country, can be formulated: 
a) Individualism–collectivism: This dimension describes the relationship among individuals 
in a society. Individuals in an individualistic culture look after themselves and their close 
families, while in a collectivistic culture, individuals belong to groups that look after the 
individuals (Soares et al., 2007: 280). In individualistic countries, the environment is more 
competitive and less secretive (Hope, 2003b: 221). It is expected that collectivist societies 
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provide lower disclosure because their families are in groups (Zarzeski, 1996: 27). The 
expected relationship between individualism and disclosure is a positive one. In the 
context of CSD, it can be argued that in individualistic societies, individuals need to 
control companies, concerning their social responsibilities, which exerts pressure on 
companies. In collectivistic societies, individuals are less desirous of controlling 
companies, because there is a stronger relationship between members of these societies. 
Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 2: Individualistic countries are more likely to have greater social responsibility 
disclosure, than collectivistic countries.  
b) Masculinity–femininity: In feminine countries, the dominant values are caring for others 
and quality of life, while in masculine countries, the dominant values are achievement and 
success (Soares, et al., 2007: 280). Masculine countries are more likely to be growth-
oriented and have companies that foster growth activities. Companies in masculine 
countries are also more likely to disclose higher levels of information (Zarzeski, 1996: 27). 
The expected relationship between masculinity and disclosure is a positive one. In this 
context, it can be argued that companies in masculine countries could provide more social 
information in order to improve their reputations, as they are strongly focused on success 
in their operations, and they need to improve their reputations. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: Masculine countries are more likely to show greater social responsibility 
disclosure, than feminine countries. 
c) Power distance: This influences hierarchy relationships in the family and organisational 
contexts (Soares, et al, 2007: 280). High power-distance countries are likely to have 
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companies that discourage extensive sharing of information. By contrast, companies in 
low power-distance countries are likely to disclose higher levels of information to comply 
with the demands of their constituents (Zarzeski, 1996: 27). The expected relationship 
between power distance and disclosure is a negative one. In this context, it can be argued 
that: 
Hypothesis 4: Low power-distance countries are more likely to have greater social 
responsibility disclosure, than high power-distance countries. 
d) Uncertainty avoidance: This cultural dimension deals with the need for well-defined rules 
for prescribed behaviour (Soares et al., 2007: 280). In strong uncertainty-avoidance 
countries, more certain relationships exist; therefore the companies are more likely to 
disclose less information (Zarzeski, 1996: 27). Thus, the expected relationship between 
uncertainty avoidance and disclosure is a negative one. In the context of CSD, it can be 
argued that in weak uncertainty-avoidance countries, fewer certain relationships exist; 
therefore the need for control of companies, concerning the social impact of their 
activities, will increase. Consequently, more pressure on companies is expected. The 
following hypothesis can be argued:  
Hypothesis 5: Weak uncertainty-avoidance countries are more likely to have greater social 
responsibility disclosure, than strong uncertainty-avoidance countries. 
2.3 Corporate Governance 
It is argued that both cultural and economic factors determine the degree of pressure that 
members of society are able to exert on companies, concerning their social responsibilities. 
An important question arises: How do companies respond to this pressure? It is expected that 
companies respond either positively or negatively to this pressure. In this regard, corporate 
governance practices appear to play an important role in determining companies’ responses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
                                                                                                                                                     - 229 -       
   
Corporate governance incorporates controlling mechanisms and procedures to ensure that 
management acts in the interest of shareholders, and this theoretical view can be extended to 
include all stakeholders, not only shareholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). Thus, good corporate 
governance practices can ensure that companies act in the interest of all stakeholders. It can 
be argued therefore, that corporate governance practices in a given country, determine how 
companies respond to social pressure, and consequently the level of social disclosure in the 
country. 
Hypothesis 6: Countries with a high level of corporate governance are more likely to show 
greater social responsibility disclosure, than countries with a low level of corporate 
governance. 
 
3. METHOD   
3.1 The Sample 
The important factor in determining the sample is cultural values data, so the sample is 
determined according to the available cultural data. The sample therefore consists of 58 
selected countries, based on the countries that are mentioned in Hofstede’s survey. Data will 
be collected for a sample of countries over a period of three years: 2004, 2005 and 2006.  
3.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the level of CSD in a country, measured by the number of 
companies that publish corporate responsibility reports in a given year, as shown on the 
website, www.corporateregister.com. This website provides the world’s largest online 
directory of CSR/sustainability reports with 21,883 reports from 5,416 companies across the 
world. This website was partnered with some professional organisations in various corporate 
responsibility survey-projects, such as a collaboration between this site with Newsweek, and 
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environmental research firms, KLD Research & Analytics and Trucost (which were 
extensively used in previous literature as a source of corporate responsibility data), to 
establish a green ranking of America’s 500 largest companies. 
3.3 Independent Variables 
With regard to cultural variables, the definitional difficulties pose a challenge to cross-
cultural research in determining convenient measures of cultural dimensions (Soares et al., 
2007: 278). The study by Soares et al. (2007) discussed some approaches used in literature to 
integrate cultural values. They argued that Hofstede’s framework provides a simple, practical 
and usable short cut for the integration of cultures into studies. Arnold, et al (2007) used 
Hofstede’s cultural values in examining the effect of a country’s culture on the 
implementation of a code of conduct in a European context. Zarzeski (1996) argued that the 
study by Hofstede (1980), is still applicable, because the culture of a country changes slowly, 
and this study has enhanced awareness of global, cultural characteristics (Zarzeski, 1996: 26). 
Gehrardy (1990) postulated that Gray’s theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation of 
the relationship between accounting and cultural dimensions. Eddie (1991) and Chanchani & 
Willett (2004) provided support for Gray’s theory. Salter & Niswander, (1995) empirically 
tested the impact of cultural values on accounting practices across different countries. Their 
findings indicated that Gray's model has a significant, explanatory power, and they contend 
that Gray appears to have provided a workable theory to explain cross-national differences in 
accounting structure and practice, which is particularly effective in explaining differential 
financial-reporting practices. The cultural variables will be measured by Hofstede’s cultural 
values. Hofstede’s Cultural values for Egypt are based on study of Brown & Humphreys 
(1995).  
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With regard to the economic level, it will be measured based on two indicators. The first 
indicator is gross domestic product (GDP), as measured by the International Monetary Fund, 
(2006). GDP is considered a common measure for the economic level, as cited in previous 
literature. Bushman & Smith (2001) stated that economic literature has developed empirical 
proxies for examining cross-country economic performances, and from these proxies, GDP. 
The second indicator is the global competitiveness score (GCS), as indicated in the global 
competitiveness report published by The World Economic Forum (WEF). Competitiveness is 
defined as “that collection of factors, policies and institutions which determine the 
productivity of a country and that, therefore, determine the level of prosperity that can be 
attained by an economy” (WEF, 2006). The global competitiveness score is based on 12 
pillars of competitiveness, that are divided into 3 pillar groups: Basic Requirements 
(Institutions, Infrastructure, Macroeconomic Stability, Health and Primary Education), 
Efficiency Enhancers (Higher Education and Training, Goods Market Efficiency, Labour 
Market Efficiency, Financial Market Sophistication, Technological Readiness, Market Size), 
and Innovation and Sophistication Factors (Business Sophistication, Innovation). Each pillar 
is made up of indicators that come from either ‘hard data’, from major international sources, 
or ‘soft data’, from the WEF-conducted Executive Opinion Survey. When creating the overall 
score for each country, weighting schemes are applied, based on GDP per capita. The level of 
corporate governance will be measured by the corporate governance index, provided in the 
global competitiveness report. The corporate governance index is considered a component of 
the state of public institutions in the competitiveness report. In 2004, the WEF introduced 
new questions on corporate governance, in its survey to calculate global competitiveness 
rankings. Some of these questions deal with institutional and legal issues (protection of 
minority shareholders), and others with company-specific factors (control of corporate 
boards). The results reflect the level of corporate governance in each country. 
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3.4 Specific Model 
The following figure presents the determinants model: 
Figure 7.2: The determinants at the country level model 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
To examine the ability of theoretical model to explain the level of CSD in a given country, 
the following regression model can be used, 
SD = ß0 + ß1 UA + ß2 IND + ß3 MASC + ß4 PD + ß5 GDPLOG + ß6 CG +ε 
Where; 
SD The level of social responsibility disclosure in a given country 
UA Uncertainty avoidance 
IND Individualism 
MASC Masculinity 
PD Power distance 
GDPLOG Log. of Gross Domestic Product for each country 
CG The level of corporate governance 
 
4. RESULTS  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 7.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample covering a period of three years. 
Cultural values 
Individualism (IND) 
Power distance (PD) 
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) 
Masculinity (MASC)  
Economic level 
GDP 
Global Competitiveness score (GCS) 
Corporate governance level (CG) 
The level of 
corporate 
social 
responsibility 
disclosure (SD) 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Min. Max. Mean Std. deviation Skew. Kurt. 
Part 1: 2004       
SD .00 285.00 32.6034 61.25642 2.666 7.254 
UA 8.00 112.00 67.7241 23.50796 -.613 -.235 
IND -12.00 91.00 41.7241 24.53626 .285 -.708 
MASC 5.00 95.00 52.7069 17.77640 -.603 .427 
PD 11.00 104.00 55.1034 20.17615 .078 .072 
CUL 118.00 288.00 217.25862 36.30986 -.732 .580 
GDP 615.43 55500.23 17049.666 15809.67 .641 -.898 
GCS 3.17 5.95 4.6187 .76197 -.200 -1.044 
CG 
 
2.90 6.10 4.7673 .61953 -.144 .402 
Part2: 2005       
SD .00 307.00 39.5000 67.66280 2.490 6. 187 
UA 8.00 112.00 66.8148 24.12708 -.504 -.413 
IND -12.00 91.00 42.0000 25.42321 .243 -.879 
MASC 5.00 95.00 51.5741 17.91342 -.487 .393 
PD 11.00 104.00 55.2593 20.91509 .052 -.142 
CUL 118.0 288.00 217.25862 36.30986 -.732 .580 
GDP 705 64193 18370.31 16817.92 .677 -.645 
GCS 3.01 5.94 4.4963 .78332 -.107 -1.099 
CG 
 
2.93 6.35 5.0144 .94838 -.507 -.797 
Part 3: 2006       
SD 0 350.00 44.91 76.961 2.472 6.103 
UA 8 94 59.85 25.822 -.625 -.757 
IND -12 91 42.00 25.423 .243 -.879 
MASC 5 95 51.57 17.913 -.487 .393 
PD 10 95 53.52 20.692 -.145 -.276 
CUL 118.00 288.00 217.25862 36.30986 -.732 .580 
GDP 769 71674 19814.637 18157.58 .732 -.427 
GCS 3.660 5.810 4.74115 .669898 .071 -1.461 
CG 2.38 6.05 4.5388 .89237 -.273 -.679 
 
With regard to CSD at a country level, the findings indicate that there is an increase in the 
average number of companies that publish stand-alone reports (32.6, 39.5 and 44.9 over the three 
years respectively) reflecting an increase in the level of CSD over time. What confirms this 
notion is that the number of countries that reveal no interest in social disclosure at all (SD =0) 
has decreased during the three-year study from 14 to 13 to 12 countries respectively.  It is 
clear that the number of companies that publish corporate responsibility reports is increasing 
over time, where the maximum number of companies increased from 285 in 2004, to 307 in 
2005 and to 350 in 2006. At the same time, it appears that the increase in the number of 
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companies which published corporate responsibility reports is focused on some countries 
only, while others are still not interested in this disclosure, whereas a minimum number of 
companies remain stable over time. The minimum disclosure score (0) reflects the fact that 
there are some countries that reveal no interest in CSD. Large values of standard deviation for 
SD during the three years, mean that the data is widely spread, reflecting the noticeable 
differences in the level of social disclosure among different countries. Significant values of 
both skewness and kurtosis, also confirm this dispersion of data. The values of standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis reflect that the SD variable lacks the normal distribution, 
and this conclusion can be statistically examined by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S) and 
Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) test. The following table presents the results of normality tests: 
Table 7.2: The results of normality test of social disclosure at a country level 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic 
 
df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
SD (2004) .298 58 .000 .593 58 .000 
SD (2005) .289 58 .000 .610 58 .000 
SD (2006) .289 58 .000 .610 58 .000 
 
Both tests are significant, indicating that data of social disclosure at a country level has non-
normal distribution. The following figure indicates the distribution of social disclosure 
variables over three years: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Figure 7.3: Graphically distribution of SD 
       
 
 
                        a- 2004                                                              b- 2005 
 
 
                                                        c- 2006 
The figure shows a low level of CSD in the majority of countries in the sample, with a 
smaller number of companies that produce corporate responsibility reports in the majority of 
countries. Frequencies analysis confirm this notion, which reveals that in 2004, 14 countries 
show no social disclosure at all (SD = 0), and 35 countries have less than 10 companies that 
produce corporate responsibility reports. The figures for 2005 are 13 and 32 countries, and in 
2006, 12 and 29 countries. It is evident that there are large gaps among countries regarding 
the level of CSD.  
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With regard to cultural dimensions, the cultural values (UA, IND, MASC, and PD) are 
stable over the three-year period because of the use of Hofstede’s cultural values. The values 
of cultural variables show that there are wide ranges for each cultural variable, which indicate 
that cultural diversity has been achieved in this sample. Values of standard deviation show 
that cultural scores tend to be distributed normally around the mean score. With regard to the 
economic-variable global competitiveness score (GCS) each country is scored on a scale of 1 
to 7, where 7 is the best score. In 2004, GCS ranged from 3.17 to 5.95 compared with a range 
from 2.5 to 5.95 for all countries in the index, which reflects the economic diversity in this 
sample. In 2005, GCS ranged from 3.01 to 5.94 compared with a range from 2.37 to 5.94 for 
all countries in the index, and in 2006, this variable ranged from 3.66 to 5.81 compared with 
a range from 2.5 to 5.81 for all countries in the index. The numbers of minimum and 
maximum also indicate the economic diversity in the sample 
With regard to the corporate governance variable (CG), the minimum score over three years 
(2.90, 2.93 and 2.38) is considered a mean score for governance level. The average corporate 
governance score also indicates, in general, a high level of corporate governance in the 
sample. The low values of standard deviation reflect that the corporate governance score is 
normally distributed. 
For more analysis of data, the countries sample is divided into developed and developing 
countries using the classification of the IMF (2006). The sample contains 33 (56.9%) 
countries that can be classified as developing countries and 25 countries (43.1%) classified as 
developed countries. Table 7.3 provides descriptive statistics of two types of countries 
(developed and developing).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
                                                                                                                                                     - 237 -       
   
Table 7.3: Descriptive statistics according to economy type 
Variables 2004 2005 2006 
  Min Max mean Min Max mean Min Max Mean 
 
SD: 0 0 48 5.3571 0 64 6.7333 0 65 7.9667 
1 0 285 
 
72 2 307 77.28 1 350 87.48 
UA: 0 13 101 71.7857 13 101 71.7857 13 101 71.7857 
 1 8 112 
 
60.5833 8 112 60.5833 8 112 60.5833 
IND: 0 -12 65 26.6429 -12 65 26.6429 -12 65 26.6429 
 1 17 91 
 
60.9583 17 91 60.9583 17 91 60.9583 
MASC: 0 21 73 52.75 21 73 52.75 21 73 52.75 
 1 5 95 
 
51.0833 5 95 51.0833 5 95 51.0833 
PD: 0 35 104 65.8214 35 104 65.8214 35 104 65.8214 
 1 11 74 
 
42.6250 11 74 42.6250 11 74 42.6250 
GCS: 0 3.17 5.21 4.0646 3.01 4.99 3.9487 3.66 5.11 4.213 
 1 4.27 5.95 
 
5.2533 4.21 5.94 5.116 4.33 5.81 5.314 
CG: 0 2.9 5.4 4.3964 2.93 5.75 4.3863 2.38 5.16 3.9977 
 1 4 6.1 5.2 4.7 6.35 5.7224 3.66 6.05 5.1424 
Where 0 developing country and 1 developed country                                                                                   
The descriptive statistics show a clear variation in most variables between the two types of 
countries. There is a clear difference in the level of social responsibility disclosure between 
the two types of countries, in which the average level of disclosure in developing countries is 
5.36, 6.73, and 7.97 over the three years respectively, against 72, 77.28, and 87.48 for 
developed countries over the three years. These figures confirm the previous notion that there 
are large gaps among different countries regarding the level of CSD. It is clear that there is an 
increasing level of disclosure over time, in both developed and developing countries. This 
noticeable variation between developed and developing countries reflects the view that social 
responsibility disclosure is a Western phenomenon. With regard to cultural variables, the 
results suggest there is cultural diversity in two types of countries in the sample. The clear 
cultural difference between developed and developing countries is related to cultural-
dimension individualism (the average score of IND is 26.64 and 60.95 for developing and 
developed countries respectively). This clear difference in the individualism score between 
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the two types of countries reflects the variance in the degree of competitiveness within the 
communities in each type of country. The average score of IND in developed countries 
reflects, as expected, a higher degree of competitiveness in the communities in developed 
countries, than exists in developing countries. There is a clear variation in both GCS and CG 
between developed and developing countries and it is apparent that both variables are related. 
This relationship between the two variables may be due to the use of World Economic Forum 
scores for both global competitiveness and corporate governance. 
4.2 Correlation Results 
Table 7.4 presents the results of both parametric and non-parametric correlation tests 
between the level of social responsibility disclosure and cultural values, and economic level 
and the level of corporate governance. 
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Table 7.4: Correlation results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The parametric and non-parametric correlation results are consistent, to a large extent, and 
are also largely consistent with the theoretical background, and provide strong evidence to 
support a general hypothesis. Regarding cultural values, the consistent Pearson and Spearman 
correlation results show that from Hofstede’s cultural values, only individualism (IND) 
Panel a: Pearson correlation results 
Part 1:2004 SD Part 2:2005 SD Part 3:2006 SD 
UA -.174 
.192 
 -.150 
.279 
 .011 
.934 
IND .620** 
.000 
 .628** 
.000 
 .611** 
.000 
MASC .234 
.077 
 .280* 
.040 
 .275* 
.044 
PD -.308* 
.019 
 -.306* 
.025 
 -.251 
.068 
CUL .250 
.059 
 .263* 
.046 
 .279* 
.034 
GDPLOG .488** 
.000 
 .477** 
.000 
 .461** 
.000 
GCS .460** 
.001 
 .437** 
.001 
 .476** 
.000 
CG .483** 
.000 
 
 .401** 
.003 
 .292* 
.036 
Panel b: spearmen correlation results 
Part 1:2004 SD Part 2:2005 SD Part 3:2006 SD 
UA -.275* 
.036 
 -.261* 
.048 
 -.217 
.101 
IND .621** 
.000 
 .630** 
.000 
 .607** 
.000 
MASC -.047 
.724 
 -.038 
.779 
 -.050 
.708 
PD -.307* 
.019 
 -.304* 
.020 
 -.297* 
.024 
CUL -.026 
.846 
 -.024 
.857 
 -.020 
.881 
      
GDPLOG .604** 
.000 
 .604** 
.000 
 .578** 
.000 
GCS .608** 
.000 
 .583** 
.000 
 .616** 
.000 
CG .617** 
.000 
 .556** 
.000 
 .430** 
.001 
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appears to be positively correlated with the level of social disclosure in a country, indicating 
that increasing competitiveness in a society is positively correlated with the level of social 
disclosure in the country. This result suggests that companies in highly-competitive societies 
use social responsibility strategy as a competitive tool; on the other hand, companies in low-
competitive societies feel that there is no importance attached to social responsibility. Power 
distance (PD) appears to have a weak negative correlation (as expected) with SD. 
Inconsistent results concerning both masculinity (MASC) and uncertainty avoidance (UA) 
reflect that both variables are weakly correlated with SD. These findings suggest that the 
most influential cultural factors on CSD are those factors associated with the degree of 
competitiveness and the degree of awareness in a society. In addition, the results indicate a 
weak correlation between the total cultural score for each country (CUL) and the level of 
social disclosure in a country, reflecting that some cultural dimensions are more strongly 
correlated with social disclosure, than others.  
The Pearson and Spearman correlation results consistently show that the economic level of 
a country is positively correlated with the level of social disclosure, reflecting, as expected, a 
high level of CSD in countries with a high economic level. The positive correlation between 
economic variables (GDPLOG and GCS) and SD can be interpreted in the context of the 
suggested model, as the economic level in a country affects the degree of awareness of non-
economic issues and consequently the importance of corporate social responsibility, and a 
high economic level provides an opportunity for members of the community to focus 
attention on non-economic issues. With regard to corporate governance, consistent 
correlation results show that the corporate governance variable appears to be positively 
correlated with SD, reflecting that the level of corporate governance in the country affects the 
degree of commitment to CSR. 
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4.3 Regression Analysis  
Regression analysis is conducted to examine the theoretical framework of determinants of 
social responsibility disclosure, at a country level. Given that the dependent variable (number 
of companies that publish corporate responsibility reports in each country) is count data, OLS 
estimation appears to be an inappropriate method. An alternative method is Poisson 
regression (Long & Freese, 2003). Poisson probabilities are used to model the number of 
occurrences (counts) of an event. A Poisson distribution has a mean equal to a variance. The 
problem with Poisson regression is the over-dispersion of data. In Poisson distribution, the 
mean and the variance are the same. Therefore, the over-dispersion of dependent variable 
data should be examined to determine whether Poisson distribution is appropriate for 
dependent variable data, or not. There are two ways to test the appropriateness of Poisson 
distribution: 
First, calculate the variance of data and compare it with the mean of data. The following table 
presents the values of mean and variance of SD variables: 
Table 7.5: Mean and variance of SD 
 Mean 
 
variance 
2004 32.60 3752.34 
2005 36.7931 4357.64 
2006 41.8276 5637.61 
 
The variance is nearly 100 times larger than the mean. These figures show, very clearly, the 
existence of a very high degree of dispersion in the data. 
Second, the likelihood-ratio, chi-squared statistic test compares the model with a model 
taking into account all the possible effects of the variables. If the test is significant, the 
Poisson regression is not appropriate. The following table presents the results of likelihood-
ratio tests over the three-year period: 
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Table 7.6: Likelihood ratio test 
 2004 
 
2005 2006 
Goodness-of-fit chi2  968.4075 1293.44 1654.391 
         Prob > chi2       0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The test is significant over the three years, indicating that Poisson regression is not 
appropriate. In addition, the large values of chi-square are another sign that the Poisson 
regression is not a good choice. An alternative method to Poisson regression is negative 
binomial regression used with count data that has over-dispersion. 
4.3.1 Pooled negative binomial regression results 
The negative binomial regression is conducted using panel data. The advantage of panel 
data regression is that it takes the time effect into account. As Cormier et al. (2005) stated; if 
an OLS regression for one period provides a picture, panel data provide a sequence of 
pictures. There are two types of panel data regression: the fixed-effects model and the 
random-effects model. Statistically, the fixed-effects model is the appropriate model with 
panel data, but sometimes the random-effects model provides better results. Therefore, the 
Hausman test is conducted to choose between the fixed and random-effects model.
The results of the Hausman test37 (chi2 (6)= 9.67 and Prob>chi2 =   0.1393) show that the random-
effects model can be used in analysis. The following table provides the results of negative 
binomial regression with panel data: 
 
 
                                                        
37 Hausman test examines the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated are the same in both the random 
and fixed effects models. Insignificant P value shows that coefficients are the same in both models, and 
therefore the random effects model can be used (Stock & Watson, 2003). 
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Table 7.7: Pooled negative binomial regression results 
 Coef. 
 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
UA -.0067033 .0127129   -0.53 0.598 -.0316202    .0182136 
IND .0317137 .0123388 2.57 0.010  .00753         .0558973 
MASC .0055623 .0108829 0.51 0.609 -.0157677    .0268923 
PD .0211658 .0152421 1.39 0.165 -.0087082    .0510398 
GDPLOG 2.058301 .4747462 4.34 0.000 1.127815    2.988786 
CG 
 
-.0954789 .0386008 -2.47 0.013 -.1711351   -.0198228 
Wald chi2(6)   97.30 
Prob > chi2      0.0000 
Log likelihood -495.91409 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled: chibar2(01) =   257.45 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
Regression results show that from cultural variables, individualism (IND) has a significant 
positive association with the level of social disclosure in a country, while other cultural 
variables (UA, MASC, and PD) have no significant association with the level of disclosure. 
With regard to the economic variables, it appears that GDPLOG has a stronger positive 
association with disclosure. The corporate governance variable (CG) has an unexpected 
negative association with disclosure. 
Discussion  
Regression results show that from Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions, individualism is 
positively associated with the level of country disclosure. The association between IND and 
SD is not strong (coef. .0317137 and P 0.010). The result indicates that countries with cultures 
displaying more individualism are more likely to disclose high levels of social responsibility 
information. The cultural dimension IND is focused on the value of success at work, and 
reflects the degree of competitiveness in society, as a society with a high level of IND would 
have a high degree of competitiveness. Therefore, a positive association between IND and 
level of social disclosure in a country suggests that social responsibility disclosure could be 
used as a part of a competitiveness strategy. This positive relationship between IND and CSD 
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could reflect that companies in high-competitive countries are more sensitive to social 
pressure and they are using CSD to establish a good social reputation. On the other hand, 
despite a low score of IND reflecting stronger social relationships in society and more loyalty 
for groups, which appears to be closely related to the concept of CSR, a society with a low 
score of IND provides a low level of SD. This relationship can be explained in the context of 
the concept of social pressure, as those societies with low individualism are less competitive 
and their members do not tend to exert pressure on others. There is no significant association 
between other cultural variables (UA, PD, and MASC) and SD. This result suggests that there 
is no relationship between the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable 
with uncertainty and ambiguity, and the degree of acceptance of institutional and 
organisational authority by individuals and the level of social disclosure in a country.  
These results are consistent with previous correlation results, to a large extent, and show 
that some cultural dimensions are related to disclosure. The results, concerning cultural 
variables, are consistent to some extent with previous studies that provide evidence on the 
relationship between Hofstede’s cultural variables and levels of disclosure. Each study yields 
mixed results concerning the impact of the four cultural variables on disclosure. Zarzeski 
(1996) found that both uncertainty avoidance and masculinity have a significant association. 
Hope (2003) found that, as predicted, uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated and 
individualism is positively associated with disclosure, while, contrary to predictions, power 
distance is positively, and masculinity is negatively, associated with disclosure. The results of 
previous studies seem to provide evidence about the association between culture and 
disclosure, but conclusions concerning the four cultural dimensions were found to be 
inconclusive. These results are also relatively consistent with the results of Williams (1999), 
who found that uncertainty avoidance and masculinity are associated with CSD.  
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The results concerning cultural variables support, to a large extent, the general argument that 
culture has a significant impact on the level of social responsibility disclosure in a given 
country. With regard to hypotheses concerning the relationship between cultural variables 
and social disclosure, the results support hypothesis 2, which indicates a positive impact of 
cultural dimensions of individualism on the level of social responsibility disclosure, while the 
results provide evidence to reject hypotheses 4 and 5 that refer to the negative impact of 
cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance on the level of social 
responsibility disclosure. The results also reject hypothesis 3 that indicates a positive 
association between the cultural dimension of masculinity and the level of corporate social 
disclosure in a country.  
With regard to the economic variables, regression results appear to strongly support a 
general argument that the economic level influences social responsibility disclosure. The 
result shows a strong, positive association between the economic levels measured by log, of 
GDP and the level of social responsibility disclosure (coef. 2.058301 and P 0.000), reflecting that 
increasing economic levels lead to an increase in the level of social disclosure at a country 
level. This strong association between economic level and social disclosure reflects the fact 
that the starting point of interest in CSR is the high level of economics that satisfies the basic 
needs of members of society. They can then pay attention to other non-economic matters 
such as the social and environmental role of companies in the society. This result concerning 
economic level is not consistent with the results of Williams (1999) and Chambers et al. 
(2003), which found no association between the economic level and CSD. This difference in 
results, compared with previous studies, may be due to the sample size or the difference in 
indicators used to measure the economic level. Williams (1999) used the dichotomous 
measure as developed and undeveloped economies. Chambers et al. (2003) examined the 
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economic level using two variables, economic performance (GDP per capita) and economic 
structure (the balance of economic sectors). With regard to hypothesis 5 that points to the 
positive impact of the economic level on the level of social responsibility disclosure in a 
given country, regression results tend to support this hypothesis. 
Corporate governance variables, contrary to expectation, are negatively associated with 
disclosure. These results provide evidence to support the general argument that the level of 
corporate governance in a country influences the level of social responsibility disclosure in 
that country, but this effect was the opposite of what was expected, as it is a negative impact. 
However, the association between corporate governance and disclosure is weak (coef. -
.0954789). The negative association between corporate governance and disclosure could be 
explained in the context of what Ho & Wong (2001) suggest that there are two competing 
viewpoints on the impact of corporate governance on corporate disclosure. One of these is 
that more governance mechanisms will improve internal control and consequently increase 
the level of disclosure, to reduce information asymmetry. The second is that additional 
governance mechanisms will lead to greater monitoring, and the need for disclosure as a form 
of monitoring, would then decrease. With regard to hypothesis 6 that indicates a positive 
association between corporate governance and social disclosure, regression results provide 
evidence to reject this hypothesis. 
Table 7.8 summarises the results of the hypotheses. Overall regression results provide 
evidence that both cultural values and the economic level are positively associated with the 
level of social responsibility disclosure in a given country, while there is a negative 
association between this disclosure and the level of corporate governance. These results 
therefore, provide evidence to support, to a large extent, the general hypothesis that the level 
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of social responsibility disclosure in a given country is determined according to the economic 
level, cultural values and the level of corporate governance.   
Table 7.8: The results of examining hypotheses 
hypotheses Expected 
relation 
Reported 
relation 
result 
1: the relation between economic level and CSD Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
2: the relation between individualism and CSD positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
3: the relation between masculinity and CSD positive No relation Reject 
hypothesis 
4: the relation between power distance and CSD negative No relation  Reject 
hypothesis 
5: the relation between uncertainty avoidance and 
CSD 
negative No relation Reject 
hypothesis 
6: the relation between level of corporate 
governance and CSD 
positive Negative Reject 
hypothesis 
 
4.3.2 More analysis: cross sectional regression results 
For further analysis of the regression model, the negative binomial regression test is 
conducted for each year. The following table presents the regression results for each year: 
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Table 7.9: cross-sectional Negative binomial regression results 
 Coef. P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Part 1: 2004    
UA .0054955 0.535 -.0118474    .0228383 
IND .0479828 0.000 .0249642    .0710014 
MASC .0085912 0.279 -.0069688    .0241512 
PD .0138533 0.298   -.0122312    .0399379 
GDPLOG 1.077772 0.016 .1981973    1.957347 
CG .0214216 0.959 -.796176    .8390192 
LR chi2(6)   50.77 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1183 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =  868.44 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
Part 2: 2005    
UA .0062767 0.443 -.0097647     .022318 
IND .0457484 0.000 .0247133    .0667836 
MASC .0078053 0.355 -.0087358    .0243464 
PD .019115 0.145 -.0065761    .0448062 
GDPLOG .735333 0.272 -.5763648    2.047031 
CG .30609 0.424 -.4438044    1.055985 
LR chi2(6)   45.87 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0985 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) = 1080.56 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
Part 3: 2006    
UA .0117531 0.227 -.0073187    .0308249 
IND .0481588   0.000 .0260042    .0703134 
MASC .0047956 0.578 -.0120839     .021675 
PD .0184122 0.170 -.0079088    .0447332 
GDPLOG 1.120346 0.046 .0220596    2.218632 
CG .0008706 0.998 -.6505927     .652334 
LR chi2(6)   43.58   
Prob > chi2 0.0000   
Pseudo R2 0.0912   
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) = 1433.09 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
Cross-sectional regression results are consistent, to a large extent, with pooled regression 
results. The consistent results over the three years show that from the cultural variables IND 
has a significant positive association with the level of social disclosure in a country, while 
other cultural variables (UA, PD, and MASC) have no association with the level of 
disclosure. With regard to the economic variables, it appears that GDPLOG has a positive 
association with disclosure in both 2004 and 2006, while there is no association between 
GDPLOG and SD in 2005. Consistent results over the three-year period indicate that 
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corporate governance variable (CG) has no significant association with social disclosure. The 
coefficients’ values reveal that the economic level has a stronger effect on disclosure. Cross-
sectional regression results seem to provide evidence to support hypotheses H1 and H5, 
similar to pooled regression results, and to reject other hypotheses. These results confirm the 
previous pooled regression results concerning both cultural variables and economic variables. 
4.3.3 Sensitivity analysis (different measures) 
Three sensitivity analyses are performed using different indicators for the variables in the 
model. (1) Using the total cultural score for each country as an alternative to using scores for 
each cultural dimension. Ndubizu & LeBow (2002) examined the country-level determinants 
of global financial analysts’ services, and found that they do not use a separate score for each 
element of cultural variables, because the analysis and interpretation of the results, using a 
composite measure, are more straightforward. The results show a positive association 
between GDPLOG and SD, and a negative association between CG and SD, which are 
consistent with reported regression results, while there is no significant association between 
total cultural score and SD, reflecting that social disclosure is associated with some cultural 
dimensions. (2) Using global competitive scores as an indicator for the economic level. The 
results show a positive association between IND and SD, and a negative association between 
CG and SD, which is consistent with reported regression results, while there is no association 
between the economic levels measured by the global competitiveness score and SD. (3) 
Using a dichotomous measure for developed and undeveloped economies as an indicator for 
the economic level. The results indicate that there is a positive association between 
individualism and the economic level and social disclosure, and a negative association 
between corporate governance and social disclosure. The positive association between the 
economic level measured by the dichotomous measure and CSD is consistent with the 
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general perspectives in previous literature, that CSD is a western phenomenon. In general, 
sensitivity analysis results are consistent, to a large extent, with reported regression results. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
This chapter examined a proposed model of determinants of social responsibility disclosure, 
at a country level. The model, based on political economy theory, depends on the idea that 
the level of social responsibility disclosure in a country is based on two dimensions: firstly, 
the degree of social pressure on companies with regard to their social responsibility, and this 
dimension can be determined according to both the economic level and the cultural values in 
a country; secondly, the degree to which companies will positively respond to this social 
pressure, and this dimension can be determined according to the level of corporate 
governance in a country. Empirical results do not support the model as a whole, as the results 
support the first dimension, while rejecting the second dimension. The regression results 
supported the association between both the economic level, and cultural dimensions and 
disclosure, while these results are the opposite of what is expected concerning the association 
between corporate governance and disclosure. This negative association between corporate 
governance and social responsibility disclosure could imply that there is no role for 
companies’ responses in determining the level of disclosure in a country. Thus, it can be 
argued that the level of social responsibility disclosure in a given country is determined 
according to the degree of social pressure on companies, with regard to their social 
responsibility. The degree of social pressure in a country will be determined according to the 
economic level and cultural values of the country.  
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As a conclusion to this chapter, a theoretical framework of determinants of social 
responsibility disclosure at a country level can be modified and presented in the following 
figure: 
Figure 7.4: modified theoretical model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical evidence provides an answer to a fundamental question in this chapter. What 
determines the level of social responsibility disclosure at a country level? The level of social 
responsibility disclosure at a country level is related to social pressure, which is determined 
according to the economic level and cultural values of the country. This raises an important 
question:  Is the level of social responsibility disclosure at a company level also related to the 
idea of social pressure and what determines this level of disclosure? This is the subject of the 
next chapter, which discuses determinants of social disclosure at a company level. 
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Chapter 8 
Determinants of CSD 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
The previous chapter explained that CSD in a given country is related to socio-economic 
factors in the country. These factors appear to determine the degree of social pressure in the 
country, with regard to CSR. In the context of the relationship between CSD and social 
pressure, two important questions are raised. Are all companies facing the same degree of 
social pressure, and do these companies respond to this pressure at the same level? It can be 
argued that an answer to the previous questions, determines the level of CSD in a company. 
To answer these questions, a theoretical framework has been developed based on legitimacy 
theory.    
This chapter makes use of statistical methods (correlation and regression) to examine the 
theoretical model of determinants of CSD at a company level. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explain the level of CSD in a given company, and the factors causing the differences in the 
level of social disclosure among different companies. The chapter addresses the following 
questions: What are the determinants of CSD in both annual and stand-alone reports? Are 
these determinants related to both quantity and quality of CSD? Can an accepted framework 
for CSD determinants be established? Is legitimacy theory providing an appropriate 
theoretical background to explain CSD? 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
It can be argued that determinants of CSD are those factors which are related to social 
pressure, and differentiation between two types of factors can be established: 
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Firstly, factors which can determine the degree of social pressure facing companies. These 
factors include corporate characteristics (size, industry and degree of multinationality), and 
media pressure. It can be argued that large industrial companies which have a high degree of 
multinational activities, and face wide media coverage, have the broader society’s attention 
and consequently face the highest degree of social pressure. Therefore, according to 
legitimacy theory, these companies are more likely to need to legitimise their activities to a 
greater extent, so a positive relationship between these factors and CSD is expected. 
Secondly, factors which can determine the degree of companies’ response to social pressure. 
These factors include corporate ownership and corporate governance. It can be argued that 
well-governed companies, with more dispersed ownership, tend to respond positively to 
social pressure and provide more disclosure. 
The following figure presents a suggested framework which will be subject to examination 
in this chapter: 
Figure 8.1: Theoretical framework of determinants at the company level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size Industry Multinationality 
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                                                                                                                    - 255 - 
         
According to the theoretical framework, the following two general hypotheses can be 
formulated: 
General hypothesis 1: Corporate characteristics and media pressure determine the level of 
social pressure that faces companies, and consequently they determine the level of CSD. 
General hypothesis 2: Corporate governance practices determine how companies respond 
to social pressure, and they determine the level of CSD. 
Through these general hypotheses, the following sub-hypotheses can be formulated: 
2.1 Corporate Characteristics  
Corporate characteristics are the predominant factors which are examined as determinants 
of corporate disclosure in accounting literature. These characteristics are: 
2.1.1 Corporate size 
Depoers (2000) explains the significant association between corporate size and voluntary 
disclosure, on the basis that larger companies that can afford increasing costs for voluntary 
disclosure, tend to employ highly skilled individuals and sophisticated management-reporting 
systems, and there may be greater demands on larger companies to provide information to 
analysts and the public. A positive association between corporate size and corporate 
disclosure is reported in some studies (Riahi-belkaoui, 2001; Ho & Taylor, 2007; Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999). 
Consistent with legitimacy theory, firm size is considered a determinant of CSD, as larger 
companies are more visible targets, facing potentially higher political costs, and having more 
investors and other stakeholders looking for information (Cormier et al., 2005:8; Cormier & 
Gordon, 2001: 589). Zhu et al. (2008) used survey data collected from 200 Chinese 
companies to indicate that larger companies have more resources than smaller companies and 
have more flexibility to devote resources to strategic supply-chain activities. Consequently, 
corporate size influences the adoption of green supply-chain management practices by 
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Chinese manufacturers. Previous studies showed consistent results that indicate a positive 
association between corporate size and CSD, but these results should be carefully considered, 
because the majority of these studies have concentrated on some sectors only, (often 
environmentally-sensitive industries) and have excluded financial companies. 
Consistent with legitimacy theory, the expected positive relationship between corporate size 
and CSD is dependent on the view that larger companies receive greater attention from 
society, and will consequently be subjected to more social pressure. Therefore, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1a: Large companies provide a greater quantity of social responsibility 
disclosure, than small companies.  
Hypothesis 1b: Large companies provide a higher quality of social disclosure, than small 
companies.  
2.1.2 Type of activity 
Husted & Allen (2007) argued that the industry environment has a large effect on corporate 
adaptation for social strategy. They indicated that one of the key indicators of managerial 
engagement in social strategy is how managers perceive the terrain of the competitive 
industry environment. Industries have different degrees of legitimacy, based on a variety of 
actions and consequences derived from the collective action of industry members. Industry-
level legitimacy is determined according to the degree in which the operations and business 
processes of companies in a given industry, and their products and services offered, are 
accepted as appropriate and useful by the broader public. For example, the oil industry’s 
reputation has been damaged by highly visible oil-spills and the chemical industry has been 
attacked in the past by environmental groups, which may have reduced its legitimacy. Many 
well-established industries have a high level of legitimacy, including sectors such as banking 
and medicine (Aerts & Cormier, 2006:10). Manufacturing companies rely on economies of 
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scale of production that may be achieved by close proximity to the marketplace, so they may 
be located in overseas markets. As a result, such companies are exposed to foreign 
regulations that may have a positive impact on disclosure (Camfferman & Cooke, 2002: 11). 
Consistent with legitimacy theory, the expected association between the type of activities 
and CSD, is dependent on the view that the type of companies’ activities, influences public 
expectations concerning the role of companies in society, and how these activities influence 
the environment and the community as a whole. In this regard, it can be argued that 
manufacturing companies receive greater attention from society, and will consequently be 
subjected to more social pressure. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be posited: 
Hypothesis 2a: Manufacturing companies provide a greater quantity of social responsibility 
disclosure, than non-manufacturing companies. 
Hypothesis 2b: Manufacturing companies provide a higher quality of disclosure, than non- 
manufacturing companies.  
2.1.3 Corporate profitability 
Profitability is considered a determinant of CSD on the basis that more profitable 
companies need to be seen as socially responsible (Cormier et al., 2005:8). Singhvi & Desai, 
(1971) argued that more profitable companies provide more extensive information, because it 
increases investors’ confidence which, in turn, increases management compensation (Singhvi 
& Desai, 1971, as cited in Ahmed & Courtis, 1999: 38).     
Ho & Taylor (2007) stated that theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship 
between corporate profitability and disclosure is mixed. On the one hand, it is argued that 
managers of more profitable companies are more likely to disclose, due to a signalling and/or 
adverse selection-incentive. On the other hand, managers are likely to have incentives to 
disclose unfavourable information, to reduce the likelihood of legal liability (Ho & Taylor, 
2007: 130-131).  
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Legitimacy theory implications do not refer to a potentially direct relationship between 
social disclosure and the financial position of a company. In addition, despite previous 
literature providing mixed results concerning the impact of corporate profitability on CSD, it 
tends to provide more support for a non-relationship between them. Given the mixed 
theoretical and empirical evidence, the following null hypotheses can be argued: 
Hypothesis 3a: corporate profitability has no impact on the quantity of CSD. 
Hypothesis 3b: corporate profitability has no impact on the quality of CSD. 
2.1.4 Multinationality  
The degree of multinational activities appears to influence both the expectations concerning 
CSR, and the level of corporate disclosure. Regarding the impact of multinationality on CSR, 
Newson & Deegan (2002) argued that, based on legitimacy theory, companies will respond to 
the expectations of relevant members of the public, and for multinational corporations, this 
response is not restricted to the home country, but rather to global orientation. In the 
multinational environment, companies are faced with a potentially divergent home-country, 
host-country situation, and international pressures that affect their self-regulation strategies 
(Muller, 2006:189). The international operations of a company have a substantial impact on 
the formulation and implementation of its business ethical principles, such as codes of 
conduct (Tulder & Kolk, 2001: 267). 
On the other hand,  Zarzeski (1996) argued that companies in the international marketplace 
provide higher levels of disclosure practices, than their domestic counterparts. Depoers 
(2000) argued that operating in a number of geographical areas, including other countries, 
increases the amount of information controlled by a company. Moreover, companies are 
induced to comply with the usual disclosure practices in countries in which they operate. 
Riahi-belkaoui (2001) stated that there are two reasons why a positive association between 
disclosure and multinationality might be expected: 
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· The capital-need hypothesis, which means that much of the impetus for voluntary 
disclosure by multinational companies is informed by the need to raise capital at the 
lowest possible cost. The pressure for information associated with global competition for 
capital, manifests itself in the supplementary voluntary disclosures that multinational 
companies have been making. 
· The multiple-listing hypothesis, which means that multinational companies are generally 
listed on more than one stock exchange. The companies with multiple listing are more 
likely to have a greater number of shareholders, which increases monitoring costs. One 
method of reducing shareholders’ monitoring costs, and alleviating a morally hazardous 
problem, is through disclosure in corporate annual reports. 
Previous research provides mixed results on the relationship between multinationality and 
disclosure. Webb et al. (2008) indicated a positive association between multinationality and 
disclosure, while Gelb et al. (2008) indicated a negative association between the two. 
Previous literature concerning CSD revealed little examination of the impact of 
multinationality on CSD, compared with other corporate characteristics. Toms et al. (2007) 
and Toms (2008) found no relationship between the number of foreign countries and CSD.  
Branco & Rodrigues (2008) found no relationship between the ratio of foreign sales and 
CSD, while Stanny & Ely (2008) found an association between them.  
In the context of the impact of multinationality on CSD, it can be argued that due to their 
geographical extension, multinational companies are more likely to face greater social 
pressure. This geographical extension creates more pressure from host societies on 
multinational companies, with regard to their social responsibilities, and the more foreign 
countries in which the company operates, the more pressure there is on the company. 
Consequently, the company could increase the level of CSD as a tool to face this pressure, 
and legitimise its activities, so the following hypotheses will thus be examined: 
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Hypothesis 4a: Companies with more multinational activities will provide a greater quantity 
of CSD. 
Hypothesis 4b: Companies with more multinational activities will provide a high quality of 
CSD. 
2.2 Media Pressure 
Brown & Deegan (1998) extend legitimacy theory by examining the role of media coverage 
in increasing the public-policy pressure faced by companies. They provide evidence that a 
higher level of print-media coverage of environmental issues, increases public-policy 
pressure by driving public concerns, which in turn leads to greater environmental disclosure. 
It is assumed that the media is able to change people’s perceptions of some issues. There 
are some studies which show that the media is able to influence people’s perceptions 
concerning corporate reputation. Hence, Hooghiemstra (2000) argued that management will 
use annual reports to counteract negative media-coverage. 
As noted before, legitimacy theory indicates that differences in social disclosure are a 
systematic function of differences in public-policy pressures, and these pressures can arise 
from cultural, political or legal environments (Walden & Schwartz, 1997:127), while media-
pressure arguments could be seen as having an influence on the cultural environment (Patten, 
2002 a:158).  
It can be argued that more attention from the media on companies, leads to more attention 
from society and consequently, more social pressure. Therefore, the following hypotheses can 
be formulated: 
Hypothesis 5a: Companies with more media attention provide a greater quantity of CSD, 
than those with less media attention.   
Hypothesis 5b: Companies with more media attention provide a higher quality of CSD, than 
those with less media attention.  
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2.3 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance mechanisms affect the information disclosed by the company to its 
shareholders (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007: 498). Corporate governance practices are basically 
explained through agency theory. Hill & Jones (1992) state that agency-theory considerations 
are applied not only to shareholders, but also to all stakeholders (a stakeholder agency-
theory). It can be argued that corporate governance mechanisms will define how companies 
respond to societal pressure concerning their social and environmental responsibilities, and 
consequently the level of use of CSD, as a tool to face this pressure. The corporate 
governance mechanisms are involved in determining and monitoring corporate-disclosure 
policy (Kelton & Yang, 2008: 66), and corporate board characteristics are considered 
important determinants of corporate governance (Bahgat & Bolton, 2008: 258). Halme & 
Huse (1997) argued that the role of the board may be linked to the companies’ environmental 
attentions; the environmental groups and corporate activists may ask the board of directors to 
make their companies behave in a socially acceptable manner, so a board could operate as a 
sort of “superego” for their companies (Halme & Huse, 1997: 142). The board of directors 
may lead to greater monitoring and consequently to a high level of CSD, and the degree to 
which the board will affect CSD, may also depend on the characteristics of this corporate 
governance mechanism.  
2.3.1 Board size 
There is a theoretical debate surrounding the size of a board of directors. While some 
researchers argue that a larger board promotes more effective decision-making and enhances 
information-processing capabilities, others argue that a larger board leads to less participation 
among members, and increases the opportunity for manipulation on the part of corporate 
management (Ho & Williams, 2003: 475). While the board’s monitoring capacities increase 
as the board size (number of members on the board) increases, the incremental costs of 
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poorer communications, that are often associated with large groups, may offset this benefit 
(John & Senbet, 1998). In addition, there is no consistent evidence to suggest a relationship 
between corporate size and voluntary disclosure (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Cheng & 
Courtenay (2006) found that there is no empirical association between board size and 
voluntary disclosure.  
In the context of the expected impact of board size on CSD, Halme & Huse (1997) argued 
that in a large board, there is a higher probability of a broader range of stakeholders, which 
indicates that a higher level of environmental attention can be expected (Halme & Huse, 
1997: 142). Consistent with this view, it can be argued that increasing the number of directors 
on the board could provide better communication with the community, and consequently 
more probability that companies will react positively to social pressure. Given this theoretical 
and empirical debate, the following hypotheses will be examined: 
Hypothesis 6a: Companies with more directors on the board provide a greater quantity of 
CSD. 
Hypothesis 6b: Companies with more directors on the board provide a higher quality of CSD. 
2.3.2 Board composition: non-executive directors 
Barako et al. (2006) argue that non-executive directors are considered a governance 
mechanism that enhances the board’s capacity to ameliorate agency-conflicts between owners 
and managers. These conflicts may occur in the decision to voluntarily disclose information 
in annual reports (Barako et al., 2006: 111). Chen (2006) indicates that in the US, non-
executive directors are shown to play a more important role in monitoring managers, than 
executive board directors (Chen, 2006: 290). In addition to monitoring the quality of financial 
information, non-executive directors can play an important role in determining and 
monitoring voluntary corporate disclosure (Ajinkya et al., 2005: 344). Anderson & Reeb 
(2004) argued that independent directors can defend the minority shareholders by protecting 
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their rights against large-shareholders’ opportunism; independent directors play an important 
role in balancing the interests of competing shareholders and act as an influential governance 
mechanism in protecting outside shareholders from large shareholders’ expropriation 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004: 2). 
The role of non-executive directors in improved monitoring of corporate boards, suggests 
that a corporate board will become more responsive to investors, and that inclusion of non-
executive directors will improve the company’s compliance with the disclosure requirements, 
which in turn will improve the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosure (Chen & Jaggi, 
2000: 286).  
Previous research provides mixed evidence on the relationship between disclosure and the 
independence of the board of directors. For example, Beasley (1996), Chen & Jaggi (2000) 
and Xiao et al. (2004) find a positive association between disclosure and the independence of 
the board, while Eng & Mak (2003) and Gul & Leung (2004) find a negative relationship. 
It can be argued that the presence of non-executive directors on the board is a tool to link 
the company with various stakeholders and the community as a whole, and therefore they 
represent one of the factors that drive the company to deal with the community’s concerns 
regarding social responsibility. Rose (2007) posited that new regulations, requiring more 
independent directors, are a major step in improving corporate ethics and social responsibility 
(Rose, 2007: 321). Thus, the increasing percentage of non-executives directors on the board 
will encourage companies to react positively to social pressure, and consequently to increase 
the level of CSD. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be formulated:  
Hypothesis 7a: the quantity of CSD is positively related to the number of non-executive 
directors on the board.  
Hypothesis 7b: the quality of CSD is positively related to the number of non-executive 
directors on the board. 
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2.3.3 The presence of the corporate responsibility committee  
The existence of the corporate responsibility committee as a board committee is, in itself, a 
sign of the company’s interest in social responsibility. This committee reflects the company’s 
desire to perform its activities in line with social-responsibility guidelines and rules. It can be 
argued that the presence of the corporate responsibility committee, as one of the board 
committees, is one of the factors that may drive companies to react positively to social 
pressure concerning the company’s social responsibility and, consequently, to increase the 
level of CSD.  
Hypothesis 8a: The quantity of CSD is positively related to the presence of the corporate 
responsibility committee as one of the board committees. 
Hypothesis 8b: The quality of CSD is positively related to the presence of the corporate 
responsibility committee as one of the board committees. 
2.3.4 Corporate ownership 
Agency theory would argue that ownership-diffusion is positively related to corporate 
disclosure. The more diffuse the ownership, the more there is corporate disclosure because 
this helps owners to monitor the behaviour of management. When ownership is less diffuse, 
less monitoring is required. A negative relationship between block ownership and disclosure 
is reported in previous research (Mitchell et al., 1995; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998; Kelton & 
Yang, 2008). This implies that a greater percentage of substantial shareholder-ownership, 
leads to less need for monitoring and transparent disclosure. Reverte (2009) argues that 
companies with widely-held shares are more likely to improve their financial reporting policy 
by using their CSR disclosure; on the other hand, companies with concentrated ownership are 
less motivated to disclose additional information on their CSR. It can be argued that more 
ownership-diffusion encourages management to react positively to social pressure, by 
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increasing the level of CSD to acquire owners’ satisfaction, and consequently the negative 
association between CSD and block ownership. 
Hypothesis 9a: The quantity of CSD is negatively associated with block ownership 
Hypothesis 9b: The quality of CSD is negatively associated with block ownership 
 
3. METHOD  
3.1 The Sample  
To examine a suggested model for determinants of CSD, UK companies were chosen, as 
they provide a high level of CSD and consequently more confidence in the results can be 
anticipated. In the UK, the FTSE all-share index represents 98% of the UK’s market 
capitalisation, with a combined value of approximately £1.28 trillion. The FTSE all-share 
index is considered to be the best performance measure of the overall London equity market.  
The FTSE all-share index also accounts for 8.11% of the world’s equity market 
capitalisation38. The FTSE all-share is the aggregation of the FTSE 100 index, FTSE 250 
index and the FTSE small-cap index. The sample contains both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
companies over a period of two years, 2005 and 2006. The FTSE 100 index lists the largest 
100 companies, and represents about 81% of the market capitalisation of the entire London 
stock exchange. The FTSE 250 index represents about 13% of the FTSE 100 index. Due to 
problems in obtaining annual reports from some companies, the final number of companies is 
317 in 2005 and 327 in 2006. FTSE companies provide clear corporate characteristics and 
more probability of applying good governance practices. They also tend to be the subject of 
high levels of media coverage. All economic sectors were included in the sample, as the 
study is related to CSD, not only environmental disclosure, and to overcome the limitations 
                                                
38 FTSE the index company, www.ftse.co.uk 
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of the majority of previous studies which have been restricted to only some economic sectors. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the results from such a sample are more general.  
3.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is the level of CSD. There are six different dependent variables 
which represent the quantity and quality of CSD in both annual and stand-alone reports. The 
quantity of social disclosure in annual reports (CSDars) is measured by the number of 
sentences. The quality of social disclosure in annual reports (CSDarq) will be measured 
according to a two-point ranking system with value 1, for quantity and specific disclosure, 
and value 0, for general disclosure. The quantity of a stand-alone report (CSDsa) is measured 
by the number of report pages. The quality of a stand-alone report (CSDsaq) will be 
measured as a two-point dummy variable, according to which a report is audited, or not, and 
prepared using reporting guidelines, or not. The total quantity of social disclosure in both 
annual and stand-alone reports (CSDT) is measured as the total number of social disclosure 
pages in both annual and stand-alone reports. The total quality of social disclosure in both 
annual and stand-alone reports (CSDTQ) is measured as the total quality score of both annual 
and stand-alone reports. The measurement of CSD was discussed in detail in the 
methodology chapter. 
3.2.1 Validity of disclosure measurement 
The reliability of disclosure measurement was measured in two stages. Firstly, inter-coder 
reliability was measured in a pilot study (as discussed in the methodology chapter). A second 
stage examined the validity of disclosure measurement. The categories of CSD index, i.e. 
environment (env), community (com), employees (emp), product (pro), customer (cus), 
ethical (eth) and other (oth) are examined for internal consistency, using Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha to assess the internal consistency of disclosure. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
takes on a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of one, and in a general, an alpha of 
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0.7 or more is acceptable. The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for the seven categories in the 
disclosure index is 0.71 and 0.69 in 2005 and 2006 respectively. This result is considered 
acceptable, compared with alpha 0.64 in Botosan (1997), and 0.51 in Gul & Leung (2004). In 
addition, a correlation analysis among broad categories is performed; the correlation 
coefficients between disclosure categories (Table 8.1) show that the categories of CSD are 
correlated. In addition, the correlation between the total disclosure for the same companies 
(292 companies) in 2005 and 2006 was examined, and the result shows a high, significant 
correlation between the levels of disclosure in the two-year period (β .798 and Sig .000). 
Previous research concerning social disclosure (and voluntary disclosure in general) has 
reported consistent relationships between the level of disclosure and corporate characteristics, 
so the correlation analysis was performed between disclosure level and corporate 
characteristics (as followed by Cheng & Courtenay (2006); Gul & Leung (2004)). The results 
show that the quantity of disclosure is correlated with corporate size and type of activities (β 
.379, .279, and Sig .000, .000), and the same applies to 2006 (.459, .254, and Sig .000, .000). 
Table 8.1: The correlation results between CSD categories 
Part 1:2005 Env. Com. Emp. Pro. Cus. Eth. Oth. Part 2:2006 
 
Env. Com. Emp. Pro. Cus. Eth. Oth. 
Env. 1 .415 
.000 
.507 
.000 
.267 
.000 
.034 
.552 
.282 
.000 
 
.312 
.000 
Env. 1 .357 
.000 
.440 
.000 
.334 
.000 
.053 
.335 
.306 
.000 
.233 
.000 
Com.  1 .376 
.000 
.190 
.001 
.137 
.015 
.182 
.001 
 
.294 
.000 
Com.  1 .287 
.000 
.084 
.128 
.114 
.038 
.137 
.013 
.351 
.000 
Emp.   1 .297 
.000 
.353 
.000 
.344 
.000 
 
.393 
.000 
Emp.   1 .278 
.000. 
.321 
.000 
.309 
.000 
.364 
.000 
Pro.    1 .042 
.455 
.403 
.000 
 
.202 
.000 
Pro.    1 .099 
.073 
.232 
.000 
.136 
.013 
Cus.     1 .138 
.014 
 
.166 
.003 
Cus.     1 .045 
.415 
.217 
.000 
Eth.      1 .264 
.000 
 
Eth.      1 .207 
000 
Oth.       1 Oth.       1 
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3.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables are divided into three groups: corporate characteristics, media 
pressure and corporate governance and ownership. Corporate characteristics variables are 
corporate size, type of activities, profitability and multinationality. Regarding corporate size, 
previous literature presents various indicators for its measurement, without theoretical 
justification for choosing one of them. In the context of CSD, employees are considered 
important stakeholders and employee information considered an important category of the 
CSD categories, so it appears that the number of employees is considered an appropriate 
indicator. Therefore, corporate size is measured by the logarithm of total number of 
employees. Total assets will also be used as an alternative measure for corporate size. With 
regard to the type of activity, previous studies used a dummy variable which differentiated 
between high and low environmental profiles. This measure is considered more convenient in 
the context of environmental disclosure. In the context of CSD, it appears that differentiation 
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies is more convenient. Therefore, 
type of activity is measured as a dummy variable with value 1, if the company is a 
manufacturing company and 0, otherwise. Corporate profitability is measured by the ratio of 
return on assets (net profit/total assets). The degree of the multinationality variable is 
measured by two alternative measures: the ratio of foreign sales to total sales, and the number 
of foreign countries in which the company has subsidiaries, so as to examine the impact of 
each indicator on CSD. 
Media pressure is measured by the number of annual news items related to the social 
responsibility of the company during the previous five years, from the Factiva database. In 
addition to normal printed media news, there is a growing trend toward using online news39. 
The concept of media pressure can thus be extended to contain online news related to the 
                                                
39 The percentage of internet usage in the world population in 2008 is 21.9%, which represents an increase in 
internet usage of 305.5% from the year 2000. In the UK, the percentage of internet usage in 2008 is 68.6%. 
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company. The media pressure in previous literature is extended by using two alternative 
variables: 
· MPpn: the number of news items related to the company from the Factiva database, based 
on previous literature 
· MPin: the number of online news items related to the company from a Google news 
search. 
Corporate governance variables are: board size, which will be measured by the total number 
of directors on the board, the existence of a corporate responsibility committee as a board 
committee, which is measured as a dummy variable with value 1, if there is a committee, and 
value 0, otherwise, and the independence of this committee, which will be measured as the 
proportion of non-executive directors on this committee. With regard to non-executive 
directors, there is a difference between independent non-executive directors and non-
independent non-executive directors, so this variable will be divided into two variables: 
· Non-executive directors (NED), measured by two alternative indicators: the proportion 
and the number of non-executive directors on the board, to examine the impact of each 
indicator on CSD 
· b- Independent non-executive directors (INED), measured by two alternative indicators: 
the proportion and the number of independent non-executive directors on the board, to 
examine the impact of each indicator on CSD. 
The corporate ownership variable is block ownership, which is measured by the percentage 
of shares held by substantial shareholders (shareholders with ownership of 3% or more in 
company shares).  
3.4 Specific Model 
The following figure presents the determinants model: 
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Figure 8.2: The determinants model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To examine the ability of the theoretical model in explaining the level of CSD, the 
following regression model is used: 
Dependent variable = ß0 + ß1 CSnoe + ß2 PRO + ß3 TA + ß4 DMAfc + β5 BS+ ß6 NEDp + ß7 CRC + 
ß8 SS + ß9 MPpn + ε 
There are six different dependent variables representing various measures of CSD. With 
regard to independent variables, the following table explains the measurement of variables 
and data sources:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate characteristics 
Corporate size (CSta) 
Type of activity (TA) 
Degree of multinational activities 
(DMAfc) 
Corporate governance 
Board size (BS) 
Non-executive directors (NED) 
Corporate responsibility committee 
(CRC) 
Media pressure (MP) 
The level of 
corporate 
social 
responsibility 
disclosure 
(CSD) 
Corporate ownership 
Substantial shareholders (SS) 
                                                                                                                    - 271 - 
         
Table 8.2: The measurement of independent variables 
Variables Description Measurement Data 
source 
CSnoe Corporate size 
 
Log. Number of employees   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
reports 
PRO Corporate profitability 
 
Return on assets 
TA Type of activities Dichotomous classification with value 1, if 
manufacturing companies, and 0, if otherwise 
DMAfc Degree of multinational activities Number of foreign countries in which the 
companies have subsidiaries 
 
BS Board size 
 
Number of directors on the board 
NEDp Non-executive directors Proportion of non-executive directors (as a 
whole) on the board 
 
CRC The presence of corporate 
responsibility committee as a 
board committee 
1, if the company has a corporate responsibility 
committee as one of the board committees, 
and 0, otherwise 
 
SS Ownership-diffusion (substantial 
shareholders) 
Ratio of shares owned by substantial 
shareholders40 
 
MPpn Media pressure (printed news) The number of annual news items related to 
the social responsibility for the company during 
the last five years 
 
Factiva 
database 
 
4. RESULTS  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for CSD was discussed in detail in chapter 5. With regard to 
independent variables, Table 8.3 provides descriptive statistics for these variables and 
alternative measures for some variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 Substantial shareholders are shareholders who hold 3% or more company shares.  
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Table 8.3: Descriptive statistics  
 N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Part 1:2005        
PRO 316 0 1 .07 .087 2.631 14.489 
ASSETS 291 0.1772 924170 1.63E4 82767.947 8.504 79.750 
EMPLOY 205 15 410074 1.87E4 42400.240 5.449 40.253 
DMA 301 0 1 .42 .351 .108 -1.477 
DMAfc 296 0 61 6.81 9.046 2.465 8.378 
NEDn 314 0 15 5.96 2.022 .689 1.548 
INEDn 309 0 15 4.89 1.799 .915 3.315 
BS 314 5 20 9.58 2.615 .809 .974 
NEDp 314 0 1 .62 .147 -.147 2.684 
INEDp 314 0 1 .50 .164 .142 3.130 
CRCI 310 0 1 .08 .242 2.887 7.023 
SS 307 3.1 92 31.21 18.094 .664 .139 
II 78 41.00 99.69 88.1141 12.73300 -2.191 4.647 
MP 289 0 140 6.43 17.409 4.636 25.336 
MPI 
 
317 .00 156.00 4.6782 15.49430 6.287 47.142 
Frequency  TA RD ACI CRC    
0 201 (63.4%) 304(95.9%) 6(1.9%) 271(85.8%)    
1 
 
116(36.6%) 13(4.1%) 309(98.1%) 45(14.2%)    
Part 2:2006        
PRO 326 0 1 .09 .090 2.407 9.593 
ASSETS 310 0.8407 996503 1.86E4 89209.654 8.385 78.921 
EMPLOY 220 5 406924 1.86E4 41898.131 5.381 39.777 
DMA 308 0 1 .40 .352 .169 -1.528 
DMAfc 302 0 61 6.66 9.024 2.441 8.445 
NEDn 324 0 15 6.02 1.974 .852 1.817 
INEDn 313 0 15 4.95 1.788 .924 3.372 
BS 324 3 18 9.53 2.667 .620 .188 
NEDp 324 0 1 .64 .144 .196 1.990 
INEDp 324 0 1 .51 .181 -.141 2.384 
CRCI 320 .00 1.00 .0943 .25436 2.605 5.438 
SS 318 3.35 92 32.44 17.942 .614 .155 
II 326 .00 1.00 .2166 .38450 1.270 -.301 
MP 304 0 172 7.63 21.131 4.755 26.813 
MPI 
 
327 .00 188.00 5.1193 17.57459 6.935 58.100 
Frequency  TA RD ACI CRC    
0 207(63.5%) 313(96.3%) 3(.9%) 270(83.6%)    
1 119(36.5) 12(3.7%) 319(99.1%) 53(16.4%)    
 
With regard to corporate characteristics, it appears that the majority of companies in the 
sample are non-manufacturing companies, as 201 (63.4%) and 207 (63.5%) companies are 
non-manufacturing companies in 2005 and 2006 respectively, while 116 (36.6%) and 119 
(36.5%) companies are manufacturing companies in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Corporate 
size was measured by two indicators: the average number of employees is 18 685.95 and 18 
636.99 in 2005 and 2006 respectively, reflecting the large size of companies in the sample in 
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general. The average total assets in 2005 are 16293.98 and 18628 in 2006. With regard to the 
degree of multinationality, the average percentage of foreign sales is 0.42 in 2005 and 0.40 in 
2006. Comparing this average with the average 0.23 in Stanny & Ely (2008) for a sample of 
500 S&P, reflects a high percentage of multinational activities in the sample. The average 
number of foreign countries is 6.81 and 6.66 in 2005 and 2006 respectively, compared with 
the average number of foreign countries of 17.85 in Toms et al. (2007) and Toms (2008). 
This difference in results may be due to the sample of Toms et al. (2007) and Toms (2008) 
being focused on multinational companies in some industries. The analysis of these averages 
according to the type of activity (not reported), shows that the average foreign sales is 0.36 
and 0.33 in non-manufacturing companies, compared with 0.53 and 0.52 in manufacturing 
companies in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The average number of foreign countries is 5.46 
and 5.32 in non-manufacturing companies and 9.18 and 9.10 in manufacturing companies in 
2005 and 2006 respectively. These figures refer to the clear difference in the degree of 
multinational activities between manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies in the 
sample.  
Concerning corporate governance variables, the results show that the companies follow 
good corporate governance mechanisms, such as a high percentage of non-executive directors 
and independent non-executive directors on the board, separation of the role of chairman and 
CEO, and independence of the audit committee. The range of board size is between 5 and 20 
in 2005 and between 3 and 18 in 2006, with about the same average of board size, 9.58 and 
9.53 in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Comparing this average with what has been found in 
other studies, 7.7 in Singapore (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006), 7.099 in South Africa (Mangena 
& Chamisa, 2008), 10.34 in the USA (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007) and 9.46 in India (Sarkar & 
Sarkar, 2008), may reflect that board size in the sample is considered large. This average of 
board size (9.5) is similar to that found in a PIRC (Pensions and Investment Research 
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Consultants) survey regarding non-executive directors in FTSE 350 companies (1998), 9.8 
directors per board. These similar results reflect that large board size has been traditional 
practice in UK companies, over time. The average percentage of non-executive directors 
(NEDp) is 0.62 in 2005, increasing to 0.64 in 2006, and the percentage of independent non-
executive directors (INED) is 0.50 in 2005, increasing to 0.51 in 2006, indicating that more 
than 60% of the directors on the board are non-executive directors, and more than half of the 
directors are independent. The average of NEDp is considered a high percentage compared 
with 0.72 in the USA (Kelton & Yang, 2008), 0.06 in Hong Kong (Gul & Leung, 2004), 0.37 
in Singapore (Cheng & Courtenay, 2004), 0.413 in South Africa (Mangena & Chamisa, 
2008), 0.36 in Spain (Arcay & Vazquz, 2005), 0.74 in India (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2008) and 0.31 
in a sample of some European countries (Krivogorsky, 2006). The average independent non-
executive directors (INED) is considered moderate, compared with an average of 0.65 and 
0.64 in the USA (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007, and Byard et al., 2006 respectively), and 0.54 in 
India (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2008). As regards the number of non-executive directors and 
independent non-executive directors, the average number of non-executive directors is 5.96 
in 2005, increasing to 6.02 in 2006, and the average number of independent non-executive 
directors is 4.89 in 2005, increasing to 4.95 in 2006, which is similar to the average number 
indicated in Brammer & Pavelin (2006), at 4.40. This result is compared with what has been 
found in the PIRC (1998) survey: the number of non-executive directors has increased over a 
four-year period from 4.83 to 5.13, reflecting the increase in the number of non-executive 
directors in UK companies, over time. With regard to the corporate responsibility committee, 
the majority of companies (271 and 270 in 2005 and 2006 respectively) do not have a CRC as 
a board committee. The average percentage of shares held by major shareholders in 2005 is 
31.21%, and 32.44% in 2006. Only 13 companies (4.1%) in 2005 and 12 companies (3.7%) 
in 2006 have the same person as a chairman and CEO, compared with 59% from the sample 
                                                                                                                    - 275 - 
         
of Kelton & Yang (2008) in the USA, 54% in Hong Kong (Gul & Leung, 2004), 59% in 
Spain (Arcay & Vazquz) and 50% in the study by Krivogorsky (2006). In the PIRC (1998) 
survey, the proportion of companies with combined chairman and chief executive had fallen 
from 17.8% in 1993 to 11.2% in 1996, and it seems to fall again to 3.7% in 2006, reflecting 
continuous improvement in this governance practice. There are also only six companies 
(1.9%) in 2005 and three companies (0.9%) in 2006, which do not have an independent audit 
committee41.  
4.2 Correlation Results 
To examine the level of association between independent variables and each dependent 
variable, the correlation test is performed. Table 8.4 provides correlation results for 2005 and 
2006.  
Table 8.4: Correlations results  
Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarq CSDsa CSDsaq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 
 
2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
PRO -.053 
.347 
-.093 
.094 
-.054 
.345 
-.128* 
.022 
-.030 
.603 
-.103 
.070 
-.034 
.560 
.003 
.963 
-.023 
.683 
-.105 
.058 
-.039 
.494 
-.018 
.745 
CSnoe .358** 
.000 
.408** 
.000 
.246** 
.000 
.325** 
.000 
.343** 
.000 
.277** 
.000 
.303** 
.000 
.336** 
.000 
.368** 
.000 
.316** 
.000 
.336** 
.000 
.382** 
.000 
TA .279** 
.000 
.254** 
.000 
.045 
.429 
.145** 
.009 
.100 
.085 
.091 
.110 
.152** 
.009 
.138* 
.015 
.133* 
.019 
.140* 
.011 
.158** 
.005 
.170** 
.002 
DMAfc .241** 
.000 
.205** 
.000 
.021 
.715 
.092 
.113 
.235** 
.000 
.054 
.364 
.110 
.067 
.173** 
.003 
.231** 
.000 
.070 
.225 
.098 
.094 
.169** 
.003 
BS .350** 
.000 
.359** 
.000 
.181** 
.001 
.262** 
.000 
.324** 
.000 
.333** 
.000 
.357** 
.000 
.417** 
.000 
.340** 
.000 
.366** 
.000 
.367** 
.000 
.446** 
.000 
NEDp .009 
.878 
-.041 
.458 
-.044 
.446 
-.047 
.405 
.024 
.681 
.011 
.849 
.082 
.164 
.066 
.249 
.030 
.597 
-.002 
.966 
.064 
.261 
.065 
.250 
CRC .269** 
.000 
.290** 
.000 
.075 
.186 
.131* 
.020 
.257** 
.000 
.293** 
.000 
.271** 
.000 
.316** 
.000 
.276** 
.000 
.322** 
.000 
.265** 
.000 
.321** 
.000 
SS -.196** 
.001 
-.175** 
.002 
-.163** 
.005 
-.162** 
.004 
-.186** 
.002 
-.327** 
.000 
-.224** 
.000 
-.329** 
.000 
-.202** 
.000 
-.332** 
.000 
-.252** 
.000 
-.346** 
.000 
MP .015 
.792 
.366** 
.000 
.000 
.997 
.225** 
.000 
.145* 
.013 
.347** 
.000 
.021 
.720 
.438** 
.000 
.145* 
.011 
.374** 
.000 
.021 
.707 
.458** 
.000 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Generally, the results are consistent, to a large extent, between the two years and consistent 
with the hypothesis. The results show that corporate profitability is not correlated, as 
                                                
41 These descriptive results, concerning both role-duality and audit committee-independence, indicate that these 
variables are the same for all companies in the sample, so these variables were excluded from the empirical 
model. 
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expected, with CSD, while other corporate characteristics variables, the corporate ownership 
variable, and the media pressure variable are correlated with CSD. In addition, corporate 
governance variables are correlated with CSD, with the exception of the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board. 
Regarding corporate characteristics variables (PRO, CSnoe, TA and DMAfc), the results, in 
general, show that corporate characteristics variables are significantly correlated with social 
disclosure, with the exception of corporate profitability, which appears not to be correlated 
with disclosure. This result is largely consistent with previous literature which indicates, in 
most cases, a significant correlation between both corporate size and type of activity, and 
disclosure, while there is no correlation between corporate profitability and disclosure. With 
regard to corporate profitability (PRO), consistent results in 2005 and 2006 show that PRO is 
not correlated with the level of social disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports. This 
result is consistent with Hackston & Milne (1996), who used four different measures for 
corporate profitability and found that none of these four profitability measures is significantly 
correlated with the amount of disclosure. Corporate size (CSnoe) appears to be highly 
correlated with quantity and quality of social disclosure in both annual and stand-alone 
reports. The result is consistent with the results of Hackston & Milne (1996), who used three 
different measures for corporate size, and found that all size measures were highly correlated 
with the amount of social disclosure, and consistent with Parsa & Kouhy (2008), who used 
three different measures of size and found a significant correlation between two measures of 
size and social disclosure. Type of activity (TA) appears to be less correlated with social 
disclosure. It appears to be correlated with quantity of disclosure in annual reports (CSDars) 
and not correlated with quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports (CSDsa). On the other 
hand, it appears not to be correlated with quality of disclosure in annual reports (CSDarq) and 
correlates with quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports. These results show that type of 
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activity is more correlated with social disclosure in annual reports, than in stand-alone 
reports, and on the other hand, it appears to be more correlated with quality of disclosure, 
than quantity of disclosure. Concerning the degree of multinationality (DMAfc), the results 
appear not to be consistent between the two years. It appears that DMAfc is correlated with 
CSDars, and weakly correlated with CSDsa. These results show that DMAfc is more 
correlated with social disclosure in annual reports, than stand-alone reports, and more 
correlated with quantity of disclosure, than the quality thereof. 
Concerning corporate governance variables (BS, NEDp and CRC), the results tend to be 
consistent over the two years and indicate that both board size (BS) and presence of corporate 
responsibility committee (CRC) are significantly correlated with the level of social 
disclosure, while the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDp) is not correlated with 
CSD. These results show that social disclosure is correlated with some governance 
mechanisms, in particular those mechanisms that do not fall within the governance 
guidelines, such as the corporate governance code. In addition, consistent results concerning 
the corporate ownership variable (SS) appears to be negatively, as expected, correlated with 
the level of social disclosure. The negative correlation between SS and disclosure indicates 
that the greater dispersion of corporate ownership is related to a higher quantity of disclosure. 
The results concerning media pressure (MP) are not consistent between the two years, and 
it tends to improve in 2006, and become significantly correlated with disclosure. These 
results reflect the lack of a clear relationship between media pressure and CSD, and are 
consistent with Brown & Deegan, 1998, who found a significant correlation between print 
media and environmental disclosure in annual reports among some industries, and no 
correlation in others.  
These correlation results can be viewed from the perspective of dependent variables. 
Regarding the quantity of social disclosure in annual reports (CSDars), the consistent results 
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in 2005 and 2006 show that variables, CSnoe, TA, DMAfc, BS, CRC and SS are significantly 
correlated with disclosure, while both PRO and NEDp are not correlated with disclosure. The 
results concerning media pressure (MP) are not consistent between the two years. In 2005 
MP is not correlated with CSDars, while it is significantly correlated with CSDars in 2006. 
These results are largely consistent with previous literature which focused mostly on the 
analysis of social disclosure in annual reports, and in particular, the analysis of quantity of 
disclosure, and indicate in general, correlation between both corporate characteristics 
variables and media pressure, with disclosure. Corporate governance and ownership 
variables, which did not receive the same attention in previous literature, seem to be 
correlated with disclosure, with the exception of NEDp. The values of correlation coefficients 
show that corporate size (CSnoe) has stronger correlation with disclosure (coef. .358 and .408 in 
2005 and 2006 respectively). With regard to the quality of social disclosure in annual reports 
(CSDarq), consistent results over the two-year period reveal a significant correlation between 
CSnoe, BS, and SS and CSDarq, while there is no correlation between both DMAfc and 
NEDp, and CSDarq. A weak negative correlation between profitability and CSDarq in 2006 
(coef. -.128 and sig .022), supports the assumption that there is no association between social 
disclosure and the financial condition of a company. Inconsistent results between the two 
years also indicate a weak correlation between TA, CRC, and MP and CSDarq. Corporate 
size has a stronger correlation with CSDarq (coef. .246 and .325 in 2005 and 2006 respectively) 
reflecting a high association between corporate size and the level of CSD in annual reports.  
Concerning the quantity of social disclosure in stand-alone reports (CSDsa), consistent 
results in 2005 and 2006 show that variables CSnoe, BS, CRC, SS and MP are significantly 
correlated with CSDsa, while variables PRO, TA and NEDp are not correlated with CSDsa. 
The results concerning the degree of multinational activities are not consistent between the 
two years, revealing a significant correlation with disclosure in 2005, and no correlation in 
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2006. These results indicate that the type of activity does not affect the quantity of social 
disclosure in stand-alone reports, contrary to the significant correlation found with the 
quantity of disclosure in annual reports. It also appears that the correlation between 
multinationality and quantity of disclosure in annual reports is clearer than the correlation 
between multinationality and quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports; by contrast, the 
correlation between media pressure and quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports is clearer 
than the correlation between media pressure and quantity of disclosure in annual reports. 
With regard to quality of social disclosure in stand-alone reports, consistent results in 2005 
and 2006 show significant correlation between variables CSnoe, TA, BS,CRC, and SS and 
CSDsaq, while there is no correlation between PRO and NEDp, and CSDsaq. The results 
concerning both DMAfc and MP are not consistent between the two years, reflecting weak 
correlation between them and CSDsaq.  
With regard to the total quantity of disclosure CSDT, consistent results in 2005 and 2006 
reveal significant correlation between variables CSnoe, TA, BS, CRC, SS, and MP and 
CSDT, while there is no correlation between variables PRO and NEDp, and CSDT. In 
addition, a weak correlation between DMAfc and CSDT was found. Similar results were 
found concerning CSDTQ.  
4.2.1 Non-parametric tests  
In addition to Pearson correlations, two-tailed t-tests for independent samples were 
performed to analyse the relationship between some independent variables (TA, DMAfc, BS, 
CRC and MP) and various dependent variables. 
In order to statistically test whether companies with different types of activities (industry 
and non-industry) report different levels of CSD, the Mann-Whitney U test was performed. 
Mann-Whitney test results (as shown in Table 8.5) reveal that companies with different 
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activities have significantly different levels of CSD. These results are consistent, to a large 
extent, with previous correlation results.  
Table 8.5: Mann-Whitney test for type of activity 
Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarq CSDsa CSDsaq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 
 
2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Mann-
Whitney U 
8182 8890 9979.5 9822 9593.5 10213 9223.5 10239.5 8627 8748.5 9174.5 9433.5 
Wilcoxon W 28483 30418 28894.5 30325 27548.5 28934 27178.5 28960.5 28928 30276.5 28089.5 29936.5 
Z -4.42 -4.18 -1.666 -2.74 -1.8 -1.84 -2.747 -2.207 -3.86 -4.355 -2.720 -3.219 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .096 .006 .072 0.066 .006 .027 .000 .000 .007 .001 
 
The Kruskal Wallis test was also performed to examine whether companies operating in a 
varied number of foreign countries, had significantly different levels of CSD. The results for 
the Kruskal Wallis test (as shown in Table 8.6) show no significant differences between the 
levels of CSD of companies with operations in a varied number of foreign countries, with the 
exception of a significant difference in CSDars in 2006. These results are not consistent with 
the previous correlation results, to a large extent, reflecting weak association between DMAfc 
and CSD.  
Table 8.6: Kruskal Wallis Test for degree of multinationality 
Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarq CSDsa CSDsaq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 2006 
 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Chi-Square 42.26 48.87 29.61 38.60 37.17 28.66 41.41 30.81 37.27 32.20 36.93 36.45 
Df 34 34 34 34 34 33 34 33 34 34 34 34 
Asymp. Sig. .156 .047 .683 .269 .325 .683 .179 .577 .321 .556 .335 .355 
 
To examine whether companies with different board sizes (number of directors on the 
board) have different levels of CSD, the Kruskal Wallis test was performed again. Table 8.7 
provides the results for the Kruskal Wallis test. The results confirm that companies with 
differing numbers of directors on the board provide different levels of CSD. These results are 
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largely consistent with Pearson correlation results, and support the correlation between BS 
and CSD. 
Table 8.7: Kruskal Wallis Test for board size 
Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarq CSDsa CSDsaq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 2006 2005 
 
2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Chi-Square 66.07 70.19 30.73 54.58 67.54 51.80 50.96 59.69 79.76 83.07 44.17 75.82 
Df 15 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed again to examine whether the levels of CSD are 
different between companies that provide corporate responsibility reports, and those which do 
not. Table 8.8 provides the results for the Mann-Whitney test. The results reveal significant 
differences in the levels of CSD between companies with corporate responsibility 
committees, and companies without. These results are largely consistent with Pearson 
correlation results and support the correlation between CRC and CSD. 
Table 8.8: Mann-Whitney test for the presence of corporate responsibility committees 
Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarq CSDsa CSDsaq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 2006 
 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Mann-Whitney U 3490 3999 5179 5433.5 3307 4016 3745 4478 2821.5 3379 4013 4433 
Wilcoxon W 4034 40584 40159 40678.5 36718 37427 37156.5 37889 39677.5 39964 38993 39678 
Z -4.6 -5.07 -1.37 -2.601 -4.98 -5.13 -4.721 -5.20 -5.772 -6.07 -3.47 -4.23 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .170 .009 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 
 
In addition, the Kruskal Wallis test was performed to examine whether companies with 
different levels of print media (media pressure) provide different levels of CSD. The results 
for the Kruskal Wallis test (as shown in Table 8.9) provide evidence that companies with 
different levels of media pressure, report different levels of CSD. These results are consistent 
with correlation results to some extent, reflecting an association between MP and CSD.  
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Table 8.9: Kruskal Wallis Test for media pressure 
Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarq CSDsa CSDsaq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 
 
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Chi-Square 74.31 79.09 46.63 57.97 113.638 124.710 103.827 147.631 109.652 121.387 79.828 101.744 
df 35 38 35 38 35 38 35 38 35 38 35 38 
Asymp. Sig. .000 .000 .090 .020 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
To examine a suggested framework of determinants of CSD, regression analysis was 
performed. The regression analysis depends on the formula Y =ƒ (×). There are six different 
dependent variables in regression analysis, and according to the type of dependent variable 
data, the type of regression test will be determined. Two types of regression test will be used: 
OLS linear regression and Poisson regression (for count data).  
4.3.1 Linear regression diagnostics 
Regression models that examine the dependent variables CSDars, CSDarq, CSDT and 
CSDTQ, can be conducted using the linear regression model, which is considered to be the 
most common method in disclosure literature. Without verifying that the data have met the 
assumptions underlying OLS regression, the results may be misleading. A number of 
assumptions underlie OLS regression; normality, homogeneity of variance 
(homoscedasticity) and collinearity. These assumptions will be examined based on the data 
for 2005 and 2006.  
4.3.1.1 normality of residuals   
This assumption refers to the fact that the residuals (errors) should be normally distributed. 
There is no assumption that independent variables will be normally distributed. Normality of 
residuals is required for assurance that the P-values for t-tests and F-test are valid. The 
normality assumption is not required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression 
coefficients. This assumption can be examined using the Stata programme as follows: After 
conducting regression analysis, the predict command will be used to generate residuals 
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(predict r, resid). Then, the kdensity command will be used to create a kernel density plot 
with the normal option (kdensity r, normal). The following figure provides a kernel density 
plot.  
Figure 8.3: A kernel density plot 
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The previous figure indicates that the 2006 data appear to have a normality problem, while 
the 2005 data appear not to have a normality problem. Using robust standard errors addresses 
the problem of errors that are not normally distributed. Robust standard errors do not change 
the coefficient estimates, but change the standard errors and significance tests.  
4.3.1.2 Heteroskedasticity  
Heteroskedasticity means that the error variance should be constant, as one of the main 
assumptions for OLS regression is the homogeneity of the variance of residuals. If the 
variance of the residuals is non-constant, then the residual variance is said to be 
heteroskedastic. To examine the heteroskedasticity problem using the Stata programme, after 
conducting regression analysis, the command hettest will be used to run the Breusch-Pagan 
test. The null hypothesis of this test is that the variance of residuals is homogenous, so if the 
P-value is small the null hypothesis will be rejected, and will accept the alternative 
hypothesis that the variance is heteroskedastic. The following table presents the results for the 
Breusch-Pagan test; the significant chi2 indicates the presence of the heteroskedasticity 
problem:    
 
 
                                                                                                                    - 285 - 
         
Table 8.10: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
 CSDars CSDarq CSDT CSDTQ 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 
 
2005 2006 
chi2(1)       48.60 59.76 0.98 9.69 153.35 101.21 53.24 53.96 
Prob > chi2   0.0000 0.0000 0.3215 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
4.3.1.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity means that the independent variables are correlated, which can cause 
problems in estimating the regression coefficients. To examine the multicollinearity problem 
using the Stata programme, after conducting regression analysis, the command VIF will be 
used. The following table provides the values of VIF which are less than 2. These values of 
VIF indicate a limited problem of multicollinearity.  
Table 8.11: The values of VIF 
 2005 2006 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
 
VIF 1/VIF 
PRO 1.13    0.882720  1.14    0.875839 
CSta 1.90    0.527458 2.05    0.488175 
TA 1.15    0.868881 1.14    0.878319 
DMAfc 1.10    0.908715 1.08    0.926442 
BS 1.50    0.664674 1.68    0.596505 
NEDp 1.15    0.873324  1.09    0.915380 
CRC 1.14    0.874394 1.20    0.831592 
SS 1.20    0.830119 1.19    0.839449 
MP 1.36    0.733417  1.03    0.970882 
Mean VIF 1.29 1.29 
 
4.3.2 Poisson regression diagnostics 
Regression models that examine the dependent variables CSDsa and CSDsaq can be 
conducted using the Poisson regression model. Poisson probabilities are used to model the 
number of occurrences (counts) of an event. In Poisson distribution a mean and a variance are 
the same. When the mean equals the variance there is equi-dispersion in distribution, and if 
the variance is greater than the mean there is over-dispersion in distribution. To examine the 
presence of over-dispersion using the Stata programme, after conducting Poisson regression, 
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the gof command will be used to run a likelihood ratio chi-squared (the goodness of fit). The 
following table provides the results of goodness of fit: 
Table 8.12: A likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic test 
 CSDsa CSDsaq 
 2005 2006 2005 2006 
Goodness-of-fit chi2   6102.085 6497.065 175.3633 176.0631 
Prob > chi2(225)       0.0000 0.0000 0.9939 0.9998 
 
If the test is significant, the Poisson regression is not appropriate. The large chi-square also 
indicates that there is not a very good fit for the Poisson regression model, and this suggests 
that there is over-dispersion. Consequently, it appears that the Poisson regression model is 
not appropriate for analysing the quantity of social disclosure in stand-alone reports (CSDsa), 
while it is appropriate for analysing the quality of this disclosure (CSDsaq). The alternative 
method for Poisson regression is negative binomial regression, which is used when the event 
shows over-dispersion. Therefore, the negative binomial regression model will be used to 
analyse the quantity of social disclosure in stand-alone reports (CSDsa).  
4.3.3 Panel data analysis  
The advantage of panel data regression is that it takes the time effect into account. As 
Cormier et al. (2005) stated; if an OLS regression for one period provides a picture, panel 
data provide a sequence of pictures. The regression results are divided into two parts; one for 
the regression results that relate to analysis of the quantity of CSD, and another for analysis 
of the quality of CSD.  
4.3.3.1 The quantity of disclosure 
Table 8.13 provides the results of regression models that examine the determinants of 
quantity of CSD. The values of R2 (models 1 and 3) are considered acceptable in the context 
of a comparison with the findings of previous disclosure literature.   
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Table 8.13: Regression analysis of quantity of disclosure  
 Dependent variables 
 Model 1 CSDars Model 2 CSDsa Model 3 CSDT 
 Coef. P 
 
Coef. P Coef. P 
PRO 26.5733 0.457 -.6123362 0.595 -3.478982 0.778 
CSnoe 16.43196 0.002 .6023472 0.002 3.761934 0.028 
TA 26.80604 0.001 .7903419 0.015 3.552807 0.197 
DMAfc .5492414 0.222 -.0515227 0.000 .036832 0.803 
BS 5.890351 0.000 .0458835 0.312 1.484453 0.004 
NEDp 56.47697 0.074 2.389459 0.012 10.664 0.323 
CRC 23.87598 0.016 .2783177 0.229 9.838231 0.004 
SS -.3718594 0.083 -.0122918 0.068 -.2082293 0.004 
MP .6104925 
 
0.011 .0069725 0.087 .3448358 0.000 
Number of 
obs 
532 515 532 
Wald chi2(9) 136.56 58.21 137.52 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within 0.0875  0.0008 
         between 0.2915  0.3332 
          overall 0.2573  0.2722 
Log likelihood  -1424.0576  
Model Random-effects GLS regression   Random-effects negative 
binomial regression 
Random-effects GLS 
regression 
 
The results show that corporate profitability (PRO) is not associated with quantity of CSD 
at all, while both corporate size (CSnoe) and type of activities (TA) are significantly 
associated with quantity of CSD, with the exception of non-association between TA and 
CSDT. The degree of multinational activities (DMAfc) does not appear to be associated with 
both quantity of disclosure in annual reports (CSDars) and total quantity (CSDT), while it has 
an unexpected negative association with quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports 
(CSDsa). With regard to corporate governance variables, the results show that governance 
practices, in general, are associated with quantity of CSD, with the exception of non-
association between both BS and CRC, and CSDsa, and non-association between NEDp and 
CSDT. In addition, substantial shareholders (SS) appear to be associated with quantity of 
CSD. Regarding media pressure, it appears to be significantly associated with quantity of 
CSD. These results, in general, are largely consistent with the findings of previous literature. 
The results seem to support the suggested framework, to a large extent, as it reveals that 
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corporate characteristics, media pressure, corporate ownership and some practices of 
corporate governance are considered to be important factors in determining the level of 
quantity of CSD. The following table summarises the relationship between different 
independent variables and the different variables that represent quantity of CSD: 
Table 8.14: The impact on different variables of quantity of CSD 
 CSD in annual 
reports 
CSD in stand-alone 
reports 
Total CSD 
Corporate size Positive association Positive association Positive 
association 
Type of activities Positive association Positive association No association 
Corporate profitability No association No association No association 
Multinationality No association Positive association No association 
Media pressure Positive association Positive association Positive 
association 
Board size Positive association No association Positive 
association 
Non-executive directors Positive association Positive association No association 
Corporate responsibility 
committee 
Positive association No association Positive 
association 
Corporate ownership Positive association Positive association Positive 
association 
 
Discussion  
The results concerning corporate characteristics variables (PRO, CSnoe and TA) are 
consistent with the dominant trend in previous literature, where the results of the majority of 
previous studies indicate that there is no association between profitability and CSD, while 
there is significant association between both corporate size and type of activities, and CSD. 
Corporate size and type of activities are positively associated with quantity of CSD, 
indicating that large industrial companies provide more quantity of social responsibility 
information. This result is consistent with the findings of previous studies in different 
countries. In the UK context, previous studies (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004; Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2006; Toms et al., 2007; Toms, 2008 and Parsa & Kouhy, 2008) indicated a positive 
association between both size and activity, and quantity of CSD. The results show that the 
association between both CSnoe and TA, and quantity of disclosure in annual reports (coef. 
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16.43196 and 26.80604 for CSnoe and TA respectively) is stronger than the association with quantity 
of disclosure in stand-alone reports (coef. .6023472 and .7903419 for CSnoe and TA respectively). The 
result is consistent with legitimacy theory, as large industrial companies are more visible and 
consequently they face more social pressure; therefore they are more likely to provide a 
greater quantity of social responsibility information. This result provides evidence that 
supports hypotheses 1a and 2a which indicated a positive association between both size and 
activity, and quantity of CSD. Corporate profitability is not associated, as expected, with 
quantity of CSD, suggesting that companies with high profitability do not care to increase 
their social and environmental disclosure. This result is consistent with previous mainstream 
literature (Cowen et al., 1987; Patten, 1991; Ahmad et al., 2003; Ghazali, 2007; Reverte, 
2009; Stanny & Ely, 2008; Garcia-Sanchez, 2008; Monteiro & Aibar-Guzman, 2009; Jinfeng 
& Huifeng, 2009), while it is not consistent with a small number of previous studies that 
indicated a significant association between profitability and CSD (Hackston & Milne, 1996; 
Hossain et al., 2006). In the UK context, prior studies (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; 2008) 
indicated no association between profitability and CSD. The non-association between PRO 
and quantity of CSD, taking into account the results of previous studies, could indicate that 
companies are not convinced of the existence of direct economic results for CSD. This result 
is consistent with legitimacy theory, which considers CSD as a legitimacy tool without direct 
financial benefits. With regard to hypothesis 3a, which refers to non-association between 
profitability and quantity of CSD, the results provide evidence that supports this hypothesis.  
The results concerning the degree of multinational activities reveal that it is not associated 
with quantity of CSD, with the exception of a weak negative association with quantity of 
stand-alone reports (coef. -.0515227). The non-association between the degree of multinational 
activities and quantity of disclosure in annual reports, is considered to be consistent with the 
previous findings of Branco & Rodrigues (2008), which indicated the absence of a 
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relationship between multinationality and CSD in annual reports, and is not consistent with 
the findings of Stanny & Ely (2008). In the UK context, this result is consistent with the 
findings of Toms et al. (2007) and Toms (2008). Generally, these results do not provide 
evidence on a clear relationship between multinationality and quantity of social disclosure. 
Therefore, with regard to hypothesis 4a, which proposes an association between DMAfc and 
quantity of CSD, the regression results provide evidence to reject this hypothesis. The 
absence of a relationship between multinationality and CSD, which is not consistent with a 
suggested framework, may be due to the probability that the geographical extensions more 
often exist in developing countries which pay little attention to the social responsibility of a 
company. It can therefore be argued that multinational companies face more social pressure 
in home countries, than they face in foreign countries and consequently they focus their 
attention on the concerns of the community in the home country. This result supports the 
argument of Toms et al. (2007) and Toms (2008) that attention should be paid to the political 
and environmental risk in the countries in which multinational companies operate, rather than 
the number of foreign countries in which they operate. 
The previous results concerning corporate characteristics (PRO, CSnoe, TA and DMAfc) 
revealed that both size and type of activities determine the social pressure that faces 
companies. It can be argued therefore, that the size of companies and type of activities are the 
most important factors in attracting the attention of the community to pursue corporate 
activity. These findings support, to a large extent, the general argument that corporate 
characteristics play an important role in determining the degree of pressure faced by 
companies, and consequently the level of CSD. 
Regarding media pressure, the results provide evidence that media pressure is significantly 
associated with quantity of CSD, indicating that companies with wide media coverage are 
more likely to provide a high level of social disclosure. This result is consistent with the 
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findings of Adler & Milne (1997), Brown & Deegan (1998), Patten (2002a), Deegan et al. 
(2002), Cormier & Magnan (2003), Cormier et al. (2005), Reverte (2009) and Branco & 
Rodrigues (2008). In the UK context, Brammer & Pavelin (2004) suggested a positive 
relationship, while Brammer & Pavelin (2006) indicated no association between media 
pressure and the decision to disclose environmental information. This result is consistent with 
legitimacy theory and the suggested framework, as more media coverage reflects more social 
pressure, and consequently more CSD. The values of regression coefficients show that 
association between MP and quantity of disclosure in annual reports is stronger than the 
association with quantity in stand-alone reports (coef. .6104925 and .0069725 for CSDars and CSDsa 
respectively), which indicates that the companies still rely on annual reports as a way of 
responding to media pressure. It appears that the impact of media pressure on CSD is lower 
than the impact of corporate characteristics. This weak association between media pressure 
and CSD, compared with the association between corporate characteristics and CSD, may be 
due to media pressure, itself being determined according to corporate characteristics. With 
regard to hypothesis 5a, which indicates a positive association between media pressure and 
quantity of CSD, the regression result appears to provide evidence that supports this 
hypothesis. 
These results, concerning media pressure, and previous results concerning corporate 
characteristics, provide evidence that supports the general argument that corporate 
characteristics and, to a lesser extent, media pressure are important determinants of social 
pressure on companies, and consequently the level of CSD. Therefore, these findings provide 
support for the first general hypothesis with regard to the dimension of disclosure quantity. 
Factors involved in this dimension of the suggested framework are extensively examined in 
previous literature, but few studies have addressed them in an integrated manner within a 
theoretical framework.  
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With regard to corporate governance variables, the regression results show that, in general, 
governance mechanisms are associated with quantity of CSD. Board size (BS) appears to be 
associated with quantity of CSD, with the exception of non-association with quantity of 
stand-alone reports. The positive association between BS and CSDars, indicates that 
increasing the number of directors on the board is associated with a greater quantity of CSD 
in annual reports. This result is not consistent with the results of Halme & Huse (1997), who 
indicated the absence of a relationship between board size and environmental disclosure in 
annual reports. A positive association between BS and disclosure in annual reports, and non-
association with disclosure in stand-alone reports could indicate that the board of directors is 
more interested in annual reports as a means of disclosure. With regard to hypothesis 6a, 
which indicated a positive association between board size and quantity of CSD, the overall 
regression results provide evidence to support this hypothesis. This result supports the 
theoretical view that board size has an impact on corporate disclosure policy. The result can 
be interpreted in the context of the proposed framework, as an increasing number of directors 
on the board, provides a greater opportunity for the presence of members who are more 
interested in CSR. Consequently, the companies with more directors on the board are more 
likely to react positively to social pressure, and one of the tools for dealing with this is to 
increase the quantity of social and environmental information.  
The proportion of non-executive directors (NEDp) appears to be associated with quantity of 
CSD, with the exception of non-association with total quantity of CSD. This result could 
indicate that companies with a high proportion of non-executive directors are more likely to 
provide more CSD. The coefficients values show that NEDp is more associated with quantity 
of disclosure in annual reports, than quantity of stand-alone reports (coef. 56.47697 and 2.389459 
for CSDara and CSDsa respectively). The positive association between NEDp and CSDars is not 
consistent with the findings of Haniffa & Cooke, (2005), which indicated that non-executive 
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directors are negatively associated with CSD, Prado- Lorenzo et al. (2009) and, in the UK, 
Brammer & Pavelin (2006), which indicated no relationship between the number of non-
executive directors and environmental disclosure. This difference in results may be due to the 
focus of previous studies on environmental disclosure and/or use of another indicator to 
measure the variable (number of non-executive directors). With regard to hypothesis 7a, the 
overall results provide limited support for this hypothesis, which states that there is an 
association between NEDp and quantity of CSD. This result can be understood in the context 
of the suggested framework, as increasing the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board, increases the likelihood that companies respond positively to social pressure and 
consequently provide more social and environmental information. This result supports the 
view that non-executive directors are seen as the balance mechanism in ensuring that 
companies act in the best interests of all stakeholders, and provide additional windows on the 
world. Consequently, non-executive directors can exert pressure on companies engaging in 
CSD, to achieve congruence between organisational actions and societal values (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005: 400). The reason for having outside presence on the board, according to Adrian 
Cadbury, is that outside directors bring awareness of the external world and the changing 
nature of public expectations, to board discussions (Clarke, 1998: 120). Clarke (1998) argued 
that non-executive directors are often considered to bring valuable external business 
experience, which can contribute to the strategic success of a company (Clarke, 1998: 118). 
The presence of a corporate responsibility committee tends to be associated with quantity of 
CSD, which is positively associated with quantity of disclosure in annual reports and total 
quantity, while it is not associated with quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports. CRC has 
a strong positive association with quantity of social disclosure in annual reports (coef. 
23.87598, and P= 0.016). This result is not consistent, to a large extent, with the study of Cowen 
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et al. (1987)42, which indicated that the presence of a corporate responsibility committee is 
related to one type of social disclosure. With regard to hypothesis 8a, which indicates the 
relationship between the corporate responsibility committee and CSD, the overall results 
support this hypothesis, as the results state that there is an association between the corporate 
responsibility committee and quantity of social disclosure. 
With regard to corporate ownership-diffusion (SS), there is a negative association between 
substantial shareholders and quantity of CSD, reflecting that companies with fewer block 
shareholders are more likely to provide greater CSD. The result reflects a positive association 
between ownership-diffusion and CSD. Ownership-diffusion means that there is a diversity 
of shareholders’ needs for information, and from that, information about the social 
responsibility of companies. This result is not consistent with the findings of Halme & Huse 
(1997), Ghazoli (2007) and Reverte (2009). With regard to hypothesis 9a, the regression 
results provide evidence to support this hypothesis. 
The overall results concerning corporate governance and ownership, provide support for a 
general argument that corporate governance and ownership play an important role in 
determining how companies respond to social pressure and consequently, in determining the 
level of CSD. Therefore, it can be argued that the results support, to a large extent, the second 
general hypothesis. In addition, the values of regression coefficients show that association 
between the corporate responsibility committee and total quantity of CSD (coef. 9.838231 and 
P= 0.004) is stronger than association between both corporate size {coef. 3.761934 and p= 0,028) 
and media pressure (coef. .3448358 and P=0.000), and the total quantity of CSD. These findings 
suggest that: (1) corporate responsibility committees appear to play a very important role in 
determining CSD strategy: (2) how companies respond to social pressure is more important 
than the degree of social pressure on companies, in determining the quantity of CSD. These 
                                                
42 This study examined the presence of the corporate responsibility committee in the company as a whole, not as 
a board committee. 
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regression results provide evidence that supports a theoretical framework with regard to the 
dimension of quantity of CSD.   
4.3.3.2 Quality of disclosure 
Table 8.15 provides the results of regression models that examine the determinants of 
quality of CSD. The values of R2 of model 4 reflect the low explanatory power of the model, 
while this value is considered as acceptable in model 6. 
Table 8.15: Regression results concerning quality of disclosure  
 Dependent variables 
 Model 4 CSarq Model 5 CSDsaq Model 6 CSDTQ 
      Coef.    P 
 
   Coef.    P   Coef.    P 
PRO -.0540036 0.440 .7050858 0.537 .24455 0.385 
CSnoe .0296201 0.003 .3388183 0.055 .1187193 0.005 
TA .0108547 0.501 .420858 0.088 .118894 0.086 
DMAfc -.0005061 0.558 -.0181662 0.135 -.001493 0.685 
BS .0050768 0.088 .1624603 0.000 .0388707 0.001 
NEDp .0838519 0.178 .8990137 0.424 .4292489 0.090 
CRC .0043614 0.822 .5509062 0.042 .2105191 0.007 
SS -.0006107 0.145 -.0150329 0.039 -.0043214 0.012 
MP .0006743 0.144 
 
.0079409 0.179 .0098634 0.000 
Number of 
obs 
530 514 530 
Wald chi2(9) 42.36 61.90 153.71 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within 0.0004  0.0244 
         between 0.1265  0.3410 
          overall 0.1218  0.3301 
Log likelihood  -316.74273  
model Random-effects GLS 
regression 
Random-effects Poisson 
regression 
Random-effects GLS 
regression 
 
The results show that a suggested framework has low explanatory power with regard to 
explaining the quality of disclosure in annual reports. Corporate profitability is not associated 
with quality of CSD. Both corporate size and type of activities appear to be positively 
associated with quality of disclosure, with the exception of non-association between type of 
activities and quality of disclosure in annual reports. The degree of multinational activities is 
not associated with quality of CSD. With regard to corporate governance variables, board 
size appears to be associated with quality of CSD. Non-executive directors tend not to be 
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associated with quality of CSD, with the exception of a weak association with total quality. 
Both the presence of a corporate responsibility committee (CRC) and substantial shareholders 
(SS) are positively associated with quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports and total 
quality of disclosure, while it is not associated with quality of disclosure in annual reports. 
With regard to media pressure, it seems to be associated only with total quality of CSD. The 
following table summarises the relationship between different independent variables, and 
different variables that represent quality of CSD: 
Table 8.16: The impact on different variables of quality of CSD 
 CSD in annual 
reports 
CSD in stand-alone 
reports 
Total CSD 
Corporate size Positive association Positive association Positive 
association 
Type of activities No association Positive association Positive 
association 
Corporate profitability No association No association No association 
Multinationality No association No association No association 
Media pressure No association No association Positive 
association 
Board size Positive association Positive association Positive 
association 
Non-executive directors No association No association Positive 
association 
Corporate responsibility 
committee 
No association Positive association Positive 
association 
Corporate ownership No association Positive association Positive 
association 
 
Discussion 
The results concerning quality of disclosure are similar, to some extent, to the results 
concerning quantity of disclosure. Generally, the impact of a suggested framework is clearer 
with regard to the quantity of disclosure, than the quality thereof. Concerning corporate 
characteristics variables, the results indicate that, similar to results of quantity, both corporate 
size and type of activities are significantly associated with quality of CSD, while both 
profitability and multinationality are not associated with quality of disclosure. Both corporate 
size and type of activities appear to be significantly associated with quality of CSD, with the 
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exception of non-association between TA and CSDarq, indicating that large industrial 
companies are most likely to provide a high quality of CSD. The non-association between TA 
and CSDarq reflects that, while industrial companies seem to provide a greater quantity of 
disclosure, the type of activities has no impact on the type of disclosure. At the same time, it 
appears that industrial companies seem to be more interested in preparing corporate 
responsibility reports, using reporting guidelines, and reviewing these reports by independent 
auditors. This result is consistent with the findings of Brammer & Pavelin (2006 and 2008) 
which indicated a positive association between both size and type of activities, and quality of 
environmental disclosure. These results, in addition to the results concerning quantity of 
disclosure, confirm the impact of both size and activity on the overall strategy of CSD. 
Comparing these results with previous results concerning quantity of disclosure, shows that 
the impact of size and activity on quantity of disclosure is stronger than their impact on 
quality of disclosure. With regard to hypotheses 1b and 2b, the regression results provide 
evidence that support both hypotheses. Corporate profitability is not associated with quality 
of disclosure, indicating that more profitable companies are not concerned about providing 
high disclosure quality in annual reports, or using reporting guidelines or independent 
reviews. This result is consistent with the findings of Brammer & Pavelin (2006 and 2008) 
which indicated no relationship between profitability and quality of environmental disclosure 
in annual reports. This result, in addition to the result concerning quantity of disclosure, is 
consistent with a dominant view in the findings of previous literature, and confirms the non-
association between financial performance and CSD. With regard to hypothesis 3b, the 
regression results provide evidence to support this hypothesis. The degree of multinational 
activities appears not to be associated with quality of disclosure, indicating that geographical 
extension has no influence on the quality of social disclosure. It appears that while 
multinationality has an impact on quantity of CSD in annual reports, it has no impact on its 
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quality. With regard to hypothesis 4b, which indicates a positive association between 
multinationality and quality of CSD, the results provide evidence to reject this hypothesis.  
These results are consistent, to a large extent, with a general argument that corporate 
characteristics determine social pressure on companies and consequently the level of CSD. 
Regarding media pressure, the results show that it is not associated with quality of CSD, 
with the exception of a weak relationship with total quality (coef. .0098634). This result is 
consistent with the findings of Brammer & Pavelin (2006 and 2008) which indicated no 
relationship between media pressure and quality of environmental disclosure, but it is not 
consistent with Cormier et al. (2005). This result, along with the previous result concerning 
quantity of disclosure, suggests that companies respond to media pressure by providing more 
social and environmental information, without paying attention to the type of aforementioned 
information. With regard to hypothesis 5b, the results provide evidence to reject this 
hypothesis. 
These results do not support, to a large extent, the general argument that corporate 
characteristics and media pressure determine the size of social pressure on companies, and 
that companies will respond to this pressure by providing high disclosure quality. Therefore, 
it can be argued that companies will focus their attention on increasing the quantity of social 
information, without paying attention to the quality of that information.  
With regard to corporate governance variables, it appears that both board size (BS) and 
corporate responsibility committee (CRC) are associated with quality of CSD. The results 
show that corporate governance practices have less impact on quality, than on quantity. The 
board size seems to be associated with quality of CSD, indicating that increasing the number 
of directors on the board, influences the type of information in annual reports, and encourages 
the use of reporting guidelines and independent auditors in preparing corporate responsibility 
reports. This result, along with the result concerning quantity of disclosure, supports the 
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theoretical view that board size has an impact on corporate disclosure policy. With regard to 
hypothesis 6b, which indicated a positive association between board size and quality of CSD, 
the results provide evidence to support this hypothesis. Non-executive directors are not 
associated with quality of CSD, with the exception of weak association with the total quality 
(coef. .4292489 and P 0.0900). It appears that non-executive directors are more concerned with 
quantity of disclosure, than its quality. This result is consistent with Brammer & Pavelin 
(2008), who indicated a non-association between the number of non-executive directors and 
the quality of environmental disclosure. These results provide evidence that rejects 
hypothesis 7b.  Regarding the corporate responsibility committee, it appears to be associated 
with quality of CSD, in particular quality of stand-alone reports, indicating that the presence 
of a corporate responsibility committee, as a board committee, plays an important role in 
preparing corporate responsibility reports. It appears that corporate responsibility committees 
are interested in using reporting guidelines (such as GRI, AAA,--), and independently 
reviewing these reports. Comparing the results concerning quantity and quality of disclosure, 
reveals that association between the corporate responsibility committee and quantity of 
disclosure, is stronger than association with quality of disclosure. It can thus be argued that 
corporate responsibility committees are more interested in the quantity of social and 
environmental information, than their quality. With regard to hypothesis 8b, which indicates a 
positive association between CRC and quality of CSD, the regression results support this 
hypothesis. 
Concerning corporate ownership, it appears that a substantial number of shareholders is 
negatively associated with quality of CSD, with the exception of a non-association with 
quality of disclosure in annual reports. This result is not consistent with the findings of 
Brammer & Pavelin (2008). It can be argued that widening the ownership base is an incentive 
for the intention of preparing corporate responsibility reports, according to reporting 
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principles, and using an independent auditor to review these reports. With regard to 
hypothesis 9b, which indicated a negative association between SS and quality of disclosure, 
the results provide evidence that supports this hypothesis.  
These results provide support, to some extent, to the general argument that governance 
practices play an important role in determining how companies respond to social pressure, 
and consequently determine the level of CSD. At the same time, the results actually reflect a 
weak association between corporate governance and ownership variables, and quality of 
CSD. Therefore, it can be argued that the influence of the suggested framework on quantity 
of CSD is clearer than its influence on quality of CSD. 
The following table summarises the results concerning hypotheses examination: 
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Table 8.17: The results of examining hypotheses 
Hypotheses Expected 
relation 
Reported 
relation 
Results 
1a: the relation between corporate size and quantity of CSD Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
1b: the relation between corporate size and quality of CSD Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
2a: the relation between type of activities and quantity of 
CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
2b: the relation between type of activities and quality of 
CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
3a: the relation between corporate profitability and 
quantity of CSD 
No relation No relation Accept 
hypothesis 
3b: the relation between corporate profitability and quality 
of CSD 
No relation No relation Accept 
hypothesis 
4a: the relation between degree of multinational activities 
and quantity of CSD 
Positive No relation Reject 
hypothesis 
4b: the relation between degree of multinational activities 
and quality of CSD 
Positive No relation Reject 
hypothesis 
5a: the relation between media pressure and quantity of 
CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
5b: the relation between media pressure and quality of CSD Positive No relation Reject 
hypothesis 
6a: the relation between board size and quantity of CSD Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
6b: the relation between board size and quality of CSD Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
7a: the relation between proportion of non-executive 
directors and quantity of CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
7b: the relation between proportion of non-executive 
directors and quality of CSD 
Positive No relation Reject 
hypothesis 
8a: the relation between presence of corporate 
responsibility committee and quantity of CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
8b: the relation between presence of corporate 
responsibility committee and quality of CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
9a: the relation between corporate ownership and quantity 
of CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
9b: the relation between corporate ownership and quantity 
of CSD 
Positive Positive Accept 
hypothesis 
 
4.3.4 More analysis  
Some more analysis (modification of some variables) through a suggested framework is 
performed. (1) Previous literature debates the unit of analysis of CSD in annual reports. This 
debate has concentrated on which is better to measure quantity of social disclosure in annual 
reports; number of sentences or number of pages. To evaluate whether these different 
measures provide different results, the regression model concerning quantity of CSD in 
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annual reports is performed by using three different indicators of quantity of disclosure in 
annual reports: number of sentences (CSDars), number of pages (CSDarp) and proportion of 
social disclosure pages to total number of annual report pages (CSDarpp). The following 
table provides the regression results using three indicators: 
Table 8.18: Regression results for different measures of quantity of CSD in annual reports 
 Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDarp CSDarpp 
 Coef. P 
 
Coef. P Coef. P 
PRO 26.5733 0.457 1.411671 0.342 .0099137 0.455 
CSnoe 16.43196 0.002 .5904253 0.007 .0038865 0.049 
TA 26.80604 0.001 1.178671 0.001 .0113934 0.000 
DMAfc .5492414 0.222 .011877 0.531 -.0001622 0.347 
BS 5.890351 0.000 .2201038 0.001 .0003388 0.556 
NEDp 56.47697 0.074 1.301212 0.219 -.004711 0.618 
CRC 23.87598 0.016 1.056917 0.010 .0088162 0.017 
SS -.3718594 0.083 -.0040986 0.652 -.0000282 0.730 
MP .6104925 0.011 .0104443 0.298 -.0000833 0.359 
Wald chi2(9) 136.56 84.86 31.29 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
R-sq:  within 0.0875 0.0656 0.0174 
         between 0.2915 0.2019 0.0894 
          overall 0.2573 0.1664 0.0654 
  
The table shows differences in regression results among the three measures indicating that 
each measure provides different results for quantity of CSD. The results show the same 
impact for corporate characteristics variables on different measures of disclosure, as both size 
and activity is significantly associated with disclosure, while both profitability and 
multinationality is not associated with disclosure. It also appears that the impact of the 
corporate responsibility committee on disclosure is consistent among the three measures, so 
this further confirms the relationship between both corporate characteristics and corporate 
responsibility committee, and quantity of disclosure in annual reports. The values of R2 for 
three models suggest using the number of sentences to provide a better measure for quantity 
of CSD in annual reports.  
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(2) Previous literature has focused on the number of news items in traditional (printed) 
newspapers, to measure the media-pressure variable. This common indicator shows a 
limitation, in that it does not take into account the fact that the internet is becoming important 
news medium. Therefore, it can be argued that the media-pressure variable can be measured 
as the total number of news items regarding CSR, related to a given company, in both printed 
newspapers and the internet. To evaluate the impact of this change in measurement of media 
pressure on the results, the previous regression tests are performed again, using total media 
pressure. The following table presents the regression results in the use of total media pressure 
in both printed newspapers and the internet (TMP), instead of only MP: 
Table 8.19: Regression results using total media pressure 
 Dependent variables 
 CSDars 
 
CSDsa CSDT CSDarq CSDsaq CSDTQ 
PRO 31.28771 -.9233446 -4.092961 -.0408969 .6951808 .2304481 
CSnoe 18.72343*** .5818357*** 3.722884** .0314886*** .3072881* .1132352*** 
TA 27.0624*** .6987566** 4.330713 .016392 .4130719* .1318507* 
DMAfc .4866919 -.0525256*** .0052432 -.0006292 -.0202665 -.0022168 
BS 6.184918*** .0682454 1.287306*** .0050792* .1570447*** .0351794*** 
NEDp 52.36885* 2.448709*** 9.458084 .0654947 .9641759 .4032536* 
CRC 24.33811** .3250478 9.056407*** .0017751 .5119* .1835406** 
SS -.3923804* -.0116218* -.1992712*** -.0006267 -.0161784** -.0042881*** 
TMP .2639967* .0069115*** .2501395*** 
 
.0005096* .0066011 .0070929*** 
Wald chi2(9) 143.21 69.49 150.97 48.64 62.51 165.64 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within 0.0669  0.0100 0.0013  0.0465 
         between 0.2971  0.3320 0.1367  0.3364 
          overall 0.2595  0.2802   0.1282  0.3292 
Log likelihood  -1463.2596   -323.25035  
(* Significant at .1 level, ** significant at .05 level, *** significant at .01 level) 
The regression results are largely consistent with previous results. This consistency between 
results could reflect that companies which attract more media coverage also attract more 
coverage through internet news. This result confirms the impact of media pressure (both 
traditional and modern media) on CSD policy. 
(3) Non-executive directors can be divided into independent non-executive directors and non-
independent non-executive directors. Beasley (1996) indicated that a number of corporate 
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governance researchers note that the traditional distinction between executive (inside) 
directors and non-executive (outside) directors, fails to account for the actual and potential 
conflicts of interests between non-executive directors and their companies. Non-executive 
directors are thus commonly classified into two categories: independent non-executive 
directors (non-executive directors who have no affiliation with the company other than the 
affiliation of being on the board of directors), and grey non-executive directors (non-
executive directors who have some non-board affiliation with the company). The impact of 
non-executive directors can therefore be measured using the proportion of independent non-
executive directors (not total non-executive directors) on the board. The following table 
summarises the results of previous regression models by using the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors (INEDp), instead of total non-executive directors: 
Table 8.20: Regression results using independent non-executive directors 
 Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDsa CSDT CSDarq 
 
CSDsaq CSDTQ 
PRO 27.73744 -.6806268 -3.248535 -.0508569 .7240885 .2518048 
CSnoe 16.27143*** .5811824*** 3.625119** .0278193*** .3384505* .1166096*** 
TA 26.75589*** .9198411*** 3.585788 .0113524 .4448055* .1190155* 
DMAfc .5538126 -.0485667*** .0363169 -.0005118 -.0173369 -.0014864 
BS 5.861077*** .0470556 1.497946*** .0052433* .1614744*** .0383839*** 
INEDp 44.97308* 3.294293*** 12.84147 .1260202** 1.183553 .4024792** 
CRC 24.06533** .2653816 9.808054*** .0035013 .539256** .2096542*** 
SS -.2937471 -.0115531* -.1877964** -.0004056 -.0137051* -.0036015** 
MP .6200755*** .0047806 
 
.3432326*** .0006525 .0076735 .0099494*** 
Wald chi2(9) 136.62 65.29 139.24 46.57 61.59 153.93 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within 0.0837  0.0010 0.0208     0.0342 
        between 0.2926  0.3359 0.1191  0.3359 
         overall 0.2570  0.2749 0.1252  0.3281 
Log likelihood  -1420.7081   -316.31026  
(* Significant at .1 level, ** significant at .05 level, *** significant at .01 level) 
The results are consistent, to a large extent, with previous regression results. The results 
concerning independent non-executive directors (INEDp) are similar to previous results 
concerning total non-executive directors (NEDp), with the exception of significant 
association between INEDp and CSDarq, while there is no association between NEDp and 
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CSDarq. This difference in results suggests that the impact of independent non-executive 
directors on CSD in annual reports is clearer than the impact of total non-executive directors. 
At the same time, it appears that the impact of both independent non-executive directors and 
total non-executive directors, on a whole strategy of social disclosures, is the same. These 
results reflect that the impact of non-executive directors on CSD is not influenced by whether 
non-executive directors are independent, or not.  
(4) The regression results, in general, indicate a significant impact from the presence of a 
corporate responsibility committee as a board committee, on CSD, so it may be useful to 
examine whether the independence of this committee has an impact on CSD, or not. 
Therefore, an additional variable, the independence of the corporate responsibility committee, 
is added to previous regression models. The following table presents the results of regression 
models with the addition of a new variable: 
Table 8.21: The regression results with additional variable regarding the independence of 
CRC 
 Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDsa 
 
CSDT CSDarq CSDsaq CSDTQ 
PRO 9.592445 -.0191339 -.2157461 -.063842 .856081 .2814345 
CSnoe 16.93623*** .5561393*** 3.60713** .0294298*** .3172587* .1143843 
TA 25.78573*** .9405791*** 3.555417 .0089622 .4511257* .1231235 
DMAfc .487995 -.0323256** .0482961 -.0005665 -.0166433 -.001841 
BS 5.548979*** .0457551 1.513166*** .0045632 .167439*** .0403348 
NEDp 54.63995* 2.06314** 10.564 .0799322 1.014164 .4322575 
CRC -10.11482 1.077766*** 12.80893** -.0313533 .9659984** .3353184 
CRCI 66.58538** -1.78995*** -7.303782 .0699308 -.7284281 -.2019768 
SS -.364775* -.0174047** -.2165975*** -.0006192 -.0155859** -.0044921 
MP .4994406** .0084837** .3641986*** .0005951 .0088083 .0100921 
Wald chi2(10) 143.31 65.00 135.20 42.90 64.53 157.48 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-sq:  within 0.0920  0.0012 0.0007  0.0304 
         between 0.3033  0.3323 0.1299    0.3477 
          overall 0.2714  0.2705    0.1241  0.3361 
Log likelihood  -1386.7937   -309.81334  
(* Significant at .1 level, ** significant at .05 level, *** significant at .01 level) 
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It appears that adding a variable of CRCI yields mixed results, which may be due to the 
problem of correlation between two variables, CRC and CRCI. The results show that the 
independence of the corporate responsibility committee is not associated with CSD.  
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis (alternative measures)  
A number of sensitivity tests are performed, in which some alternative measures, for some 
variables, are used. Generally, the results of sensitivity tests, not reported, are consistent with 
reported regression results. (1) Using total assets as an indicator for corporate size. The 
findings reflect the same results, as they reflect a significant association between corporate 
size and all dependent variables. (2) Using ratio of foreign sales as an indicator for 
multinationality. Similar results to previous regression results were found with two 
exceptions: a weak association between multinationality and CSDTQ (coef. -.169215 and P 
0.071), and a negative association with CSDsaq (coef. -.9895657 and P 0.011). (3) Using number, 
not proportion, of non-executive directors, as in the studies of Brammer & Pavelin (2006, 
2008). Two differences from previous regression results were found: it is not associated with 
CSDars, and shows a weak association with CSDarq (coef. .0132742). (4) Using internet news 
as an indicator for media pressure, as an alternative to printed news, which is considered a 
common indicator in previous literature. By contrast with previous regression results, a non-
association with CSDars was found. 
4.5 Robustness of Results 
Two types of robustness checks are performed: using robust regression which is considered 
useful to deal with the heteroskedasticity problem, and using Quantile (median) regression 
which is considered an appropriate alternative to linear regression in analysis data concerning 
corporate disclosure. (1) Robust regression is an option in regression analysis in the Stata 
programme. As noted in linear-regression diagnostics, the problem of heteroskedasticity 
might exist. Robust regression deals with the problem of outliers in the regression model. 
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Robust regression uses a weighting scheme which leads outliers to have less impact on 
coefficient estimates, so robust regression generally produces different coefficient estimates. 
Four regression models (1, 3, 4, and 6) are performed again, using the robust option43. The 
robust regression results, not reported, regarding models 3 and 6 (CSDT, and CSDTQ) are 
largely consistent with previous regression results. The robust regression results for model 1, 
(CSDars) show there is no association between both substantial shareholders and media 
pressure, and quantity of disclosure in annual reports, while these variables were significantly 
associated in reported regression results. Robust regression results concerning model 4, 
(CSDarq) also show that there is no association between board size and quality of disclosure 
in annual reports, while there is a significant association between them in reported regression 
results. In general, the robust regression reveals a limited influence on regression results, 
indicating that the influence of the heteroskedasticity problem on regression results might be 
limited. (2) Quantile regression has been suggested as an appropriate solution for linear-
regression problems. Quantile regression cannot be performed with panel data, so Quantile 
regression is performed with 6 models in both 2005 and 2006. Table 8.22 provides Quantile 
regression results. Generally, Quantile regression yields weak results which are not 
consistent, to a certain extent, with reported regression results. Quantile regression results are 
not consistent between the two years, but in general, they improve in 2006. The results reflect 
non-association between corporate characteristics variables and CSD, which is not consistent 
with previous literature and reported regression results. At the same time, the results tend to 
confirm the association between media pressure and CSD. In addition, Quantile regression 
results seem to provide evidence that supports the association between corporate governance 
variables and CSD. Therefore, it appears that Quantile regression is not an appropriate 
method for current data.   
                                                
43 Stata command is  
xtreg CSDars PRO CSnoe TA DMAfc BS NEDp CRC SS MP, vce(robust) 
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Table 8.22: Quantile regression results 
 Dependent variables 
 CSDars CSDsa CSDT CSDarq CSDsaq CSDTQ 
Part 1: 2005       
PRO 21.59468 .8571008 -.7832746 .0126451 5.74 .1531192 
CSnoe 7.788607 .086098 1.772563 .0427776*** 1.51 .0581943*** 
TA 17.12113* .6437233* 1.985439 .0266703 2.75 .0485699 
DMAfc .5652989 -.0136385 -.0061851 -.000301 -2.76* -.0015858 
BS 6.727721*** .359782*** 1.143683*** .0078885** 2.02*** .0214582*** 
NEDp 58.27986 1.079627 5.375073 .0534386 4.61 .0247101 
CRC 33.90306** 18.84835*** 14.59183*** -.015432 6.95* .0559349 
SS -.6666365** -.0018731 -.035062 -.0009306* -6.39 -.0020091** 
MP .2338301 .7358981*** .6663199*** -.0003179 .0111111*** .01061*** 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.1358 0.1943 0.2190 0.0762 0.0407 0.0938 
Part 2: 2006       
PRO -39.0605 4.53927 3.153269 -.1893655 .0309781 .3272851 
CSnoe 13.8409*** 1.270365* 1.567913 .0368938*** -.0049075 .053692** 
TA 16.91817** 1.558885 3.874264 .0021466 .0080114 .0502263 
DMAfc .6276023 -.0689105 -.107656 -.0006858 .0004394 .0007645 
BS 4.993912*** .7811798*** 1.887763*** .0104835*** .0021718* .033103*** 
NEDp 91.06226*** 4.408851 17.16452** .1427767** .0080188 .3327236* 
CRC 18.05431 24.5387*** 12.28142*** .0159829 .0115755 .0583493 
SS -.739956*** -.1013946*** -.1770951** -.0011418** -.0002683 -.0031167*** 
MP .5397901** .1394528*** .1569477** .0004159 .0216287*** .018205*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1785 0.1311 0.1908 0.1473 0.1159 0.1994 
     
5. CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine a suggested framework for determinants of both 
quantity and quality of CSD, in both annual and stand-alone reports. Both correlation and 
regression tests are performed, and the results of both tests support, to a large extent, the 
suggested framework for quantity of CSD, and, to a lesser extent, the quality of CSD. The 
suggested framework depends on the basic premise that social disclosure is a function of two 
factors: quantity of social pressure that faces a company, and how a company responds to this 
social pressure.  
According to the empirical results of this chapter, the level of quantity and, to a lesser 
extent, the level of quality of CSD can be interpreted in the following context: Larger 
industrial companies that have more media coverage attract more attention from the 
community, and consequently they are subject to more scrutiny concerning their social 
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responsibilities. These companies thus face a high level of social pressure. In addition, 
companies with a large board size and wide ownership, that have a corporate responsibility 
committee, are more likely to respond positively to this pressure. Therefore, the level of CSD 
will be determined according to corporate characteristics (size and activity), media coverage, 
governance practices (board size and corporate responsibility committee) and ownership-
diffusion. Based on these results, the following figure explains the modified determinants of 
level of social disclosure in a given company according to empirical results: 
Figure 8.4: Modified determinants framework at the company level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results referred to non-association between geographical extension in other countries 
and level of CSD, indicating that multinational companies are more interested in the 
community of the home country, than in foreign countries. This result could be due to the fact 
that the geographical extension is, in most cases, in less developed countries that are most 
likely to be less interested in CSR.  
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The empirical results in this chapter provide clearer evidence than previous studies on the 
impact of governance practices on CSD. This result reflects the role of corporate governance 
practices in bringing companies closer to their communities. It appears that a corporate 
responsibility committee, as a governance practice, has a stronger effect on CSD.  
This chapter addressed the following questions: (1) what are the determinants of CSD in 
both annual and stand-alone reports? The previous figure informed the factors that determine 
the level of CSD. (2) Are these determinants related to both quantity and quality of CSD? It 
appears that all variables are related to both quantity and quality of CSD, with the exception 
of media pressure, which is not associated with quality of CSD. The results show that these 
variables are more associated with quantity of disclosure, than its quality. (3) Can we 
determine the accepted framework for CSD determinants? The empirical results support, to a 
large extent, a suggested framework, indicating that this framework is acceptable. (4) Does 
legitimacy theory provide us with an appropriate theoretical background to explain CSD? It 
appears that the idea of social pressure, a basic concept in legitimacy theory, is accepted as an 
appropriate explanation for CSD, and consequently, it can be argued that legitimacy theory 
provides an appropriate theoretical background to explain CSD.  
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Chapter 9 
Consequences of CSD 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
The growing interest in CSD has led to the emergence of an important question regarding 
the benefits of this disclosure for companies. Does this disclosure achieve any benefits for the 
companies? Those companies that voluntarily disclose social responsibility information are 
convinced that this disclosure has value. Gray (2006) argued that the steady increase in social 
and environmental reporting over the last 15 years, suggests that a proportion of managers 
sees a business case for such activity. Therefore, such reporting is perceived by managers to 
be of value (Gray, 2006: 806). It is important to clarify the benefits that would have been 
achieved by the companies. The consequences of CSD can be considered as feedback from 
society on CSD, and could be seen as an answer to the question; does such disclosure achieve 
its objectives? This chapter focuses on analysing the benefits/consequences of CSD. The 
focal point of this chapter is to clarify that CSD is just a communication tool, in the context 
of legitimacy theory, alleviating pressure from the community, and without direct economic 
dimensions.  
It can be argued that the study of consequences of CSD is related to identifying the 
motivations for this disclosure, as the motives of CSD represent the expected benefits of this 
disclosure. Generally, the drivers behind voluntary social and environmental disclosure, are 
achieving financial benefits for companies, and/or complying with external pressure. With 
regard to the first driver; it indicates that CSD may positively affect the economic 
performance of the companies. There is a divergence of views at the theoretical level, and at 
the level of results provided by the empirical studies, in this regard. With reference to the 
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second driver, CSD is a response to external pressure. It is considered a basic component of 
legitimacy theory, which considers the most appropriate theory to explain CSD. According to 
this idea, the companies may be seeking to alleviate social pressure by improving their social 
reputation, and CSD is playing an important role in this process.  
It can be argued that, according to legitimacy theory, companies use CSD as a tool for 
legitimising their activities, in the face of social pressure. Therefore, the primary consequence 
of CSD is to improve corporate social reputation, while there is no clear theoretical link 
between CSD and financial performance. To examine this idea, this chapter explores the 
impact of CSD on both corporate social reputation, and corporate financial performance. The 
chapter extends the previous studies in two ways; firstly, by concentrating on the quantity and 
quality of CSD on both annual and stand-alone reports, and secondly, by using Tobin’s Q as 
an indicator of corporate financial performance. 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
According to legitimacy theory, companies use social disclosure as a legitimacy tool, as CSD 
can be considered a part of corporate legitimacy strategy. Actually, the companies voluntarily 
provide social and environmental information, to satisfy the community’s desire to identify 
the degree of commitment of companies toward their social responsibilities. Therefore, CSD 
is directed at all sectors in the society and as a result, the consequences of this disclosure 
depend on its importance to each sector, and the ability of these groups to influence 
companies (figure 9.1). Solomon (2000) indicated that the difference between environmental 
and financial reporting is in the greater emphasis attached to some users (employees, 
legislators and regulators), and the less significant emphasis attached to others (shareholders).  
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Figure 9.1: Theoretical framework for consequences of CSD 
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The previous figure shows that companies provide social disclosure for different sectors 
(stakeholders, NGOs, professional organisations, governments, investors and SRI) of society. 
It can be argued that the consequences of CSD depend on the extent to which CSD appears to 
be important to each sector. In this context, it appears that stakeholders, NGOs and 
professional organisations are more interested in CSD than other groups, and they can react 
to social disclosure, by improving companies’ social reputation, while the importance of CSD 
for investors is still a disputed concern. In addition, the low proportion of socially responsible 
investors in the financial market, reflects the limited influence of this sector on companies, 
and consequently indicates a limited financial impact on CSD. Governments deliver CSD as a 
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means to evaluate the status of companies’ commitment to the concept of corporate social 
responsibility. Governments can therefore determine the need to enact various regulations 
that organise the impact of companies’ activities, on the environment and community as a 
whole. It can be expected then that CSD could aim to alleviate governmental intervention in 
companies’ activities, but it is difficult to examine this objective empirically. Therefore, the 
following general hypothesis can be formulated: 
General hypothesis: The consequence of CSD is to improve the corporate social reputation, 
while it has no direct impact on corporate financial performance. 
From this general hypothesis, two other hypotheses will be examined as follows: 
2.1 Corporate Reputation 
According to legitimacy theory, corporate reputation is considered to be the result of a 
legitimisation process. “Corporate image and corporate reputation are considered as the 
global outcomes of the process of legitimisation” (Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001: 227). Quevedo-
Puente, et al. (2007) argued that corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate reputation 
(CR) are two closely linked concepts, which include the relationship between the company 
and its stakeholders. These concepts are linked by company legitimisation, which considers 
the process that translates past performances into future expectations. Legitimisation 
transforms corporate social performance, an objective flow variable, into corporate 
reputation, a perceptual stock variable. There are some views that link CSD and corporate 
reputation. Hooghiemstra (2000) argued that narratives may contribute to the building of 
corporate reputation therefore; it is assumed that companies can try to influence their 
reputation by engaging in CSD (Hooghiemstra, 2000: 58). Michelon (2007) argued that once 
a company has a strong reputation, CSD can be used to preserve such a reputation (Michelon, 
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2007: 7). Bebbington et al. (2008) stated that there is some evidence that companies use CSR 
reports to manage their reputation risks; 
· Co-operative Financial Services stated that its reporting approach seeks to build upon its 
reputation as being amongst the most socially responsible businesses in the world. 
· Global reporting initiatives (GRI) 2002, confirms the perception of a link between 
reputation risk-management and CSR reporting, when it is stated that the process of 
developing a sustainability report, provides a warning of trouble spots, in both reputation 
and brand management. 
· KPMG’s 2005 survey of CSR reporting claims that one of the business drivers for CSR is 
to maintain a good brand and reputation (Bebbington et al., 2008: 341).  
The expected relationship between CSD and corporate reputation can be theorised in the 
context of two ideas. Firstly, corporate communication strategy plays an important role in 
constructing corporate reputation, and CSD is considered part of corporate communication 
strategy. Secondly, corporate social responsibility activities positively add to corporate 
reputation, and CSD is considered an interpretation of the corporate social responsibility 
concept. In the context of the first perspective, corporate reputation is considered a socially 
constructed concept, which reflects the stakeholders’ perceptions of how well companies’ 
responses are meeting the demands and expectations of different stakeholders (Nguyen & 
Leblanc, 2001: 228). Corporate image involves people’s perceptions of the company, which 
results from information transmitted via the company’s communications. Lewis (2001) stated 
that reputation is a product, at any particular moment, of a mix of behaviour, communication 
and expectation. Gray & Balmer (1998) presented an operational model for managing 
corporate reputation and image, suggesting that companies gain their reputation or image 
through their communication (Gray & Balmer, 1998: 696). Espinosa & Trombetta (2004) 
argued that the communication strategy of a company is crucial in determining its image, and 
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quality of annual report disclosures is a natural element of a company’s communication 
strategy. Lewis (2003) argued that if companies are to engage the public in the 21st century, 
their communication must give social responsibility a bigger and more central role. Ethics 
and values will play a more prominent role in consumer choices.  
Concerning the second perspective, corporate reputation is affected by, among other things, 
the quality of management, the company’s financial soundness and its demonstration of 
awareness of social matters (Hooghiemstra, 2000:58). Lewis (2003) stated that there are six 
major facets of reputation which determine overall reputation: leadership, quality of 
products/services, financial performance, treatment of staff, environmental responsibility and 
social responsibility. 
Therefore, the relationship between CSD and corporate reputation can be theoretically 
justified, and the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 1a: The quantity of social disclosure has a positive impact on corporate social 
reputation. 
Hypothesis 1b: The quality of social disclosure has a positive impact on corporate social 
reputation. 
2.2 Market Value  
Theoretically, an increased level of disclosure (either increased quantity of disclosure, or 
quality of disclosure, or both) reduces the information asymmetry between the company and 
its shareholders, or among potential buyers and sellers of company shares. This, in turn, 
should reduce the discount at which company shares are sold and hence lower the costs of 
issuing capital (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000: 92). Plumlee, et al. (2007) posited that, 
theoretically, voluntary disclosure quality, influences firm value through direct effects on a 
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company’s cost of equity capital, and/or indirect effects on a company’s cash flow (Plumlee, 
et al, 2007: 3). Rahman (2002) argued that corporate voluntary disclosure is considered one 
of the determinants of market value, with internal and external corporate governance factors.  
The theoretical link between CSD and economic performance is based on two pillars: (1) the 
increasing interest in CSR suggests that investors may be interested in social responsibility 
information in investment decisions, and (2) the accompanying increase in socially 
responsible investors creates more demand for social responsibility information. With regard 
to the first pillar, a number of studies indicate the increasing interest in CSR, and the potential 
positive relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial 
performance. Therefore, investors are interested in corporate social performance information 
when making investment decisions. In this context, Shane & Spicer (1983) indicated that 
empirical studies have investigated the general question of whether investors have found 
corporate social information useful for investment decisions, and, in general, it is not clear 
that investors actually use corporate social information in making investment decisions 
(Shane & Spicer, 1983: 522). The empirical evidence, concerning the argument that investors 
are interested in CSD, is mixed. Some early studies support this argument. Elis (1972) found 
a weak preference for reports which include human resource information. Hendricks (1976) 
found that the inclusion of human resource information in reports, affects stock investment 
decisions. Acland (1976) found that analysts use behavioural indicators in their investment 
decisions. Other early studies failed to support this argument. Buzby & Falk (1979) found 
that social information is not important for university investors. McNally, et al (1982) found 
that social and environmental information is of little use to the financial community.   
Recently, Solomon & Solomon (2006) noted a moderate request from institutional investors 
on public, social and environmental information. Valore et al. (2009) surveyed both 
individual investors and financial consultants about social investment. Individual investors 
                                                                                                                         -- 319 -- 
showed moderate awareness of the socially responsible investment concept, given that only 
36.8% had heard of it before, and 0.05% of the sample uses non-economic criteria to choose 
their investment. Concerning financial consultants, nearly all of them (96.5%) are aware of 
SRI, and 65% would not invest in companies with better social performance, unless returns 
are equal or higher. Therefore, the idea that investors are using social information may seem 
uncertain, and needs further testing. On the other hand, Murray et al. (2006) argued that 
financial markets are offering a big opportunity for international capitalism to re-invent itself 
in a new form that is compatible with the exigencies of sustainability, and the important 
factor in achieving this is information, and in particular, information about social 
responsibility activities. At the same time, they cast a light on an important point concerning 
the usefulness of inside disclosure in this matter, in arguing that social and environmental 
disclosure through annual reports fulfils this role, but this disclosure is inadequate, because it 
fails to offer a complete picture of a company’s social responsibility activities (Murray et al., 
2006: 229). In addition, one can query the source of social information which persuades the 
investor to obtain such information.  
With regard to the second pillar, the growing percentage of socially responsible investors 
(SRI) is a strong factor in the expected positive impact of social disclosure on economic 
performance. Ullmann (1985) posited that ethical investors could pay a premium price for 
shares in socially responsive companies. Murray et al. (2006) argued that the growth in 
ethical investment funds, reverses the traditional hypothesis that all investors are exclusively 
interested in a financial appraisal of their investments, so social and environmental 
information may well offer an important source of direct input to ethical investors’ decisions 
(Murray et al., 2006: 232). In this context, an important question is raised about the size of 
social responsible investment in financial markets, and whether this size is considered 
adequate to influence companies.   
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In previous literature, the relationship between CSD and the economic performance of a 
company was studied from two points of view. One examined economic performance as a 
determinant of CSD, and the other examined economic performance as a result of CSD. The 
empirical results of the studies provided inconclusive evidence about the relationship 
between CSD and economic performance. Given the ambiguous theoretical opinions and 
empirical results, the null hypothesis appears to be most appropriate, and more consistent 
with legitimacy theory.  
Hypothesis 2a: The quantity of CSD has no impact on the corporate market value. 
Hypothesis 2b: The quality of CSD has no impact on the corporate market value. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Empirical Models and Data 
The objective of this chapter is to explore the consequences of CSD through the study of 
both the social and the economic impact of CSD, using the following empirical models: 
3.1.1 Social impact 
This model examines the influence of CSD on corporate social reputation, using the sample 
of 317 companies in 2005, and 327 companies in 2006. The dependent variable is corporate 
social reputation, which will be measured according to whether the company was located in 
the CSR index or not. Ullmann (1985) argued that one approach to measuring social 
performance is the development of reputational indices, which list companies exhibiting good 
or bad social performance. Collison et al. (2009) interviewed management of companies 
listed in FTSE4Good, and asked them about the possible reputational risk that companies 
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could encounter if they were not listed in FTSE4Good. The results indicated that inclusion in 
indices had a significant impact on companies’ reputation.  Different organisations are 
interested in measuring the social performance of companies and issuing rankings for 
companies based on this performance, such as the EIRIS database in the UK, and the KLD 
database in the USA. Also, some media are interested in issue ranking for companies based 
on their social performance such as Business Ethics 100 Best Corporate Citizens, Fortune 
Most Admired Companies, and Britain’s most admired companies issued by Management 
Today. In addition there is Dow Jones Sustainability Index DJSI and FTSE4Good. 
Previous studies used this approach to measure reputation; both Toms (2002) and Hasseldine 
et al. (2005) used Britain’s Most Admired Companies’ index, and Michelon (2007) used 
DJSI. Therefore, corporate social reputation will be measured as a dummy variable, which 
equals: 
1, if the company is included in the social responsibility index, and 
0, otherwise 
Six social indices will be used, (FTSE4Good, Dow Jones Sustainability Index, Britain’s Most 
Admired Companies, Fortune Global Most Admired Companies, Business in the Community 
and Global 100 Sustainability Companies) and then points are collected for each company. 
Corporate social reputation will be measured in both 2006 and 2007, as the empirical model 
examines the relationship between CSD in a given year, with corporate reputation in the 
following year. 
The independent variables comprise four variables, which represent the quantity and quality 
of CSD, in both annual and stand-alone reports. The measurement of independent variables 
was discussed in detail in chapter 4. In addition, two control variables will be used in the 
model; corporate size and corporate profitability. 
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Specified model  
The following figure presents the social impact mo 
Figure 9.2: Social impact model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following regression model will be used to examine the relationship between corporate 
social reputations and lagged corporate reputation: 
CR = ß0 +ß1 CSDars + ß2 CSDarq + β3 CSDsa+ β4 CSDsaq+ β5 CSta + β6 PRO +ε 
Where: 
ß0              intercept 
ß1 to ß8    coefficient for slope parameters 
ε               error 
Dependent variable 
CR           Corporate social reputation 
Independent variables 
CSDars     the quantity of social disclosure in annual reports 
Corporate 
reputation 
CSD 
Quantity of CSD in annual reports 
Quality of CSD in annual reports 
Quantity of CSD in stand-alone 
reports 
Quality of CSD in stand-alone reports 
Control variables 
Corporate size 
Corporate profitability 
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CSDarq    the quality of social disclosure in annual reports 
CSDsa     the quantity of disclosure in stand-alone reports 
CSDsaq   the quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports 
Control variables 
CSta        Corporate size measured by total assets 
PRO        Financial performance (profitability) measured by the return on assets 
3.1.2 Financial impact 
To examine the financial impact of CSD, two tests will be used. The first will examine the 
correlation between CSD and the profitability ratios, profit margin %, EBIT margin % (profit 
before interest / turnover), EBITDA (profit before interest + depreciation + amortisation of 
intangibles /turnover) and average annual stock-earnings yield. This correlation test is based 
on a sample of 317 companies in 2005, and 327 companies in 2006. The profitability ratios 
have been obtained from the FAME database. 
Corporate value model 
This model examines the influence of CSD on corporate market value, which represents a 
proxy for corporate financial performance, in 2006 and 2007. The sample for this model 
comprises FTSE 100 companies in 2005 and 2006. The dependent variable is corporate 
market value, which will be measured using Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q represents the ratio of the 
market value to the replacement cost of assets. If the value of the ratio is less than one, this 
means less profitable investment opportunities are expected, and if the value is more than 
one, this means more profitable investment opportunities are expected (Wahba, 2008: 92). It 
was developed by James Tobin. It is widely used as an indicator of intangible value in 
economics research, and in the international business literature (Dowell, et al, 2000:1063). 
Tobin's Q has been used to explain a number of diverse corporate phenomena, such as: 
· Cross-sectional differences in investment and diversification decisions. 
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· The relation between managerial equity ownership and corporate value. 
· The relation between managerial performance and tender offer gains. 
· Investment opportunities and tender offer responses. 
· The relation between industry structure and corporate profitability. 
· The effect of deposit constraints on bank lending. 
· The motive for corporate cash holdings (Chung & Pruitt, 1994:71; Erickson & Whited, 
2006: 7). 
The benefit of Tobin's q is that it makes comparisons between companies relatively easier 
than comparison based on stock returns or accounting measures where a risk adjustment or 
normalization is required (Allaynnis & Weston, 2001: 251). Heal, (2005) mentioned that 
“one robust result seems to be that superior environmental performance is correlated with 
high values for Tobin’s q” (Heal, 2005:402). 
Erickson & Whited, (2006) discussed a wide variety of estimates of Tobin’s q by using 
various combinations of the different algorithms. Two measures of preferred equity, four 
measures of debt, and five measures each for inventories and for the capital stock can be used 
to compute 200 different estimates of Tobin’s q. they summarize that to examine five 
estimates of Tobin’s q (book, LB, LR, NB, and EW) and they find that none of these 
estimates is of high quality q proxy. 
Some studies used Q as a proxy of firm value; Allaynnis & Weston, (2001) examined the 
impact of using foreign currency derivatives on firm value (Tobin's q), Dowell, et al, (2000) 
find that companies adopting a stringent global environmental standard have higher market 
values as measured by Tobin's q, Lo & Sheu, (2007) find a significantly positive relationship 
between corporate sustainability and its market value measured by Tobin's q. 
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In this study Tobin’s q will be measured (as in Gomper et al., 2003; Moon, 2007) as follows: 
                    Market value of assets 
Tobin’s q =  
                     Book value of assets 
 Book value of assets + market value of common stocks – book value of 
common stocks – deferred taxes 
 
                                                                   Book value of assets 
Independent variables are four variables which represent quantity and quality of CSD in 
both annual and stand-alone reports. The measurement of independent variables was 
discussed in detail in chapter 5.  
In addition, previous literature (Allayannis & Weston, 2001; Lo & Sheu, 2007) indicated 
some variables that could affect the firm value, and must be excluded from the model. These 
variables are: 
· Size – there is ambiguous evidence about the influence of corporate size on firm value. 
This variable will be measured by using total assets. 
· Access to financial market – if the companies are not able to obtain the necessary 
financing, their Q may remain high because they only undertake positive NPV (net present 
value) projects. This variable will be measured by using a dividend dummy with value 1, 
if a company paid a dividend in the current year, and value 0, otherwise. 
· Leverage – the company’s capital structure has an impact on its value, so it must be able to 
control the capital structure effect. This variable will be measured by total debt, divided by 
total assets. 
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· Profitability – if the company is more profitable, it is more likely to trade with a premium, 
than a less profitable one, and thus increase its Q. This variable will be measured by return 
on assets, which is defined as the ratio of net income (loss) to total assets. 
· Investment growth – the corporate value depends on future investment opportunities. This 
variable will be measured by the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. 
· Industrial diversification – there is ambiguous evidence about the influence of industry 
diversification on firm value. While some theoretical arguments suggest that industry 
diversification leads to increase in the firm value, there is some empirical evidence 
showing that industry diversification is negatively related to firm value. This variable will 
be measured as a dummy variable with value 1, if a company operates in more than one 
sector, and value 0, otherwise. 
· Multinationality – there are some theoretical arguments suggesting that geographical 
diversification increases value. This variable will be measured by the percentage of sales 
to foreign countries to total sales (for the manufacturing companies), or the percentage of 
foreign branches to total branches (for non-manufacturing companies).  
The following regression model will be used to examine the relationship between CSD and 
lagged corporate market value: 
TQ = ß0 +ß1 CSDars +ß2 CSDarq + ß3 CSDsa + β4 CSDsaq+ β5 CS +ß6 AFM + ß7 LEV + ß8 CP +ß9 
IG +ß10 ID +ß11 DMA + ε 
Where: 
ß0                   intercept 
ß1 TO ß11       coefficient for slope determinants 
ε                    error 
TQ                firm value measured by Tobin’s q 
Independent variables 
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CSDars         quantity of social disclosure in annual reports 
CSDarq        quality of social disclosure in annual reports 
CSDsa          quantity of social disclosure in stand-alone reports 
CSDsaq        quality of social disclosure in stand-alone reports 
Control variables 
CS               corporate size  
AFM           access to financial market 
LEV            leverage 
CP              corporate profitability 
IG               investment growth 
ID              industry diversification 
DMA         degree of multinational activities 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for CSD was discussed in detail in chapter 5. Regarding the corporate 
reputation variable, table 9.1 provide descriptive statistics for this variable. the average score 
for corporate reputation is 1.5 in 2006, and 1.36 in 2007, and the frequencies of corporate 
reputation score in table 1 is 0.9. The table indicated that 102 companies (32.2%) are not 
listed in any social index in 2006, and these companies increase to 123 companies (37.6%) in 
2007. The majority of companies (67.8% and 62.4% in 2005 and 2006 respectively) are listed in at 
least one social index, and it appears that most of these companies are listed in one or two 
social indices. In 2006, 89 (32.2%) companies are listed in one social index, and this 
increased to 94 companies (28.7%) in 2007. In addition, 54 companies (17%) are listed in 
two social indices and this decreased to 41 companies (12.5%) in 2007. Only five companies 
are listed in six social indices in both 2005 and 2006.  
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Table 9.1: Corporate reputation descriptive statistics 
Social 
reputatio
n score 
Part 
1:200
6 
Frequenc
y 
Percentag
e 
Valid 
percentag
e 
Part:
2 
2007 
Frequenc
y 
Percentag
e 
Valid 
percentag
e 
0  102 31.0 32.2  123 36.6 37.6 
1  89 27.1 28.1  94 28.0 28.7 
2  54 16.4 17.0  41 12.2 12.5 
3  28 8.5 8.8  27 8.0 8.3 
4  28 8.5 8.8  25 7.4 7.6 
5  11 3.3 3.5  12 3.6 3.7 
6  5 1.5 1.6  5 1.5 1.5 
 
The descriptive statistics for FTSE 100 companies (not reported) show that, with regard to 
CSD, the quantity of CSD in annual reports is between 2 and 500 sentences in 2005, and 
between 7 and 691 sentences in 2006. Minimum quantity reflects that all FTSE 100 
companies provide CSD in their annual reports. The maximum quantity is the same 
maximum for the sample as a whole, indicating that FTSE 100 companies are more interested 
in CSD within the sample. The average quantity of CSD in annual reports is 148.92 sentences 
in 2005, and increased to 178.84 sentences in 2006. Comparing this average with the average 
of the whole sample (102.24 and 116.89 sentences in 2005 and 2006 respectively) confirms 
the notion that FTSE 100 companies are more interested in CSD within the sample. The 
average quality score for CSD in annual reports is 0.48 in 2005, and this increased to 0.51 in 
2006. Comparing this score with the average score for the sample as a whole (0.4280 and 
0.4258 in 2005 and 2006 respectively), suggests that FTSE 100 companies show higher 
quality score within the sample. With regard to CSD in stand-alone reports, the average 
quantity of disclosure is 34.73 pages in 2005, and increased slightly to 35.60 pages in 2006. 
Comparing this average with the average of the sample as a whole (16.3531 and 16.1410 
pages in 2005 and 2006 respectively), indicates that FTSE 100 companies are also more 
interested in corporate responsibility reports. The average quality score for stand-alone 
reports is 0.71 in 2005 and 0.87 in 2006. Comparing these averages with the averages of the 
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sample as a whole (0.245 and 0.3365 in 2005 and 2006 respectively), reflects that FTSE 100 
companies are more interested in using reporting guidelines and third-party assurance within 
the sample.  
The average of Tobin’s q is approximately the same over the two-year period, (0.64 and 0.65 
in 2005 and 2006 respectively). The average of industrial growth is 9.37 and 11.70 in 2005 
and 2006 respectively. The average of profitability is approximately the same over the two 
years, 0.07 and 0.08, and the degree of multinationality over the two years is 0.50 and 0.47. 
4.2 Social Impact 
4.2.1 Correlation results  
To examine the relationship between each disclosure variable and corporate reputation, a 
correlation analysis is performed. The correlation test is performed on six disclosure 
variables, representing quantity and quality of CSD in both annual and stand-alone reports, 
and total quantity and quality of CSD. Table 9.2 provides the correlation results between 
corporate social disclosure variables in both 2005 and 2006, and lagged corporate social 
reputation (corporate reputation in both 2006 and 2007). The consistent results in both 2005 and 
2006 show a high correlation between CSD and CR. Further analysis of these results shows 
that CR is more correlated with social disclosure in stand-alone reports, than social disclosure 
in annual reports. The correlation coefficients between corporate reputation and quantity of 
disclosure in stand-alone reports (.501 and .515 in 2005 and 2006 respectively), is higher than the 
coefficients between corporate reputation and quantity of disclosure in annual reports (.400 and 
.427 in 2005 and 2006 respectively). In addition, the correlation coefficients between corporate 
reputation and quality of disclosure in stand-alone reports (.541 and .592 in 2005 and 2006 
respectively), is higher than the coefficients between corporate reputation and quality of 
disclosure in annual reports (.231 and .364 in 2005 and 2006 respectively). This result reflects the 
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fact that that the organisations concerned with the composition of social indices are more 
interested in corporate responsibility reports as a means of disclosing social and 
environmental information, than annual reports. On the other hand, the corporate reputation is 
more correlated with the quality of social disclosure, than the quantity of social disclosure. 
The correlation coefficients between corporate reputation, and variables that represent quality 
of disclosure, are higher than the variables that represent quantity of disclosure.  
Table 9.2: Correlation results between social disclosure and corporate reputation  
 
 
4.2.2 Regression results  
To examine the impact of CSD on corporate reputation, a regression analysis is conducted, 
using both cross-sectional and panel data. Given that the dependent variable is count data, the 
analysis is conducted using the Poisson regression (Long & Freese, 2003). A likelihood ratio 
chi-squared statistic test (goodness of fit chi2) is conducted to examine over-dispersion, and 
the results show that Poisson distribution is appropriate. 
4.2.2.1 Cross-sectional regression results 
Table 9.3 provides Poisson regression results for each year. Generally, the results in both 
2005 and 2006 appear to provide evidence that CSD is positively associated with corporate 
2005 CR 
 
2006 CR 
 CSDars .400** 
.000 
CSDar .427** 
.000 
CSDary .231** 
.000 
CSDary .364** 
.000 
CSDsa .501** 
.000 
CSDsa .515** 
.000 
CSDsay .541** 
.000 
CSDsay .592** 
.000 
CSDt .527** 
.000 
CSDt .547** 
.000 
CSDty .555** 
.000 
CSDty .634** 
.000 
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reputation, indicating that increasing the level of CSD leads to increasing social reputation. In 
2005, the results show that variables of CSDars, CSDsa and CSDsaq are positively associated 
with CR, while CSDarq is not associated. This result indicates that, consistent with previous 
correlation results, corporate responsibility reports have more impact on corporate social 
reputation, than social disclosure in annual reports. Quality of disclosure in stand-alone 
reports has the strongest association with corporate reputation (coef. .2073901), indicating that, 
consistent with previous correlation results, the quality of social disclosure, in particular the 
quality of stand-alone reports, has more impact on corporate reputation, than the quantity of 
social disclosure. This result suggests that organisations concerned with the composition of 
social indices could be more interested in corporate responsibility reports, which are prepared 
in accordance with the corporate responsibility guidelines (such as GRI), and which have 
been reviewed by an independent auditor. Similar results emerge in 2006, in which CSDarq, 
CSDsa and CSDsaq are positively associated with corporate reputation, while CSDars is not 
associated. CSDarq and CSDsaq are more associated with CR (coef. .8515095, and .283274 
respectively), and CSDarq has the greatest impact on CR (coef. .8515095). This result confirms 
that quality of disclosure has a stronger impact on corporate social reputation. 
These results are consistent with the results of Toms (2002) and Hasseldine et al. (2005), 
which indicated that social (or environmental) disclosure significantly adds to the creation of 
social (environmental) reputation, but these previous results are extended by providing 
evidence that stand-alone reports have more effect than annual reports. It is also consistent 
with the findings of Hasseldine et al. (2005), which indicated that quality of disclosure has a 
stronger effect on environmental reputation, than quantity of disclosure. With regard to 
hypothesis 1, which refers to a positive impact for quantity and quality of CSD on corporate 
reputation, the overall results appear to provide evidence that supports this hypothesis. 
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Table 9.3: Cross-sectional regression results for each year 
 Part 1:2005 Part 2: 2006 
      Coef. 
 
   P     Coef.     P 
CSDars .0012616 0.048 .0001312 0.805 
CSDarq .0289847 0.935 .8515095 0.026 
CSDsa .0033046 0.017 .0028892 0.063 
CSDsaq .2073901 0.005 .283274 0.000 
PRO .2245775 0.784 .794475 0.174 
CSta .5139339 0.000 .4936808 0.000 
Cons. 
 
-4.75368 0.000 -5.047805 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1954 0.2520 
Goodness-of-fit chi2 246.8629 291.4396 
Prob > chi2 0.7111 0.5312 
 
4.2.2.2 Panel data analysis 
The advantage of panel data regression is that it takes times effect into account. Table 9.4 
provides Poisson regression results with panel data. The results of panel data regression are 
largely consistent with cross-sectional regression analysis. It appears that all disclosure 
variables are significantly associated with corporate reputation, and quality of disclosure is 
more associated with CR, than quantity of disclosure (coef. .6582335 and .4280455 for CSDarq and 
CSDsaq respectively) 
The consistent regression results (cross-sectional and panel) provide evidence that both 
annual report disclosure, which reports specific activities, and audited corporate 
responsibility reports that are prepared using reporting guidelines, can positively add to 
corporate social reputation. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         -- 333 -- 
Table 9.4: Poisson regression with panel data 
 Coef P 
 
CSDars .0018685 0.000 
CSDarq .6582335 0.050 
CSDsa .0040755 0.012 
CSDsaq .4280455 0.000 
PRO -1.138927 0.060 
CSta .0685233 0.023 
Cons. -1.026235 0.001 
Wald chi2(6)    149.36 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) =    30.79 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
4.2.3 Sensitivity analysis (alternative measures) 
Two additional sensitivity analyses are performed: (1) Using two variables to measure the 
level of CSD, total quantity of social disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports, and 
total quality of disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports. (2) Using the number of 
employees as an alternative measure of corporate size. These two analyses provide results 
that are consistent with previously reported results. 
4.3 Financial Impact 
It is hypothesised that CSD has no direct economic impact, and to examine this hypothesis, 
two types of analyses are performed. The results of these analyses follow: 
4.3.1 Profitability ratios 
To examine the potential financial impact of CSD, the correlation between CSD and 
profitability ratios is explored. The correlation results (Table 9.5) show that there is no 
correlation between pre-social disclosure and profitability ratios. This result is not consistent 
with Parsa & Kouhy, (2001), who show that profitability was found to be positively 
associated with CSD. This result is consistent with mainstream studies that examined the 
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relationship between profitability and CSD, from the point of view that profitability is a 
determinant of CSD, and indicated a non-relationship between them. 
Table 9.5: The correlation results between social disclosure and profitability ratios 
Part 
1:2005 
Profit 
margin 
EBIT EBITDA Earnings 
yield 
Part2: 
2006 
Profit 
margin 
EBIT EBITDA Earnings 
yield 
CSDar .061 
.351 
 
-.058 
.334 
-.011 
.871 
-.161* 
.015 
CSDar .047 
.466 
-.035 
.553 
-.013 
.843 
-.017 
.786 
CSDary .055 
.406 
 
-.060 
.318 
.007 
.922 
-.117 
.081 
CSDary .081 
.202 
.030 
.617 
-.030 
.659 
.003 
.958 
CSDsa -.007 
.912 
 
-.014 
.817 
-.011 
.874 
-.078 
.241 
CSDsa .000 
.997 
.033 
.585 
.053 
.442 
.049 
.448 
CSDsay -.034 
.615 
 
.087 
.158 
.084 
.228 
-.017 
.809 
CSDsay .046 
.478 
.014 
.817 
.090 
.187 
.075 
.249 
SCDt .005 
.939 
 
-.020 
.736 
-.010 
.881 
-.090 
.178 
SCDt .003 
.964 
.026 
.662 
.053 
.436 
.041 
.523 
CSDty -.015 
.825 
.067 
.272 
.082 
.227 
-.016 
.816 
CSDty .053 
.403 
.017 
.781 
.080 
.237 
.068 
.290 
 
4.3.2 Corporate market value 
Corporate market value is considered an indicator of the actual position of a company in 
financial markets. Analysis of the impact of CSD on corporate market value could provide a 
clear indicator of the importance of CSD to investors.  
4.3.2.1 Correlation results  
To examine the relationship between each disclosure variable and corporate market value, 
correlation analysis is performed. Table 9.6 presents the correlation results between corporate 
market values, as measured by Tobin’s Q. The results show that there is no significant 
correlation between CSD and TQ, with the exception of the significant correlation between 
CSDarq and TQ in 2006. 
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Table 9.6: The correlation results between social disclosure and corporate market value 
2005 TQ 2006 
 
TQ 
 CSDars .037 
.739 
 CSDar .168 
.110 
CSDarq .017 
.882 
CSDary .406** 
.000 
CSDsa -.088 
.431 
CSDsa .132 
.208 
CSDsaq -.159 
.150 
CSDsay .131 
.215 
CSDt -.083 
.454 
CSDt .147 
.162 
CSDtq .037 
.166 
CSDty .189 
.071 
 
4.3.2.2 Regression results  
To examine the overall impact of CSD on corporate market value, regression analysis is 
conducted, using panel data analysis. There are two types of panel data regression: the fixed-
effects model and the random-effects model. Statistically, the fixed-effects model is the 
appropriate model with panel data, but sometimes the random-effects model provides better 
results. Therefore, the Hausman test46 is conducted to choose between fixed and random-
effects models. The result of the Hausman test (chi2 (8) =   52.56 and Prob>chi2 =   0.0000) points to 
the fixed-effects model being more appropriate. Table 9.7 provides the results of OLS 
regression with panel data. 
 
                                                   
46 Hausman test examines the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated are the same in both the random 
and fixed-effects models. Insignificant P value shows that coefficients are the same in both models, and 
therefore the random-effects model can be used (Stock & Watson, 2003). 
Table 9.7: Panel regression fixed-effects 
 Coef. 
 
Std. Err. P [95% Conf. Interval] 
CSDars -.000077 .0002497 0.759 -.00058     .000426 
CSDarq .0435652 .1597368 0.786 -.2781611    .3652916 
CSDsa -.0000522 .0004936 0.916 -.0010463    .0009419 
CSDsaq -.0036744 .022818 0.873 -.0496321    .0422833 
LEV -.9981681 .2587086 0.000 -1.519234   -.4771022 
IG -.0008363 .0053712 0.877 -.0116544    .0099818 
PRO -.9637482 .370128 0.012 -1.709224   -.2182721 
DMA .4961757 .1623406   0.004 .1692049    .8231464 
Cons. 
 
.7637349 .1587751 0.000 .4439455    1.083524 
R-sq:  within 0.6213 
           between 0.0005 
          overall 0.0000 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(92, 45) =     8.47              Prob > F = 0.0000 
The regression results show that, consistent with previous correlation results, to a large 
extent, there is no significant association between CSD and corporate market value. These 
results appear to provide evidence that there are no financial consequences for CSD. These 
results are considered inconsistent with some studies which indicated an association between 
CSD and some financial aspects. Gozali et al. (2002) found a relationship between 
environmental disclosure and share price, but they differentiated between good and bad 
environmental news. Blacconiere & Northcut (1997) found a relationship between stock 
prices and the extensive use of environmental disclosure in chemical companies. Murray et 
al. (2006) indicated that over a period of time, total social and environmental disclosure is 
significantly related to market returns, even after adjusting for the size effect, and Richardson 
& Welker (2001), indicated, in a contrasting hypothesis, that there is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between the level of social disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
With regard to the second hypothesis, which indicated no impact of CSD on market value, 
the overall results provide evidence to support this hypothesis. The non-association between 
CSD and corporate market value provides an indicator that investors are not actually 
interested in social disclosure information when they make their investment decisions. 
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Despite the growing importance of corporate social responsibility practices, suggesting that 
the investors could draw attention to the social responsibility information in the investment 
decision-making process, the studies conducted to examine the extent of investor interest in 
social disclosure, provided mixed results, with Anderson & Frankle (1980) and Epstein & 
Freedman (1994) indicating that investors are interested in social disclosure, while Chan & 
Milne (1999) indicated that there is no significant reaction to good environmental 
performance, and Milne & Chan (1999) show that the decision impact of CSD is small. 
According to the Oracle and Economist Intelligence Unit, based on the results from the 
Corporate Responsibility Survey, 85% of executives and investors surveyed, ranked 
corporate responsibility a central consideration in investment decisions (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2005). On the contrary, Murray et al. (2006) argue that despite investors 
exhibiting an increasing demand for social responsibility information, there is no proven link 
between the price-sensitivity of social disclosure and the substantial changes in economic 
circumstances that this information could be signalling (Murray et al., 2006: 231). Epstein & 
Freedman (1994) argued that social information should theoretically be of use to various 
stakeholders (Epstein & Freedman, 1994: 97), and their survey results, regarding the 
importance of social and economic information for various stakeholders, show that most 
shareholders prefer economic information (83.55% prefer additional information on 
economic impacts and 69.83% prefer social information), while other stakeholders 
(employees, community groups, customers and environmental groups) prefer social 
disclosure, more than economic disclosure. In addition, Shane & Spicer (1983) indicated that 
investors use externally-produced social information in making investment decisions. 
Blacconiere & Patten (1994) found that there is market reaction to environmental disclosure, 
but this was related to environmental disasters. Balabanis et al. (1998) found a negative 
market reaction in the subsequent period, from companies with high CSD. These mixed 
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results indicate, to a large extent, that investors do not pay much attention to CSD. In addition 
to this debate about the importance of CSD to investors, an important concern has emerged 
concerning the adequacy of disclosed social and environmental information for investors. 
Buzby & Falk (1978) found that investors represent a reasonable source of demand for some 
social and environmental information, and there is inadequacy in the availability of public 
social and environmental disclosure. Harte, et al (1991) found that social and environmental 
information disclosed in annual reports was not considered adequate for investment 
decisions. In line with the notion of Murray, et al, (2006), that CSD in annual reports could 
be inadequate for investors, other studies have paid attention to another type of disclosure; 
private social disclosure. Private disclosure refers to the process of engagement in which one-
on-one discussions between companies, and users of information, is undertaken. Solomon & 
Solomon (2006) indicated that investors did not consider public CSD adequate for their 
investment decisions, and private CSD disclosure channels were developed. Solomon & 
Darby (2005) indicated that private CSD is important for both companies and investors, as it 
is used to inform companies about information required by investors. Thus the question 
arises: Which source of information do investors prefer to obtain social information? The 
empirical results of Dhaliwal, et al (2009) indicated that investors are more interested in 
social performance indicators, than CSR reporting.  
On the other hand, the theoretical link between CSD and financial performance depends, to 
a large extent, on social responsibility investment (SRI). Despite the rapid growth of SRI47, it 
is still a small percentage. The Social Investment Forum’s 2007 Report on Socially 
Responsible Investing Trends identified that approximately 11% of assets under professional 
                                                   
47 SRI assets rose more than 324% from $639 billion in 1995 (the year of the first Report on Socially 
Responsible Investing Trends in the United States) to $2.71 trillion in 2007. During the same period, the 
broader universe of assets under professional management increased less than 260% from $7 trillion to $25.1 
trillion. 
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management in the U.S. – nearly one out of every nine dollars – are now involved in SRI48. 
According to Eurosif (2006), SRIs represent between 10% and 15% of assets under 
management in the US and in Europe. This small proportion of SRI could explain its limited 
effect on financial markets. In addition to the notion of a low percentage of SRI, Miles, et al 
(2002) presented another view, which indicated that disclosure of social and environmental 
information was only partially useful for SRI assessment, because it did not focus on the 
relationship between this information and shareholder value and financial performance. 
Cross-sectional regression analysis 
An OLS regression analysis is also conducted. Table 9.8 provides the results of regression 
analysis for each year. Regression Diagnostic procedures (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
and VIF) do not reveal heteroskedasticity and multi-collinearity problems. With regard to 
heteroskedasticity, the chi-square values are small and the test is insignificant, indicating that 
heteroskedasticity is not a problem. In addition, VIF values show that multi-collinearity is in 
all likelihood, not a problem. The R2 value and the adjusted R2 value, shows that the models 
have a high level of explanatory power. The consistent results in both 2005 and 2006, in 
general, appear to provide evidence that CSD is not associated with TQ. Only CSDarq is 
positively associated with TQ in 2006. These results are largely consistent with panel data 
regression. This result is considered to be consistent, to some extent, with the findings of 
Plumlee et al., 2007, which examined the relationship between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and components of firm value (cost of capital and expected future cash flow). 
They documented a negative relationship between both cost of capital and expected future 
cash flows, and quality of voluntary environmental disclosure. 
                                                   
48 Social investment forum 2007 report on socially responsible investing trends in the United States. 
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 Table 9.8: OLS regression analysis for each year 
 Part 1: 2005 Part 2: 2006 
    Coef. 
 
   P  VIF     Coef.    P VIF 
CSDars .000492 0.575 1.20 -.0000272 0.904 1.54 
CSDarq .4127673 0.500 1.17 .7961413 0.000 1.51 
CSDsa 6.82e-06 0.997 1.32 -.0005813 0.399 1.30 
CSDsaq .0347794 0.723 1.28 .0316439 0.235 1.24 
LEV -3.303095 0.000 1.15 -.0671005 0.658 1.24 
IG -.0075507 0.098 1.36 -.0049784 0.000 1.26 
PRO 1.193898 0.326 1.20 -.2355646 0.353 1.22 
DMA 
 
-.7073821 0.005 1.19 .0302505 0.663 1.32 
F 88679.60 10.07 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Adj R-squared 
 
0.9999 0.4577 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity: 
chi2(1) 0.46 0.28 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.4955 0.5975 
Mean VIF 1.23 1.33 
 
4.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Two additional sensitivity analyses are performed: (1) Using two variables to measure the 
level of CSD, total quantity of social disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports and 
total quality of disclosure in both annual and stand-alone reports. (2) Using the number of 
employees as an alternative measure of corporate size. These two analyses provide results 
that are consistent with previously reported results. In addition, both robust and clustered-
robust checks are performed, and the robustness tests yield results that are consistent with the 
regression results. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
This chapter aimed to examine the consequences of CSD. It is hypothesised that CSD has a 
social impact, while it has no direct financial impact. The empirical results, taking into 
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account the previous results, supported the general hypothesis. Therefore, it can be argued 
that, on the one hand, CSD has a social impact, as it is positively associated with corporate 
social reputation, and on the other hand, there is no financial impact of CSD, as it is not 
associated with corporate market value. These results are consistent with the viewpoint of 
legitimacy theory, as the direct result of social disclosure as contained in this theory, is to 
influence the perceptions of society toward the impact of the activities of the company on the 
environment and the community as a whole, and consequently improve the company’s 
reputation.  
The results indicated that the quality of stand-alone corporate responsibility reports has a 
stronger effect on corporate social reputation. These results reflect the importance of these 
reports to interested parties, regarding corporate social responsibility. It also reflects the 
importance of preparing these reports, using the corporate responsibility disclosure 
guidelines, and having them reviewed by an independent auditor. These results draw attention 
to the need to focus on the development of clear standards or guidelines for the preparation of 
corporate responsibility reports, and to develop the process of reviewing these reports, in 
terms of the existence of independent parties, to carry out that process, and develop 
appropriate criteria for such a review. 
The absence of a financial impact of CSD can be interpreted in the light of the following 
reasons: (1) the probability that investors are not interested in social and environmental 
information when they make investment decisions, (2) social responsibility investment still 
represents a small proportion of the business environment, (3) the financial market still does 
not pay appropriate attention to corporate social responsibility and its impact on the financial 
future of the company. On the other hand, these results raise a number of questions which 
may require future study. Firstly, are investors and financial markets actually interested in 
CSD? The answer to this question will determine and explain, to a large extent, the impact of 
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corporate social responsibility on the economic performance of companies. Secondly, how 
important is CSD as a source of information for socially responsible investors, and are these 
investors dependent on company disclosure, or do they prefer to rely on other sources? The 
last question is; is this disclosure achieving its objectives? These questions cannot be 
answered without precise definitions of the objectives, but these questions can be analysed in 
the light of what has been agreed upon by the majority of previous studies, that companies 
voluntarily provide social and environmental information, in response to society’s interest in 
this matter. The results of this chapter, the positive impact of CSD on corporate reputation, 
suggest that CSD achieves its main objective in improving corporate social reputation, but on 
the other hand, good corporate reputation should be reflected in economic advantages for the 
company in the long term. 
The findings of this chapter seem to be consistent with the argument of Bebbington et al., 
(2008) that one of the emerging explanations of CSD is that it could be conceived as both an 
outcome of, and part of, the reputation risk-management process. This explanation can be 
understood in the context of legitimacy theory, and it is not considered as an alternative for 
legitimacy theory, in the view of Adams (2008). It can be argued that both legitimacy and 
reputation are related concepts, and corporate reputation is considered an outcome of the 
legitimisation process. On the other hand, it is difficult to discuss CSD in the context of the 
debate between the traditional view of the corporation (Friedman, 1962, 1970), and the new 
view of the corporation (Freeman, 1984), where there are no decisive theoretical or practical 
results to support whether financial markets actually draw attention to social disclosure, or 
not. In this context, it can be argued that external sources of information, regarding corporate 
social responsibility, seem to be more important than internal resources of this information.  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
  The extensive attention to the concept CSR over more than three decades is reflected in 
attention to the disclosure on these activities (CSD). A considerable body of literature has 
developed over the last three decades. This study aims to present a framework that can explain 
CSD in terms of both determinants and consequences. The study begins with the general 
argument, in line with the deductive approach, that legitimacy theory is considered the most 
appropriate theory to explain the phenomenon of CSD. According to legitimacy theory, CSD is a 
function of public pressure on companies concerning their social responsibilities. Based on this 
argument, the study presents a theoretical framework for both determinants and 
consequences.  In this context, the study presents previous studies related to determinants and 
consequences of CSD. This presentation of previous studies includes two general limitations of 
these studies: 
1. Limitations concerning CSD, as these studies do not provide a complete picture of CSD. 
Previous literature, in most cases, has concentrated on environmental disclosure which is 
considered one category of CSD. Also, previous studies concentrated extensively on the 
quantity of CSD with less attention paid to its quality. In addition, these studies paid the most 
attention to CSD in annual reports and ignored other disclosure media. 
2. Limitations concerning variables that are examined as determinants and consequences of 
CSD. Previous studies do not provide clear theoretical backgrounds for selected variables. 
Also, previous studies do not provide a clear framework for consequences of CSD and 
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provide mixed and ambiguous views of the association between CSD and economic 
performance.  
The theoretical framework to explain CSD has developed, and it is interpreted in three 
empirical models as follows: 
· The first model is to examine the determinants of CSD at a country level. The argument 
underlying this model is that socio-economic factors are incorporated to determine the level 
of awareness in society about CSR and consequently the level of CSD in a given country. 
Therefore, the variables that are examined as determinants of CSD in a given country are the 
economic level, culture dimensions and level of corporate governance.  
· The second model is to examine the determinants of CSD at a company level. The argument 
underlying this model is that the level of CSD for each company is determined according to 
the degree of social pressure that faces a company and how the company responds to this 
pressure. Therefore, the variables that are examined as determinants of CSD are corporate 
characteristics, media pressure and corporate governance practices. 
· The third model is to examine the consequences of CSD. The argument underlying this model 
is that the direct consequence of CSD is to improve corporate social reputations, and there is 
no direct economic consequence for it. Therefore, the variables that are examined as 
consequences of CSD are corporate social reputations and corporate values measured by 
Tobin’s q. 
Within these models are included a number of variables that are measured through some 
databases. Within this study, the focal variable is CSD which is measured in two types of 
documents; annual reports and corporate responsibility reports. Content analysis technique is 
used to measure both quantity and quality of disclosure in annual reports. These models are 
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statistically examined using regression methods and the following section presents summary of 
the results and conclusion.   
 
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION  
The empirical results provide evidence that supports, to a large extent, a suggested 
framework. The following figure presents the framework that was the subject of the 
empirical examination.  
Figure 10.1: The suggested framework to explain CSD 
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                                                                           (1)  Social pressure  
                                          Companies                                                         Society 
                                                                            (2)  Social disclosure  
Through this framework, three empirical models were examined. The results of the 
empirical models provide some insights.  
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At a country level, both cultural values and economic level determine the level of social 
responsibility disclosure in the country. This result can be interpreted in the context of a 
suggested framework as both prevalent cultural values and level of economic 
development actually determine the degree of community awareness by non-economic 
issues such as the social and environmental impacts of companies’ activities. 
Consequently, they determine the level of social pressure on companies regarding their 
social responsibilities. This idea clarifies the general argument in prior literature that 
CSD is a Western phenomenon, as it indicates a strong association between economic 
level and CSD in a given country.  
At a company level, two models were examined, one for determinants and another for 
consequences of CSD. Concerning determinants of CSD, it appears that quantity of CSD, 
and to lesser extent quality of CSD, can be determined according to the following 
variables: corporate size, type of activity, media pressure, board size, the presence of 
corporate responsibility committee as a board committee, and ownership diffusion. This 
result can be interpreted in the context of a suggested framework as the variables of 
corporate size, type of activities, and media pressure determine the level of social 
pressure that face a company, and the variables of board size, corporate responsibility 
committee, and ownership diffusion determine how companies respond to social 
pressure. The level of CSD is a function of both level of social pressure on companies and 
how companies respond to this pressure. With regard to the consequences of CSD, the 
empirical evidence indicates that CSD significantly influences corporate social 
reputation, while it has no impact on corporate market value. This result is consistent 
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with a basic idea underlying legitimacy theory, that CSD is a legitimation tool without 
direct economic benefits. 
According to empirical results, the integrated framework can be summarized as follows. 
In high economic level countries that have cultural values of competitiveness, a 
community is more interested in the social and environmental impact of corporate 
activities. So, in these countries, the companies will face a high level of social pressure 
concerning their social responsibility. This social pressure will be more directed to large 
industrial companies that have more media coverage. The companies with large 
corporate size and wider ownership diffusion, and have corporate responsibility 
committee as a board committee will respond positively to this social pressure. This 
framework can be explained in the following figure. 
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Figure 10.2: Modified framework to explain CSD  
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In addition to this framework, the study addresses some research questions; 
· Is there a relationship between quantity and quality of CSD? The correlation analysis 
in chapter 5 shows a weak correlation between the quantity and quality of disclosure 
in annual reports, and a medium correlation between quantity and quality of 
disclosure in corporate responsibility reports. In addition, there is a medium 
correlation between total quantity and total quality of social disclosure, reflecting 
that, as a general rule, the relation between quantity and quality of CSD is not strong. 
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· Is there a relationship between either quantity or quality of CSD in annual reports 
and produce stand-alone CSR reports? The correlation analysis in chapter 6 shows a 
weak correlation between producing stand-alone reports and quantity of disclosure 
in annual reports. This result indicates that the quantity of social disclosure in annual 
reports is not influenced, to a large extent, by whether companies produce corporate 
responsibility reports or not. 
· Do determinants have the same influence on quantity, quality and stand-alone CSD? 
It appears that all variables are related to both quantity and quality of CSD, with the 
exception of media pressure which is not associated with quality of CSD. The results 
show that these variables are more associated with quantity of disclosure than its 
quality. 
· What are the variables which have the strongest effect on CSD? It appears that 
corporate responsibility committee, as a governance practice, has a stronger effect 
on CSD.  
· Are the consequences the same for quantity, quality, and stand-alone CSD? The 
analysis in chapter 8 shows that various disclosure variables are combined in addition 
to social reputation while these variables are not influenced by corporate financial 
position. 
· Does legitimacy theory, as a dominant theory in CSD literature, provide adequate 
explanation for the consequences of CSD? It appears that legitimacy theory provides 
a better theoretical background to explain CSD.  
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In addition to answering the research questions, the study provides the following 
additional insights: 
· The level of CSD is increasing over time, reflecting growing attention to this type of 
disclosure. Generally, this increase in the level of CSD is focused on increasing the 
quantity of this disclosure without paying the same attention to the quality of 
disclosure. 
· Annual report is still an important means of social disclosure and it is not influenced 
by the growing trend of produce corporate responsibility reports. 
· It appears that using third party assurance as a way to add credibility to responsibility 
reports is a growing practice in the UK business environment. 
· Despite the growing interest in environmental issues across the world and the 
focusing of the majority of studies on environmental disclosure, it appears that 
employee-related information is the dominant category of social disclosure in annual 
reports. Consequently, it appears that employees are the most important 
stakeholders for companies. 
· Industrial companies appear to be more interested in CSD than other economic 
sectors. 
· The economic level of a given country is the most important factor that determines 
the level of CSD in this country.  
· CSD at a country level tends to be related with the cultural dimension that focuses on 
the degree of competitiveness inside the community. This finding suggests that 
companies may be using CSD as a part of competitiveness strategies.  
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· The level of corporate governance in a country tends not to be related with the level 
of CSD in a country. This finding could reflect that good governance mechanisms are 
a common trend in most countries. 
· It appears that using different units to measure quantity of CSD in annual reports 
(number of sentences, number of pages, and proportion of pages) provides different 
results for disclosure. Number of sentences seems to provide better results. 
· Corporate characteristics and presence of corporate responsibility committee on the 
board are significantly associated with different measures of quantity of disclosure in 
annual reports. 
· It appears that impact of non-executive directors on corporate social disclosure 
strategy is not influenced by whether non-executive directors are independent or 
not. 
· It appears that different measures of corporate size are associated with corporate 
social disclosure confirming the impact of corporate size on disclosure policy. 
· It appears that multinational companies are more interested in community concerns 
in their home country than foreign countries. 
· It appears that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in making 
companies closer to community needs and ensuring that companies are acting in the 
interest of all stakeholders not only shareholders. 
· It appears that media coverage in both traditional media means and modern media 
means an (internet) influence CSD. 
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· The results indicated that the quality of stand-alone corporate responsibility reports 
has a stronger effect on corporate social reputation. This result draws attention to 
the need to focus on the development of clear standards or guidelines for the 
preparation of corporate responsibility reports, and develop the process of reviewing 
these reports in terms of the existence of independent parties to carry out that 
process and develop appropriate criteria for such a review.    
 
3. LIMITATIONS          
(1) As in all accounting studies, the results should be interpreted in the light of proxies that are 
used to measure different variables, sample and time of study. Ali & Birley, (1999) argued that 
the distinction between constructs and variables is important. Constructs can be defined as 
“terms which though not observable either directly or indirectly may be applied or defined as 
the basis of observables”, while variables can be defined as “an observable entity which is 
capable of assuming two or more values”. For example, performance is a construct for which 
sales or return on investment is the variable (Ali & Birley, 1999: 105). (2) The study is dealing 
with CSD as a total without classifying it to voluntary and compulsory disclosure. (3) Measuring 
CSD in both annual and stand-alone reports without other disclosure media. (4) Due to time 
limitation, content analysis technique is not used to measure the quality of stand-alone reports.  
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES  
(1) In-depth study of the relationship between corporate governance and CSD through analyses 
of the impact of various corporate governance practices on CSD is needed. It is important to 
analyze this relationship in different environments, as corporate governance practices are varied 
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among different environments. Also, comparative studies among different countries concerning 
the relationship between corporate governance and CSD can be conducted. (2) Develop 
indicators to measure quality of social and environmental disclosure in corporate responsibility 
reports. Also, studies on the development of guidelines for the assurance process of corporate 
responsibility reports can be conducted. (3) Within a suggested framework of determinants of 
CSD, it can study the impact of another variable (competitiveness) on CSD. It can be argued that 
companies which face a high degree of competitiveness are more sensitive to social pressure 
and consequently could provide more CSD.      
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Appendix 1:  
Companies of the sample 
 
2005 2006 
1. 3i Group 1. 3i Group 
2. Admiral Group 2. Aberdeen Asset Management 
3. Aegis Group 3. Admiral Group 
4. Alliance & Leicester 4. Aegis Group 
5. Alliance Trust (The) 5. Aggreko 
6. Alliance UniChem 6. Alliance & Leicester 
7. Amec 7. Alliance Trust (The) 
8. Amlin 8. Amec 
9. Amvescap 9. Amlin 
10. Anglo American 10. Amvescap 
11. Antofagasta 11. Anglo American 
12. ARM Holdings 12. Antofagasta 
13. Arriva 13. ARM Holdings 
14. Associated British Foods 14. Arriva 
15. Associated British Ports Hldgs 15. Associated British Foods 
16. AstraZeneca 16. AstraZeneca 
17. Aviva 17. Aviva 
18. AWG 18. BAE Systems 
19. BAA 19. Balfour Beatty 
20. BAE Systems 20. Barclays 
21. Balfour Beatty 21. Barratt Developments 
22. Barclays 22. Bellway 
23. Barratt Developments 23. Berkeley Group Holdings 
24. BBA Group 24. BG Group 
25. Bellway 25. BHP Billiton 
26. Berkeley Group Holdings 26. Boots 
27. BG Group 27. Bovis Homes Group 
28. BHP Billiton 28. BP 
29. BOC Group 29. Bradford & Bingley 
30. Boots Group 30. British Airways 
31. Bovis Homes Group 31. British American Tobacco 
32. BP 32. British Energy Group 
33. Bradford & Bingley 33. British Land Co 
34. Brambles Industries 34. British Sky Broadcasting Group 
35. British Airways 35. Brixton 
36. British American Tobacco 36. BT Group 
37. British Energy Group 37. Bunzl 
III 
                   
38. British Land Co 38. Burberry Group 
39. British Sky Broadcasting Group 39. Burren Energy 
40. Brixton 40. Cable & Wireless 
41. BT Group 41. Cadbury Schweppes 
42. Bunzl 42. Cairn Energy 
43. Burberry Group 43. Caledonia Investments 
44. Burren Energy 44. Capita Group 
45. Cable & Wireless 45. Carnival 
46. Cadbury Schweppes 46. Carphone Warehouse Group 
47. Cairn Energy 47. Catlin Group Ld 
48. Caledonia Investments 48. Cattles 
49. Capita Group 49. Centrica 
50. Carnival 50. Charter 
51. Carphone Warehouse Group 51. Close Brothers Group 
52. Cattles 52. Cobham 
53. Centrica 53. Compass Group 
54. Charter 54. Cookson Group 
55. Close Brothers Group 55. Corus Group 
56. Cobham 56. Daily Mail & General Trust (A Shs) 
57. Collins Stewart Tullett 57. Debenhams 
58. Compass Group 58. Diageo 
59. Corus Group 59. Drax Group 
60. CSR 60. DSG International 
61. Daily Mail & General Trust (A Shs) 61. Easyjet 
62. Diageo 62. Electrocomponents 
63. DSG International 63. Emap 
64. Easyjet 64. EMI Group 
65. Electrocomponents 65. Enterprise Inns 
66. Emap 66. First Choice Holidays 
67. EMI Group 67. FirstGroup 
68. Enterprise Inns 68. Foreign & Col Invest Trust 
69. First Choice Holidays 69. Friends Provident 
70. FirstGroup 70. GKN 
71. Foreign & Col Invest Trust 71. GlaxoSmithKline 
72. Friends Provident 72. Greene King 
73. Gallaher Group 73. Group 4 Securicor 
74. GKN 74. GUS 
75. GlaxoSmithKline 75. Hammerson 
76. Greene King 76. Hanson 
77. Group 4 Securicor 77. Hays 
78. GUS 78. HBOS 
79. Hammerson 79. Henderson Group 
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80. Hanson 80. Hochschild Mining 
81. Hays 81. Homeserve 
82. HBOS 82. HSBC Hldgs 
83. Hilton Group 83. ICAP 
84. HSBC Hldgs 84. IMI 
85. ICAP 85. Imperial Chemical Industries 
86. IMI 86. Imperial Tobacco Group 
87. Imperial Chemical Industries 87. Inchcape 
88. Imperial Tobacco Group 88. Informa 
89. Inchcape 89. Inmarsat 
90. Informa 90. InterContinental Hotels Group 
91. Inmarsat 91. Intermediate Capital Group 
92. InterContinental Hotels Group 92. International Power 
93. Intermediate Capital Group 93. Intertek Group 
94. International Power 94. Invensys 
95. Intertek Group 95. Investec 
96. Invensys 96. ITV 
97. Investec 97. Johnson Matthey 
98. ITV 98. JPMorgan Fleming Mercantile IT 
99. Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group 99. Kazakhmys 
100. Johnson Matthey 100. Kelda Group 
101. Johnston Press 101. Kesa Electricals 
102. JPMorgan Fleming Mercantile IT 102. Kingfisher 
103. Kazakhmys 103. Ladbrokes 
104. Kelda Group 104. Land Securities Group 
105. Kesa Electricals 105. Legal & General Group 
106. Kingfisher 106. Liberty International 
107. Land Securities Group 107. Lloyds TSB Group 
108. Legal & General Group 108. LogicaCMG 
109. Liberty International 109. London Stock Exchange Group 
110. Lloyds TSB Group 110. Lonmin 
111. LogicaCMG 111. Man Group 
112. London Stock Exchange 112. Mapeley 
113. Lonmin 113. Marks & Spencer Group 
114. Man Group 114. Meggitt 
115. Marks & Spencer Group 115. Michael Page International 
116. Meggitt 116. Millennium & Copthorne Hotels 
117. Michael Page International 117. Mitchells & Butlers 
118. Millennium & Copthorne Hotels 118. Morrison (Wm) Supermarkets 
119. Misys 119. National Express Group 
120. Mitchells & Butlers 120. National Grid 
121. Morrison (Wm) Supermarkets 121. Next 
122. MyTravel Group 122. Northern Rock 
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123. National Express Group 123. Northumbrian Water Group 
124. National Grid 124. Old Mutual 
125. Next 125. Partygaming 
126. Northern Rock 126. Pearson 
127. Northumbrian Water Group 127. Pennon Group 
128. O2 128. Persimmon 
129. Old Mutual 129. Petrofac 
130. Partygaming 130. Premier Foods 
131. Pearson 131. Provident Financial 
132. Pennon Group 132. Prudential 
133. Persimmon 133. Punch Taverns 
134. Pilkington 134. Qinetiq Group 
135. Provident Financial 135. Rank Group 
136. Prudential 136. Reckitt Benckiser 
137. Punch Taverns 137. Redrow 
138. Rank Group 138. Reed Elsevier 
139. Reckitt Benckiser 139. Regus Group 
140. Reed Elsevier 140. Rentokil Initial 
141. Regus Group 141. Resolution 
142. Rentokil Initial 142. Reuters Group 
143. Resolution 143. Rexam 
144. Reuters Group 144. Rio Tinto 
145. Rexam 145. RIT Capital Partners 
146. Rio Tinto 146. Rolls-Royce Group 
147. RIT Capital Partners 147. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group 
148. Rolls-Royce Group 148. Royal Bank Of Scotland Group 
149. Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group 149. Royal Dutch Shell A 
150. Royal Bank Of Scotland Group 150. SABMiller 
151. Royal Dutch Shell A 151. Sage Group 
152. SABMiller 152. Sainsbury (J) 
153. Sage Group 153. Schroders 
154. Sainsbury (J) 154. Scottish & Newcastle 
155. Schroders 155. Scottish & Southern Energy 
156. Scottish & Newcastle 156. Scottish Mortgage Inv Tst 
157. Scottish & Southern Energy 157. Scottish Power 
158. Scottish Mortgage Inv Tst 158. Serco Group 
159. Scottish Power 159. Severn Trent 
160. Serco Group 160. Shire 
161. Severn Trent 161. SIG 
162. Shire 162. Signet Group 
163. Signet Group 163. Slough Estates 
164. Slough Estates 164. Smith & Nephew 
165. Smith & Nephew 165. Smiths Group 
166. Smiths Group 166. St.James Place 
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167. St.Jamess Place Capital 167. Stagecoach Group 
168. Stagecoach Group 168. Standard Chartered 
169. Standard Chartered 169. Standard Life 
170. SVG Capital 170. SVG Capital 
171. Tate & Lyle 171. Tate & Lyle 
172. Taylor Nelson Sofres 172. Taylor Woodrow 
173. Taylor Woodrow 173. Tesco 
174. Tesco 174. Tomkins 
175. Tomkins 175. Travis Perkins 
176. Travis Perkins 176. Trinity Mirror 
177. Trinity Mirror 177. Tullett Prebon 
178. Tullow Oil 178. Tullow Oil 
179. Unilever 179. Unilever 
180. United Business Media 180. United Business Media 
181. United Utilities 181. United Utilities 
182. Vedanta Resources 182. Vedanta Resources 
183. Virgin Mobile Holdings (UK) 183. Venture Production 
184. Viridian Group 184. Vodafone Group 
185. Vodafone Group 185. Whitbread 
186. Whitbread 186. William Hill 
187. William Hill 187. Wimpey(George) 
188. Wimpey(George) 188. Witan Inv Tst 
189. Witan Inv Tst 189. Wolseley 
190. Wolseley 190. Wolverhampton & Dudley 
191. Wolverhampton & Dudley 191. Wood Group (John) 
192. Wood Group (John) 192. WPP Group 
193. WPP Group 193. Xstrata 
194. Xstrata 194. Yell Group 
195. Yell Group 195. Abbot Group 
196. 888 Holdings 196. Aberforth Smaller Companies Tst 
197. Abbot Group 197. Aga Foodservice Group 
198. Aberdeen Asset Management 198. Aquarius Platinum 
199. Aberforth Smaller Companies Tst 199. Ashtead Group 
200. Aga Foodservice Group 200. Assura 
201. Aggreko 201. Atkins (WS) 
202. Aquarius Platinum 202. Autonomy Corporation 
203. Ashtead Group 203. Aveva Group 
204. Atkins (WS) 204. Avis Europe 
205. Autonomy Corporation 205. Babcock International Group 
206. Avis Europe 206. Bankers Investment Trust 
207. Babcock International Group 207. BBA Aviation 
208. Bankers Investment Trust 208. Beazley Group 
209. Benfield Group 209. Big Yellow Group 
210. Bodycote International 210. Bodycote International 
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211. Brit Insurance Holdings 211. Brit Insurance Holdings 
212. British Empire Sec & General Tst 212. British Empire Sec & General Tst 
213. Brown (N.) Group 213. Britvic 
214. BSS Group 214. Brown (N.) Group 
215. Candover Investments 215. BSS Group 
216. Capital & Regional 216. Capital & Regional 
217. Carillion 217. Carillion 
218. Carpetright 218. Carpetright 
219. Catlin Group Ld 219. Chemring Group 
220. City of London Investment Trust 220. City of London Investment Trust 
221. CLS Holdings 221. CLS Holdings 
222. Colt Telecom Group 222. Collins Stewart 
223. Computacenter 223. COLT Telecom Group SA 
224. Cookson Group 224. Countrywide 
225. Countrywide 225. Crest Nicholson 
226. Crest Nicholson 226. Croda International 
227. Croda International 227. CSR 
228. Dairy Crest Group 228. Daejan Hdg 
229. Dana Petroleum 229. Dairy Crest Group 
230. Davis Service Group 230. Dana Petroleum 
231. De La Rue 231. Davis Service Group 
232. Derwent Valley Hldgs 232. De La Rue 
233. Dimension Data Holdings 233. Derwent Valley Hldgs 
234. Enodis 234. Dimension Data Holdings 
235. Euromoney Institutional Investors 235. Electra Private Equity 
236. Expro International Group 236. Enodis 
237. F&C Asset Management 237. Euromoney Institutional Investors 
238. Filtrona 238. Expro International Group 
239. Findel 239. F&C Asset Management 
240. Forth Ports 240. Filtrona 
241. Go-Ahead Group 241. Findel 
242. Grainger Trust 242. Forth Ports 
243. Great Portland Estates 243. Galiform 
244. Greggs 244. Go-Ahead Group 
245. Halfords Group 245. Grainger Trust 
246. Halma 246. Great Portland Estates 
247. Helphire Group 247. Greggs 
248. Henderson Group 248. Halfords Group 
249. Hikma Pharmaceuticals 249. Halma 
250. Hiscox 250. Headlam Group 
251. HMV Group 251. Helical Bar 
252. Homeserve 252. Helphire Group 
253. IG Group Holdings 253. Hikma Pharmaceuticals 
254. Insight Foundation Property Trust Ld 254. Hiscox 
255. Interserve 255. HMV Group 
256. iSOFT Group 256. Hunting 
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257. JJB Sports 257. IG Group Holdings 
258. Kensington Group 258. Insight Foundation Property Trust Ld 
259. Kier Group 259. Interserve 
260. Laing (John) 260. Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group 
261. Laird Group 261. JJB Sports 
262. Luminar 262. JKX Oil & Gas 
263. Mapeley 263. Johnston Press 
264. Marshalls 264. JPMorgan European Invest Tst (Gwth Shs) 
265. McCarthy & Stone 265. JPMorgan Japanese Inv. Trust 
266. Minerva 266. Keller 
267. MITIE Group 267. Kier Group 
268. Monks Investment Trust PLC 268. Laird Group 
269. Morgan Crucible Co 269. Luminar 
270. Morgan Sindall 270. Marshalls 
271. Murray Income Trust (Ord) 271. McAlpine (Alfred) 
272. Murray International Trust (Ord) 272. Melrose PLC 
273. Northern Foods 273. Minerva 
274. Northgate 274. Misys 
275. Northgate Information Solutions 275. MITIE Group 
276. Paragon Group of Companies 276. Monks Investment Trust PLC 
277. Pendragon 277. Morgan Crucible Co 
278. Petrofac 278. Morgan Sindall 
279. Premier Farnell 279. Mouchel Parkman 
280. Premier Foods 280. Murray Income Trust (Ord) 
281. Premier Oil 281. Murray International Trust (Ord) 
282. PZ Cussons 282. MyTravel Group 
283. Quintain Estates and Development 283. Northern Foods 
284. Randgold Resources 284. Northgate 
285. Rathbone Brothers 285. Northgate Information Solutions 
286. Redrow 286. Paragon Group of Companies 
287. Renishaw 287. Paypoint 
288. Rotork 288. Pendragon 
289. Savills 289. Premier Farnell 
290. SCI Entertainment Group 290. Premier Oil 
291. Scottish Investment Trust 291. PZ Cussons 
292. Shaftesbury 292. Quintain Estates and Development 
293. Shanks Group 293. Randgold Resources 
294. SIG 294. Rathbone Brothers 
295. SkyePharma 295. Renishaw 
296. Smith (DS) 296. Restaurant Group 
297. Smith (WH) Group 297. Rightmove 
298. Soco International 298. Rotork 
299. Spectris 299. RPS Group 
300. Spirax-Sarco Engineering 300. Savills 
301. Spirent 301. Scottish Investment Trust 
302. SSL International 302. Shaftesbury 
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303. St.Modwen Properties 303. Shanks Group 
304. Temple Bar Inv Tst 304. Smith (DS) 
305. Topps Tiles 305. Soco International 
306. TR Property Investment Trust 306. Spectris 
307. Ultra Electronics Holdings 307. Speedy Hire 
308. Unite Group 308. Spirax-Sarco Engineering 
309. Venture Production 309. Spirent Communications 
310. Victrex 310. SSL International 
311. VT Group 311. St.Modwen Properties 
312. Weir Group 312. SThree 
313. Wellington Underwriting 313. Taylor Nelson Sofres 
314. Wetherspoon(J D) 314. Temple Bar Inv Tst 
315. Woolworths Group 315. Topps Tiles 
316. Workspace Group 316. TR Property Investment Trust 
317. Yule Catto & Co 317. UK Coal 
 318. Ultra Electronics Holdings 
 319. Unite Group 
 320. Victrex 
 321. VT Group 
 322. Warner Estate Hldgs 
 323. Weir Group 
 324. Wetherspoon(J D) 
 325. WH Smith 
 326. Woolworths Group 
 327. Workspace Group 
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Appendix 2:  
Companies in pilot study 
2005 2006 
company name sector company name sector 
1. 3i Group Speciality & other 
finance 
1. Arriva transport 
2. Admiral Group insurance 2. Associated British 
Foods 
food producers & 
processors 
3. Aegis Group Media & photography 3. AstraZeneca pharmaceuticals 
4. Alliance & Leicester banks 4. Aviva life assurance 
5. Alliance Trust (The) investment companies 5. BAE Systems Aerospace & defence 
6. Alliance UniChem health 6. British Land Co real estate 
7. AWG water 7. British Sky 
Broadcasting Group 
media 
8. BAA transport 8. Brixton real estate 
9. BAE Systems Aerospace & defence 9. BT Group telecommunication 
services 
10. Balfour Beatty Construction & building 
material 
10. Bunzl support services 
11. Barclays banks 11. Burberry Group general retailers 
12. Barratt Developments Construction & building 
material 
12. Cobham Aerospace & defence 
13. BP Oil & gas 13. Compass Group restaurants pubs & 
breweries 
14. Bradford & Bingley banks 14. Drax Group electricity 
15. Brambles Industries support services 15. DSG International general retailers 
16. British Airways Airline & airports 16. Intertek Group support services 
17. Cable & Wireless telecommunication 
services 
17. Invensys engineering & machinery 
18. Cadbury Schweppes food producers & 
processors 
18. Investec Speciality & other 
finance 
19. Carnival Travel & leisure 19. LogicaCMG Software & computer 
services 
20. Carphone Warehouse 
Group 
general retailers 20. Michael Page 
International 
support services 
21. Cattles speciality& other finance 21. Millennium & 
Copthorne Hotels 
leisure, entertainment & 
hotels 
22. Centrica gas distribution 22. Persimmon Construction & building 
material 
23. Electrocomponents support services 23. Petrofac Construction & building 
material 
24. Emap Media & photography 24. Premier Foods food producers & 
processors 
25. GKN automobiles & parts 25. Rentokil Initial support services 
26. GlaxoSmithKline pharmaceuticals 26. Resolution life assurance 
27. Greene King leisure, entertainment & 
hotels 
27. Rio Tinto mining 
28. Group 4 Securicor diversified industrials 28. Severn Trent water 
29. GUS general retailers 29. Shire pharmaceuticals 
30. ICAP Speciality &other finance 30. SIG support services 
31. IMI engineering & machinery 31. Unilever food producers & 
processors 
32. Inmarsat telecommunication 
services 
32. United Business 
Media 
Media & photography 
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33. Invensys engineering & machinery 33. Britvic beverages 
34. Investec Speciality & other 
finance 
34. Brown (N.) Group general retailers 
35. ITV Media & photography 35. Dana Petroleum Oil & gas 
36. Misys software & computer 
services 
36. Davis Service Group business support services 
37. Mitchells & Butlers leisure, entertainment & 
hotels 
37. De La Rue support services 
38. Morrison (Wm) 
Supermarkets 
Food & drug retailers 38. Derwent Valley Hldgs real estate 
39. MyTravel Group leisure, entertainment & 
hotels 
39. Dimension Data 
Holdings 
Software & computer 
services 
40. Pilkington Construction & building 
material 
40. Electra Private Equity investment companies 
41. Provident Financial Speciality & other 
finance 
41. Findel general retailers 
42. Prudential life assurance 42. Forth Ports transport 
43. Sage Group computer software 
services 
43. Galiform household goods & 
textiles 
44. Great Portland Estates real estate 44. Luminar leisure, entertainment & 
hotels 
45. Greggs Food & drug retailers 45. Marshalls Construction & building 
material 
46. JJB Sports general retailers 46. Northern Foods food producers & 
processors 
47. McCarthy & Stone Construction & building 
material 
47. Northgate transport 
48. Minerva real estate 48. Rathbone Brothers Speciality & other 
finance 
49. MITIE Group support services 49. Renishaw electronic & electrical 
equipment 
50. Smith (DS) forestry & paper 50. Rotork engineering & machinery 
51. Smith (WH) Group general retailers 51. RPS Group support services 
52. Soco International Oil & gas 52. Spirent 
Communications 
information technology 
53. Unite Group real estate 53. SSL International health 
54. Venture Production Oil & gas 54. TR Property 
Investment Trust 
investment companies 
55. Victrex chemicals 55. UK Coal mining 
56. VT Group Aerospace & defence 56. Workspace Group real estate 
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Appendix 3 
Sample of Simstat outputs 2005 
 
INTER-RATERS: ENVS_1 by ENVS 
 
  INTER-RATER AGREEMENT MEASURES 
 
  Nominal level 
 
             Pct agreement =  80.4% 
 
             Cohen's Kappa = .795 
                Scott's pi =  .794 
            Free marginals =  .798 
 
  Ordinal level 
 
      Krippendorff's r bar = .999 
          Krippendorff's R = .999 
            Free marginals =  .999 
 
VALID CASES: 56     MISSING CASES: 0 
 
 
 
INTER-RATERS: COMS_1 by COMS 
 
  INTER-RATER AGREEMENT MEASURES 
 
  Nominal level 
 
             Pct agreement =  89.3% 
 
             Cohen's Kappa = .888 
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                Scott's pi =  .888 
            Free marginals =  .890 
 
  Ordinal level 
 
      Krippendorff's r bar = .999 
          Krippendorff's R = .999 
            Free marginals =  .999 
 
VALID CASES: 56     MISSING CASES: 0 
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Appendix 4 
Sample of ReCal outputs 2005 
 
ReCal 0.1 Alpha for 2 Coders 
results for file "envs.csv" 
 
File size:  350 bytes 
N columns:  2 
N variables:  1 
N coders per variable: 2 
 
 
Percent 
Agreeme
nt 
Scott'
s Pi 
Cohen'
s 
Kappa 
Krippendorf
f's Alpha 
N 
Agreemen
ts 
N 
Disagreeme
nts 
N 
Case
s 
N 
Decisio
ns 
Variabl
e 1 
(cols 1 
& 2) 
80.4% 0.794 0.795 0.796 45 11 56 112 
ReCal 0.1 Alpha for 2 Coders 
results for file "coms.csv" 
 
File size:  360 bytes 
N columns:  2 
N variables:  1 
N coders per variable: 2 
 
 
Percent 
Agreeme
nt 
Scott'
s Pi 
Cohen'
s 
Kappa 
Krippendorf
f's Alpha 
N 
Agreemen
ts 
N 
Disagreeme
nts 
N 
Case
s 
N 
Decisio
ns 
Variabl
e 1 
89.3% 0.888 0.888 0.889 50 6 56 112 
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(cols 1 
& 2) 
ReCal 0.1 Alpha for 2 Coders 
results for file "emps.csv" 
 
File size:  382 bytes 
N columns:  2 
N variables:  1 
N coders per variable: 2 
 
 
Percent 
Agreeme
nt 
Scott'
s Pi 
Cohen'
s 
Kappa 
Krippendorf
f's Alpha 
N 
Agreemen
ts 
N 
Disagreeme
nts 
N 
Case
s 
N 
Decisio
ns 
Variabl
e 1 
(cols 1 
& 2) 
89.3% 0.889 0.89 0.89 50 6 56 112 
 
